AGAINST "COMPLEX EQUALITY"

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The norm of distributive equality prescribes that the goods of the world should be divided equally (in some respect) among persons. Is such equality a worthy moral ideal? Conceptions of equality have taken a beating in recent years at the hands of political theorists, and some non-conservative theorists have joined in the assault. An interesting but largely ignored feature of Michael Walzer's *Spheres of Justice* is his attempt to refurbish the ideal of equality by redefining it. Walzer's strategy of response to conservative critics of equality is to shift the ground of debate. He rejects the "simple equality" that he claims philosophers are wont to favor and defends his own version of what he calls "complex equality." I will show that complex equality is a very weak brew, in which any element of anything that could plausibly be identified with egalitarianism is so diluted as to be virtually undetectable. The rhetoric of *Spheres of Justice* is at odds with its substance: Walzer seems not to notice how little equality remains in his "complex equality," and propounds this notion in a spirit that suggests his conviction that he is defending the liberal egalitarian tradition rather than retreating from it. Since Walzer is an intelligent and sensitive cultural critic, it will be worthwhile to analyze his argument to see what is driving it, and whether the dissatisfaction he evidently feels with notions of equality less sophisticated than his own is well-founded.

I. SIMPLE EQUALITY AND LITERAL EQUALITY

By stipulation *simple equality* is the condition in which everyone in society has the same amount of money, the same income and wealth. Offhand it is not clear what sort of property right is envisaged when people are imagined to own money subject to the constraint that anybody's holding of money must equal everyone else's. Suppose the regime of simple equality is in place in a three-person society, so initially each has the same, but one person then spends all his cash on cotton candy (so he has less and the seller of the candy has more), must redistribution then take place to reestablish equality of cash holdings? It seems that the ideal would be
better formulated as equality of purchasing power among citizens over the
course of their lives.4 Ignore differences in people’s life spans and assume
there is a population in which everyone happens to live for fifty years and
each person has exactly $1000 to spend over the course of her life. This is
the condition of simple equality as Walzer conceives of it.

The ideal of simple equality so far described might seem indeterminate
pending a specification of what people may do with their equal allotments
of cash. People’s equal cash gives them equal power to purchase whatever
is for sale on the market. At least, this is so if discrimination in trading is
prohibited. (If it were not, a customary bias against trading with those of a
disliked racial background might bring it about that a person of that race
could make no purchases at all despite the fact that her cash holding
exceeds the ostensible purchase price of many commodities.) Over their
life time, persons with equal amounts of cash face a possibly changing
array of goods for sale at possibly fluctuating prices. Presumably there
must be some moral constraints on the operation of the mechanism that
determines what goods will be offered for sale at what prices at any given
time, if simple equality is to be represented as a worthy ideal. Evidently
equality of money needs to be supplemented by a companion principle that
stipulates what is to count as a fair economic mechanism determining the
opportunities for purchase that the market provides.

Walzer does not trouble to fill in the details or sketch a context, to enable
us to see better what equality of money amounts to, or might amount to if
thought through systematically and coupled to kindred moral principles.
Simple equality is a foil. This becomes apparent once one notes that
Walzer’s full stipulation of “the regime of simple equality” identifies a
society “in which everything is up for sale and every citizen has as much
money as any other” (p. 14). This sounds like a Brechtian vision of hell.
Simple equality turns out to be a compound of the norm of equal market
purchasing power and a gratuitous expansion of the common-sense scope
of permissible market activity to include votes in the democratic process,
places in schools and universities, sexual services of any kind that consum-
ers, however degraded, might desire, verdicts of juries in criminal trials,
and so on, as legitimate goods to be traded on the market. But not every-
thing should be for sale: some potential exchanges that individuals might
want to make should be blocked by law or social custom.5 So let us set
aside the “everything is for sale” component of simple equality.

Walzer’s initial objection to equality of money is that the movement to
achieve it inevitably leads to state tyranny. His formulations recall Robert
Nozick’s famous “Wilt Chamberlain” argument against enforcement of
patterned principles of justice.6 Left unrestricted, individuals initially
placed in a regime of equality of money would act to further their own
purposes in ways that would generate as a by-product the subversion of
this regime.
In company with Nozick, Walzer stresses the danger of statism. In order to maintain equality of money against the eroding tendency of market exchange, we would have to monitor exchange outcomes and frequently redistribute resources so as to offset the tendency to inequality.7 To accomplish these tasks we would need a powerful state, which would then become an irresistible target for those who would come to seek a monopoly of political power. At this point Walzer’s argument appears to be that thinking through the predictable effects of any serious attempts to attain equality must impress on us the lesson that it is an elusive goal and that a serious effort to achieve one form of equality, monetary equality, will just render other forms of inequality more salient and onerous and will exacerbate the social processes that generate these other newly salient inequalities.

Against the claim that equality of money matters, one observation suggested by Walzer’s remarks is that several kinds of equality matter. Accepting this observation for the sake of the argument, I deny that it follows that equality of money does not matter or is not worth promoting. The point would rather be that what is needed is to articulate a comprehensive ideal of equality, in which all morally considerable equalities would have their place, so that the relative importance of equality of money (and whether its importance is instrumental or intrinsic) would be ascertained.

Walzer appears to be confident that his objection against simple equality generalizes to all varieties of literal equality—that is to say, to all principles of distribution that prescribe that everybody should get the same quantity and quality of goods according to some standard specified by the principle. “Equality literally understood is an ideal ripe for betrayal,” he writes (p. xi). It is a sucker’s game, which sophisticated egalitarians should eschew. From this standpoint, the attempt to elaborate a comprehensive ideal of literal equality would be misguided, naive. But why think this is so?

One might believe that the various worthwhile equalities are incommensurable; hence, no comprehensive ideal of equality could be formulated. But Walzer gives no argument on this point, so I am going to ignore this.

It might be that Walzer’s objection against any variety of literal equality is really an objection against an extreme doctrine of equality which holds that it is of overriding moral importance that the distribution of socially valued goods must be exactly equal in some crucial respect. No deviation from equality is tolerated, and the pursuit of equality trumps (takes lexical priority over) all other values. The extreme doctrine of equality is implausible on its face. But its implausibility does not gainsay the possibility of elaborating a moderate doctrine that holds that (1) small deviations from equality, below a threshold, do not matter morally, (2) above the threshold, inequalities should be reduced, ceteris paribus, but (3) equality does not trump all other moral concerns and must be balanced sensibly against competing values. So the lack of appeal of extreme egalitarianism would not plausibly support a sweeping rejection of equality literally construed.
(Notice that the more a doctrine of equality tends toward moderation, the less severe will be the conflict between maintenance of an acceptable degree of equality and preservation of desirable individual freedom.)

Walzer offers the conjecture that when people have banded together to struggle under the banner of equality in movements that have proved to be historically significant, their real motivations have been quite different from the egalitarianism they professed. Not the striving for any sort of equality of condition but the hatred of domination has been the spur to protest and revolt. What rankles is not the mere fact of difference between rich and poor, aristocrat and commoner, but the additional fact that the haves lord it over the have-nots, command deferential behavior, rule paternalistically, display their privileges ostentatiously, insist on controlling the lives of those who lack the badges of privilege. The rich "grind the faces of the poor" (p. xiii). So the experience of personal subjection gives rise to the call for equality. Walzer implies that the true motivation of rebels and protestors should alert us to a more important moral demand than the demand for a literal equality of condition that the rhetoric of egalitarianism has suggested to philosophers. His idea is that it is not important that some people have more and other people less of whatever socially valued goods are currently prominent. What is important is equality of freedom from domination.8

I mean to leave aside Walzer's conjecture about the motivational wellsprings of egalitarian protest throughout history. What concerns me is an inference that Walzer seems to draw from this conjecture: that literal equality or equality of condition does not matter morally, or matters hardly at all in comparison to the goal of eliminating domination. No significant personal relations, and a fortiori no personal relations of domination, obtain between persons who live in geographically distant regions of the earth. Consider then the great inequalities in income and wealth, and the inequalities in opportunities for lifetime welfare that these monetary inequalities generate, as between the best-off people in the richest nations of the earth and the poorest inhabitants of the poorest nations. These vast inequalities are not tainted even slightly by co-existing relations of domination. Here we seem to have a fairly pure case of vast inequality of condition or literal inequality that is not accompanied even by a slight degree of domination. I have no argument to show that this pure inequality is morally consequential to anybody whose intuitions incline him to deny it. I merely point out that anyone who is prepared to admit that inequality of condition or literal inequality of this sort is morally troublesome in this pure case, will not find in Walzer any arguments that would tend to show that in mixed cases where both literal inequality and domination are present, only the domination matters from the standpoint of egalitarianism rightly understood.
II. Complex Equality

The type of equality that Walzer asserts is worth seeking is a nonliteral equality that he terms "complex." According to Walzer, the distribution of social goods takes place in distinct spheres or sets of social practices with associated customary beliefs, values, and expectations. The criteria of proper distribution of a good are part of its social meaning. As Walzer defines the term, complex equality obtains when the distribution in all spheres is autonomous, and distribution is autonomous when goods are distributed according to their social meanings.

It is compatible with the definition of autonomous distribution that in a society the distribution of goods is fully autonomous, so that complex equality fully obtains, yet the same individuals always fall at the top end and bottom end of the distributional profile in every single sphere. Complex equality is also compatible with the supposition that the spread between the top and bottom of the distributional profile in every sphere is enormous. Winners win big, and losers get small crumbs, in each autonomous distribution, and furthermore the same individuals are the winners and losers in every separate sphere. Complex equality is only equality in a Pickwickian sense.

Walzer has two responses to this objection. One response is to characterize a society in which complex equality obtains:

Though there will be many small inequalities, inequality will not be multiplied through the conversion process. Nor will it be summed across different goods, because the autonomy of distribution will tend to produce a variety of local monopolies, held by different groups of men and women (p. 17).

It is arbitrary to assume that inequalities in each sphere will be "small." No theoretical support is provided for this hope. In the case of one of the spheres that Walzer identifies, the sphere of money and commodities, the market economy, there is good reason to expect that autonomous market distribution will generate what anyone would regard as large inequalities. Leaving this aside, we must also consider the possibility that inequalities will be "summed" across different goods, because the autonomous criteria of distribution will tend to favor the same individuals in each sphere. Mulling over this possibility, Walzer has a second response: "This would certainly make for an inegalitarian society, but it would also suggest in the strongest way that a society of equals was not a lively possibility" (p. 20).

But this second response gives away the game. Since it is stipulated that the situation Walzer is pondering exhibits complex equality, Walzer's references to "inegalitarian society" and "society of equals" in the quotation just above must invoke the supposedly discarded notion of literal equality. Complex equality cannot be recommended as a genuine egalitarian ideal in its own right, but at most as an institutional means to realize some literal,
old-fashioned ideal of equality that has not yet been specified. "Complex equality" is only contingently egalitarian, and for all that Walzer has claimed, the contingencies look to be quite remote.

In broad terms, the contingency issue is whether the possession of traits that lead to success (or failure) in one distributive sphere is statistically independent of the possession of traits that lead to success (failure) in other spheres. Or is possession of the wherewithal for educational success correlated with possession of traits that make for high income and wealth, the ability to attract desirable romantic and marital partners, stable good health and avoidance of disability, a gratifying career, attainment of positions of influence and authority, and other elements of the good life? The answer to this question will surely differ to some extent for different societies, which value different goods and embrace divergent standards for their distribution. Walzer needs to distinguish two questions: (1) In contemporary democratic societies, are the social meanings of goods such that autonomous distribution would lead to egalitarian outcomes (by a norm of literal equality)? and (2) Could we imagine a society in which the social meanings of goods are such that autonomous distribution would lead to egalitarian outcomes (by a norm of literal equality)? Most of Walzer's book wavers between questions (1) and (2), but actually answers (2) alone. Walzer imagines that answering (2) affirmatively shows a deep affinity between complex equality and an unspecified literal equality ideal that hovers in the background, so that promoting complex equality in contemporary societies is promoting equality in some genuine, substantive sense. Nothing could be further from the truth, any more than showing that we can imagine a dictatorship in which the dictator generously enforces wide respect for important individual freedoms shows that there is a deep affinity between dictatorship and freedom.

Promotion of complex equality in some (likely) circumstances can obstruct the pursuit of desirable literal equality. Consider the example of affirmative action in contemporary American society. Affirmative action policies are various, but the general idea is that in response to the history of American racial discrimination, places in universities and posts of responsibility in government and in private firms should go to underrepresented minorities over other applicants who would be judged better qualified but for the consideration of applicants' race. Given the poverty of the groups favored by affirmative action, successful execution of this policy would (let's assume) promote equality of wealth and income. But insofar as we can usefully speak of distinct distributive spheres of market exchange and educational provision, the social meaning of the goods of superior positions in the labor market and superior places in higher education tends toward a meritocratic norm of distribution: better positions should go to those most qualified for them. In these crucial spheres, current social meanings are antiegalitarian.
Another example in which complex equality and literal equality conflict is provided by contemporary Chinese industrial culture, as analyzed by Andrew Walder. He finds Chinese industry organized around neotraditional patronage relations. In a communist society with thin markets in consumer goods, the distribution of a wide range of important consumer goods occurs at the workplace, under the auspices of communist party cadres who dispense material benefits to loyal workers who support the political line of the party in the factory setting. These patronage relations are not generally viewed by employees to be illegitimate, according to Walder’s informants. Chinese factory culture affirms these client-patron ties; they are an accepted part of the social meaning of industrial work in that society. But equality would be better served if this system of patronage were broken, firms organized by a distribution system that rewarded excellent job performance rather than loyalty to political superiors, and the efficiency gains used to better the lot of the worse-off rural sector of the population.

III. DOMINANCE AND DOMINATION

Recall that Walzer has yet another arrow in his quiver, to be brandished in support of the complex equality ideal. He believes that what lies behind egalitarian sentiment is resentment against domination and that the society of complex equality is above all one from which domination has disappeared. Then perhaps it may not matter so much whether complex equality achieves much equality, if a more important goal is reached. Walzer asserts a tight connection between complex equality and nondomination:

The critique of dominance and domination points toward an open-ended distributive principle. No social good x should be distributed to men and women who possess some other good y merely because they possess x and without regard to the meaning of y. (p. 20)

... the disregard of these principles [of autonomous distribution] is tyranny. ... In political life—but more widely, too—the dominance of goods makes for the domination of people. ... The regime of complex equality is the opposite of tyranny. It establishes a set of relationships such that domination is impossible. (p. 19)

But in fact the connection between complex equality and nondomination which Walzer insists on is spurious. Let us call the principle quoted in italics above the principle of nondomination. One person dominates another when the first exercises a great deal of control over the life of the second, the second does not have reciprocal control over the life of the first, and the first exercises control in ways that are with good reason experienced by the second as onerous, galling, or degrading. This definition corresponds to what Walzer seems to have in mind when he uses the term.

How closely then is domination related to dominance and to autonomous distribution and complex equality? Not very, in my judgment. First,
the social meaning of some goods may render domination legitimate within their spheres. For example, the distribution of honor and status under feudalism was such that certain modes of domination of serfs and other vassals by lords were culturally approved. In these cases autonomous distribution fits hand in glove with domination. Nothing in the definition of "complex equality" prevents a society of complex equality from being heavily laced with domination. Feminists would note that the sphere of contemporary family life countenances domination of wives by their husbands (albeit in somewhat subtler forms and with less moral assurance than in the past). Many modern societies contain a sphere of markets and commodities marked by hierarchical firms and a culturally endorsed expectation that the employer and his managerial agents will exercise a tight authority over subordinate employees. No doubt a society in which distribution occurs piecemeal in several distinct spheres places limits on domination practices. The authority of the boss is supposed to stop at the factory gate. The preacher, who may be a tyrant to his flock, has no special writ of authority beyond his church. But the limited and piecemeal character of authority that is a feature of societies divided into separate spheres does not per se tend to block domination within the separate spheres.

Walzer has identified no mechanism or inner tendency within autonomous distribution that would produce nondomination. So far as I can see there is no such mechanism to be identified. On this score the most that can be said is that if distribution accords with prevalent social meanings then whatever degree of domination is bound up with that distribution will probably not be experienced as morally improper by those who accept those social meanings.

IV. Freedom and Complex Equality

Walzer's concerns about statism and individual equality, though interesting, do not support the complex equality ideal as he supposes. His hunch is that whereas pursuit of literal equality requires the creation of a strong state that would then be captured by a new elite, creating new dominant inequalities, complex equality is much closer to self-enforcing. Under a regime of complex equality, he writes, "the resistance to convertibility would be maintained, in large degree, by ordinary men and women within their own spheres of competence and control, without large-scale state action" (p. 17).

But no theory or analysis is developed to bolster this hunch. The jurisdictions of distributive spheres can overlap. Health care, for example, is both a commodity distributed by the market and a human need that might be met by society's collective arrangements for meeting basic needs. As administered by medical doctors, health care is not a good at all according to certain religions, notably Christian Science. Overlapping jurisdictional claims give rise to conflicts that require state decision and state enforce-
ment. Also, the boundaries of distinct distributive spheres are susceptible to breach. To preserve whatever degree of integrity of the separate spheres is deemed desirable, state action is required. Finally, despite the metaphor of “separate spheres,” in fact the social meanings of goods are continually disputed, contested, and renegotiated. Protagonists in these disputes regularly call on the modern state to enter the fray on their side. State action is always on the agenda even where the state currently adopts a laissez-faire posture. In these circumstances one hopes that institutions and associations of civil society will carry forward traditions and allegiances that will be a counterweight against the danger of tyranny that is inherent in the power of the modern state. Notice, however, that this salutary hope is pertinent whether the society is committed to complex equality or not and whether or not it is committed to literal equality. The extent to which the private life of civil society protects against wrongful incursions on individual liberty depends entirely on the character of that private life. The question is not whether distribution accords with social meanings, rather what the social meanings are.

At the level of abstraction at which Walzer’s analysis is pitched, there is no way to predict whether pursuit of literal or of complex equality would require dependence on a state that is likelier to turn repressive of desirable individual freedom.

V. What’s in a Name?

It might be objected that I am vehemently challenging only the name that Walzer attaches to his distributive ideal, and not the ideal itself. But why quibble about a name?

In reply: My objection is that “complex equality” permits any degree whatsoever of inequality and that it stands in a much more tenuous relation to satisfaction of the nondomination ideal than Walzer asserts. I do not mean to deny that other things equal, goods should be distributed according to their social meanings. This is so for two reasons: (1) Other things equal it is desirable that institutions should conform to the moral beliefs of those people affected by them and (2) other things equal, it is desirable that institutional rules should conform to the preferences of those who live under the institutions, as to what the rules should be. (In my view these two considerations are very weak, when the beliefs and preferences in question are unreasonable or based on ignorance.) This “distribute according to social meanings” norm is an empty vessel, the content of which could be anything. Egalitarian norms fit into this picture in the role of possible proposals for filling in specific content. In an egalitarian society, it is part of the social meaning of goods that bringing about an equal division of them is deemed morally good.

Is there a version of distributive egalitarianism that is worth promoting even at significant cost to other moral values? What is the most perspicu-
ous way to formulate a norm of equality? What sorts of trade-offs between equality and other moral values are reasonable? I take these to be important questions. Walzer’s complex equality doctrine appears to offer guidance on these questions, but this appearance, under examination, proves false. Walzer advances complex equality as a rival to literal equality, as though they were competing interpretations of the concept of equality, but this presentation of the issue is confused. I think it is fair to conclude that Walzer has provided no good arguments against the egalitarianism that he rejects and no good arguments in support of the “complex equality” that he favors, and which as as we have seen is misdescribed as any sort of equality.

This exploration of Walzer’s doubts regarding egalitarianism has turned up two positive points that should be retained as constraints on any acceptable principles of distributive equality. One constraint, already noted, is that distributive equality is at most one moral value among others and does not generally take priority over the others, singly or together. Distributive equality competes with other moral values and should sometimes gracefully lose the competition. A second constraint, implicit in some of Walzer’s expressed doubts about simple and literal equality, is that an acceptable principle of equality must leave room for individuals by their free and voluntary choices to act in ways that shift outcomes away from an initial distribution in which everyone has “the same” by an appropriate measure. In this sense an acceptable principle of distributive equality will require equality of opportunity, not equality of outcomes. Walzer lays stress on the practical undesirability of attempting to enforce an egalitarian norm that requires continuous coercive redistribution by the state of people’s property holdings. One could as well appeal to the moral authority that free and voluntary choice intended to reach a given outcome confers on that outcome: Certainly, when you and I start equal and I then freely and voluntarily give you my share, no norm of equality that should matter to us is violated—though, there may perhaps be an adverse shift in position suffered by nonconsenting third parties to the transaction. But following through this insight to specify an appropriate equality of opportunity principle is a topic for other occasions.13

NOTES


3. Perhaps a fairer judgment is that in chapters two through twelve of *Spheres of Justice* Walzer sensibly pursues a democratic egalitarian agenda that is not conceptually well integrated with the framing theoretical discussions in the Preface and the first and last chapters, which develop his complex equality conception.


5. Walzer himself provides reasons backing this judgment in a perceptive chapter that approvingly describes deeply entrenched moral judgments concerning the limits of permissible market activity in contemporary democratic culture. See *Spheres of Justice*, pp. 99-108.


7. Nozick emphasizes the violations of libertarian individual rights that would be required to sustain equality of condition. Walzer stresses the self-defeating character of egalitarianism literally construed. The attempt to achieve one sort of literal equality begets (or exacerbates) other literal inequalities that are just as bad or worse.

8. In Raz's terms, the question arises whether the call for equal freedom from domination expresses a rhetorical or genuine egalitarianism. The answer would turn on whether the equal nondomination norm judges that in some circumstances everyone's being dominated to a certain extent is morally better than some people being dominated to that extent while some others are free from domination. If not, the norm is better formulated as the humanitarian principle that domination should not be perpetrated or allowed, and equality is just a by-product. See Raz, pp. 227-33.

9. For example, according to the common understanding of love and romance in modern Western societies, these goods are appropriately bestowed by individuals on each other either in reciprocal exchange or by freely chosen marriage contract. For sensible doubts about whether the social meanings of goods do generally determine the appropriate criteria for their distribution, → Brian Barry, "Imitations of Justice," *Columbia Law Review*, vol. 84 (1984), pp. 806-15.


12. Satisfaction of the principle of nondominance does not guarantee that distribution in a given sphere is autonomous, because a good might be distributed in ways that violate its social meanings, yet this does not happen just because the beneficiaries of these nonconforming distributions possess some other social good.

13. For further discussion, see my "Equality and Equal Opportunity for Welfare," *Philosophical Studies*, vol. 56 (1989), pp. 77-93; "Liberalism, Distributive Subjectiv-