Passionate Politics
To all those who have pursued social justice with passion
Contents

Preface and Acknowledgments xi

Introduction: Why Emotions Matter

Jeff Goodwin, James M. Jasper, and Francesca Polletta 1

Part One Theoretical Perspectives

1 Social Movements and the Focus of Emotional Attention

Randall Collins 27

2 Putting Emotions in Their Place

Craig Calhoun 45

3 A Structural Approach to Social Movement Emotions

Theodore Kemper 58

4 The Business of Social Movements

Frank Dobbin 74

Part Two Cultural Contexts

5 Emotions and Political Identity: Mobilizing Affection for the Polity

Mabel Berezin 83

6 A Revolution of the Soul: Transformative Experiences and Immediate Abolition

Michael P. Young 99

7 Revenge of the Shamed: The Christian Right’s Emotional Culture War

Arlene Stein 115
Part Three Recruitment and Internal Dynamics

8 Rock the Boat, Don’t Rock the Boat, Baby: Ambivalence and the Emergence of Militant AIDS Activism
Deborah Gould 135

9 The Social Structure of Moral Outrage in Recruitment to the U.S. Central America Peace Movement
Sharon Erickson Nepstad and Christian Smith 158

10 Fear, Laughter, and Collective Power: The Making of Solidarity at the Lenin Shipyard in Gdansk, Poland, August 1980
Colin Barker 175

11 The Felt Politics of Charity: Serving “the Ambassadors of God” and Saving “the Sinking Classes”
Rebecca Anne Allahyari 195

Julian McAllister Groves 212

Part Four The Emotions of Conflict

13 Emotional Strategies: The Collective Reconstruction and Display of Oppositional Emotions in the Movement against Child Sexual Abuse
Nancy Whittier 233

14 Finding Emotion in Social Movement Processes: Irish Land Movement Metaphors and Narratives
Anne Kane 251

15 The Emotional Benefits of Insurgency in El Salvador
Elisabeth Jean Wood 267
16 Emotion Work in High-Risk Social Movements: Managing Fear in the U.S. and East German Civil Rights Movements

Jeff Goodwin and Steven Pfaff


Francesca Polletta and Edwin Amenta

List of Contributors

References

Index
Like many edited volumes, this one began life as a grant proposal, evolved into a conference, and finally blossomed into a book. Our own research on social movements and political conflict had made us dissatisfied with the reigning paradigms for studying these, and we tried to break loose by turning to culture, psychology, and agency as other guiding impulses. Exploring the emotions of protest seemed like a way to develop a more multifaceted image of political actors, with a broader range of goals and motivations, tastes and styles, pains and pleasures, than were commonly recognized in the academic literature. Although much work remains, we hope this volume is the first step toward a richer view of political action.

For the conference, we received a grant from the American Sociological Association and the National Science Foundation through their Fund for the Advancement of the Discipline (FAD). Craig Calhoun, then chair of the Department of Sociology at New York University, provided matching funds from that institution. In February 1999, we were able to convene a small conference in New York. Attended by roughly one hundred people over the course of three days, almost thirty scholars presented their insights into emotions, politics, social movements, and social theory. Given the lack of attention to emotions and politics in recent decades, we were surprised—and of course gratified—by the interest and enthusiasm of all the participants. Thomas Lynch, Barbara Gribbins, and Merna
Raymond of NYU’s Department of Sociology helped enormously with the organization and logistics of the conference, which proved to be one of the most stimulating and pleasurable we have attended.

Because we feel that the subfields of sociology have become too ingrown, unable or unwilling to learn much from one another, we invited a number of people to participate in the conference who are not known primarily or at all for research on social movements and politics, including Randall Collins, Theodore Kemper, Frank Dobbin, and Patricia Clough. Charles Tilly and Edwin Amenta, well-known experts on social movements, but from more structural perspectives, sought to bridge different traditions within the field of social movements.

For a variety of reasons, we were able to include only about half the conference papers and comments in the present book. We would like to thank those conference participants whose work is not represented in this volume, but who enriched everyone’s thinking about emotions and politics: Leo d’Anjou, Lynn Chancer, Patricia Clough, Helena Flam, Deborah Gerson, Linda Klouzal, John van Male, Doyle McCarthy, Kelly Moore, Jean-Pierre Reed, Charles Tilly, and Guobin Yang. Contributors followed a fairly quick timetable in going through a number of revisions, responding to several rounds of comments from the editors and others. Two anonymous reviewers provided sound guidance and suggestions. At the press, Doug Mitchell’s enthusiasm was inspiring, perfectly backed up by Robert Devens’s flawless attention to details. We would also like to thank Saran Ghatak of NYU’s Department of Sociology for his editorial assistance.

Royalties from this volume will be contributed to the Fund for the Advancement of the Discipline.

Jeff Goodwin, James M. Jasper, and Francesca Polletta
Introduction

Why Emotions Matter

Jeff Goodwin, James M. Jasper, and Francesca Polletta

So here I am, in the middle way, having had twenty years—
Twenty years largely wasted, the years of l’entre deux guerres—
Trying to learn to use words, and every attempt
Is a wholly new start, and a different kind of failure
Because one has only learnt to get the better of words
For the thing one no longer has to say, or the way in which
One is no longer disposed to say it. And so each venture
Is a new beginning, a raid on the inarticulate
With shabby equipment always deteriorating
In the general mess of imprecision and feeling,
Undisciplined squads of emotion. . .

—T. S. Eliot, “East Coker”

Once at the center of the study of politics, emotions have led a shadow existence for the last three decades, with no place in the rationalistic, structural, and organizational models that dominate academic political analysis. Social scientists portray humans as rational and instrumental, traits which are oddly assumed to preclude any emotions. Even the recent rediscovery of culture has taken a cognitive form, as though political participants were computers mechanically processing symbols. Somehow, academic observers have managed to ignore the swirl of passions all around them in political life. With this volume, we hope to reverse
this trend, reincorporating emotions such as anger and indignation, fear and disgust, joy and love, into research on politics and protest. Emotions, properly understood, may prove once again to be a central concern of political analysis.

Max Weber, more than anyone, set social scientists down the road of associating emotions with irrationality. Unlike “logical” action, he claimed, we understand emotion-laden action through empathy, or at least some of us do: “The more we ourselves are susceptible to such emotional reactions as anxiety, anger, ambition, envy, jealousy, love, enthusiasm, pride, vengeance, loyalty, devotion, and appetites of all sorts, and to the ‘irrational’ conduct which grows out of them, the more readily we can empathize with them. . . . For the purposes of a typological scientific analysis it is convenient to treat all irrational, affectually determined elements of behavior as factors of deviation from a conceptually pure type of rational action” (1978 [1922]: 6). This places emotional action in a similar category as “traditional” action, in a gray zone “between meaningful and merely reactive behavior.” Of course, Weber recognized the possibility of “mixed” types of action, but he generally assumed that rational action could not be emotional, and vice versa. Social scientists have been traveling down this road ever since.

Until the 1960s emotions were considered a key—for some, the key—to understanding virtually all political action that occurred outside familiar political institutions. In nineteenth-century images of the mob, normal individuals were thought to be transformed mysteriously in the presence of a crowd, prone to anger and violence, and easily manipulated by demagogues. Well into the twentieth century, crowds and their dynamics were conceived as the heart of protest movements. Crowds were assumed to create, through suggestion and contagion, a kind of psychologically “primitive” group mind and group feelings, shared by all participants and outside their normal range of sensibilities. In Herbert Blumer’s (1939) formulation, crowds short-circuited symbolic communication, with participants responding directly to each other’s physical actions. As a result, they could easily be driven by anxiety and fear, especially when spurred by rumors. They were also, he believed, irritable and prone to excitement. Other scholars argued that frustration led inevitably or frequently to aggression, especially when reinforced by crowd dynamics (Miller and Dollard 1941).

Scholars also looked for peculiar individuals who might be susceptible to recruitment, even brainwashing. Most saw something like alienation (Kornhauser 1959) or a predisposition toward violence (Allport 1924). Freudian psychology was often appropriated to show that partici-
pants were immature: narcissistic, latently homosexual, oral dependent, or anal retentive. Harold Lasswell (1930, 1948) saw a political “type” for whom politics was an effort to fulfill needs not met in private life. Eric Hoffer (1951) likewise saw a desperate fanatic who needed to believe in something, no matter what. Because driven by inner needs, especially the lack of a secure identity, Hoffer’s true believer could never be satisfied. He hoped to lose himself in a collective identity. Participation itself was his sole motivation; the goals of protest hardly mattered. Fears of fascism and communism only exacerbated these dismissive tendencies in the 1950s.

Even the social movements of the 1960s did not always arouse sympathy, as they could be dismissed as the work of confused youngsters. Like many on the “other” side of the generation gap that appeared in the 1960s, Neil Smelser (1968) analyzed student protest as largely an Oedipal rebellion. Orrin Klapp (1969: 11–13) described the signs of “identity trouble” that led people to seek fulfillment in collective action: a feeling of being blemished, self-hatred, oversensitivity, excessive self-concern (including narcissism), alienation, a feeling that “nobody appreciates me,” a desire to be someone else, a feeling of fraudulent self-presentation, Riesman’s “other-directedness,” and an identity crisis. In academic traditions like these, protest was either a mistake, a form of acting out, or a sign of immaturity.

Among protestors themselves, there were other traditions—largely alien to the academy—picturing participants in a more positive light. Marx, Lenin, Trotsky, and their successors portrayed revolutionaries as rationally pursuing their material interests. For Marxists, the interesting questions had more to do with how to succeed than with explaining why people would rebel, which to them was obvious—at least until Gramsci and his generation were forced to explain the Western proletariat’s lack of revolutionary consciousness. If, in the academic portrait, there was nothing but a swirl of passions, in the revolutionary vision there were hardly passions at all. As the twentieth century progressed, however, community organizers such as Saul Alinsky were able to portray their followers as both rational and emotional; emotions were a useful strategic factor (which organizers could manipulate without necessarily having any themselves). For proponents of nonviolent direct action, who became influential in the radical pacifist movement in the 1940s and the civil rights movement in the 1950s, emotion management was crucial. If anger and indignation often spurred participation, a movement animated primarily by such sentiments was doomed to failure. Winning over opponents, or at least undermining public support for them, depended
on conveying an image of calm resolution and serene determination. Widely read Gandhian disciples like Richard Gregg (1934) and Krishnalal Shridharani (1939) provided careful instruction on how to substitute love for anger. However, this line of thinking, like the Leninist and Alinskyist traditions, had little impact on academic models.

The portrayal of emotions at the core of academic treatments of protest was flawed in many ways. In one tradition, emotions came directly from crowds, having little to do with individuals’ own lives and goals. They appeared and disappeared in response to what was happening in one’s immediate surroundings, with little lasting resonance. In the other, emotions were primarily emanations from individual personality conflicts—a legacy of Freudian psychology—rather than responses to the environment. Thus, only certain kinds of flawed or immature people were susceptible to movement appeals. The emotions they had were inevitably negative or troubled rather than positive and joyful; they reflected a psychological problem, albeit one that might go away with maturity. Participants did not choose or enjoy protest, but were compelled to it by their inner demons. In both traditions, there were severe methodological problems: the salient emotions were often vague and difficult to identify except through the very actions they were meant to explain. Can we recognize a propensity to violence except when it results in violence? Can we see anomie or alienation except through forms of participation or nonparticipation? Emotions like these are unusual, rarely attached to normal action or to rational interests. But in the absence of empirical investigation, what Gustave Le Bon thought he saw in crowds in 1895 or Eric Hoffer believed he saw in political extremism in 1951 was more a projection of their own fears and anxieties than an accurate psychological portrait of protestors.

On the one hand, efforts to bring psychological insight to bear on politics usually reduced the latter to little more than internal personality dynamics. On the other hand, group psychology often ignored individual traits altogether. Little was recognized between the individual and the social: no social networks, organizations, shared cultural meanings, processes of negotiation and interaction. Protestors either already had their set of emotions, or they got them in the crowd. Driven by forces outside their control, whether subconscious drives or the mysterious pull of the crowd, they were not rational agents with purposes of their own. Most of all, the actual stuff of politics—moral principles, avowed goals, processes of mobilization, strategizing, the pleasures of participation—was absent.

By the early 1970s, many sociologists had either been active in or were sympathetic to the movements they studied. Dismissive of the pejo-
rative tone and empirical inaccuracy of prior accounts, their orientation was structural, rationalistic, and organizational. Protestors were simply pursuing existing group and individual interests, largely defined by structural positions such as social class. They operated outside normal political channels primarily when access to those channels was blocked. Rather than being studied alongside fads, crazes, and panics, social movements were now seen as an extension of normal, everyday politics, as “politics by other means.” Drawing from the revolutionary tradition, the new observers were more interested in the “how” of organization-building, strategy, and tactics than in the “why” of motivation. Just as older theorists had concluded that their emotions made protestors irrational, the new generation of scholars—eventually dubbed the resource-mobilization paradigm—treated rational protestors as devoid of emotions. Since the end of the 1960s, accordingly, emotions have played almost no role in theories of social movements and collective action.

Just as scholars coming of age in the 1970s attacked their elders for theoretical and empirical blindness, so it is now clear that they too were unable to see many aspects of protest. Their methods of research imposed some blinders. It is hard to identify emotions from brief newspaper accounts of protest events. Historical research precludes the participant observation that may be the best means for identifying the emotions of protest. In addition, the strength of mobilization theorists’ opposition to crowd theories may have been conceptually limiting. Resource mobilization theories were empirical, scientific, rigorous—everything the earlier theorists were not. What went on inside people’s heads—not to mention their hearts—was murky, dangerous, and pejorative. Mobilization theorists felt they could ignore all that.

In the past three decades, mobilization models have evolved in many ways (nicely captured in Morris and Mueller 1992). First came a recognition of the importance of the movement’s environment, especially the state. This was followed eventually by an acknowledgment that movement players interpreted their surroundings through cultural lenses, as a number of scholars showed that movement organizers engaged in cultural work—summed up as “framing”—in order to recruit members (Snow et al. 1986). Finally, scholars relaxed the strictly rationalistic assumptions about individual motivation (e.g., Olson 1965), recognizing group solidarity as a relevant factor. Loyalty to a “collective identity” might encourage an individual to participate even if cost-benefit calculations at the level of the individual did not favor it (Fireman and Gamson 1979; Polletta and Jasper 2001). In recent years, a full-blown cultural approach to social movements has emerged as an alternative to resource-
mobilization models even in their revamped form (Johnston and Klandermans 1995; Melucci 1996; Jasper 1997).

Few of those responsible for the recent cultural turn have recognized the importance of emotions in politics, however, apparently still accepting the view that emotions are not part of rational action. Methodological barriers have persisted, since the rigorous questionnaires and controlled experiments favored by social psychologists who study emotions are not always appropriate or feasible in studies of protest. More at fault is the sociology of culture, which has proliferated terms and concepts for understanding meanings and boundaries and the more cognitive aspects of culture—frames, schemata, codes, tool kits, narratives, discourses—but has offered little that would help us grapple with feelings. Cultural sociology, so powerful in many ways, has been nearly silent about emotions (for example, Lamont and Fournier 1992; Crane 1994; Zerubavel 1998).

While not explicitly theorized or even recognized, emotions are nonetheless present in many of the concepts that scholars have used to extend our understanding of social movements in recent years. Mobilizing structures, frames, collective identity, political opportunities—much of the causal force attributed to these concepts comes from the emotions involved in them. This should be apparent when we examine several of them (for more, see Jasper 1998; Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta 2000).

Frames are one of the most commonly used concepts in the social-movement literature, used to capture a number of cultural processes. During recruitment to protest groups, especially, organizers and potential participants must “align” their “frames,” achieving a common definition of a social problem and a common prescription for solving it. David Snow and Robert Benford (1992: 137), the concept’s leading advocates, define a frame as “an interpretive schemata that simplifies and condenses the ‘world out there’ by selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences, and sequences of actions within one’s present or past environment.” Snow and Benford (1988) see three types of framing as necessary for successful recruitment: diagnostic, in which a movement convinces potential converts that a problem needs to be addressed; prognostic, in which it convinces them of appropriate strategies, tactics, and targets; and motivational, in which it exhorts them to get involved in these activities.

The many definitions and applications of frames and framing processes deal almost entirely with their cognitive components. “Motivational framing,” which would seem to have a great deal to do with emotions, is rarely discussed, although it is apparently what gets people actually to do something. Cognitive agreement alone does not result in action. Benford
himself points out in a recent retrospective (1997: 419) that “those operating within the framing/constructionist perspective have not fared much better than their structuralist predecessors in elaborating the role of emotions in collective action. Instead, we continue to write as though our movement actors (when we actually acknowledge humans in our texts) are Spock-like beings, devoid of passion and other human emotions.”

More widely, the motivation to engage in protest—a process overflowing with emotions—has been largely ignored in recent research because it has so often been taken for granted under the structuralist assumption of objectively given interests. Once the desire and willingness to protest are assumed, only changes in the opportunity or the collective capacity to act on them are needed to explain the rise of social movements. Doug McAdam used the term cognitive liberation for this moment, arguing that “objective” opportunities for action only lead to action when potential protestors recognize those opportunities as such. As he described it, “the altered responses of members to a particular challenger serve to transform evolving political conditions into a set of ‘cognitive cues’ signifying to insurgents that the political system is becoming increasingly vulnerable to challenge” (McAdam 1982: 49). Thus, even though the term seems to imply a radical change in one’s perspective or worldview, cognitive liberation is portrayed as a relatively instrumental reading of available information about the likelihood of repression. “Liberation” implies heady emotions that “cognitive” then denies. As McAdam says, some such shift is crucial to the emergence of protest movements. But what is liberated and how? To take an example from his own work, McAdam argues that the series of Supreme Court decisions favoring black petitioners which culminated in Brown v. Board of Education (1954) demonstrated to black southerners the government’s new amenability to black claims. Such decisions were thus a key political opportunity for black insurgency. But, in contrast to McAdam’s portrayal, the 1954 Brown decision was followed by a wave of repression in the deep South and the formation of the notorious White Citizens Councils; counting 80,000 members within two years, the councils relied on economic reprisals and physical intimidation to quash desegregation and registration efforts. Seven black activists in Mississippi were killed in 1955 alone. While over 20,000 blacks were on the Mississippi voting rolls in the early 1950s, the number had dropped to 8,000 by 1956. Between 1955 and 1958, the NAACP lost 246 southern branches and 48,000 members (C. Payne 1995). Brown nevertheless served as a potent symbol and effective tool in subsequent southern organizing, not as an objective or purely cognitive indicator of the odds of success, but as an emotional
spur. Brown stood for the possibility of change, for the triumph—however incomplete—of justice over bigotry. Cognitive liberation is as important for its bundle of emotions as for any “objective” information about odds of success (Jasper 1997: 118).

Injustice frames also figure prominently in recent explanations for the emergence of protest. William Gamson has described them as a way of viewing a situation or condition that expresses indignation or outrage over a perceived injustice and which identifies those blameworthy people responsible for it. Of all the emotions, injustice is most closely associated with “the righteous anger that puts fire in the belly and iron in the soul” (Gamson 1992: 32). Indeed, suspicion, hostility, anger, and other emotions may arise even before blame is allocated through more cognitive processes. Gamson (1992: 33) later elaborated on the sources of injustice frames, including “concreteness in the target, even when it is misplaced and directed away from the real causes of hardship.” The need for strong emotions, in other words, may lead organizers to distort their cognitive analyses. They may “exaggerate the role of human actors, failing to understand broader structural constraints, and misdirect their anger at easy and inappropriate targets.”

Another set of mechanisms that have been highlighted in recent research are the social networks through which recruitment occurs (Snow et al. 1980, 1986). Yet scholars have rarely specified what makes those networks so influential (Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994). Part of their importance, certainly, is that they connect people with already shared assumptions and beliefs. But they are causally important at least as much for their affective bonds. We accept a friend’s invitation to a rally because we like her, or because we fear her disapproval if we turn her down, not just because we agree with her. It is affective ties that bind and preserve the networks in the first place, as well as give them much of their causal impact.

Recently, collective identity has become a popular term among both protestors and those who study them (for an overview, see Polletta and Jasper 2001). Identity is usually contrasted to “interest,” suggesting a connection to movement aims that is closer to kinship than to material interest. Most commonly, identities are based on ascribed traits such as sexual preference, nationality, race, class, and gender—although one can also identify with beliefs or principles, such as religions. Collective identity is also used to describe a sense of solidarity among members of a social movement itself, suggesting bonds of trust, loyalty, and affection. However, most discussions portray collective identity as the drawing of a cognitive boundary rather than as affection for group members and,
frequently, antipathy toward nonmembers. Strong feelings for the group make participation pleasurable in itself, independently of the movement’s ultimate goals and outcomes. Protest can be a way of saying something about oneself and one’s morals, of finding joy and pride in them. One can also have negative emotions about one’s identity, such as shame or guilt; many movements are organized precisely to fight stigmatized identities. What is difficult to imagine is an identity that is purely cognitive yet strongly held. The “strength” of an identity, even a cognitively vague one, comes from its emotional side.

The cultural trends of the last decade and the popularity of concepts like frames and collective identity have not brought emotions back into models of political action, but they have generated a greater receptivity to them. It is difficult to study frames, after all, without noticing people’s feelings about specific beliefs and understandings, or collective identities without appreciating the sentiments attached to them. In addition, sociologists have recently been able to draw conceptual tools from fields outside sociology, feminism chief among them. Taking the opposition between rationality and emotions as a claim rather than an assumption, feminists have explored the institutional processes by which emotions and women have been made—and are continually remade—into devalued partners in male-female, reason-unreason dichotomies (Rorty 1980; Campbell 1989; Frye 1983). They have also probed the relations between emotion and cognition (Bartky 1990). Women’s political claims are more frequently dismissed as “merely emotional” than men’s, they have shown; at the same time, women’s expression of “outlaw emotions” can become the basis for powerful political challenges. Emotions can be strategically used by activists and be the basis for strategic thought.

These lines of thinking point to even broader conclusions. Like other aspects of culture, emotions can be seen as an aspect of all social action and social relations. They accompany rational acts as fully as irrational ones, positive experiences as much as negative ones. Like other aspects of culture, such as cognitive meanings or moral principles, emotions are shaped by social expectations as much as they are emanations from individual personalities. They depend on traditions and on cognitive assessments. In other words, both the Freudians and the crowd theorists were wrong in where they located emotions. The empirical task now is to look at the interaction of emotions with other kinds of cultural dynamics but also with organizational and strategic dynamics. Emotions are central to all of these.

We hope this capsule history of theories of contentious politics provides insight into how paradigms work to reveal some things while they
conceal others. The most demeaning and opaque kinds of emotions interested crowd theorists and their immediate successors. Mobilization theorists shared little with their predecessors except a dichotomized opposition between rationality and emotion, which led them to deny emotions altogether in the politics they studied. Today, after the cultural revolution, we can begin to see emotions in a new light.

Part of the challenge in incorporating emotions into political analysis is that many diverse things are grouped under this single rubric (Griffiths 1997). Fleeting reactions to events and people are grouped with abiding affective ties such as love or hate and moods such as resignation or depression. Although Theodore Kemper (1978a: 47) has defined an emotion as “a relatively short-term evaluative response essentially positive or negative in nature involving distinct somatic (and often cognitive) components,” these reactive emotions seem to us but one form, with well-defined objects and settings. We see other forms as well, defined along two dimensions, as laid out in table 1. The first dimension concerns how long the feelings last. Thus, one category includes longer-lasting affects like love or hate, trust or respect, which accompany—even help to define—enduring social relationships; the other consists of shorter-term responses to events and information. Jasper (1998) has tried to get at this difference by labeling these affective versus reactive emotions. The second dimension contrasts feelings about specific objects with more generalized feelings about the world that transcend specific objects. Moods—which lack a clear direct object—may themselves be short or long in duration: a panic attack, for example, compared to depression and resignation. All four kinds of emotions are clearly relevant to political action.

Emotions are part of the “stuff” connecting human beings to each other and the world around them, like an unseen lens that colors all our thoughts, actions, perceptions, and judgments. As Thomas Scheff and others have pointed out, the emotions most directly connected to moral sensibilities, such as shame, guilt, and pride, are especially pervasive as motivators of action. Other emotions help channel action because they offer familiar situations and narratives: we know what indignation is, or compassion, or fear, and act in certain ways once we know we have these emotions (although the causal direction here is not always clear).

Debates have raged over the sources of emotions. One prominent contender is biology. Some have argued that emotions have been hard-wired through evolution to help us act quickly, as in fear and flight, or to act slowly, as in depression, or to act in other ways that—at the mo-
TABLE 1  Categories and Examples of Emotions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time Scale</th>
<th>Has Specific Object</th>
<th>General</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Longer Term</strong></td>
<td>Hate, Love</td>
<td>Resignation, Cynicism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Compassion, Sympathy</td>
<td>Shame</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Respect, Trust, Loyalty</td>
<td>Paranoia, Suspicion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Moral outrage</td>
<td>Optimism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Some forms of fear (dread)</td>
<td>Pride, Enthusiasm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Shorter Term</strong></td>
<td>Other fears (fright, startle)</td>
<td>Anxiety</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Surprise, Shock</td>
<td>Joy, Euphoria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Anger</td>
<td>Depression</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Grief, Sorrow</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ment we experience them—enhance our chances of survival, or did at some time in the evolutionary past (Frank 1988). The claimed universality of several basic emotions—such as anger and surprise—seems to support this position. This view, although popular among psychologists, has little relevance to sociologists. Twenty years ago, Kemper (1978a) bemoaned the fact that psychologists had preempted the study of emotions, leading sociologists to pay little attention to them. Many psychological theories, he complained, concentrate on the physiology of emotions or the degree to which they are innate, with less attention to the social settings that stimulate them. He said, “Even psychologists who are sympathetic to a situational approach can usually do little more than urge us to consider the situation within which emotions are generated . . . without telling much about how to specify the situation” (Kemper 1978a: 10).

Another tradition—psychological but with sociologists among its exponents—has centered emotions in the “personality structure” of the individual. Freudian traditions see emotions as arising from our need to manage inner conflicts, presumably because, in their role as healers, psychoanalysts concentrate on where things have gone wrong and on the unusual or disturbed emotions that result. One recent study in this tradition attributes authoritarian political attitudes to the unresolved negative emotions that result from harsh and rigid child-rearing (Milburn and Conrad 1996). Although prominent sociological theorists like Talcott Parsons and Jeffrey Alexander have been influenced by this view, we find it unhelpful to associate emotions primarily with the individual rather than with the social and cultural.

Political psychologists have also occasionally examined emotions.
Their primary interest has been in the relative effects of affect and cognition on political attitudes and decisions. Some have argued that emotional appraisals of candidates are independent of cognitive attitudes (Abelson et al. 1982) and are perhaps unconscious, while others argue that cognitive judgments affect those emotions (Ottati and Wyer 1993). No one has fully disentangled these effects. There is also some evidence that a positive mood increases the odds of liking a candidate when exposed to her (Ottati et al. 1989)—but the effects of longer-lasting moods such as resignation or cynicism have still not been established. When political psychology has paid attention to emotions, it has usually been to recognize their role as a cognitive aid in helping individuals process or store information efficiently (e.g., a positive feeling toward a politician can substitute for detailed information about her positions and voting record).

A more social-structural tradition, represented in this volume by one of its major exponents, Theodore Kemper, claims that relations of power and status generate certain kinds of emotions depending on where one is in these hierarchies and to whom one is reacting. Interactionist in inspiration, this view seems especially helpful for understanding the reactive emotions that arise from direct one-on-one relationships. To us, it seems less helpful for understanding longer-term affects or emotions that deal with people who are not intimates—the frequent subject, or target, of political organizing.

Most of the contributors to this volume adopt a fourth view, one of emotions as culturally or socially constructed. As inspired especially by Arlie Hochschild, this tradition looks at the social rules for expressing feelings, the management of emotions by oneself and others, and the social evaluation of emotions. Unfortunately, social constructionists have spent more time arguing with the biological evolutionists than developing their own models. Jasper (1998) has argued that most emotions can be studied the same way as more cognitive cultural meanings, since they exhibit similarities such as tensions between public and private expressions, social rules from which individuals often deviate, collective learning processes, the feeling of being imposed from the outside, and sanctions for deviations.

One thrust of recent debates seems to be that emotions differ in their sources and forms. Anger and surprise may be more immediate and universal than “higher order” emotions such as indignation or shame. Even the “same” emotion may take different forms. The startled fear that one feels when a figure rushes out of the dark is not the same fear that one develops of plans for a hazardous waste dump in the neighborhood or of abuse by a racist police force. The anger that one feels toward inani-
mate objects that are not cooperating or that have just fallen on one’s toe is not the same anger one feels toward a politician caught in a lie. Some emotions are more constructed than others, involving more cognitive processing. Little cognitive processing is required to fear a lunging shadow, whereas quite a lot is needed before one fears a garbage dump or the policies of the World Trade Organization. Certain emotions strongly depend on our understanding of events around us, even when that understanding is immediate and intuitive rather than elaborately processed.

The emotions most relevant to politics, we believe, fall toward the more constructed, cognitive end of this dimension. Moral outrage over feared practices, the shame of spoiled collective identities or the pride of refurbished ones, the indignation of perceived encroachment on traditional rights, the joy of imagining a new and better society and participating in a movement toward that end—none of these are automatic responses. They are related to moral intuitions, felt obligations and rights, and information about expected effects, all of which are culturally and historically variable. It is for this reason that our analysis of the emotions of protest and politics departs from much work in the sociology of emotions, which has tended to concentrate on intimate settings and long-standing affective relationships, as well as from experimental work in psychology that tries to probe the more “instinctive” emotions. To us, the tools of cultural analysis, aided by psychological awareness, are the best means of coming to grips with the emotions that matter most in politics and social conflict.

A cultural approach to emotions is compatible with others. Culture shapes the socially appropriate expression of emotions that may have other sources, just as it defines the social settings that are the central concern of the social-structural vision. Likewise, it is possible to recognize occasional conflict between the dynamics of personality and surrounding cultural expectations. Finally, none of this is incompatible with a recognition that emotions have some relation to biology—some emotions more so than others.

Even within the broadly cultural approach of this volume, there are different ways to talk about emotions. One is to see them as “nouns”: distinct entities each with its own coherence and behavioral implications, at least within a specific cultural setting. This kind of emotion gets displayed, sometimes in a conscious way, in movement brochures, speeches, and sometimes action. Such displays not only show what those expressing them feel but are also intended to arouse similar feelings in others. They are often an explicit movement goal. Although there is a danger of reifying emotions, portraying them as fixed and solid things, there is also a
realism in treating emotions as nouns. After all, most people think they know what anger or fear or love is. They know it when they see it, and when they feel it. Protestors hope to create anger, or sustain indignation, or induce pride. Real people are guided by nouns like these, often choosing from among the available cultural repertory of labels to identify their own emotions, presumably channeling them in the process. Yet many sociologists find it naive to attribute this much clarity and concreteness to people’s inner lives.

A more subtle way to look at emotions is as “adverbs” (see Colin Barker, chap. 10 in this volume). In this case they are more a style or taste or tone, a quality of an action or identity. They are connoted, sometimes unconsciously, and not always easily articulated. They are, in the traditional sense, a feeling, a physical sensation of the body. They are somewhat like a disposition to act in a certain way, which sociologists will recognize as part of what Pierre Bourdieu calls “habitus.” Such styles are a crucial yet relatively unexplored aspect of social action, especially political action.

Emotions, whether viewed as nouns or adverbs, are also important as building blocks for other general sociological concepts. They are an important component of roles, for instance. Gender roles are especially laden with emotional expectations, as women are expected to do more and different kinds of “emotion work” in most societies. Sherryl Kleinman (1996), for instance, describes how men and women were rewarded or punished for different patterns of emotional expression at an alternative healing center that she studied. In her study of the southern civil rights movement, Belinda Robnett (1997) shows that while formal leaders like Martin Luther King, Jr., used emotional appeals to mobilize audiences, grassroots leaders, who were predominately women, did a different kind of emotion work: Their day-to-day interaction with local residents built the emotional intimacy necessary for persuading them to act in dangerous circumstances. Changing the emotions associated with gender roles may be a target of movement activity, as it was for the post-partum depression groups that Verta Taylor (1996) studied, although gendered emotions may also be source of internal movement conflict. Many studies of social movements have looked at conflicts over gender roles without fully articulating their emotional dimensions (e.g., Luker 1984; Blee 1991). As we have seen, a number of other social-movement concepts—networks, identities, frames, opportunities—depend heavily on the emotions running through them.

The study of emotions has often run aground on several analytic distinctions which have hardened into false dualisms. We have already
spoken of the misleading opposition of emotions and rationality. The well-known distinction between “instrumental” and “expressive” social movements simply repeats this error. Instrumental movements are also emotional and expressive. Indeed, even the most “professional” and bureaucratic movements necessarily involve emotions and emotion work—often a great deal of emotion work designed to create the appearance of disinterestedness or objectivity. Such movements are not emotionless; they simply involve different emotions than do more typically exuberant movements. In fact, one reason the emotions of protest are hard to study is that some of them have been deeply repressed, not only in the models of those who study them but by many protestors themselves. Protestors are often ambivalent about emotions. On the one hand, they work hard to present themselves to outsiders as rational, even instrumental: they are only responding in an objective way to real threats, outside of any personal bias or interpretation. They do not want to be labeled “soft-hearted” when that is dismissively opposed to “hard-headed.” On the other hand, some organizers are quite explicit about the emotional techniques they use both inside the group and outside it (Epstein 1991). They try to build solidarity, loyalty, and love among members, as one part of trying to make participation a pleasurable experience. As for outsiders, protest leaders hope to manipulate their feelings—their compassion, anger, outrage, fear—as much as their beliefs.

It is no surprise that protestors, making claims on society’s central institutions, adopt the same suspicion and devaluation of “emotionality” as the society at large. Science, not feeling, is the dominant language of legitimation and persuasion in today’s liberal societies. Measurable costs and benefits, atmospheric data, with occasional reference to legal precedents or God thrown in, work well. You cannot sue a manufacturer because its pollution makes you sad or upsets you (although courts do consider emotional distress when awarding damages). Protestors’ reluctance to admit their emotions is only a small part of modern societies’ efforts to frame emotions in pejorative ways. They have regularly fallen on the “bad” side of a number of prominent dichotomies in Western thought, including body and mind, nature and culture, female and male, private and public (see Craig Calhoun, chap. 2 in this volume).

Emotions are also often counterposed to cognitions, as if only one or the other could shape behavior at any one time. Yet cognitions typically come bundled with emotions, and are meaningful or powerful to people for precisely this reason. Long-lasting moods and affective ties, for their part, may make people more susceptible to certain beliefs and understandings. Rather than viewing emotions and cognitions in zero-
sum terms, then, we need to grapple with their interactions and combinations. This task, moreover, cannot be avoided by supposing that emotions only matter at the “micro” level of analysis and can therefore be ignored by “macrosociological” analysts. Emotions, we have argued, are collective as well as individual, and they permeate large-scale units of social organization, including workplaces, neighborhood and community networks, political parties, movements, and states, as well as the interactions of these units with one another. As we have seen, moreover, a number of macrosociological concepts help to explain movements precisely because of the emotional dynamics hidden within them. Macrosociological analysts of movements, in short, cannot leave the study of emotions to social psychologists—and social psychologists cannot fully understand emotions without examining “macro” structures and processes. T. S. Eliot notwithstanding, emotions are not entirely undisciplined; social interactions and expectations shape them in predictable ways.

Having seen how emotions are present in a number of core concepts, and having examined recent research on the nature of emotions, we can now return to the role of emotions in movements and politics. We hope that this volume will persuade readers that emotions are important in all phases of political action, by all types of political actors, across a variety of institutional arenas.

Emotions are clearly important in the growth and unfolding of social movements and political protest (Flam 1990a, 1990b). “Moral shocks,” often the first step toward recruitment into social movements, occur when an unexpected event or piece of information raises such a sense of outrage in a person that she becomes inclined toward political action, whether or not she has acquaintances in the movement (Luker 1984; Jasper and Poulsen 1995; Jasper 1997). Whether the underlying image is a state of shock or an electrical shock, it implies a visceral, bodily feeling, on a par with vertigo or nausea. The prospect of unexpected and sudden changes in one’s surroundings can arouse feelings of dread and anger. The former can paralyze, but the latter can become the basis for mobilization. Activists work hard to create moral outrage and anger and to provide a target against which these can be vented. Inchoate anxieties and fears must be transformed into moral indignation and outrage toward concrete policies and decision makers (Gamson et al. 1982; Gamson 1992). Activists must weave together a moral, cognitive, and emotional package of attitudes. By framing the problem as, say, “big business” or “instrumentalism,” they suggest a moral judgment: humans are being
abused by greedy businesspeople or unfeeling bureaucrats. The proper emotion shifts from dread to outrage. There is someone to blame. A study of pro-choice and anti-abortion newsletters found that they “identify concrete and specific adversaries, characterize enemy action in an entirely negative light, attribute corrupt motives to the foe, and magnify the opponents’ power” (Vanderford 1989: 174). Such characterizations enhance protestors’ outrage and sense of threat, transforming emotions at the same time as cognitive beliefs. Demonization fuels powerful emotions for social movements, such as hatred, fear, anger, suspicion, and indignation.

In their contribution to this volume, Sharon Erickson Nepstad and Christian Smith describe the social structure behind moral shocks. When a history of covert U.S. involvement in Central America was publicized in the early 1980s, many members of American religious communities were especially likely to respond with activism because of prior personal connections with Central Americans. Missionaries returning to the United States and Central American refugees given asylum by American congregations brought with them stories of atrocities suffered at the hands of U.S.-supported regimes. American churchgoers developed strong bonds with their fellow Christians, and when they heard about CIA-sponsored mining of Nicaraguan harbors and the CIA counter-insurgency “murder manuals,” they expressed their shock by turning to activism on behalf of people they felt they knew.

In his chapter, Michael Young treats another group of activists who mobilized on behalf of a group with whom they had even less contact. In the 1830s, American evangelical Protestants began to call for an immediate end to slavery with an urgency unthinkable only a few years earlier. What had changed, Young argues, was the cosmology and, even more importantly, the temperament of evangelical Christianity. Having long viewed slavery as a metaphor for Christians’ own sinfulness, evangelicals now began to see slavery itself as sinful. Abolishing chattel slavery was linked with personal redemption. Young’s chapter thus shows how shifts in “emotion cultures” can create new motivations for, and targets of, protest. He demonstrates how affective and reactive emotions interact in moral shocks.

Several chapters in this volume explore the complex relations between shame, agency, and activism. In her interviews with Christian conservative activists, Arlene Stein found that they accounted for their participation in terms of a selfless commitment to higher authorities—family, nation, God. Yet they also expressed feelings of rejection and passivity, and described themselves as victims of forces beyond their control. Through their activism, Stein argues, they try to construct a positive sense
of themselves and their families as strong and independent, in contrast to weak, shameful others—in this case, the gays and lesbians they were mobilizing against. Examining shame in a very different setting, Deborah Gould observes that although a rhetoric of “pride” has been normative since the late 1960s among lesbians and gay men who are “out,” it has not eliminated feelings of ambivalence and shame. As a result, gay and lesbian activists initially responded to the AIDS crisis not by calling for militant activism but by encouraging volunteerism, remembrance of the dead, and quiet nobility in the face of a deadly epidemic. Five years into that epidemic, however, the movement’s emotion rules changed. Shocked by the Supreme Court’s *Bowers v. Hardwick* anti-sodomy decision and state legislatures’ willingness to consider quarantines, following years of government inaction, gay men and lesbians began to express indignation and outrage and to form activist groups like ACT UP. For many, “pride” now demanded militant confrontation.

Participation carries many pleasures, which may be great enough to motivate participation without relying on a cognitive belief that success is possible or likely. According to Derrick Bell (1992: xvi), many black civil rights protestors participated to gain dignity in their lives through struggle and moral expression, not necessarily because they expected to gain equal rights from that struggle; as he says of one participant, “her goal was defiance, and its harassing effect was likely more potent precisely because she did what she did without expecting to topple her oppressors.” In her contribution to this volume, Elisabeth Jean Wood similarly argues that Salvadoran peasants took pleasure and pride in their rebellion against long-dominant economic and political elites, irrespective of their calculations about the likely success of their actions—which hardly seemed good. Some campesinos engaged in collective action for its own sake: to assert agency was to reclaim their dignity; not to act was to be less than human. Protest itself was the goal. Only later in the war, after the worst repression had passed, did some insurgents find pride and pleasure in their ability to further their interests through coordinated action. If emotions are intimately involved in the processes by which people come to join social movements, they are even more obvious in the ongoing activities of the movements. The richer a movement’s culture—with more rituals, songs, folktales, heroes, denunciation of enemies, and so on—the greater those pleasures. Most discussions of the solidarity-building functions of movement culture have concentrated on shared rhetoric and beliefs rather than on the emotions which accompany them. Each of the components of movement culture that Lofland (1996) sees as embodying participants’ beliefs—values, symbolic objects, stories, oc-
Introduction: Why Emotions Matter

casion, roles, and personae—also has an equally important emotional side, entailing joy, hope, enthusiasm, pride, and affective attachment to the group. These are crucial to sustaining movements. For example, ongoing participation in “high-risk” movements typically requires the mitigation of participants’ fears of violent reprisals against one’s self or family, or of losing one’s job. Jeff Goodwin and Steven Pfaff’s chapter examines the “encouragement mechanisms” through which civil rights movements in the U.S. and the former East Germany managed to do precisely this. They show that factors and processes that movement analysts have typically invoked for other explanatory purposes—including networks, mass gatherings, rituals, and new collective identities—also helped participants deal with their fears (sometimes as unanticipated consequences of these processes) and thereby helped sustain participation in these movements.

Movements are themselves a distinct setting in which emotions can be created or reinforced. In contrast to emotions which grow out of existing moral frameworks such as religious systems or professional ethics, the emotions created within social movements are attempts, often explicit, to elaborate intuitive visions into explicit ideologies and proposals. The anger of a farmer living near a proposed site for a nuclear plant is the intuition that the antinuclear movement tries to build into a systematic ideology of opposition. What the farmer sees first as “meddlesome outsiders” develops into “technocracy”; fear develops into outrage. Each cognitive shift is accompanied by emotional ones.

In his chapter, Colin Barker shows how a tiny band of Polish activists in the Gdansk shipyard was able to turn workers’ vague anger toward a repressive regime into a strike shutting down the 16,000-person operation. What participants remembered afterward were the sudden shifts in emotions: the moment when fear turned to pride and then derisive laughter at the actions of officials; when solemn silence to honor a sacked colleague ceded to fierce shouting; when doubt turned to pleasure, panic to confidence. It was in those charged moments that they discovered a capacity for collective action they had not known before.

In her contribution, Rebecca Anne Allahyari looks at what she calls the “felt politics” of caring for the poor. Felt politics, meant to contrast with the more disembodied “politics of feeling” (Morgen 1995), highlights the importance of experiencing, or feeling, these politics as embodied participants in organizational cultures. While The Salvation Army’s muscular Christianity demanded a disciplined commitment to rehabilitation and hard work along with an acceptance of state policy, Loaves & Fishes’ radical Christianity encouraged political activism. Allahyari’s account reveals the emotions, morality, and cognitions wrapped up in
the “self-work” that takes place in and around social movements. Anne Kane, in her chapter, explores the emotional aspects of movement meanings, solidarity, and alliances, showing how emotions are metaphorically conceptualized and organized, and situated in complex cultural structures. Analyzing the narratives shared at mass “monster meetings” during the Irish land movement, she finds an abundance of emotion metaphors, and structures behind these metaphors. Indeed, these metaphors exist alongside, and sometimes constitute, what we think of as the cognitive and instrumental dimension of narrative and discourse.

Jasper has distinguished between two kinds of emotions generated within a social movement. Reciprocal emotions concern participants’ ongoing feelings toward each other. These are the close, affective ties of friendship, love, solidarity, and loyalty, and the more specific emotions they give rise to. Together they create what Goodwin (1997) has called the “libidinal economy” of a movement, yielding many of the pleasures of protest, including erotic pleasures. Other emotions—Jasper calls them shared—are held by a group at the same time, but they do not have the other group members as their objects. The group nurtures anger toward outsiders, or outrage over government policies. Reciprocal and shared emotions, although distinct, reinforce each other, thereby building a movement’s culture.

Collective emotions, the reciprocal ones especially, are linked to the pleasures of protest. Most obvious are the pleasures of being with people one likes, in any number of ways. Other pleasures arise from the joys of collective activities, such as losing oneself in collective motion or song. This can be satisfying even when done with strangers—who no longer feel like strangers. (And articulating one’s moral principles is always a source of joy, pride, and fulfillment, even when it is also painful.) In her contribution, for example, Mabel Berezin shows how Italian fascists employed public rituals to induce strong feelings of national belonging—the neglected underside of political identities, according to Berezin—a cultural project that most other movements and regimes have also pursued, albeit often through more banal means (Billig 1995).

Activists, like all people, have firm ideas about what kinds of emotions are appropriate in different settings. Nancy Whittier shows that activist survivors of child abuse encourage different emotions in conferences dominated by fellow survivors, on talk shows, and in courts of law. When among their own, survivors are urged to experience and express strong emotions—anger, grief, and shame, but also pride at overcoming their victimization. When pressing claims for crime victims’ compensation, survivors must demonstrate grief, fear, and shame in order to legiti-
mate their claims of injury, but not anger or pride. The animal rights activists interviewed by Julian Groves often used the term “emotional” to criticize activists they considered unprofessional, irrational, or feminine—that is, if they were women. Men’s expressions of emotion, especially anger, were considered legitimate. Groves argues that the career-oriented women who made up the bulk of the movement believed it was necessary to substantiate their feelings about animal cruelty with scientific arguments and the support of men. Justified as “strategy,” the emotional injunctions described by Whittier and Groves reveal activists’ normative assumptions about gender, feeling, and rationality.

Emotions help to explain not only the origin and spread of social movements but also their decline. As Goodwin (1997) shows, love and erotic attraction can lead individuals and dyads out of active participation in movements and into private life. Frustration can cause groups to change tactics or to disband altogether. Individuals can “burn out” and withdraw from activism. Jealousy, envy, disgust, and hatred can pull groups apart. In Albert Hirschman’s (1982) account, people retreat from the public to the private sphere because “participation in public life offers only this unsatisfactory too-much-or-too-little choice and is therefore bound to be disappointing in one way or another” (1982: 120). Voting offers too little involvement; social movements often demand too much. We become addicted to protest activities, commit huge amounts of time to them, and become exhausted; we have unrealistic expectations of social change and are easily disappointed. Hirschman’s description of these dynamics depends (mostly implicitly) on emotions such as excitement, disappointment, and frustration: “The turns from the private to the public life are marked by wildly exaggerated expectations, by total infatuation, and by sudden revulsions” (1982: 102).

Emotions also help to sustain movements in their less active phases. In her discussion of the “abeyance structures” through which movements survive between periods of mass mobilization, Verta Taylor (1989; also Rupp and Taylor 1987) recognizes the role of emotions. In her example, the National Women’s Party provided the resurgent women’s movement of the 1960s with activist networks, goals and tactical choices, and a collective identity. Yet the factors responsible for these—the group’s continuity over time, purposive commitment, exclusiveness, centralization, and culture—depended on emotions for their causal effect. The time dimension, as Taylor describes it, offers a sense of community and a continuity of membership, but the participants she quotes also use emotional words like “thrilling” and “uplifting.” Purposive commitment, exclusiveness, centralization, and culture also had the effect of reinforcing a strong
Jeff Goodwin, James M. Jasper, and Francesca Polletta

sense of a community among a small group of activists (which in turn yielded the activist network and collective identity). “Personal ties of love and friendship among members were an important cultural ideal,” she observes. “A willingness to shape personal relationships around the cause was, in large measure, what made possible the intense commitment of members” (Taylor 1989: 769). Many activists were actually couples, and many had an intense devotion to the party’s leader.

Finally, the emotions displayed in protest reshape broader emotional cultures as well as the emotional repertoires available to later movements. For example, the black nationalist movement of the 1960s helped to make attractive to subsequent feminist and gay movements a “politics of rage” (Frye 1983; Browning 1993). Movements’ impacts on law, policy, and institutionalized practices can also be shaped by the emotions associated with activists. Stearns and Stearns (1986) argue that the anger expressed in workers’ movements in the early 1900s prompted concerns among employers about workers’ emotions; preventing anger became an important goal of labor relations. As Julian Groves shows, animal rights activists’ struggles to be taken seriously as political challengers reflect a still-dominant view of animal rights activists as unintimidating “animal lovers.” In spite of scholars’ new interest in the impacts of social movements, they have not explored how movements reshape emotion cultures or how protestors’ political impact may be limited by the emotional attachments attributed to them.

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The chapters of this volume are organized thematically. Part 1 provides several distinctive theoretical standpoints from which one might consider the place of emotions in social movements and politics. Craig Calhoun and Randall Collins offer perspectives derived from social theory and the history of thought. Theodore Kemper weighs in with his own perspective from the sociology of emotions, providing a healthy skepticism of the cultural approach adopted by most contributors. And Frank Dobbin provides a commentary informed by his expertise on the institutionalization of new practices and structures.

Part 2 turns to the broadest cultural context of contentious politics. A recent trend in the literature has been to explain the emergence of social movements by setting them in historical context, relating them to processes of urbanization, industrialization, the rise of national markets, and so on. But there has been virtually no attention to the distinctively “modern” sensibilities out of which political interests and repertories of contention have grown. These sensibilities include not just cognitive mean-
ings and classifications but also structures of feeling. Movements to save the environment or protect animals simply would have been inconceivable several hundred years ago, as the necessary sympathies were not yet available. In this section of the book, contributors examine broad changes in the structures of feeling that animate protest.

Recruitment and the internal dynamics of movements are the subjects of part 3. A central finding of research on recruitment has been the importance of social networks, as individuals tend to join movements in which they already know one or more participants. The network approach has been criticized for ignoring the cultural symbols and meanings transmitted across the networks, but it also overlooks the affective bonds that help define the network in the first place (Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994; Goodwin 1997). Social networks affect behavior because people have emotions toward the other people in the networks, ranging from trust to ambivalence to antipathy. Another under-studied aspect of movements and politics is the emotions and experiences that prepare individuals for political action. Anger or outrage over a government decision, the feeling of betrayal by elected representatives or employers, fears and anxieties about perceived threats, the anticipated pleasures (often exaggerated or romanticized) of protest—all shape what happens when a potential protestor is contacted by a recruiter. In some cases, indeed, emotions are sufficiently strong that an individual takes the initiative in seeking out a protest organization (or forming her own). In addition to these emotional responses to events or information, humans have a complex web of affective affiliations—to people, places, symbols, and so on—that help explain their willingness to act (or not). Several essays in this section examine the sources of these emotions and the role they play in recruitment.

Part 3 also examines the internal functioning of political groups, another setting where indignation, pleasure, and pride play crucial roles. Even after participants have been recruited, organizers must arouse particular emotions to sustain their dedication and loyalty. Public displays of emotion are a regular movement strategy for forging and maintaining a collective identity. Southern black students displayed a calm joy even when going to jail. Feminists have encouraged women to express their anger about discrimination and denigration. The chapters in part 3 analyze how emotions are shaped and displayed within protest groups.

The focus of part 4 shifts to the emotional dynamics that arise from the interactions and conflicts among political groups and individuals. The construction of friends and foes, as Carl Schmitt pointed out long ago, is crucial to politics. What could be more emotional? Negative emotions
must be aroused against enemies, positive ones toward potential allies. Emotions also accompany, perhaps even help to cause, the demobilization of social movements. The effects of fear, for instance, are especially important in the face of state repression.

In a concluding essay, Francesca Polletta and Edwin Amenta offer some cautionary lessons from the experience of other once-novel concepts in the sociology of social movements. Students of movement emotions can best reorient existing theoretical paradigms by identifying the conditions in which emotional dynamics explain the emergence and trajectories of movements better than the structural and cognitive processes usually cited. At the same time, students of movement emotions should not hesitate to ask macro-historical questions about how dominant emotion cultures come into being and shape widespread perceptions of what is strategic, what is political, and what is an interest.

Emotions are but the entering wedge for many aspects of politics and protest that have been neglected by the structural paradigm of the last thirty years, a whole world of psychological and cultural processes that have been considered too “soft” or too messy for empirical investigation. Gendered styles, roles, expectations, and self-definitions are one such set of processes, closely connected to emotions. The body is another, as emotions are seen as “embodied” thoughts and feelings, often with physiological traces. Place, the sense of physical orientation to the surrounding world, is obviously related to this physicality of emotions. The self is a fourth topic. Theorized most recently by postmodernists, many of whom deny its existence, the self is experienced simultaneously as site, stage, agent, and outcome of emotions. Strategic choices and interactions, often guided by intuition or emotion, are another topic which scholars have barely touched on in recent years. The chapters that follow just begin to address these complex issues. But once the range and significance of political passions are fully recognized, the study of politics and social movements will never be the same.

Endnotes

1. For a broad critique of the structural bias of political process theory, including its inability to accommodate emotions, see Goodwin and Jasper 1999, accompanied by responses and a rejoinder.

2. For a more detailed history of emotions in theories of social movements, see Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta 2000.
Part One

Theoretical Perspectives
Chapter One

Social Movements and the Focus of Emotional Attention

Randall Collins

Social movements, when successful, are crescive, emergent phenomena. To understand the shape of their emergent and transient pathways across time, I will suggest we need to capture their emotional dynamics in a social attention space.

Let us start with an analogy. Imagine a city in which there are restaurants and cafes in different parts of town. Some of them are quiet, even painfully quiet, so that it feels uncomfortable to be the only customer in the place. Others are bustling with people. They are “where the action is.” They are the places to go, not just to eat and drink, but to be on the scene, to feel the energy, to feel you are where things are happening. This center of attention tends to shift around; some establishments rise like stars, shine for a while, then fade again a few months later, replaced by someplace else.

Such phenomena can be analyzed by the now-familiar theory of the critical mass (Marwell and Oliver 1993). I will add two points: (1) The critical mass develops, and fades away, because of emotional dynamics. (2) Social movements operate inside a social attention space, which has room for only a limited number of participants; hence there is an implicit struggle to position oneself within this attention space. This process largely determines victory or defeat, as well as whether a movement can get off the ground at all and how long it will remain important.

First, the emotional dynamic. At the center of every highly mobi-
lized social movement is what Durkheim (1995 [1912]) called “collective effervescence.” This is the product of what Durkheim called “moral density” and what I would call “high ritual density.” The ingredients are:

1. The physical assembly of people, so there is bodily awareness of copresence.
2. A shared focus of attention. This may arise because participants are carrying out a stereotyped action (chanting, gesturing, etc.) which has become traditional because there is a prior history of such participation; or it may develop spontaneously, as a first time occasion, because something in the circumstances has brought a common action.1
3. The focus of attention becomes a mutual focus of attention. Each participant becomes aware of each other’s awareness, and thus of each one’s unity at this moment with each other. This is the crucial process, the shared sense of the group as focusing together, that creates what Durkheim called “conscience collective,” fusing cognitive and moral unity.

Corresponding to the extent that these ingredients are present, there are a series of consequences:

1. Feelings of group solidarity.
2. Emotional energy (EE) in individual participants, as they become pumped up with enthusiasm and confidence.
3. Symbols of the group, encapsulating the memory of collective participation. Contact with group emblems allows individuals to keep up their feelings of dedication when they are away from the group. Bringing forward such emblems helps the initiators of a new collective gathering to set off new occasions of focused attention. Behaviors toward emblems are tokens of respect for the group; hence the emblems are touchstones for loyalty and targets for external challenge, the focal points around which confrontations with opponents are most easily generated.
4. Feelings of morality. The emotionally solidary group generates its own standards of right and wrong. The highest good becomes commitment to the group and sacrifice of individual selfishness in its service; those who are outside the group, or worse yet, oppose it, are morally tagged as unworthy, evil, or inhuman.

A Durkheimian ritual operates by transforming emotions. The ritual process can start with any emotion, as long as it is shared or can spread within the group and become its implicit focus of attention. The
Social Movements and the Focus of Emotional Attention

Key to the relative success or failure of collective mobilization is the degree to which such emotional transformation takes place.

There are two kinds of emotional transformation in collective rituals. One involves the amplification of the initiating emotion. If the initiating emotion is moral outrage, the collective focus of the group makes the feeling of outrage stronger. Similar processes unfold when the emotion is fear, pity for a victim, concern for one’s selfish material interests, a sense of sinfulness and despair, anger against an enemy, or any of the variety of emotional experiences described in the following chapters.

The second kind of emotional transformation involves the transmutation of the initiating emotion into something else: the emotion which arises out of consciousness of being entrained within a collective focus of attention. This is the emotion which makes up solidarity, and which makes the individual feel stronger as a member of the group. I call this emotional energy. It is what Durkheim (1995 [1912]) sometimes referred to as “moral force”; Mauss (1972 [1902]) equated it with mana, the collectively transmitted social energies that in some tribal societies are interpreted as magic power. Tom Scheff (1990; Scheff and Retzinger 1991) has argued that the central emotion of strong social bonds is pride, and of damaged social ties is shame; I suggest these are the subjective, self-oriented interpretations of what in the collective aspect is emotional energy.

A successful social ritual operating in the collective gathering of a social movement is a process of transforming one emotion into another. The ritualized sharing of instigating or initiating emotions which brought individuals to the collective gathering in the first place (outrage, anger, fear, etc.) gives rise to distinctively collective emotions, the feelings of solidarity, enthusiasm, and morality which arise in group members’ mutual awareness of their shared focus of attention. To some extent there is a catharsis of the initiating emotions; these might well be unpleasant or painful, but the group experience transmutes them so as to take off the painful edge. Cognitively, the original label of the emotional process still remains (and likely becomes even more articulate), but there is now a positive flow, the sense that what one is doing has a higher importance, even a magnetic quality.

There is a danger in this way of analyzing the emotional experience of highly mobilized movement participation. It may give the impression that social movement members are just excitement-seekers, without commitment to the cause, just looking for an emotional good time. Several things need to be said on this point. It is indeed true that this is the motivation for some proportion of participants in collective gatherings of social
movements. Recent work, including some in this volume, has focused on sexual motives for attending protest meetings, which motives might be unconscious or overt. It would be a mistake to draw too sharp a dichotomy between excitement-seeking (put more generally, emotional energy-seeking) participants, and the “morally serious” participants who come out of a deeper sense of need or dedication. That is, we could distinguish between (and perhaps, with some care, empirically observe) persons who are toward the end of the continuum where the emotional energy boost is their primary attractor, and persons who start with one of the initiating emotions (pity, anger, etc.) and whose transmuted emotions in the group remain anchored in that specific emotional orientation. We could further distinguish those whose participation is most ephemeral, who opportunistically stick around only for just those moments when the energy is being pumped up most dramatically and publically; and on the other hand those who have internalized the group energy through attachment to its symbolic objects and who thus are motivated to do the grunt work, sometimes even in solitary or routine situations. But these are further variants within the same ritual process model. All social movements and their participants, if the ritual process builds up far enough to make for successful commitment-generating occasions, undergo the process of generating collective emotional energy. The degree of ephemerality or internalization, and the cognitive focus on particular emotional tones and hence objects and goals, characterize different kinds of social movements and different participation profiles within each of them.

Another way of defending the centrality of collectively generated EE in social movements is on the theoretical level, in the debate between rationalistic and nonrationalistic (cognitive, emotional) theories of social movement mobilization. Rational choice theorists have recognized the need to posit commitment incentives to overcome the free-rider problem. This is what the ritual process of generating EE provides. In this light, ritually generated emotional energy is a sine qua non for successful social movements. Where the formulation of a neo-Durkheimian model of ritual build-up gives a special analytical advantage is that it provides a mechanism, a process, and a set of causal variables which produce different levels of outcomes. It is not enough to posit, in a very generalized and causally backward-reaching functionalist argument, that if a social movement exists it must have solved the participation incentive problem. The ritual model gives us a forward-oriented causality, showing what conditions (the ingredients listed earlier) give rise to solidarity effects and the other emotional consequences of ritual participation; it thus explains the
relative intensities of the movement commitments, and gives the conditions under which they fail to get off the ground in the first place, as well as when they dissipate and crash.

What I have analyzed so far is the way in which emotional dynamics of ritual participation appeal to members. We could go further in this direction, to consider how social movements periodically gather, in smaller or larger collective occasions, sometimes to recreate the effervescence that launched the movement, and sometimes to infuse new emotions, one of the most effective ways being confrontation with targets or enemies.

In addition to this internal appeal, emotional dynamics have external effects. This is particularly important for determining the appeal of social movements to conscience constituencies. Such supporters may have preexisting sympathies, which predispose them to agree emotionally with the movement. A theoretical problem is to account for why the appropriate conscience constituencies happen to exist. One hypothesis is that conscience constituencies exist to just the extent that persons have gone through interaction ritual chains in their lives that have produced an emotional orientation similar to that of the social movement. They must have been charged with respect for the same kind of symbols. Examples would be the kinds of experiences which create liberal universalizing values, producing a conscience constituency for social movements dramaticizing insurgency of the oppressed; or experience in particularistic religious communities which makes one receptive to the emotional appeal of conservative religious activists.

In addition to drawing upon preexisting emotional bases in individual experience, a conscience constituency is emergent, at least in the case of highly successful social movements. A movement which has widespread social impact, which arouses the moral concern of a majority of the surrounding society, to a considerable extent creates that moral concern in the very process of mobilizing the movement. The same kinds of processes that transmute emotions into emotional energy bringing internal commitment and forceful activity to the movement, spill over and become outwardly directed. Sometimes this emotional propagation happens more or less by accident; at other times, it can be consciously staged. There is a continuum here; all movements which have any track record of sustained experience learn how to dramatize their ritualistic activities so that they mobilize a larger penumbra of support (e.g., Gitlin 1980). The outer layers of a conscience constituency are the most changeable part of a movement’s support. When and if a social movement arrives at
one of those rare and much-sought moments when a majority of the society is paying attention, there is a limited amount of time to take advantage of this temporarily widened window of shared conscience.

Movements use terms for this process such as “raising consciousness,” but this is misleading in several respects. The rhetoric implies that issues of conscience objectively exist, and persons only need to have their consciousness expanded to focus on them. But there are a huge, perhaps infinite, number of things that people may focus upon, that they can invest with significance and treat as calling for moral commitment. Any particular framing of what is the crucial issue becomes increasingly ephemeral as one moves outward into the larger penumbra of an audience attracted to a particular focus of dramatic attention. The rhetoric of “consciousness raising” is analytically misleading in implying that the process is primarily one of cognition; the dynamic is centrally emotional, and therefore strongly time-bound. Shared emotions propelled by dramatic events build up over a relatively compact period of time. Their peak appears to be sustainable for a maximum of a few days; we see this in the most extreme instances, such as the wild enthusiasm that takes place after a successful political revolution; most emotional peak mobilizations seem to be shorter. They can be repeated, with emotional “time off” in between; this process has not been measured, but I would estimate that a series of such peak emotional mobilizations, perhaps with breaks of a few weeks or months in between, can be sustained for possibly as long as two or three years. The various permutations of possibilities remain to be studied. But all of them involve a rising-and-declining pattern of collective emotional arousal; eventually core participants burn out, and attention among the peripheral onlookers who make up the conscience constituency becomes siphoned away.

The upshot is that the larger the conscience constituency, the more ephemeral it is. I do not intend to moralize about it, but simply note that successful movements live with this fact and take advantage of it where they can. For a movement to take a purist stance of accepting the support only of those who have principled long-term commitments is to doom itself to never winning any large victories. The key is to get the maximum out of those moments when a large conscience constituency is called into existence.

It is this crescive and transient quality of conscience constituencies that explains the importance of innocent victims in mobilizing wide support for social movements. It has been noted in specific historical cases that an oppressive regime begins to crumble, or a social movement begins to make headway against its targeted injustice, when its activists are sub-
jected to a well-publicized atrocity. The image of police unleashing their dogs on a crowd of peaceful marchers is the archetype of this kind of mobilizing event. Let us note however that what mobilizes a conscience constituency in such cases is not merely moral outrage, the feeling that it is manifestly unfair, morally disgraceful, to attack the weak. The victims must not only be innocent, but they must be emblems of the movement’s dedication, or be quickly converted into such emblematic associations.\(^3\) It is their deliberate willingness to sacrifice themselves, or at least to expose themselves to the danger of such atrocities, that broadcasts the sense of a moral commitment operating. This is inseparable from the feeling of moral and emotional (and ultimately social) strength. The victims become martyrs because they are taken to represent the moral power of the movement; they symbolize the feeling that the movement will ultimately win out. Metaphorically, their message is that God is on their side; at times this is a literal belief, as in the case of the Christian martyrs, who generated considerable admiration and enthusiasm as they were paraded by Roman authorities through the Mediterranean communities on their way to Rome for exemplary execution.\(^4\) There is a good Durkheimian reason for the connection between martyrdom and moral power. Durkheim (1995 [1912]) argued that the social basis of the concept of God is the experience of power, exaltation, and transcendence of everyday mundane experience that takes place in emotionally heightened collective occasions. God symbolizes the emotionally unified group; no wonder that if this emotional unifying process is widely enough focused upon, the sense arises that no power can stand against it, that evil must lose to it in the end.

The process of creating and widening a conscience constituency is this process of taking the moral high ground. But the moral suasion is also rooted in collective emotional participation; strength and morality are fused into high levels of collective dedication. God is not only good, but omnipotent. And although these metaphors have their fuzzy edges at which contradictions set in (the long-standing theological problem of how God can coexist with evil is the main conceptual contradiction), they are emotionally meaningful and socially mobilizing at just those moments in time when the collective focus is high. It is this that gives the final impetus for movement success. For if a conscience constituency can be extended far enough, so that it encompasses the vast majority of a society (even if only temporarily), there is no privileged person who can stand against it, no authority who will not be delegitimated and deserted. Most movements do not get this far, but their relative successes and failures correspond to how far this dynamic can flow.
At the outset I proposed that there are two keys to social movement dynamics: not only emotional process but competition over a limited attention space. To explore the latter, it is useful to broaden our discussion from politically oriented social movements to two other kinds of movements: religious movements and intellectual movements.

Religious movements are illuminating because they are so obviously and centrally emotional. They do not lend themselves to prima facie interpretations in terms of material interests (although some analysts have adapted a more complex version of rational calculus models to religious movements as well.) In other respects, religious movements share many features with political social movements, especially the importance of social networks for recruitment and for sustaining commitment. One special advantage of the religious movement research literature is that it contains explicit analyses of movements which fail.

This has been for the most part lacking in the broader area of social movement research. There is a methodological problem of studying movements which have been selected retrospectively, that is to say, movements which have reached a certain level of success in recruitment, retention, and public notoriety so that they attract news accounts and scholarly researchers. This produces a sampling bias, which obscures a significant fact about social movements: most of them barely get off the ground, and disappear before anyone thinks of researching them. In other words, there is probably a vast population of tiny or incipient movements, out of which only a handful reach the level where they become visible enough to be studied. All movements are transient in one degree or other, but we considerably understate the extent to which transience and ephemerality is the condition in which social movements exist. Put another way: the movements which we study are the successful end of the distribution, those which have overcome the problems of extreme transience and have gone on to further phases of development.

Research on religious movements has at least partially surmounted this problem, especially in the focus upon religious cults. There are particular social milieux in which cults proliferate, so that it has been possible to study times and places (e.g., the San Francisco region in the 1960s) where researchers could study incipient movements and their failures.\(^5\) Particularly in work by Stark and Bainbridge (1985), we have explicit models of what makes the difference between cults which grow and those which do not. Religious cults, if they begin to grow at all, do so by recruiting through networks of persons who are already acquainted, especially kin and friends. Additionally, on the leadership side, the “entrepreneurs” who found new cults typically have been involved in an interorganiza-
tional network; they learn their skills at ritually generating emotional experience, and acquire their judgment as to where in the array of symbolic appeals there is room for a new cult, by coming up through the professional ranks in a previous religious movement. For example, the successive founders and leaders of the Nation of Islam—the Black Muslims—gained their initial experience by close contact with preachers in black Christian evangelical churches (Lincoln 1994). Both leaders and followers are recruited through networks.

The very process that makes it possible to form new cults is simultaneously the source of their difficulty in growing large. Cults arise in a larger network of social connections, in which there are a number of different nodes, each attempting to recruit others into its center of attention. On the side of membership recruitment, a major problem for religious cults is that they tend to attract to their meetings persons who are “seekers” who circulate around from one group to another; that is to say, they are part of a loose overlapping network that has acquaintance with a number of different cults. The growth of one cult tends to be at the expense of others. Thus Transcendental Meditation, which enjoyed a phenomenally rapid growth in membership for a few years (1971–75), had an even more precipitous drop in the next few years as members turned to other “new age” cults (Stark and Bainbridge 1985: 284–303).

Another piece of the puzzle is provided by studying intellectual movements. Intellectual creativity is socially constituted as a struggle over an intellectual attention space. Extensive evidence on this pattern is presented in my comparative study of philosophers (Collins 1998). Successful intellectuals are connected in networks. New intellectual stars are pupils of the earlier stars, making up lineages across the generations. In addition, there is a collective shaping of new intellectual topics and styles; entire groups of young intellectuals make their careers together, connected before anyone in the group has done the work that later makes them famous. (The group in the 1920s around the young Sartre, de Beauvoir, Merleau-Ponty, Aron, Lacan, and others is just one of many examples.) These networks are competitive. Youthful groups split into rival positions as they become successful; pupils break with their teachers. These breaks are a crucial part of the process of innovation, since this must consist in producing something different than what has already been said and than what other people are now saying. New intellectual stars appear simultaneously, staking out rival positions. Throughout history, there has virtually never been an era of major creativity in which a single new position appeared without a contemporary rival. To mention just one example: the Vienna Circle logical positivists and the existentialists of
the 1920s and 1930s not only appeared at the same time but recombined segments of the same ancestral networks; and they shaped their new positions not only against the older generation but in vehement arguments aimed at each other.

Intellectual creativity is a process of recombining and transforming cultural capital simultaneously in rival directions. Creativity is shaped by the emotional dynamics of networks which are close enough to maintain a focus of attention. The emotional build-up of creativity involves several concatenating processes. New intellectuals carry over the dominant emotional energy of their mentors, the successful previous generation of the network; we can infer that since innovators are not mere followers, what the younger generation gets from the older must be not merely cultural capital, but an emotional learning of what it is to be a focal point in the attention space. In addition to this vertical transmission of EE, there is also a horizontal source of EE, the solidarity of young intellectuals working together to shape a new position early in their careers. Such innovative groups build up a burgeoning sense of confidence and enthusiasm as they begin to sense a successful opening in the field of attention. This emotional energy internal to the group is further enhanced by the energizing effects of rivalry, as the new school of thought works out its position in counterpoint with other programs being formulated by similarly structured groups elsewhere.

I do not mean to sound as if intellectual movements operate on a purely subcognitive level, that nothing but emotions are involved and that explicit ideas are irrelevant. The ideas are symbols of group membership, initially of membership in the networks of the previous generation, and then emergently as membership in positions that come to dominate the new round of debate. The emotional dynamics are central in the sense that they energize the process of formulating new ideas; above all, new ideas are shaped to oppose the ideas of rival positions and thus are carried upon the polarizing dynamics of conflict. And just as in the case of social movements, where I have argued that it is the broadcasting to a wider audience of the emotion-focusing rituals of the group that generates a conscience constituency, I propose here that intellectual movements succeed because their energizing conflicts focus attention for the entire intellectual field; some players are transformed into actors, others into audience.

Let me give an example from the history of social movement theory itself. We have a strong tendency to think of the field as progressing through a series of waves or paradigms succeeding one another. Thus we talk about the transition from the old crowd psychology and social strain
Social Movements and the Focus of Emotional Attention

models to the resource mobilization paradigm; then to cultural frames; and now to our current paradigm shift-in-process, social movements and emotions. In fact these are rivals, and many of them which we sharply distinguish as successive are largely overlapping in time. Not only are they produced to a considerable extent in branches of the same network of colleagues, teachers, and fellow pupils (one can think of Neil Smelser and Chuck Tilly, both coming out of the Harvard Social Relations Department in the 1950s); but they also unfold by move and countermove. Our tendency to think of them as successive paradigms is part of the polarizing dynamic of conflict. In actuality the several theories share a number of points in common (e.g., the common emphasis of both resource mobilization and cultural framing models upon networks), but their militant proponents place their attention upon the points at which they disagree (e.g., playing up the rational calculus used by some proponents of the resource mobilization school as against the autonomy of cultural meanings in the framing school). Which is to say that social movement theory operates like other intellectual fields, by a dynamic of conflict, in which rivals take energy and focus from picking on lines of disagreement. Intellectual movements are organized, cognitively and socially, by focus upon splits in the attention space.

In my analysis of philosophers, I have argued that intellectual life is structured by what I call “the law of small numbers”: In any lively, nonmoribund intellectual field, there are between three and six factions which dominate the attention space. There are always at least two factions, because rivalry is the key dynamic of intellectual life. There is typically a third position, because a plague on both houses is always a viable position. Given the usual complexity of most intellectual issues, it is possible to formulate positions which combine agreements and oppositions in a considerable number of ways. But the “law of small numbers” has an upper limit, not because many more positions than five or six cannot be formulated, but because the attention space will not accommodate them. At the moment when the new field of oppositions breaks out (about once a generation at the most), the first few positions to establish themselves in the field of argument capture most of the attention. Over a period of time, a few names are winnowed out as the leading spokespersons for those positions; peripheral intellectual audiences, and later historians, tend to heroize these individuals and attribute all the creativity to them as individuals, even though they are merely the focal points of a recombination of cultural capital which takes place across the entire field. Once the major lines of conflict are drawn, other intellectual participants have a choice: to attach themselves to one of the few positions that enjoy a
high focus of attention, or to go one’s own route and try to formulate an additional position. When this position is the seventh, eighth, or perhaps the thirteenth to be formulated, the amount of attention it can receive becomes diminishingly small. This structural limitation of the intellectual attention space is responsible for a good deal of the emotional drama, and not infrequent bitterness, of intellectual life.

Does the intellectual “law of small numbers” apply outside of the intellectual attention field, to religious and political movements? There has been as yet no systematic study of this question. My tentative answer is yes, there is also a struggle over a limited attention space, which crucially shapes the fate of these other kinds of movements; but it is not numerically the same as the intellectual “law of small numbers,” three to six successful factions at a time. It is possible that intellectual movements may have a higher upper limit, at least compared to religious and social movements which achieve a dominant position in attention space. The crucial part of the dynamic is that rival movements mobilize simultaneously, drawing their energy and their tactics from each other, while focusing their attention polemically on what distinguishes each from the other. Thus the two great movements of medieval Christian friars, the militant monks-in-the-world outside the monastery, the Franciscans and Dominicans, were created within ten years of each other in the early 1200s and underwent a series of parallel developments (including parallel displacements from their founding ideological missions) during the course of the century. In medieval Japan, there was an unfolding of rival movements of Pure Land Buddhism (popular evangelical Buddhism preaching emotionally to the masses); these too split off from the same originating networks and promulgated much the same theological and tactical innovations; and they devoted their greatest polemical energy toward each other, often drawing out what detached observers might call the exaggeration of small differences (e.g., over just what kind of chant brought salvation) into emblems of group difference. (On these movements, see Collins 1998: chaps. 7 and 9.)

In the sphere of politically oriented social movements, entire families of movements come on the scene, spinning off from each other. Thus in the 1960s, the civil rights movement, the antiwar movement, and the hippie counterculture movement were so heavily cross-identified that their participants in the late 1960s used to just refer to “the Movement.” It was from this overarching movement (with its variety of component SMOs) that networks branched into catalyzing feminist, gay, green, animal rights, and other movements. Indeed, it was this process of drawing upon overlapping networks of mass participation, and of propagating an
Social Movements and the Focus of Emotional Attention

extending heritage of tactics (e.g., nonviolent direct action) and ideologies, that was the inspiration for the concept of a movement “frame.” What I want to stress is that not only did “the Movement” operate as an attention space, which split into subspaces in a fashion something like the intellectual “law of small numbers,” but also that this case shows how a movement can achieve temporary prominence in an attention space by the conflict among rival mobilizations. The process involves not just the excitement of splits within a movement family but also the emotional buildup of rival social movement families.

A social movement battens on its enemies. Our methodology (as well as our ideological focus, our tendency to view a movement through the lens of its own self-definition) tends to obscure this fact; one sees the mobilization of one’s own side but tends to view the enemy as a constant until the point at which it is defeated and declines. But surely there is countermobilization of the other side; it is just this simultaneous escalation that produces the dramatic events, the confrontations and atrocities, that make up the history of the movement in action. The White Citizens Councils and organizations of night riders in the south were surely mobilizing in parallel to, indeed in counterpoint to, the burgeoning civil rights movement; each new strategic move (the freedom rides, the voter registration campaigns, the marches) was met by an upsurge of countermobilization specifically targeting it. In this sense, the full history of the struggle over civil rights in the U.S. from the 1950s through the 1960s has not yet been written; the sympathetic historians of the civil rights movement are not temperamentally suited to get the full story.

I am not suggesting, of course, that antagonistic movements mirror each other’s mobilization all the way through their histories; if this were so, then outcomes would always be stalemates. It will take a further refinement of analysis to show why it is that some part of the field of rivalry peaks at a certain point and then loses its ability to sustain its mobilization, while the other goes on to much wider dominance of the attention space. This is part of the battle over the largest audience, the broadest and most ephemerally involved conscience constituency.

The point I wish to bring out is that rivals are locked together, especially in the early to middle phases of mobilization. Thus the period in which the victorious civil rights movement (victorious on certain limited but highly visible public matters such as official integration and public rights) broke apart into a set of movements on the liberal side of the spectrum (the 1970s), was also the period in which a new style of conservative movement grew. In important respects, the “new religious right” was an imitation of the Movement, especially in ritualistic techniques of
solidarity and confrontation. It borrowed many of its ideologies and tactics: its anti-traditionalism (Jesus People playing guitars in church in place of the old hymns), its use of group dynamics and consciousness-raising techniques (touchy-feely group psychology), even its nonviolent sit-ins (in the 1980s and 1990s, used mainly by the Right to Life movement). There is of course also the bomb-throwing wing of the Right to Life movement, which had its parallel in Progressive Labor and Weatherman on the left. It seems ironic, but it is in keeping with the theory of rivalries in a focused attention space, that the closest approximation to the mood and tactics of the 1960s New Left movement can be found today in these right-wing religious movements.

Using the terminology of cultural framing, one could say that a movement frame extends not only to allied movements but to enemy movements. Furthermore, as in the case of intellectual movements, the focus upon opponents is a key to the emotional dynamics. At the end of World War I and into the 1920s, the proto- and full-fledged fascist movements in Italy and Germany carried out much of their activity in street fighting against communist movements; that is to say, the peak of revolutionary mobilization on the left gave rise to a countermobilization on the right. What seems a strange anomaly of fascist movements arising as splits (in the case of Mussolini) and as ideological borrowings (in the case of national socialism) from the militant labor movements is nevertheless part of the pattern of splits within an attention space. One might go further in reconstructing the competition for attention among the variety of small militant groups of the early period, which eventually simplified down to a starker political choice; I suggest that those movements came to the fore and consolidated smaller contenders within themselves (as Hitler’s version absorbed the Stahlhelm, a paramilitary organization of veterans) which were best able to capture the focus of attention as the leading fighters against a well-defined rival. Thus the Communists, anchoring the extreme end of the left (and upstaging the Social Democrats) and the Fascists, upstaging a morass of antimodernist movements, were successful above all in mobilizing against each other.

A further example from the chapters in this volume: Arlene Stein’s “Revenge of the Shamed” (chap. 7) brings out the way in which the new Christian right focuses on gays as a primary target for their own protest actions. Stein interprets this in the context of the motivating emotions she sees in the initial recruitment of Christian activists, especially their sense of shame and social inferiority arising from prior life circumstances and their class position vis-à-vis privileged liberal elites. Stein depicts the campaign against gay lifestyle as a displacement of this shame motivation
into a moral rage which restores their superiority over at least one group. This may well be accurate as a picture of the emotional ingredients involved. But I suggest that shame is the initiating or ingredient emotion which becomes transformed, as in all social movements, into collective solidarity and hence energy for collective action. The new Christian right emerged, not in isolation and driven solely by its inner emotional needs, but in a field of forces consisting of rival movements. Successful movements in this field each made their claim upon the public attention space and for a share of its emotional energy. I interpret Christian gay-bashing, not so much as scapegoating and emotional displacement, but as the kind of magnetic attraction among rivals which helps mobilize both sides. Without combative issues, a movement has a much harder time keeping up its energy and its solidarity, not least because it needs things to do which bring the members together in collective action. The gay rights movement and its public campaigns over housing ordinances are part of the same generation of movements as the new Christian right; and the same public campaigns may well operate to sustain mobilization on both sides.

I have suggested that struggle over an attention space shapes the emotional dynamics of intellectual, religious, and political movements alike. We might be tempted to conclude, however, that the “law of small numbers” does not apply to the most dramatic social movements of all, the big political showdowns in which an insurgent movement confronts the power of the state. A state, after all, is not a social movement; thus we have only one movement in the attention space, something that never happens with intellectual movements no matter how successful. Nevertheless, I think that an important part of the analytical apparatus of attention spaces does apply. In the showdown between rebels and the state, both appeal to the broadest possible conscience constituency. A power showdown is so emotionally charged, gripping the attention of the entire populace, because both sides are making a demand that can scarcely be evaded to show one’s sympathies, to support either the existing order or its breakdown and transformation into another order. Such moments are volatile, and they also have the character of rapid tipping points, of jumping off one bandwagon and onto another (Schelling 1960). What I would add to the concept of tipping points is that the dynamic is primarily emotional; individuals “decide” which coalition they will give a show of support to, insurgent or status quo, not so much by calculation of costs and benefits (which is impossible at this point of extreme uncertainty), but by collective emotional flow. The details of the model of emotional solidarity, which I have given above in discussing the ritual structure of
collective action, are crucial in determining which focus of attention will gather into itself a sense of which part of the crowd is speaking in the Durkheimian voice of God.

A political showdown simplifies the attention space down to two factions, and then ultimately to one, the side which wins. In moments of political revolution (or defeat of revolution), the law of small numbers is overthrown. But this situation is highly unusual, and temporary. The winning side inevitably fragments. Its emotional unity cannot last, because it was generated by an overwhelmingly magnetic focus of attention brought about by the showdown conflict. It was this mechanism that transformed disparate individual emotions into one big center of energy, tension, and enthusiasm. Once the conflict is over, there reigns a mood of mass celebration; from the East European and Soviet revolutions of 1989–91, I would estimate that this mood is at its height for up to three days and that it dissipates considerably within a few weeks. Factional struggles reemerge, often along new lines as the attention space is redivided.

This overriding unity dominating the attention space is not the normal condition of social movements. Most of the time they are struggling to mobilize, by doing collective emotional labor, in Nancy Whittier’s nice phrase. That is to say, social movements struggle to find a niche in the emotional attention space, playing off coexisting emotional centers that have been created by previous and rival movements. And since conscience constituencies may be, in part, residues of earlier social movement mobilizations, the emotional self-presentation of a social movement will succeed or fail to just that extent that a historical sequence of social movements leaves adherents in one emotional frame or another. 12

Nevertheless, a final word is needed on those historically rare moments when a social movement does achieve a drastic simplification in a showdown confrontation “with all the world watching,” at least all the world that is relevant to that historical time and place. These times are huge emotional highs, so high that they reverberate across the generations. They become codified in symbols—emblems, songs, slogans—which evoke the supreme solidarity of that moment. The memory of emotional resonances of the French revolution in 1789 were so strong that insurgent political movements tried to recreate that moment for over one hundred years; this was a guiding emotional imagery right down into the early twentieth century, when the fascist split so muddied the symbolic transmission that its emotional clarity was lost.

Taking its place in the 1960s was the American civil rights move-
Social Movements and the Focus of Emotional Attention

ment; not because it achieved a true revolutionary showdown, but because it reached the point of dominating the attention space and won the symbolic-emotional victory of near-absolute ascendance in moral legitimacy. That this legitimacy was more symbolic than practical, and that it proved ephemeral, is in keeping with the emotional dynamics at the center of movement success. But like the French revolution, the focus achieved by the civil rights movement in the mid-1960s has been a model that virtually all social movements, friends and foes alike, have been trying for the past thirty years to recreate. Emotion-laden symbolic capital reverberates from one movement mobilization to the next. Movement dynamics are not only transient, but reincarnating.

Notes

1. An example from personal observation is the key mobilizing moment of what became the Free Speech Movement on the Berkeley campus in fall 1964: a group of CORE members were engaged in civil disobedience by setting up their informational tables on the steps of the university administration building, in defiance of regulations. When the campus police arrested one member, the spontaneous reaction of the other CORE members was to trap the police car by sitting down en masse around it; thereby drawing a larger (and eventually huge) crowd, giving rise to speech-making from the top of the car, and provoking a confrontation with a large body of police in riot formation. The initiating tactic, which set off this round of high emotional solidarity and the group identity which became the FM, was an adaption of the sit-in tactics which CORE demonstrators had been using on local businesses in their integration protests; it was already a tradition, and it was the key generating device of solidarity and membership emotions among CORE people.

2. An exception would appear to be Leninist-style movements of full-time professional cadres. But their very structure commits them to a strategy of private plotting. Mass participation enters mainly in the dubious belief in the effects of dramatic terrorist acts for “electrifying the masses” (in terms debated long ago in revolutionary circles). Lenin’s cadre movement succeeded because of a coincidental condition, the breakdown of the Russian army and state, which left a unique opening for the cadres to act.

3. For example, protest meetings were quickly organized in New York City in February 1999 over an innocent African street-vender, Amadou Diallo, who was shot 41 times by the police (New York Times, Feb. 13, 1999). The shooting victim was unconnected with any movement. But the incident came in the midst of political controversy over Mayor Guiliani’s policy of aggressive policing of all public behavior; and protest organizations were in place with a capacity for quick mobilization. Their rallies quickly adopted Diallo as an emblem of innocent victimhood. On the varieties of emotions relating to innocent victims and martyrs, see Jasper 1997.

4. Stark 1996 provides an analysis of how the martyrs operated as a recruitment device in the formative period of early Christianity.

5. Another historical period in which religious cults proliferated was the early Ro-
man Empire. It has become increasingly apparent to religious scholars that Christianity emerged from a plethora of early Christian movements, along with a variety of Jewish, Hellenistic, and other cults. Segal, 1986; Fowden 1986; Mack 1995.

6. It is possible that at times of widespread interest in religious movements the size of the pool of supporters (the religious equivalent of a “conscience constituency”) may expand. Competition is not necessarily over slices of a constant pie; the pie can grow some of the time, when a set of movements generates heightened emotional focus and thus expands the attention space. But just as political conscience constituencies are intrinsically ephemeral, so too religious movements have a limited window in time in which to compete over the newly available membership. The basic competitive problem continues to exist, even if there is an accordion-like expansion of the recruitment pool at some moments.

7. Diani 1995 analyzes evidence on these overlapping networks in the case of Italian movements.

8. As James Jasper points out (personal communication), a variety of audiences may be targeted by particular kinds of movements, including the state, nonstate targets, mobilizable local supporters, as well as a broad range of bystanders. The battle to reach the larger and more distant of these audiences is considerably a battle over attention space in the mass media.

9. There was also a certain amount of direct spin-off from “new age” social networks; southern California rock musicians started the Calvary Chapel movement, which burgeoned into core new Christian movements such as the Vineyard, the Harvest Crusade, the Promise Keepers, and the Toronto Blessing.

10. S. Payne (1995: 150–64) and Fritzsche (1998: 134) list a variety of populist authoritarian contenders in Germany of the post-WWI period: the Germanenorden, the Thule Society, the Freikorps, the Stahlhelm, and other paramilitaries, numerous youth groups including the Jungdeutscher Orden, the National Bolsheviks, and the German National People’s Party, as well as rightist factions inside the moderate parties. There was also a leftist movement inside the SA (the Nazis’ own paramilitary) under Ernst Roehm, which overlapped in part with left-wing movement constituencies and which was not fully absorbed until Hitler carried out a round of assassinations in June 1934.

11. See also Kuran 1995, on why the volatility of tipping points makes it impossible for actors to predict just when a regime transition will occur; for a micro-situational application of tipping points to the coordination of applause and booing in crowds, see Clayman 1993.

12. Thus Fritzsche 1998 presents evidence that the experience of Germans in the massive crowds of July 1914 agitating for war during the international crisis following the Sarajevo assassination left an emotional memory of national solidarity which was called upon repeatedly by the Nazi mobilizations ten to twenty years later.
Chapter Two

Putting Emotions in Their Place

Craig Calhoun

Toward the end of the twentieth century, a number of sociologists took up the struggle to bring emotions into serious consideration within our discipline. Some came from the symbolic interactionist community which, despite a certain cognitivism suggested by the very label “symbolic,” has always been more attentive to emotions than most of sociology. Others drew on other traditions in social psychology—field theory, for example, and studies of frustration and aggression in intergroup relations. Still others tried to find an importable psychology, often in psychoanalysis (even while it was losing something of its foothold in psychology departments), also in other traditions including newer lines of work in physiological psychology and neurology. Still others turned to efforts to grasp emotions in cultural studies, in feminism, and in various branches of aesthetic analysis. All of these potentially inform the revitalization of sociology by attention to emotions.

Some sociologists have managed not only to borrow effectively but to advance interdisciplinary inquiry into the emotions, maintaining a foothold on each side of the border between psychology and sociology. Nonetheless, wide-reaching though efforts in the sociology of emotions have been, they have not yet deeply transformed sociological theory in a general way, nor have they reshaped many subfields of the discipline. Instead, the sociology of emotions has gained a certain recognition as a
field of its own. Whatever advantages this has for the networks of specialists, it is a compartmentalization that may limit the impact of the field within sociology more generally.

At the same time, in order to understand why studies of emotions have not become more central in sociology, we have to ask not just about the character of the studies themselves, but about the nature of and reasons for the inattention in the rest of the discipline. We need to understand what kinds of resistances inquiries into emotions meet, and what features of existing theories and approaches make connections hard to establish. I do not mean the word “resistances” lightly. I think that the understanding of “serious science” with which many sociologists labor actually inhibits taking emotions seriously. The idea that inquiry into emotions may be frivolous is reinforced, perhaps, by the frivolity with which many in cultural studies play with ideas of emotion, evoking more than explaining. But a somewhat deeper reason for the resistance lies in the implicit behaviorism absorbed by many sociologists, the notion that emotions are by their nature vague references to unobservable inner states. Just as Robert Wuthnow proposed that mainstream sociology would accept only a sociology of culture that moved “beyond the problem of meaning,” so many sociologists fear any approach to emotions that depends on interpretation. Never mind that all knowledge depends on interpretation; it is less disguised in most serious work on culture and emotions than in other lines of sociological inquiry. Emotions seem less firmly observable than, say, incomes or voting (though it is not clear that they are less observable than class or power). Opening the theoretical door to emotions suggests sociological analysis in which anything goes, with explanations being offered on the basis of appeals to an introspective or interpretative black box labeled emotions. The fear is overdetermined, for the challenge is not just to epistemic practice, but to the sense of self-as-serious which undergirds the self-esteem of many sociologists. Last (at least for this list, though I have no doubt a longer one could be instructive) and certainly not least, studies of emotions raise the specter of psychologism for many sociologists. Schooled in a somewhat one-sided reading of Durkheim, these fear (note: fear is an emotion) explanation of social phenomena by psychological factors. And what if epistemic reductionism led to reductions in power and resources, as psychology faculties grew at the expense of sociology?

Faced with these resistances, it seems to me important to affirm some commitments with regard to sociological inquiry into emotions. First, I think the importance of the sociological study of emotions lies
precisely in studying emotions sociologically, that is, not as an autonomously psychological or “internal” phenomenon which can be adduced as such to explain social phenomena. Emotions are both produced and shaped by social interaction and cultural understanding. But we have to be cautious here. We will lose something of the specific idea of emotions if we lose touch with their bodily dimension. Second, what we need is not just a sociology of emotions, but an integration of emotions into sociological understanding, explanation, observation, and theory more generally. Such an integration would not only avoid compartmentalization; it would avoid the tendency to bring emotions into explanation as a supplement or corrective to an explanation conceived initially in terms of a largely emotion-free sociological theory. Third, we need to approach emotions within a critical theoretical perspective. I do not mean that we should privilege a particular school of thought, claiming say that Horkheimer and Adorno did a better job with emotions than anyone else. Rather, I mean that we need to approach emotions not in a spirit of simple positivity—not simply affirming “Hey! Emotions exist! Emotions are important! Emotions have this or that effect” but inquiring critically into the difficulties of observing and thinking about emotions, the implications of the history of thought that lies behind some of the habitual ways in which we do so, and the ways in which ordinary language is fraught with biases. To cite only one glaring example, among the attractive contributions of sociological study of emotions could be a challenge to or reconsideration of the ubiquitous tacit assumption of a mind/body dualism. This will only take place, however, if we pay critical attention to that assumption, its history, and the way it is embedded in our theories, language, and perceptions. Indeed, the power of that assumption may be one of the reasons why it is so hard to get emotions onto the analytic center stage: they simply cannot be grasped well in terms of that dichotomy.

More generally, a number of issues—and constitutive oppositions—shape the intellectual heritage and habits with which we must grapple in pursuing a better integration of emotions into movement studies. Opening the New York University conference on which this book is based, Jim Jasper described the event not just in terms of advancing an intersection between two subfields, movements and emotions, but in terms of setting out “in search of new visions, images, and language” for the study of social movements. This quest is important not simply because the field has gotten a bit stale (which it has) but because the founding definition of the field is directly hostile to grasping emotions well.
There seems little doubt about the importance of emotions to movement participation and to the shaping of collective action and specific events. Alas, there is equally little doubt about the minimal place accorded emotions in the leading theories within the field. Emotions were banished from the study of social movements, to a very large extent, in reaction against a tradition of collective behavior analysis that ran from Le Bon through Turner and Killian and Neil Smelser. This older tradition approached collective behavior mainly from the outside, as something that irrational others engaged in. When attention turned to movements (not merely episodes) and to struggles with which analysts had sympathy (and in which they might engage themselves), the perspective changed. The argument that we should think in terms of collective action (not just behavior) marked that shift of perspective, opening up an internal analysis of something that “people like us” might do. It was seen as rational in the sense of reasonable, self-aware product of choice as well as (more narrowly) strategic, interest-based, calculated in terms of efficient means to an end. The new framing of the problem also suggested a redefinition of the range of appropriate objects of study. Under the label “collective action,” social scientists grouped protests together with trade struggles, the insurgencies of labor together with the attempts of capitalists to control prices. Even more, the study of social movements—enduring, concerted action, often carefully planned and supported by substantial formal organization—encouraged an opposition to explanations of specific events of collective behavior as explicable by socio-psychological processes. With the bathwater of some very serious biases, the baby of emotions was commonly thrown out. It is hard to get emotions back into the field partly because they were not merely neutrally absent from it but expelled in an intellectual rebellion that helped to give the field its definition.

At the same time, I would like us to recall how old an issue in social science we are addressing. Certainly, as I suggested above, we cannot understand this issue (and the resistance to thinking it through, and certain of the odd formulations that have resulted) without seeing how it builds on problematic foundations, such as mind/body dualism. Already basic for Plato, this dualism takes a distinctively influential form in Epicurus’s teachings that we must treat our bodies as external in much the same way we treat other people, farm animals, and volcanoes. What is internal is clearly mind. Augustine opened up the space of this interior to the self, but continued the emphasis on control over body—and emo-
tions. On top of this come distinctions like rational/irrational, motive/action, individual/social. The point is simply that we cannot start into the effort to think emotions better without grappling with the heritage that has produced the very idea of emotions—and the distinction of these from reason. The tradition of reasoning which we inherit, in other words, has been built in part by putting emotions in a specific and contained place. This has been resisted, by Romantics, Freudians, mystics, and post-modernists. But it has not been escaped. It thus structures how we approach our more specific problem of providing a place for emotions in the study of social movements.

Most contributors to this volume have tacitly situated their attempts to bring emotions back in as either a challenge or an amendment to the reigning conventional wisdoms of political process theory, resource mobilization, and rational choice. Of course, approaches are not identical, but what they share in common is a more or less instrumental approach to questions of collective action. Instrumental thinking is dominant in the field because of the specific post-1960s struggles that have defined it, but it exists and has the intellectual power it has because of a much longer history linking reason to control (including control over emotions).

Some presenters have simply wished to amend such an instrumental approach by suggesting that among the things movement organizers need to manage, among the tactics for mobilization they may employ, among the strategies they may use against their enemies, emotions and their manipulation ought to figure more prominently. Others have seen attention to emotions as more of a challenge to instrumental approaches. At least tacitly, they have suggested that emotions alert us to different ways in which movement participants are motivated, achieve solidarity with each other, and shape their actions.

Bedeviling this discussion is a tendency to see emotions as somehow “irrational,” either explicitly or simply implicitly because of the opposition to “rationalistic” analytic approaches. We would do well to remember that passions figured quite strongly alongside interests in the founding of modern utilitarianism and instrumental political analysis. Frank Dobbin (see chap. 4 of this volume) mentions Hirschman’s analysis of the rhetorical shift by which passions were for many analysts and whole disciplines such as economics transmuted into interests. But for Machiavelli, Hobbes, and even Bentham, passions remained directly and in their own right a focus of attention. They saw human action as shaped fundamentally by passions, they saw a need to tame and organize passions, they saw passions shaping the otherwise inexplicable source of differences in
what people found pleasurable and painful without which a utilitarian calculus could not be put in motion.

It is helpful also to remember Adam Smith’s (1984 [1759]) devotion to a “theory of moral sentiments” and in general the extent to which the Scottish moralists were concerned with historical, cultural, and social structural variations in the ways in which emotional bonds and lines of conflict were institutionalized. Alongside their development of a notion of civil society they brought forward a notion of common sense, by which they meant not simply a lowest common denominator of reason but a capacity to achieve common understanding shaped by feeling as well as thinking.6

A key distinction between emotions and interests in this discourse concerns relations to morality. Arguments from interests have commonly suggested that morality is a matter of “mere ought,” with no material force. One of the advantages to taking emotions seriously is to see better how moral norms and injunctions come to have force. This helps us thus to distinguish the compelling from the good—in either the sense of interests and their many goods, or of morality as only an abstract ideal. This is not to say that mere strength of emotions constitutes a basis for moral judgment. Rather, as Charles Taylor (1989) has suggested, we come to know the higher goods that define us as persons and bring order to our moral judgments by reflecting on our strongest responses.

II

With this in mind, we would do well to ask more clearly, “emotions in relation to what else”? The answer may not be interests. Attachment to money or power or the other sort of resources that some movement analysts treat as objective interests is as much a matter of emotion—as the classical utilitarians saw—as attachment to one’s nation or one’s children. The question for them in each case was the extent to which one pursued the ends thus given with means provided by reason.

An alternative but closely related distinction would contrast emotions to cognition. This has the advantage of removing the implication that thinking always results in some normatively understood achievement of “rationality.” Here, however, I would raise two other concerns: (1) How fully can we separate cognition and emotion? (2) Don’t we need a third category to complement them, that of perception?

It seems to me a good case could be made that much of what we are seeking to do is to bring the relationship among cognition, emotion,
and perception to the forefront of our attention. If this is right, we are also presumably challenging not one but two of sociology’s long-standing resistances: to cultural and psychological analysis. Any serious sociology of emotions must be more than an ad hoc call to look at the additional variable of “emotionality.” It requires frameworks for bringing intrapsychic and cultural dimensions of meaning and action into clear relationship with social organization.

I suspect that few who have read this far are likely to question the virtue of paying serious attention to culture in the production of meaning and identity. Intrapsychic factors are another matter. It is interesting how many psychoanalytic concepts are imported into the sociology of emotions with how little attention to a psychoanalytic framework of analysis. I want to mention just one important instance from the conference on which this book is based. Someone asked from the floor the question “if emotions are being managed, what is doing the managing?” The question seemed to stop conversation, puzzle the presenter, and pose a challenge. One answer—that for example of Epictetus as I cited him above—might be self, in the sense in which self is sharply distinguished from body, and passions relegated to the latter. This is not an answer most moderns feel at ease with, however, having incorporated into our notion of self the idea that we are constituted partly by our feelings, and that we reveal ourselves by expressing an inner, significantly emotional, nature (Taylor 1989). Psychoanalysis suggests a different answer, based on the internal differentiation of psychic faculties (though the term faculties may be contested).

Psychoanalysis suggests a complex view of intrapsychic relations, in which the challenges of balancing and organizing relations among drives and emotions, inhibitions and repressions, indeed, pleasures and pains, are assigned to a distinct faculty of selfhood—the ego. I do not want to argue a case here for ego-analysis as opposed to other psychoanalytic schools (indeed, some others like object-relations may be better at other sociological tasks, like grasping cultural variations). Indeed, my point is not to argue for psychoanalysis as such, but for the idea that if we are to be serious about emotions, we should think about them with the aid of models of intrapsychic processes that do justice to their complexity. While we may have good reason analytically to distinguish emotions from cognition and perception, we also have good reason to see each influencing the other.

It is worth asking why emotions so automatically seem opposed to cognition and interests? I suggest the answer lies in one of Western cul-
nature’s pervasive dualistic constructions. Think of the analogies among these paired oppositions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>thinking</th>
<th>feeling</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>mind</td>
<td>body</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>public</td>
<td>private</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>male</td>
<td>female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>pride</td>
<td>shame</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>controlled</td>
<td>uncontrolled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>conscious</td>
<td>unconscious</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>higher</td>
<td>lower</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>outer</td>
<td>inner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>individuating</td>
<td>general (or shared)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Predominant usage has placed the positive valance on the first in each pair, but of course this can be reversed—as it has been by Rousseau, Romantics, and many of us since the 1960s:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>inauthentic</th>
<th>authentic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>artificial</td>
<td>natural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>repressive</td>
<td>expressive</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The short but difficult moral to this story is that in order to do a really good job studying the place of emotions in social movements (as of movements in social life), we need to try to transcend, not reproduce, the pervasive dualism. Indeed, it is partly because emotions appear usually on the embarrassing side of the dichotomy that they have been understudied by those who would take movements seriously rather than treat them only as instances of deviant collective behavior in which norms against emotional short-circuiting break down. At the same time, we need to understand how the dualism itself affects the ways in which people deploy notions of both reason and emotion. In seeking to transcend it in our own work, we should not fail to attend to its efficacy in structuring the movements we study.

III

So far, like many of the contributors to this volume, I have been speaking of emotions more or less as a group. This is a problem, however, since one of the first answers to the question I asked a few moments ago—“emotions in relation to what else?”—ought to be, “other emotions.” We
need to differentiate and specify emotions, and see that it is every bit as much of a challenge to relate them to each other as to cognition or perception.

I do not propose to try to list all the emotions from anger to fear, shame to hate, joy to love, thrill to pride. I do want to add a couple of suggestions: (1) These work differently from each other. (2) There are patterns and challenges in relating these to each other, and these may be very important for movement analyses. Some emotions may get in the way of others; some may specifically call forth others. Whether we choose psychoanalysis or Heise’s affect control theory or Heider’s earlier balance theory, we need to see the ways in which people not only have emotions but have many emotions with dynamic relations among them. It seems to me that movement activity is often shaped not just by a single pervasive emotional source but by participants’ shifting emotional orientations—as they express hatred, for example, and feel needs to balance it with more solidaristic emotions.

This is one place where the idea of an “emotional habitus,” which Anne Kane introduced with a lineage from Elias, Bourdieu, and de Sousa, may be helpful. People do not simply display characteristic emotions, but have characteristic ways of relating emotions to each other, and of relating emotions to cognition and perception. These involve a sense of how to act, how to play the game, that is never altogether conscious or purely reducible to rules—even when it seems strategic. Moreover, I think we should probably follow Bourdieu in seeing the habitus as a result of the individual’s inscription into social relationships, not as something altogether portable and interior to the individual.

IV

One of the problems with the pervasive dualism in Western thinking about emotions is that it keeps locating emotions inside individuals. It leads us to look for their roots in biographical experience or perhaps in biochemical reactions in their brains. Sociology should remind us to look also at social relations. As the concept of habitus suggests, emotions are produced and organized—played out—in interpersonal relations. These are both immediate, and emotions are particularly important in directly interpersonal dynamics, but also indirect. We maintain emotional relationships to large-scale organizations and whole fields of relationships—from our kin to business worlds and social movements.

This is not just a matter of noting that organizations call on us to perform emotional labor, though this is true. It is also a matter of the
way in which we invest ourselves in and achieve our identities through emotional relationships to other people and complex organizations.

We are in danger of a sort of “sampling on the dependent variable” in studies of emotions. We see emotions as contrary to cognition, disruptions in organizational processes, challenges to stable institutions. I would suggest, however, that institutions, and organizations, and relationships all gain their relative stability in part from people’s emotional investments in them. In other words, we have huge emotional investments in the everyday status quo. It may look like we are relatively unemotional as we go about our tasks, but disrupt the social structure in which we work, and our emotional investments in it will become evident. From different theoretical foundations, Scheff (1997) has offered a not altogether dissimilar analysis of shame as a response to threats to rupture the social bond.

What this means for us as students of social movements is that we need to be careful not to ascribe emotions to movements as though everyday maintenance of social structures were not equally a matter of emotions. In addition, this point focuses attention on a range of emotions—or at least patterns in emotions—which have to do with the nature of social relationships as such. A sociology of emotions ought to help us to understand commitment, trust, security, and investment as well as anger, shame, and joy. If we see emotions only in connection with disruptions to social life, we shall exaggerate the importance of certain emotional dynamics and miss others.

Relatedly, this should focus our attention on the link between a sociology of emotions and the politics of identity. The latter is not simply a matter of pointing to multicultural variations, but of seeing the centrality of problems of recognition. Any structure of social relations extends to those who live within it some degree of occasion for recognizing themselves through their social relationships. But this is variable; social movements arise with recognition as one of their goals precisely for this reason. But this is not because those who are not recognized become emotional, while those who are recognized remain reasonable. The emotions are bound up in the whole field and organization of relations from the beginning.

Here we should also consider a range of other problematic oppositions which we sometimes treat as ontologically given, and therefore as automatically useful in analysis rather than in need of continual critical examination: individual/collective, nation/individual, and structure/culture, among others.

Paying attention to emotional investments in everyday social struc-
tures should help us understand (among other things) why predictability reduces fear (e.g., why nonstate violence may be more threatening than state violence).

V

Having suggested that we should watch out for seeing emotions only in relation to social disruptions, I want to return in closing to some specific points about social movements.

Because they involve steps outside ordinary structural routines, social movements do indeed make emotions prominent. This is one of the points to Victor Turner’s (1969) idea of liminality. It would be a mistake to view this as simply a matter of “breakdown” theories of collective action, however. In the first place, the claim is not that collective action arises because of a breakdown in normative order, but that nonroutine action removes some of the everyday social relationships in which emotions are invested stably and gives occasion for the workings of other emotions or other patterns in the appearance of emotions. Secondly, as Turner emphasizes, emotions may be organized through ritual. They do not simply arise and run amok when conventional repressions are lifted. What are expressed in ritualized occasions for liminality are often reversals of conventional norms. This may be emotionally cathartic, but that is precisely because emotions were already invested in the existing norms (and the usual patterns of repression).

Social movements differ greatly, however, in the extent to which they involve steps outside established routines and normative organizations of emotions. We must make more of this. It is touched on under the rubric of “high-risk mobilizations,” but this is only one issue. To a considerable extent in the modern world, social movements have become normal, everyday routines. We need more clearly to distinguish those that are not. One problem in this is the investment many movement analysts (especially those broadly sympathetic to the movements of the 1960s) made in seeing movement activity as rational and reasonable rather than deviant, as many collective behavior analysts had presented it.

Social movements also differ in the extent to which and manner in which they build new normative structures for emotions. Nancy Whittier pointed to aspects of this in her account of movement participants’ learning how to manage emotional expression. It goes beyond this, however, to other variables.

Movements produce emotions; they do not simply reflect emotional orientations brought to them by members. This goes beyond evoking
emotions to attract members to recurrently reproducing them in order to secure commitment, maintain shared meanings, and indeed, offer the “high” of emotional release as a “selective incentive” to their participants. Recurrent occasions for “peak” emotional engagement may be more or less ritualized and more or less consciously managed by movement leaders. There may be a pattern of escalation in the kinds of emotional engagements required to keep movement participation exciting. Just as crowds may have to get bigger to keep attracting news media, emotional catharses may be escalated to keep attracting participation—and this is potentially dangerous, as it often propels movements towards climactic confrontations.9

The issue is not just extent of emotional engagement, though, but the kind of balancing involved, as for example fear-inducing confrontations with police call for solidarity-affirming communal experiences. We should not forget the extent to which the emotional dynamics of movements are driven by fatigue as well as excitement.10 This may be easy for a reader to recognize, and a sign to an author to stop writing.

Notes

1. For a prominent example, see Scheff 1997. Other noteworthy analysts also developed theory bridging sociology and psychology (in different ways). David Heise’s affect control theory, of which the core text is Understanding Events: Affect and the Construction of Social Action (1979), is an original extension of Heider’s balance theory, among other sources, and is among the foremost contemporary efforts to develop a formal theory of emotions that is clearly social as well as psychological. Several sociologists have sought to advance psychoanalytic psychology and sociology at the same time, notably Chodorow 1999, Smelser 1999, and Chancer 1992. The three represent different psychoanalytic as well as sociological traditions.


3. And, as Gary Marx (1972) once suggested, deserved to be abandoned because it ran from these academic sources through to unsavory political responses to protest. He dubbed this account of crowd action as socio-psychological short-circuiting “the Gustave LeBon–Ronald Reagan ‘mad dog’ image” of collective behavior.

4. Mancur Olson’s Theory of Collective Action (1965) played an important role in this reframing of the field of resemblances, as well in specific analyses.

5. See Albert Hirschman’s (1977) famous recovery of this dimension of moral philosophy at the moment when it gave birth to political economy. See also Louis Dumont’s (1982) account of how this process was tied to the distinctively Western construction of the individual.

6. Hutcheson (2000 [1728], 1919) is the crucial figure here.

7. On this, see the many contributions both of the Tavistock school of organiza-
tion and of group analysts who were influenced heavily by object relations psychoanalytic thought (e.g., Bion 1961; Miller and Rice 1967). Note also how this was related (albeit somewhat speculatively) to the formation of religious movements by Philip Slater (1967).

8. See Gutman 1994, especially the lead essay by Charles Taylor; also Calhoun 1993b.

9. I discussed one instance of this in my analysis of the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests in China (Calhoun 1995b).

Chapter Three

A Structural Approach to Social Movement Emotions

Theodore D. Kemper

Social movements are awash in emotions. Anger, fear, envy, guilt, pity, shame, awe, passion, and other feelings play a part either in the formation of social movements, in their relations with their targets who are either antagonists or possible collaborators, and in the lives of potential recruits and members. Without the emotions engaged in movement environments, dynamics, and structure, it would be hard to explain how social movements arise, amass critical levels of support, maintain such support in long-enduring campaigns in the face of often intense opposition, and provide means for recruiting and sustaining supporters, both as active members and as favorably disposed publics and bystanders. Unquestionably, understanding the dynamics of emotions clarifies social movement dynamics.

Social movement researchers who are interested in examining the emotional elements of movement issues cannot be expected to be expert both in social movements and in emotions theory. The modern segmentation of scientific fields generally inhibits such types of dual competence. This chapter is intended to supply a brief grounding in what is termed a structural approach to emotions, which is particularly suited to a multiplicity of emotion-related questions that social movement researchers and theorists are likely to confront.

Modern sociological theories of emotions of potential interest to social movement researchers are of two main types: cultural and struc-
tural, a division that Goodwin and Jasper (1999) assert marks the general field of social movement studies itself. Cultural theories of emotions (Hochschild 1979, 1983; Gordon 1990; Stearns and Stearns 1986) are generally concerned with such questions as: What are the norms for emotions in given populations in given situations, i.e., what emotions are prescribed and are at least modal in given groups? What changes have occurred in such norms over time? And what social conditions give rise to such changes? These are important and valid questions about emotions that apply in many contexts of interest to social movement researchers, as Jasper (1998) has shown.

A structural approach to emotions, by contrast, examines social structural conditions to explain why specific emotions are either prevalent or likely to arise as the structural conditions either change or continue as before. The structural approach to emotions presents a broad foundation of empirically supported grounds for examining many questions about social movement structure and dynamics.

**A Structural Approach to Emotions**

A structural approach to emotions derives from the following proposition: A very large class of emotions results from real, anticipated, recollected, or imagined outcomes of social relationships (Kemper 1978a: 43). This is a general statement, but it is easily seen how it applies to social movement issues. For example, what kinds of social relational conditions provoke the emotions that ripen the grounds for social movement emergence or recruitment? What kinds of social relational conditions produce emotions that enable social movements to obtain concessions from targets or opponents? What kinds of social relational conditions favor emotions that enable social movements to recruit members to take on often difficult tasks and to sustain them during periods of scant movement success? What kinds of social relational conditions lead to the emotions that signify a waning of social movement support? These and many similar questions entail consideration of the emotional matrix that the social relational conditions engender. A structural theory of emotions supplies a useful point of entry to the examination of these questions.

It should be apparent that the above general proposition on social relations and emotions is valuable only if the social relational conditions can be specified. Here, the structural theory is particularly fortunate in having available a strong empirical generalization to support a useful model of social relations for present purposes. A truly impressive number of studies in a variety of domains have remarkably converged on a limited
number of dimensions of social relations. These dimensions derive from observation in social psychology laboratories, surveys of behavior in a variety of populations, cross-cultural analyses, examinations of underlying semantic dimensions of scores of languages, and have an unusual and persuasive degree of ethological support. Physiological processes are also linked via the emotions to the relational dimensions (see Collins 1975; Kemper 1978a, 1978b; Heise 1979; Kemper and Collins 1990; Kemper 1991). Macrostructures and macroprocesses, both within and between societies, and including issues pertinent to social movements, such as class as well as international conflict, support this model of relationships (Kemper 1992; Kemper and Collins 1990).

The foregoing research has settled on two major dimensions of relationship: power and status. Variation in these basic relational or structural conditions, as will be presented below, can explain a very large class of human emotions. Power, which is of central interest to social movement researchers, is defined in the structural theory of emotions as the process, or (when the process leads to more or less stable and predictable outcomes) the relationship or structure, within which one actor is able to realize his or her interests in interaction with another actor, even over the opposition of the other actor (cf. Weber 1946: 181). In power relations, one actor’s compliance with the wishes or demands of another actor is involuntary. Behaviorally, power entails the full panoply of coercive actions and manipulations, ranging from threat and intimidation to violence, both physical and verbal; from deprivation of simple attention and access to social rewards conventional in a culture to deprivation of major life-sustaining resources, such as adequate nutrition, shelter, and means to maintain health. More subtle types of power use include lies, deceptions, and manipulations designed to overcome resistance covertly. A borderline type of power, of particular relevance to students of social movements, is the tactical use of nonviolence. In nonviolence, which appears at first glance not to be a power mechanism, the coercive impact derives either from the threat of the relatively massive number of those who congregate to engage in nonviolent protest, thus straining the control (counterpower) resources of the opposition (frequently government) toward which the nonviolent protest is directed, or by the fact that the nonviolence enlists the legal or moral standards of the opposition, thus evoking guilt or shame, to nullify its ability to act forcefully against the nonviolent protesters. Clearly, power is a tool that is used pandemically in society, both by dominant groups and by social movements seeking to overthrow them.

Power is also prevalent in institutionalized settings, but it is care-
fully delimited by formal or informal law, and, by virtue of this, it be-comes authority. Authority is marked by legitimacy, which means that those under the scope of the authority agree to abide by requests or com-mands that are understood to be within the range of delimited power. With respect to the emotions that power engenders, authority is a grey area, since authority holders and those subject to authority often disagree about the boundary between legitimate and illegitimate commands, and what constitutes coercion.

Status-accord (or status, in brief), the second relational dimension, is the form of relationship in which one actor willingly complies with the actual or supposed interests or wishes of another actor, without threat, intimidation, or coercion, and without an expected quid pro quo, such as occurs in relations of social exchange. Thus one actor accords status to another actor by esteeming and valuing the other, verbally and/or ma-terially; by defending the other actor’s interests; by seeking opportunities for the other actor; or by contributing in a variety of ways available in the culture to the other actor’s well-being. Not surprisingly, the ultimate of such status-accord is what many would define as love, i.e., where one actor actually or potentially accords another actor an unlimited amount of status. This could include giving one’s life to protect and defend the loved one, or suffering any deprivation to save the loved one from depriva-tion. Most human relationships, despite occasional peaks, are restricted to relatively moderate levels of both power and status.

Power and status relations can be conceptualized as behavior or as structure. If considered as behavior, they comprise all of the types of indicative behavior referred to above. But behaviors tend over time to lead to structures, so that the behavior itself may vanish in some respect from the relational setting. For example, after a series of power encoun-ters in which one actor consistently defeats another actor, the defeated one may end his or her resistance and the ongoing interaction no longer manifests the types of power behaviors, e.g., threat and violence, that occurred during the defining period. But now the relationship is a stable, largely uncontested structure, in which the more powerful actor can have his or her wishes more often satisfied by the less powerful actor, even though the latter does not wish to do so, but without any manifest sign of power behavior. In the discussion of emotion below, we will deal with both the behavioral and the structural implications of power and status for emotion.

Although power is a manifest concern in social movement analysis, status may seem to have less relevance. But this is to miss the fact that social movements are not always on the “firing line,” so to speak. A sub-
substantial amount of social movement interaction is internal, thus oriented
toward the satisfaction of its members, or collaborative, and thus orien-
ted toward organizations and publics whose sympathy and support it
hopes to recruit. In these domains, status concerns are paramount. No
social movement can succeed through coercion of its, at least nominally,
voluntary members, or by alienating its potential public supporters,
whose mobilization in any degree is a victory over the opposition.

Power and status relations also give rise to emotions. Rephrasing
the proposition at the head of this section, we can say that a very large
class of emotions results from real, anticipated, recollected, and imagined
outcomes of power and status relations. That is, individual or collective
actors engage in social, i.e., power and status, relations with other actors,
and one result of those interactions is emotion—in both actors. To move
from the general statement to specific emotions, we can specify the fol-
lowing about social relations as modeled by the power and status dimen-
sions.

In a relationship between actor A and actor B (actors may be indi-
viduals or collectivities), every interaction between them has a number
of potential relational outcomes: actor A’s power can rise, fall, or remain
the same; actor B’s power can rise, fall, or remain the same; actor A’s
status can rise, fall, or remain the same; and actor B’s status can rise, fall,
or remain the same. This sums to twelve possible outcomes. Four of these
will actually occur as outcomes of any given interaction between A and
B, reflecting the change (and/or stability) in the power and status standing
of the two actors.

What does it mean to say that power or status rises or falls? Power
in the relational or structural sense results from successful power acts.
These acts obtain compliance from another actor through overcoming
that actor’s resistance by invoking fear of the consequences of noncompli-
ance. A louder, more insistent voice may sometimes suffice as an effective
power act, or it may be a forceful physical blow, or a threat of greater
deprivation, and so on. These elevate or enlarge the scope of one actor’s
power over another actor. Power declines or falls when one actor is able
to withstand whatever power acts are directed against him or her, and
thus is less constrained to comply with the first actor’s demands. Status
rises when one actor confers, or is willing to confer, more esteem, atten-
tion, deference, material and symbolic goods, and so on, on the other.
Status decline is, of course, the reverse process. 3

Crucially, each of the twelve possible relational outcomes detailed
above can be linked to an emotion. This alerts us to three important
considerations about social relations and emotions: (1) Emotional space is not unidimensional, i.e., one emotion per interaction; rather, each interaction generates a multiplicity of emotions, although not all of them will necessarily be intense, or experienced simultaneously. (2) We must be aware of mixed emotions, in the sense that a given actor’s power-status outcomes can have both a positive and a negative element, for example, an actor’s status may decline, but power may remain constant, though it was expected to decline. In many instances, there will be a dominant emotion and this will be one the social movement analyst will be most concerned with, but the structural approach allows for recognition of nondominant emotions. Some of these can operate to intensify or moderate the dominant emotion. (3) Actors have emotions not only about their own power and status outcomes but also about the power and status outcomes of the other actor. Thus, each actor experiences four emotions, two regarding his or her own power and status outcomes and two regarding the other actor’s power and status outcomes. Reducing this complexity somewhat is the contraction of effects in the power domain: The emotions relating to the power of self and of other are generally reciprocal. Thus, if one’s own power rises, it produces the same emotion as when the other actor’s power falls. If the other actor’s power rises, it produces the same emotion as when one’s own power falls.

What emotions follow from the outcomes of power and status relations?

**Own Power**

1. When one’s own power rises, this gives rise to a feeling of safety and security, since it warrants that one is less vulnerable to the power of the other, should the other use his or her power. But when the rise in power results from one’s own excess use of power, the resulting emotion is guilt. That is, guilt results from sensing that one has wronged another, by employing to excess any of the manifold ways that power can be wielded. Clearly, it requires applying a moral or legal standard to come to such a judgment about one’s use of power. (Guilt stems from power use and is different from shame, which is discussed below.) On the other hand, even a very great use of power, when deemed legitimate by the power user, can produce satisfaction as well as security, as when one has overwhelmed an enemy or defeated someone deemed evil.

2. When one’s own power falls, this gives rise to fear or anxiety, since it warrants that one is more vulnerable to the power moves of the
other actor. When one’s own power falls, but not as much as was anticipated, this gives rise to cautious optimism or hope.

3. When one’s own power remains the same, the emotions depend on prior expectations and desires for the outcome. If expectations were for higher power, then stability engenders both disappointment and some anxiety, although not as much as when power falls. If on the other hand, expectations were for decline, then the emotions include security, although not as much as when power rises, as well as cautious optimism or hope.

From a social movement perspective, a common relational issue is not rising or falling power, but stable low power relative to the dominant opponent. Emotions in such circumstances may be considerably muted, with only a low level of the kind of discontent that is usually a precursor to movement emergence. Instead, the generally deprived state may lead to pervasive apathy and depression.

Own Status

1. When one’s own status rises (this happens when the other has accorded more status than previously), this gives rise to a complex of positive emotions: satisfaction, happiness, or pleasure, depending on how much status the other accorded; liking for the other, again depending on how much status the other accorded; pride, depending on whether the status was accorded for an attainment or achievement. But there is also the possibility that one will feel dissatisfied and unhappy, and will dislike the other despite the fact that the other has accorded status. This will be true when one expected even more status than was accorded. On the other hand, expectations can produce a positive multiplier when the status one received was more than one expected.

2. When one’s own status falls (the other has withdrawn status he or she previously accorded, or has accorded less than was promised or expected), this also gives rise to a complex of emotions, in this case, negative ones: disappointment, anger, depression, and shame, and dislike for the other, depending both on the amount of the shortfall of status accord and on the sense of agency, i.e., who caused the shortfall. Disappointment and anger result when the actor deems the other the agent—the willing, knowing actor who failed to accord sufficient status. Depression results when the loss of status is deemed to be irremediable, somewhat like Fate, or in the nature of things. For example, the other is dead, or has broken off the relationship and will no longer provide status.
Anger and depression are thus both possible, since the other may be
deemed the agent, and the case may be irremediable. Shame results when
one is oneself the agent of the loss of status. That is, although the other
must still be the active depriver, one senses one is oneself the cause of
the deprivation. Basically, shame results from the recognition (and con-
firmation) of the fact that one has not acted in a manner to deserve one’s
usual due of status, or that one has acted in an unworthy manner. In
its focus on status, shame differs from guilt and its focus on the power
dimension.

3. When one’s own status remains stable, the emotional outcome
depends on expectations and desires. If they were for increase, the emo-
tion is disappointment or anger; if they were for decline, then the emotion
is satisfaction and perhaps gratitude toward the other; if they were for
stability, the emotion is likely to be muted.

Other’s Power

1. When the other’s power rises, it gives rise to fear or anxiety.
Understandably, these are the same emotions as when one’s own power
falls. Although power relations in the structural model are not zero-sum,
the emotions related to rise and fall are equivalent to what they would
be were the zero-sum model to apply.

2. When the other’s power falls, it gives rise to safety and security,
the same emotions as when one’s own power rises.

3. When the other’s power remains the same, the emotion depends
on what was expected or desired. If decline in the other’s power was
expected, then disappointment and anxiety arise. If rise in the other’s
power was expected, this gives rise to a feeling of relief. If stability was
expected, then the emotion is muted.

Other’s Status

1. In the power-status relational model, when the other’s status
rises, it is due to one’s own accord of status to the other. As discussed
above, this is voluntary. Since one desires to accord more status, satisfac-
tion or pleasure ensues from doing so and in having evidence of success
in doing so. (Since the structural model treats one relational exchange at
a time, it requires a second analysis to examine the emotions of actor A
when actor B does not acknowledge or express appreciation after actor
A has accorded increased status to actor B. Actor B may have expected
more status and thus be disappointed or angry. But from actor A’s point
TABLE 1  Power and Status Sources of Emotions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Emotions</th>
<th>Relational Sources of Emotions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Safety, security</td>
<td>Own power increases, or other’s power decreases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fear, anxiety</td>
<td>Own power decreases, or other’s power increases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guilt</td>
<td>One has used power in excess</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust</td>
<td>Confidence other will not use power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfaction, happiness,</td>
<td>Other accords status</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pleasure</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pride</td>
<td>Status is accorded for one’s achievement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anger, resentment</td>
<td>Other withdraws status</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shame</td>
<td>One is not worthy of the amount of status accorded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Depression</td>
<td>Irremediable loss of status</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liking</td>
<td>Directed to other who gives status</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contempt, disgust</td>
<td>Directed to other who claims more than deserved status</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Envy</td>
<td>Desire for same high status accorded to other by a third party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dislike</td>
<td>Directed to other who gives less status than one deserves</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disappointment</td>
<td>Power or status gain less than expected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relief</td>
<td>Power or status loss less than expected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Optimism/hope</td>
<td>Anticipation of improvement in power or status standing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consternation</td>
<td>Power or status loss much greater than expected</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

of view, actor B’s failure to acknowledge or appreciate would constitute a loss of status for actor A—his or her gift of more status was taken for granted, or treated as unimportant.) Ordinarily, one increases another actor’s status within a context of either liking or loving, that is, a strong positive feeling toward the other is already present. (Liking and loving are different emotions and stem from different relational conditions [see Kemper 1989 for details].)

2. When the other actor’s status falls, it is because one has reduced the amount of status accorded to the other. This usually occurs within a context of anger or retaliation against the other for power acts or status-withdrawal acts (real or imagined) by the other actor. Satisfaction in anticipation of the other actor’s disappointment is highly likely. Dislike
is also prevalent in such a situation, but because the other actor may retaliate, there is also some anxiety about his or her impending use of counterpower.

3. When the other actor’s status remains stable, it usually evokes little or no emotion, since it is a routine situation, with no resonance. On the other hand, if one is aware that the other expected an increase in status, then the same emotional spectrum as in 2 above is likely.

This concludes the presentation of the major emotions that the structural model predicts from an examination of power and status relational outcomes. Table 1 summarizes the results. Other power-status related emotions will emerge in the discussion below. We turn now to implications for social movements.

**Structural Emotions Applied to Social Movements**

The structural approach to emotions allows social movement researchers to approach their data and research sites with improved understanding of the dynamic conditions under observation. Some applications follow.

**Types of Discontent**

It is well known that social movements often arise from a sense of grievance and/or of injustice. This points toward status issues between some who deny adequate status to others and others who feel they are denied the amount of status they deserve. The main emotion of the denied is anger. But this says nothing about the power dimension and its main emotion, namely fear. When fear is high along with anger, the emotional resultant is hate (Kemper 1978a: 124). This is another order of magnitude in the spectrum of negative emotions and can become the basis for extremely violent actions, including terrorism, assassinations, and other means of punishing or overthrowing the opponent. Social movements often splinter on the basis of such tactics and the emotions underlying them. Where fear dominates, anger is less likely to lead to violence. Where anger dominates, then fear tends to be suppressed. Leaders then require considerable courage and willingness to endure extreme punishment if they are taken by the opposition. The resulting actions often then define the movement for a considerable time to come, either as a violent fraction, e.g., the Irish Republican Army, or a more mainstream move-
ment that keeps at least within sight of the boundary between what is legitimate and what is prohibited. Social movement researchers who study nascent movements can gauge which way a movement is likely to develop based on whether status or power issues are at stake for members. Different membership segments may reflect the prevalence of one or another emotion. This may occur also as a result of different attitudinal or cultural views of the opposition, e.g., their intentions, malignity, susceptibility to pressure, etc.

In some cases, the dearth of status may be long institutionalized, e.g., the denial of voting rights to blacks for many years in the South, and thus manifestations of power may tend to be few, although these are available to the deniers when needed. In such cases, anger is likely to be modest and fear muted. A social movement that wishes to change this state must contemplate that to raise consciousness of status-denial and to release its emotion, anger, will necessarily arouse relatively quiescent power relations, hence fear.

Discontent may also move individuals to join social movements even though they are not themselves subject to the deprivations the movement seeks to alleviate. The motive may be moral outrage or noblesse oblige. These are guilt and/or shame phenomena. At its simplest, the relational “other” in this emotional context is the group of intended beneficiaries. To fail to act in their behalf is to court feelings of having wronged them or having failed to act in a worthy, status-deserving manner with respect to them. In another scenario, the “other” in the relationship may be God, with whom one must keep emotionally straight so as to avoid guilt and/or shame.

**Emotions as the Manifest Symptom**

Often, emotions are the first line of observation in a situation that is ripe for social movement mobilization. Whether it is anger, fear, or apathy, these emotions derive from social relations that have achieved structural stability. Social movement organizers, and students of movements, can use the manifest emotions to read back to the power-status relations that give rise to them. This is important, since it is not the emotions but the structural conditions that give rise to them that are the target of the movement and the critical point for analysis by the researcher. Thus, examining emotions enables an assessment of (1) the important relational conditions of the problematic setting; (2) the efficacy of the means to be employed in changing the problematic conditions associated with unsatisfactory social relations of that setting; and (3) the degree of
success or failure, that is, whether the problematic relational conditions actually changed.

The Emotional Content of Framing

Jasper (1998) has pointed out that the frame alignment approach of Snow et al. (1986) must be more than simply cognitive, but also emotional to evoke social movement participation. But lacking a formal theory of emotions by means of which to examine framing techniques, Jasper is relegated to speculation. The structural approach to emotions can “read” the framing methods in their relational significance and hence lead directly to predicted emotions. Snow et al. present four types of frame alignment:

1. Frame bridging refers to the “linkage of two or more ideologically congruent but structurally unconnected frames regarding a particular issue or problem” (Snow et al. 1986: 467). Although this is stated as a cognitive issue, i.e., as ideology, the possibility of bridging occurs when separate groups have the same power and status relations, hence emotions, vis-à-vis a common other. This other can be government, an interest group, or semi-organized collectivities, such as Eastern liberals or the Christian right. One of the main emotional effects of bridging comes from the aggregation of members. This will ordinarily work in the power dimension, giving individual members a sense of greater, perhaps indomitable, strength and power, thus reducing fear and increasing security.

2. Frame amplification refers to “clarification and invigoration of an interpretive frame,” whether through “value” amplification or “belief” amplification (Snow et al. 1986: 469). In respect to values, Kemper (1992) has argued that the power-status model implies two central values: freedom (concerned with the power dimension and hence the relevant emotions of security and fear) and justice (concerned with the status dimension and hence the relevant emotions of satisfaction and anger). Any amplification of values can be analyzed in terms of the relational dimensions and the emotions they entail. Beliefs too are understandable as being about the prevailing relational dimensions: who has the power, the status, the authority, and how much? Changing beliefs thus entails not merely cognitive but emotional change as new relational conditions are entertained. Snow et al. (1986) do point out some of the emotional ramifications of changing beliefs about power and status relations with dominant groups, for example optimism when the power of the opposition is under-
stood to be lower than previously believed. A systematic power-status examination can reveal a full spectrum of pertinent emotions.

3. Frame extension refers to how a social movement extends “the boundaries of its framework so as to encompass interests or points of view that are incidental to its primary objectives but of considerable salience to potential adherents” (Snow et al. 1986: 472). Here the issue is how the movement extends its relational context to include new antagonists who arouse new cadres of potential supporters. It is a case of “the enemy of my enemy is my friend.” Ordinarily a social movement will attempt such a frame extension only when the new constituency does not also bring with it an enemy that overmatches the movement undertaking the extension.

4. Frame transformation refers to a reinterpretation of an existing understanding so that it instigates action among those who have been mainly quiescent (Snow et al. 1986: 474). Snow et al. speak of attributional processes, which are equivalent to agency as presented in the discussion of emotions above. Thus to redirect the understanding of agency is to reconstitute the emotions in the given relational setting. If one regards oneself as the agent of one’s own low status, the emotion is shame. But if one regards the other as agent, the emotion is anger. Frame transformation is essentially emotional transformation. The power-status model focuses attention on the relational conditions that evoke both the old and new emotions.

Bystander Emotions

Since no social movement recruits more than a small number of active members from its potential recruitment population, among the most important issues facing any social movement is how bystanders will regard it and its issues. Some bystanders will reject the movement as a threat to their interests, even though the movement intends to speak in the name of such persons. Others will remain moderately interested in the aims and activities of the movement, but without extending themselves even as far as making a monetary contribution. Yet the sentiment of such bystanders can be crucial to a movement’s success. Here the issue may become one of which emotion to engender in such a population, and to what degree? The distinction between shame and guilt applies importantly here.

Shame results from status considerations, e.g., am I worthy of the status I claim from others? Guilt on the other hand results from power
considerations, e.g., what I did (or didn’t do) harmed another person and was wrong. As the structural approach to emotions shows, a person can feel both shame and guilt. But clearly the distinction is a matter of focus, that is, which relational dimension is being activated? Social movements may fail to activate bystander sympathy because they evoke the wrong emotion for the population at hand. Instead they alienate potential sympathizers.

Social movements can alienate bystanders through instigating fear, anger, disgust, or distrust (disgust, like contempt, results from excessive status-demands by another; distrust is reluctance to put oneself in the power of the other), in bystanders who may even be basically sympathetic, by acts that transcend bystanders’ beliefs about what constitutes a legitimate form of opposition. The bombing of the University of Wisconsin Mathematics Research Center in 1970 clearly went beyond what even a sympathetic left-leaning student constituency would tolerate. They wanted social change, but not at the cost of life itself. To endorse that would have meant endorsing power behaviors that evoked guilt. There is a distinction too between coercive shaming, a power move based on arousing fear of social judgment, and what may be called self-induced shame, in which there is an authentic sense that one does not deserve the status one claims. In the former, the bystander is subjected to direct pressure, as were many Chinese students during the Tiananmen Square dissent period (Zhao 1998). They went along, but to an unknown extent they also carried with them anger or resentment against the activists who enlisted them against their will. In self-induced shame, there is a discrepancy between a claimed quality, for example, a standard for ethical conduct, and actual behavior. The bystander must then resolve the emotional dissonance. Self-induced shame will require a longer time to change behavior than coercive shaming, but the change may be longer lasting, with significant benefits from this for the social movement goal in the future.

Multiple Relational Channels

Although the structural theory of emotions is best illustrated in dyadic relations, it is applicable also when there are multiple relational channels. In social movement analysis, there may be as many as four focal groups to consider: (1) the movement, (2) the target group whose policy or behavior the social movement is trying to change, (3) the bystander public, including both potential allies and potential allies of the opponent,
and (4) government. Sometimes the target is the government, or at least a pivotal segment of it, e.g., regulators, legislators, the executive, etc. In any case, the movement must necessarily consider the relational dynamics not only between itself and the other groups, but the relations between the other groups, exclusive of the movement. Further, these groups have internal power-status dynamics which may affect the group’s standing vis-à-vis the movement, as shown in Jenkins and Perrow’s (1977) examination of how internal conflict within the government mitigated the government’s unsympathetic attitude toward migrant farm workers in the late 1950s.

Nor must one overlook relational, hence emotional, dynamics within the movement itself. Few movements are free of internal division over strategy and tactics, and often a good deal of movement energy is consumed in a struggle for power. Each side usually has contempt for the other. (Contempt is the disgust one feels toward others who are claiming more status than one believes they deserve. See also note 1 on culture and beliefs and values.) How could those people believe they have the true interests of the movement at heart! Think Bolsheviks and Mensheviks. Each side dislikes the other, since each side feels the other denies it the status it deserves. And each side has its full complement of envy. (Envy is the resentment toward another who receives high status from a third party when one desires but does not receive the same status oneself.) Although movements take their place in history by what they do on the stage of history, internally they are often cauldrons of emotions at the boil. Important cues to these internal conflicts and struggles for ascendancy are the relational patterns prevailing between standard categories in society: age, gender, class, race, occupation, and so on. Generational differences are particularly critical, since they often represent differences in degree of adaptation to the very conditions that the movement intends to change. In both the civil rights and the feminist movements, generational differences were widely noted (Morris 1984; Freeman 1973; Whittier 1995). These categories give rise to conflicts over status—who will be regarded as more important in the movement—and over power—who is to control the movement’s destiny.

As indicated at the outset, a cultural view of emotions in social movements provides a valuable point of departure when the issues can be formulated in normative, belief, or value terms. On the other hand, when the issues are better formulated in interaction terms, with outcomes that define either stable or changing relationships, especially of power and/or status, a structural approach is preferable.
Notes

1. The structural approach depends on culture to the extent that cultural beliefs and values define important elements of structure, e.g., how much power is legitimate; what constitutes excess power; what acts deserve status accord, and to what degree; how much status shall be accorded to a particular social position, etc. (For extensive discussion of the culture-social structure link, see Kemper 1995.)

2. Power and status, identified by various nomenclatures (see Kemper and Collins 1990), are the most consistently found dimensions of relationship. One frequently found additional dimension, designated task or technical activity, reflects the division of labor rather than relationship between group members. Kemper and Collins (1990) discuss this distinction.

3. Although there is constraint toward a roughly shared understanding or agreement on how much power and status each actor has in a relationship, disagreement may predominate. Where agreement is absent, the structure tends to be unstable or even unattainable (Heinicke and Bales 1953).

4. Unless otherwise required, it is useful to treat a social movement collectivity as a single unit with respect to power/status and emotion. Even if not every member feels precisely the same emotion in a given instance, movement leadership acts in a representative role to express the effective emotion of the collectivity: “We are angry that . . . ,” “We are pleased that . . .” Alternatively, collective action—sometimes spontaneous, sometimes not—may bespeak the emotion of the movement as a whole. In no sense, however, is a “group mind” implied here.

5. For present purposes, the only relevant power/status relationship in view is between movement members, considered collectively, and the opposition, or government, or bystanders. Taken individually, members of the same movement may have widely varying power/status positions in society at large, e.g., some are physicians, some are housewives. Despite such variation, by virtue of their movement membership, they have a common power/status position vis-à-vis the movement’s opponents and other publics.

6. It is also possible for changes in social structure to induce emotions that give rise to social movements. For example, an enfeebled repressive regime may relax its control, hence reducing fear and enhancing optimism in the repressed population. Such a situation is ripe for the emergence of an opposition movement.
Many of the chapters in this volume concern the role of emotions in collective political behavior. The paradigm they take issue with is a highly rational one, in which social movement activity proceeds much as business activity proceeds. It is spearheaded by ideological entrepreneurs, competing in markets for the allegiance of potential participants. It is based on the calculated employment of well-defined organizing and oppositional strategies. It depends on the use of these strategies during particular windows of political opportunity.

These chapters challenge that vision of social movement activity. They sketch a different kind of social movement, driven by indignation, fear, hope, a sense of right and wrong. One might see the project as an effort to re-romanticize political activity, in that it recalls an era when social movements were self-consciously about ideology and right versus wrong—an era when the language of rational political calculation had not yet invaded either social movements or the social-science theories that described them.

These days, the prevailing social-science paradigm for understanding social movements emphasizes rational calculation among movement “entrepreneurs.” Many of the contributors to this volume explore, conversely, how passion matters. In this brief commentary I sketch the transformation of passionate action into calculative interest-driven action not merely within social movements but across social realms. My aim is not
to romanticize the past but to note a wider trend in which human action is increasingly framed as driven by interest and calculation, even in realms that were, not long ago, thought to operate on other principles.

Albert Hirschman, in *The Passions and the Interests* (1977), described how the process of modernization transformed the “passions” motivating social behavior into modern “interests” and thereby turned passionate behavior, rhetorically at least, into calculative behavior. The chapters in this volume can be seen as pushing Hirschman’s agenda forward, by suggesting that while “interest” is the new rhetoric of social movements (both in practice and in social theory), passions and emotions continue to be an alternative trope through which social movement actors make sense of their own behavior. Outward-looking descriptions of activity may have assumed the language of strategic management, but inward-looking descriptions still often assume the language of emotion and commitment.

My contention is simply that the ongoing substitution of interest for passion, in conceptions of human behavior, helped to generate the prevailing rationalist social-scientific paradigm. This change may also be leading social movements to depict themselves as oriented to rational calculation—as “managed” in the conventional sense, rather than as spontaneous, devotional, and charismatic. Until recently, theorists had described both social and religious movements as based on beliefs, ethics, and sentiment. Now, social and religious movements alike are seen as akin to business enterprises, and theorists describe individual behavior with metaphors borrowed from rational choice theory. Modern theories of political activity more generally depict the world in this way. This raises a question: Should we satisfy ourselves with constructing theories that mimic the rhetoric of actors themselves, or should we try to explain that rhetoric itself? Is it enough to develop a theory that treats social movement leaders as the strategic actors they describe themselves as?

The wider phenomenon that produces this dual change, in social movements and social-scientific theories describing those movements, is the rationalization and demystification of social life. The particular course that rationalization has taken in the West has been to exalt the individual and to envision all of her behavior from the vantage point of microeconomic theory. The rise of rational choice theory in political science is part and parcel of this process, for now modern political behavior is thought to be subject to narrow principles of calculation. Not only voting choices are calculated, but the color of candidates’ ties and the force with which they kiss their wives on television. What has happened to social movement theory and practice has happened everywhere, and certainly to political theory and practice.
The power of the universal rational-actor model is abundantly clear in the sociological field of organizational studies and in the various practical fields of administration. As recently as the 1960s, organizational theorists held that different administrative models were appropriate for different realms. They argued that soup kitchens should be managed differently from stock brokerages, because organizational goals and individual motives vary between realms. But in all domains of management theory these days, actors are first and foremost rational. Thus it was not so long ago that public administration was a separate field from hospital administration, which was distinct from educational administration, social service administration, etc. (e.g., Clark 1956; Scott and Meyer 1983). Some of these realms were closer to one another than others, but there were broad differences across realms. Theories of administration were taught in distinct professional schools, each with its own ethic. Each was based in a distinct theoretical tradition and in a distinct empirical core of cases or studies, precisely because organizational goals, and the motives of workers in those organizations, were thought to differ radically. But this world has changed. Hospitals, social service agencies, and now social movement organizations hire MBAs who craft incentive and reward systems, career ladders and evaluation systems, based in the presumption that everyone is a rational actor. That no one acts out of passion.

The economics-based model of organizing diffused from business corporations to every imaginable realm of social activity (Meyer 1994). Churches and little leagues now buy into the notion that there are universal laws governing social behavior that demand a universal set of organizing principles. The distinct philosophies of management found in different sectors a generation ago have given way to a common model, based in micro-economic theory. What elicits the right behavior on Wall Street will work, as well, at Unicef. All sorts of organizations:

- Adopt strategic plans.
- Use internal labor markets to create long-term incentives.
- Write mission statements.
- Depict themselves as entrepreneurial.
- Appoint CEOs and presidents and human resources management vice presidents.
- Consider mergers to achieve economies of scale and spinoffs to help them focus on their core mission.

Management is management. Organizational goals, and the motives of members, no longer matter. Managing a social movement is no differ-
ent from managing a bank because we are all in it, whatever it is, to pursue self-interest. Thus the models of how to organize collective endeavors—whether automobile plants, stock brokerages, or environmental movements—have converged on a single set of precepts, based loosely in economic theory. One obvious consequence of this shift is that people in all walks of life pay increasing attention to issues of remuneration, for our incentive-based, individualistic, rationalized management systems signal to us that this is what we should care about. “Show me the money” is the mantra everywhere. An unintended consequence of the economists’ effort to incentivize work is a growing disparity in income—as doctors and HMO managers and United Way directors and even professors come under this system, those at the top of their professions get “incentivized” off the charts (Frank and Cook 1996). The incentives have become a legitimate reason for being and doing—everywhere and not only in executive suites.

Even entire organizations that were founded to proselytize or to do good works can legitimately abandon their missions if it seems rational to do so. The YMCA abandons religious evangelizing when the market for it dwindles, and runs health clubs (Zald and Denton 1963). Community colleges give up on bringing college education to the masses and instead offer French cooking and remedial math (Clark 1956).

Rather than pondering this trend, most social scientists have taken it at face value. They increasingly treat people as self-interested, rational, and calculating. Theories of social services management, educational management, and indeed social movements themselves are increasingly rationalized. They reduce human motivation to the single dimension of rational calculation, for that is how the actors themselves describe their own motives. I don’t mean to evoke a romantic past in which people, and theories about them, were driven by passion for life, altruism, and brotherly love. Most sociological theories have described actors as driven not by passion but by something much more mundane, namely habit and routine. Rather than romanticize the past, I simply mean to suggest that we might think of this shift itself as a sociological outcome to be explored.

This trend has so fully taken over social movement theory that management theorists are beginning to borrow back. When they look to social movement theory, lo and behold, they find precisely the same kinds of rational-actor models found in strategic management theory. In some cases, those models have been extended by social movement theorists, and their innovations have been embraced by management theory (Sumanathan and Wade 1999).

Social scientists cannot really be faulted for this. Theorists of mo-
dernity typically take actors at their word. To the extent that social movement activists frame their own behavior in terms of strategy, calculation, and prevailing principles of management (windows of opportunity, issue entrepreneurialism), it comes as no surprise that theorists use the same kinds of language. But of course, the language of rational calculation is, in social movements as in corporations, a lens through which actors see their own actions, retrospectively and prospectively. When you do what you do, you invent stories to tell that are highly rationalized. The president of Exxon does, but so does the president of Greenpeace. This is the point of the organizational theorist Karl Weick (1993), when he talks about the process as “sense-making”—the post hoc construction of meaning for behavior. In the organizational cases Weick comes into contact with, as in modern social movements, the accounts actors construct are calculative, rational, and strategic. Sense-making occurs within given cognitive frames, and actors construct rationales for their behavior based on the choice of frames. One can frame any single action in a multiplicity of ways. A demonstration against the abuse of laboratory animals can be framed in terms of the natural rights of those animals and in terms of the opportunity to build a coalition and expand membership in a social movement organization. Movement activists now supplement, or even supplant, the former sort of “sense-making” with the latter.

In The Passions and the Interests Hirschman did not argue that in the modern world only rational calculation exists. He argued that in the modern world interest and rational calculation are how people understand behavior. Where prevailing political/rational theories in the field of social movements fall short is that they are insufficiently skeptical about actors’ own accounts. When anthropologists observe totemic societies in which local lore has it that frog spirits rule the universe, they do not conclude that frogs are inscribed in plows and circumcision mats because frogs indeed rule this domain. They conclude that the locals have developed a system of meaning that locates authority over social practices in the frog totem. Likewise, when we study modern social practices, we must do what we can to step outside of the frame of reference of the locals. We must try to see rationality as a system of meaning that locates authority in a set of universal social and economic laws—laws that have the same status as the frog totem.

What is perhaps regrettable about the expansion of the interest frame is that we all make sense of our own behavior through this lens, and it is, after all, the lens of the “dismal” science of economics. Would that we could choose the frame we use, for we might well choose to see our lives in terms of the pursuit of salvation or the liberation of house
cats. Indeed, what is distinctly irrational about the rational choice model
that we all now must live by is the very choice of this dismal model of
action. Would we freely choose to orient our lives to the accumulation
of German luxury sedans, however splendid, when we could substitute
the glory of eternal salvation?

Because managers have been at the game of behaving rationally for
quite a while, students of management developed cultural accounts of
managerial rationality long ago. Weber emphasized the importance of
verstehen in sociology, or grasping the actor’s own understanding of his
actions. On Weber’s shoulders stand most of the constructionist theorists
of organizations, from John Meyer (Meyer and Rowan 1977) and W.
Richard Scott (1995) to Paul DiMaggio and Walter Powell (1991), as
well as many of the network theorists, from Harrison White (1992) to
Mark Granovetter (1985). They see rationality as a frame of action,
which shapes action (to be sure) but which also shapes the accounts peo-
ple give of their own action. In Weick’s terms, rationality provides the
framework within which sense-making happens. Anthropologists have
long been in the business of parsing the meaning of human behavior, and
they come to similar conclusions when they observe modern, rational,
settings. Mary Douglas (1986) underscores this by noting that rational-
ized social systems carry very different logics of rationality that shape
individual action. She thereby refutes the notion that individuals behave
in ways that are rational in an absolute sense. Clifford Geertz (1983)
treats the modern meaning system of lawyers as much like that of aborigi-
nes, in that it provides an interpretive framework for action.

Prevailing social movement theorists, like early management theo-
rists, have perhaps moved a bit too far in the direction of taking actors’
accounts as the gospel. They give too much credence to the stories their
informants tell. Surmounting this problem is not easy, because if actors
frame their behavior, both prospectively and retrospectively, in terms of
rational calculation rather than in terms of emotions and sentiments, it
may be empirically impossible to detect, much less prove, that their mo-
tives are otherwise. The typical sociological response under these circum-
stances is to assume that habits and sentiments, and not merely calcula-
tions, motivate actors. After all, for the average movement activist, there
is little fame and glory and very little gold indeed in the pursuit of the
rights of whales, or of women. Economists have long since learned to
elide the question of whether we are primordially rational by declaring
that they cannot predict people’s preferences (this is the job of sociolo-
gists) but only the (rational) means by which people will pursue those
preferences. That is, they hold no opinion about whether individuals will
prefer to save whales or to accumulate BMWs, but they can predict the means once they know the preference. Of course, they are so well able to predict the means because those means are spelled out in economic theories that are, in varying degrees of precision, available to all. We all know that the carrot of a promotion is a strong incentive to work hard, even if we do not know the formula for the optimal size of that carrot.

The economic perspective suggests that preferences (for saving whales, or fighting abortion) are determined by arational sentiments, but that the means to achieving those preferences are determined by rational calculation. This approach insulates social movement theorists from having to address the question of motives, and indeed much of recent social movement theorizing has moved in this direction. But this approach is inadequate in social movement theory, just as it is in management theory. It has been shown to be inadequate in management theory by a host of studies demonstrating that rational courses of action are historically contingent and socially constructed. If rational action is not invariant and predictable, then problematizing the particular frame of rational calculation itself becomes important. To that extent, social movement behavior has, as it has embraced the frame of rational calculation, become part of the wider empirical universe of organizational theory.

There is every reason to believe that this focus on rationality, among movement “entrepreneurs” and among social-science paradigm-entrepreneurs alike, will decline over time. In organizational theory, the pendulum has swung back and forth during this century, with periods of extreme rationalism (in theory and in corporate practice) followed by corrective periods when “Theory Y” about the importance of the group, or some version of psychobabble, take over (Barley and Kunda 1992). Social movement theory has recently had its first big swing toward rationalism. The time is ripe for a swing back toward theories that take emotions, culture, narratives, metaphors, and norms into account.

If and when the field of social movements swings back toward passions and emotions, will the lesson be that social movement participants are really motivated by their hearts rather than by their heads? It seems to me that this isn’t the lesson to be derived at all. Rather, if we make sense of the world through one of the cognitive frames available to us and if the rational actor model is but one of those frames, the passionate actor model is but another. To say that people really participate in movements because of their passions is little different from saying that they really act rationally. Perhaps the more important question before us concerns where these frames come from in the first place, and how we select among them in explaining our own behavior to ourselves.
Part Two

Cultural Contexts
Chapter Five

Emotions and Political Identity: Mobilizing Affection for the Polity

Mabel Berezin

Inventing Belonging in New and Old Political Spaces

The collapse of postwar political arrangements in Eastern, and to some extent Western, Europe, the former Soviet Union, Africa, and Asia in the past decade has re-mapped geopolitical space and challenged social science to find new ways to conceptualize cultural and social transformation. The fall of long-established regimes coupled with vast shifts in migration flows have catapulted political identity, with its concomitant issues of nationalism, ethnicity, and citizenship, to the forefront of social scientific research. 1

I argue that political identities are inherently problematic as they are the least “natural” of all possible identities that individuals or groups might possess. I use the term “natural” not to posit an essentialist view of identity but to suggest that subjective political identities are, except in times of political crises such as wars, distant from the concerns of “ordinary life.” 2 We experience a range of identities from the public to the private as “hierarchies”—simply put, some are more important to us than others. Political identities are public identities. They frequently take second place to more deeply felt private identities. Political identities tread a difficult line as they require that individuals feel that something exists outside the private self—the party, the state—that is worth dying for. “Feeling” political identity requires a reordering of the “hierarchies”
of identity—as such, political identities must be part of ongoing national cultural, or identity, projects.

Macrosociological interest in political identity tends to focus principally upon the legal institution of citizenship, the problem of immigration, and juridical issues of membership and group rights. My essay recasts citizenship as a cultural as well as legal mode of political incorporation and underscores the symbolic and emotional practices that nation-states marshal to mobilize affection for the polity. Wedding emotion and citizenship expands the concept of membership to include the felt experience of national belonging.

I take up these issues in three interrelated segments. The first is analytic and conceptual. It discusses political identity as a category of felt experience, examines the role of the nation-state as mobilizer of political emotion, and explores the relation between liberalism and the denial of emotion. The second is empirical and draws on my research on Fascist Italy. Political ritual is the focus. Public political rituals serve as arenas where ritual actors, both participants and observers, blur the boundary between self and other, self and nation-state. These temporary arenas, “communities of feeling,” dramatize political identity or felt membership in the national polity. The third section draws out the implications of my work for future theorizing about identity, emotion, and political belonging.

**Political Identity—Who Are We?**

Identity is inextricable from the understanding of the self and is central to participation in meaningful patterns of social and political action. We all have identities independently of how narrowly or broadly we construct them. Self and other, subject and object—the recognition of difference begins from earliest life. Identity is an inescapable dimension of social life. Political philosopher William Connolly (1991: 158) argues: “each individual needs an identity; every stable way of life invokes claims to collective identity.”

Identity suggests first and foremost similarity, and it demands acknowledgment of what Charles Taylor (1989: 36) terms a “defining community.” The social construction of identities involves the recognition of and participation in a web of social relations or communities that envelop the self and through which individuals feel themselves as identical with others. Identities are neither essential nor purely constructed; they are multiple but not schizophrenic (Calhoun 1993b). Individuals relate to and derive meaning from many communities of similar selves. We all
possess both public and private identities. Public identities principally include citizenship and work identities that are institutionally buttressed by the legal organizations of the modern nation-state and market. Interest and rationality govern these identities. Private identities originate in their purist forms as kinship relations. Tradition as well as emotion inform these identities.

Cultural identities—religious, national, regional, and ethnic identities—are more fluid and may be either public or private depending upon historical context. Democracy tends to legislate religious, regional, and ethnic identities out of the public sphere and to invoke selectively the affective dimensions of nationalism to support the nation-state. Cultural identities are based upon meanings—the meanings of religious practice, homeland, and group affiliation. They have the capacity to generate and have generated powerful public emotions and militancy. Patriotism, ethnic nationalism, and racism, for example, embody the semipermeable line between love and hate in the political sphere.

The multiplicity of available identities does not suggest that they carry equal meaning to those who participate in them. To borrow from Connolly (1991: 173), many identities are “contingent,” that is, circumstantial. Identities belong to a category that Charles Taylor (1989: 63) has described as “hypergoods”—objects that are of relatively more value to us than others. We experience some identities as “hypergoods,” and some we experience as essentially “contingent” (Berezin 1997: 19–30; 1998). I use the term “hierarchy of felt identity” to conceptualize the emotional categorizing of which we individually and collectively partake.

Political identities are particularly vulnerable to contingency. David Laitin (1998: 24, 31–32) even goes so far as to argue that the “conglomerate identities” that emerge in times of national recalibration resemble what rational-choice theorists describe as a “tipping game.” Political identities fractionate into local, regional, and national identities (Agnew and Brusa 1999) as well as ideological identities (Cohen 1985; Berezin 1997). Identity has two dualities built into it which prove confounding when it is used in political analysis. Identity is noun and verb; singular and plural. What is it; whom do I identify with? Who am I; who are we? Personal identity and political identity differ. Who am I becomes who are we? Who is one of us and who is not? In addition, identity has an ontological and epistemological status (Somers 1994). It describes a state of being as well as a category of social knowledge and classification. In an ideal universe, political identities merge emotional attachment and institutional categories. “I am French” and “we are French” would be both ontological and epistemological statements.
Modern nation-states serve as vehicles of political emotion. Patriotism and nationalism, political love and political hate, define friends and enemies. Nation-states move the epistemological—citizenship as category—towards the ontological—citizen as felt identity. To borrow Benedict Anderson’s now familiar formulation (1991: 7), the modern nation-state is an “imagined community” that in turn creates a spirit of “fraternity” that generates a feeling of “attachment” to the state in the form of “love for the nation” (Anderson 1991: 141, 143). Nation-state is a two-pronged institutional and conceptual entity. The state is in the “business of rule” and focuses upon bureaucratic efficiency and territorial claims; the nation is in the business of creating emotional attachment to the state or “noncontingent” identities. Recent discussions of nationalism suggest that scholars are beginning to pay more attention to the distinction between nation and state. For example, Brubaker, in his institutionalist account of nationalism, implicitly acknowledges the importance of drawing distinctions between state and nation when he argues that “the analytical task at hand . . . is to think about nationalism without nations” (1996: 21). Miller (1995: 18) argues that the “confusion of ‘nation’ and ‘state’ obfuscates discussions of nationality.”

The nation side of the nation-state dyad, while it appears as the product of natural emotions, is highly constructed. The success of individual nation-state projects in the nineteenth century lay in the strength of constructed emotion, and some nation-state projects were more successful than others. Historical and theoretical accounts demonstrate that nineteenth-century nation-states did not just come together as a result of the elective affinity of compatriots. They were forged from wars, the reorganization of cultural institutions, principally education, and the standardization of language. National cultures were created at the expense of local and regional cultures. Modern nation-states require a cultural infrastructure to ensure that commitment to a national polity is salient among the “hierarchy” of felt identities. All political regimes engage in some form of symbolic politics. National languages and literatures and education systems as well as museums, monuments, and music serve to keep the spirit of national belonging alive (for example, Mukerji 1997; Corse 1997; Bonnell 1997; Spillman 1997).

“Imagined” community was a novel concept when it first appeared in 1983. Its principal battle has been won, and scholars generally accept the constructed dimension of “nation-ness.” However, scholars have either glossed over or simply assumed “political love” without delving into
what sociologist Robert Connell (1990: 526) has described as the “structure of cathexis” or the “patterning of emotional attachments” to the polity.\(^9\) This lacuna is problematic in all accounts of nation-state making, and particularly problematic in the case of anti-liberal states where attachment is assumed to be a product of coercion.\(^{10}\) Attachment to the nation-state forms in the space between shared social meanings and formal organization. Culture (nation) and rationality (state) fuse to create the nation-state.

**Liberalism and the Repression of Political Emotion**

“Making” political love, or “reordering the hierarchies of identity,” is a form of state action derived from the repertoire of available emotive cultural symbols and practices. In her analysis of the “family romance” of the French Revolution, Hunt (1992: 196) suggests that the emotional metaphor of family and all that it implies is vacuous if it is not situated in a specific cultural and historical context. Distinct political regimes where ideology and practice merge in institutional form, in this instance the modern nation-state, provide a context for excavating the cultural cues that generate “political love.”

Liberalism, as ideal and as political organization, institutionalized the central cultural chasm of modernity: the division of collective and individual into public and private selves.\(^{11}\) Public and private as a broad categorization schema captures all possible identities. In general, I advocate a slightly less conventional use of this distinction as a convenient shorthand for what we would term private or “ordinary” life: family, gender, love, religion—arenas of deeply felt identities that are beyond the purview of the liberal democratic state.\(^{12}\) Liberalism and, by extension, democracy relegate emotion to the private sphere.

Identity is an issue of modernity that is connected to an ideological conception of individualism (Calhoun 1995a: 194–95). Democratic contractualism which upholds the integrity of individualism and multiple identities sometimes has a political effect that diverges from its theoretical intent. Lefort (1986) in his discussion of totalitarianism suggests the alienating potential of democracy when he notes that “number breaks down unity, destroys identity” (303). He locates the weakness of democracy in its desacralization of politics represented in its rejection of a sacred center which the monarchy symbolizes in preliberal forms of government. Democracy leaves an empty symbolic space which totalitarian forms might fill: “Democracy inaugurates the experience of an ungraspable, uncontrollable society in which the people will be said to be sovereign, of
course, but whose identity will constantly be open to question, whose identity will remain latent” (303–304).

Lefort’s analysis suggests that the split between public and private selves is the historical exception rather than the historical norm—and that the democratic public sphere is continually vulnerable to the reinsertion of the private, or the resacralization of politics. The denial of emotion embodied in democracy’s refusal to incorporate the sacred into its institutions is the subterranean fault line that threatens to derail democratic ideals. Modernity and its concomitant commitment to individualism and the separation of public and private is a caesura—not an ongoing march into the future.13 The alienating effects of democracy create the void that anti-liberalism attempts to fill when it rejects the liberal separation of public and private and, ultimately, the democratic state.

Theorizing about political identity tends to assume a modern democratic nation-state and to presuppose a single mode of participating in the polity. These assumptions prove inelastic in the face of alternative visions of political belonging and organization.14 Modern (post-1900) anti-liberal states are predicated upon the fiction of novelty, in that they claim to create new political cultures and identities.15 Their claim to novelty places their identity strategies in bold relief—strategies that are less transparent in established nation-states.

Resacralizing Politics and Mobilizing Affection: Examples from Fascist Italy

In liberal and social democratic nation-states, symbolic political practices are expressive phenomena that temporarily objectify the state; in anti-liberal nation-states, symbolic politics, particularly ritual actions, attempt to obliterate the distinction between self and other, i.e., nation and state, private and public.16 My work on fascist Italy (Berezin 1997, 1998, 1999a) shows how anti-liberal nation-states relied on public political rituals to reorder the hierarchies of felt identity.

Ritual shares certain formal properties with identity. Rituals, repeated actions in public spaces, are representational and performative; categorical and experiential; or epistemological and ontological. In the course of twenty-two years, the Italian fascist regime staged thousands of public political events—large and small, in the center and on the periphery. For example, in the relatively small Italian city of Verona, the fascist regime staged 727 ritual events between 1922 and 1942 (Berezin 1997: 169–73). At the level of representation or cultural cognition, these
events frequently played with deeply held private Italian identities, re-
scripting them in the language of fascism.

Italian fascist nation-state builders imagined political identity as a fusion of public and private conceptions of the self. Fascist conceptions of identity diverged sharply from the style in which Italian citizens constructed their identities. “Noncontingent” Italian identities tended to be private and tied to family, local and tied to place, and religious and tied to the Catholic Church. Family, region, and religion were the cultural communities that provided the cultural repertoires, modes of thought, and behaviors that were the sources of the Italian self, the loci of emo-
tional attachment. The fascist identity project could not be cut from whole cloth and had to be patched together from remnants of existing identities.

The “popular culture of Roman Catholicism” and the “cult of the mother” were the emotional tropes represented in fascist public ritual. Catholicism evoked the solidarity of shared religious heritage, and motherhood embodied the sentiment of familial love. Roman Catholic doctrine was functionally irrelevant to its practice in a semi-literate country such as early-twentieth-century Italy, where a battery of cyclical liturgical rituals obliterated whatever nuances of Church doctrine seeped into popular consciousness. The popular practices of Roman Catholicism, engraved in the mental frames of even the fascists, provided an opportunity for cultural transposition.

The first anniversary commemorations of the “March on Rome,” the melange of events that brought fascism to power, provides an example of how the Italian fascist regime appropriated the Roman Catholic Mass and its liturgy. A Mass celebrated in the Piazza Siena in Rome, and simultaneouly in every part of Italy, was a symbolic enactment of the new national unity that fascism had brought (“La Messa al campo Piazza di Siena,” La Tribuna, October 30, 1923).17 The “rite” that exerted a “mys-
tical fascination” upon the crowd was an intricate blending of Roman Catholic and fascist practice. The use of the term “rite” instead of liturgy, the more appropriate term for variations on the staging of a Roman Cath-
olic Mass, is in itself a clue to the subtle shifts in consciousness that the newspaper representation was trying to encourage for those who could not attend.

The elevation of the Eucharist, at which point the priest recites the words that change ordinary bread and wine into the body and blood of Christ, is the center of the Catholic Mass. This action is such a central part of Catholic liturgy and doctrine that it would be a rare Italian Catho-
lic who did not understand its significance. The Mass inserted fascist ritual practice into the most sacred part of the liturgy. At the moment that the priest raised the Eucharist and turned to the audience, a trombone sounded, the troops presented arms, and the fascists raised their arms in a Roman and fascist salute.

As the priest consecrated the Eucharist, the fascists consecrated themselves and blurred the distinction between what was sacred and what was secular—what was Church and what was State. This fascist imposition upon Catholic ritual suggested that one could be both fascist and Catholic. Of course, the Eucharistic transformation is an article of faith—which one believes or does not believe. The bread remains bread, and every one knows that it is not the body of Christ. So too the fascist “revolution” was in 1923 more an object of belief among devoted adherents than a felt popular experience.

The fascist “cult of the mother” appropriated a visceral Italian feeling about the nature of motherhood that sprang from a deep cultural well. The union of family and nation was not unique to fascism. A fascist grammar-school text taught that according to Giuseppe Mazzini, the intellectual architect of Italian unification, “the first cell of the organism of the Patria is composed of the Family,” and that the mother was the “angel of the family” (Biloni 1933: 243). The people’s adunata that began in 1935, the year the regime invaded Ethiopia, brought together nation and family by wedding maternal to military representations.

The adunata were huge rallies that brought masses of persons into public squares throughout Italy to demonstrate solidarity with the regime’s imperialist ventures. The pictures of these events in Popolo d’Italia, the National Fascist party’s daily newspaper, are blurry, suggesting a raw mass of living bodies giving consent to the regime. The newspaper headlines shout the imperial aspirations of a regime that was inventing colonies and imagining empire. There were six national adunate in Rome from 1935 to 1937. Four of them focused on the war in Ethiopia and the founding of the fascist empire; Italian women were the focus of the other two.

To celebrate the “victory” in Ethiopia, Mussolini ordered an adunata in Rome of 500,000 persons where he proclaimed in the language of colonial conquest, “Ethiopia is Italian: Italian in fact, because it is occupied by our victorious armies; Italian in law, because of the Roman gladiators and the civility that triumphs over barbarism, the justice that triumphs over arbitrary cruelty, the redemption of miseries that triumphs over a millennium of slavery” (Il Popolo d’Italia, May 6, 1936). The crowds gathered in all the piazzas of Italy and bells pealed from the
church towers and public buildings of the medieval landscape. The streets of central Rome from the Via del Impero to Corso Umberto were filled with cheering Italians. Three days later, on May 9, 1936, Mussolini declared Italy an “Empire.”

The *Rivista Illustrata del Popolo d’Italia*, the four-color photographic weekly appendage to the *Popolo d’Italia*, prepared a special commemorative issue in honor of the new empire. A photomontage from this edition of the review captured the multiple cultural schemas upon which the Italian fascist project drew as it aimed to create the fascist nation-state and empire. The forefront image is of Romulus and Remus nursing at the breast of the wolf. According to popular legend, Romulus and Remus founded Rome after the wolf saved them from starvation. The first backdrop features banners with fascist eagles waving. The image clearly comes from a rally. The background is a stone monument depicting a map of Mediterranean Europe, North Africa, and the Middle East. Italy and the colonies of the new fascist empire—Libya and Ethiopia—are in bold relief.

This monument was, and is, on the Via del Impero, now renamed, but it is still visible in Rome and tourists on the road to the Coliseum, then and now, may stop to look at it. The words at the bottom of the photomontage are: “Rome ought to appear marvelous to all people of the world: vast, organized, powerful as it was in the time of the first emperor Augustus” (Agnelli and Starace 1937). The image combines the myth of the founding of Rome with the emerging myth of empire. The image is also one of maternity, albeit the rather fierce maternity contained in the wolf’s body, against the backdrop of empire.

In the period of increasing militarization in the mid-1930s, we might expect that the “cult of the mother” would retreat before the “cult of militarism.” Yet, women became more prominent in fascist spectacle and narrative as the regime marched forward. Why would the regime emphasize women in a period of intense mobilization? The display of women and family in the service of the regime and the appropriation of marriage and motherhood were central to the regime’s social and political mission. In a regime that expected to endure, women, as the producers of new fascist bodies, were important. Despite the demographic campaign and the cultural importance of the family, the empirical evidence does not suggest that Italian women were all that enthusiastic about becoming mothers—and Italian fertility declined during the fascist period.

The public display of women was the center of two adunate. The “day of faith” occurred on December 18, 1935, and the “woman’s mobilization” in Rome occurred on May 8, 1936—three days after Mussolini
announced victory in Ethiopia and two days before the declaration of empire. While the latter event simply featured the raw display of masses of women’s bodies in the service of the regime, the “wedding ring campaign,” as the former event is known, speaks directly to the symbolic weight accorded to family and motherhood. After three months of fighting, the Ethiopian campaign was rapidly emptying state coffers. The regime needed gold, and Mussolini asked Italian women to sacrifice their wedding rings to the glory of the nation. There were ceremonies in all of Italy to donate wedding rings. The main ceremony occurred in Rome on the steps of the monument to Victor Emanuel. The queen of Italy led Italian mothers and wives to the “Altar of the Patria,” where they donated their wedding rings to the nation. “Fourteen years of national education” mobilized Italian women to sacrifice their wedding rings to a cause “even more sacred than the family and the effects of the family” (“La Memorabile giornata a Roma,” *Il Popolo d’Italia*, December 1935).

The Italian culture of the family was put on the line for the troops on the line, and *Il Popolo d’Italia* made explicit reference to the appropriation of the family: “This People which has a cult of the family and its traditions could not but fully and profoundly understand the significance of offering nuptial faith for a grander faith.” The queen, who rarely spoke publicly in Italy, gave a brief oration on the day of the ceremony. Standing at the foot of the monument to Victor Emanuel, she said:

> In climbing the steps to the sanctuary of the Vittoriano, united, the proud mothers and wives of our dear Italy leave their wedding rings, symbol of our first joys and deepest renunciation on the altar of the Unknown Hero. In this purest offering of dedication to the Patria, bowing to the earth, almost merging our spirits with our glorious Fallen of the Great War . . . united, we invoke them, and to God, the “Vittoria.”

**Communities of Feeling**

Religion and family, the popular culture of Roman Catholicism and the “cult of the mother,” were the representational aspects of fascist public ritual. The vantage point of history permits discursive readings of these emotional tropes. They provide a window to the regime’s cultural intentions. As Geertz (1973: 449) argues in his discussion of the Balinese cockfight, ritual display serves as a kind of “sentimental education” in its use of “emotion” for “cognitive ends”: “What the cockfight says it says in a vocabulary of sentiment—the thrill of risk, the despair of loss, the plea-
Emotions and Political Identity

Sure of triumph. Yet what it says is not merely that risk is exciting, loss depressing, or triumph gratifying, banal tautologies of affect, but that it is of these emotions, thus exampled, that society is built and individuals are put together.”

Geertz’s analysis, while pointing to the cognitive ends of emotion, elides the question of ritual outcome. Ritual is performative as well as representational, and we attenuate its political significance if we move no further than the cognitive. Discursive ritual knowledge is, I shall argue, ultimately indeterminate. But how does ritual mean if not discursively; and how does it contribute to a politics of identity, if it conveys no narrative knowledge? Public political ritual is performance; and performance, whether it occurs in the tightly bounded world of the theater or the more permeable social space of a public piazza, is a highly elusive entity because its effects are experiential. The experiential, or performative, nature of ritual points in the direction of action. Ritual is a form of action, as well as representation, and it derives much of its distinction as a cultural entity from its formal characteristics.

Public political rituals serve as arenas of identity, bounded spaces, where collective national selfhood is enacted. Ritual action communicates familiarity with form, and this familiarity may be as simple as the recognition that one is required to be present at an event. Familiarity and identity are coterminous. The repeated experience of ritual participation produces a feeling of solidarity—“we are all here together, we must share something”; and lastly, it produces collective memory—“we were all there together.” What is experienced and what is remembered is the act of participating in the ritual event in the name of the polity.

Emotion is the pivot upon which political ritual turns. It is a vehicle of political learning that has the capacity to create new identities. Emotion can make the difficult and unnatural appear easy and natural. Emotion is the antithesis of modern political organization except when it is rigidly codified in the nation side of the nation-state dyad. Emotion is nonrational but it is not irrational. Emotion obliterates prior identities. It fuses self and other, subject and object, the ontological and epistemological.

Public political rituals create “communities of feeling”—my adaptation of Raymond Williams’s (1977: 132) concept, “structure of feeling.” According to Williams, “structures of feeling” are “social experiences in solution.” He is trying to articulate the nondiscursive elements of aesthetic emotion. Williams contrasts “feeling” to discursive elements such as “worldview” and “ideology” which are linguistic and textual in their import. His analysis diverges from Geertz, in that it suggests the
indeterminacy of emotional politics: “we are concerned with meanings and values as they are actively lived and felt, and the relations between these and formal or systematic beliefs are in practice variable (including historically variable), over a range from formal assent with private dissent to the more nuanced interaction between selected and interpreted beliefs and acted and justified experiences” (Williams 1977: 133).

Rousseau in his *Letter to D’Alembert* argues that the grouping of persons in public space is the purest articulation of political equality, and by extension, democracy (Taylor 1994: 47–48). Rousseau was only partially correct. Ritual eliminates indeterminacy in social space through the carefully staged crowding of bodies in public spaces, but this does not presume that ritual eliminates indeterminacy as to meaning. Ritual, by acting out emotion, includes indeterminacy. Public political ritual, as Lefort argued with respect to democracy, is a double-edged sword as it creates an open interpretive space. Solidarities and memories—the identities of subjects who have gathered under similar circumstances—may be extremely fluid. Emotion may obliterate the old self, but there is no guarantee as to what form the new self or identity might assume. “We are all here together” may as easily become, “Here we go again.”

**Identity and Belonging: The Political Logic of Emotion**

Emotion is frequently absent from, or underemphasized in, discussions of political identity. Identity formation under conditions of anti-liberalism provides an extreme case that allows us to place more standard conceptions of political identity formation under the microscope. Regimes that began with the fiction of novelty and relied upon public political rituals bring into sharp focus the relation between emotion and political identity obscured by discussions of political identity which assume democratic practices.

I am not suggesting that we are about to witness a resurgence of anti-liberal regimes similar to those of the early twentieth century, nor am I suggesting a resurgence of public ritual as a way of political life. History and context do matter: this is 1999 and not 1929. Indeed other technologies of political communication, from television to the internet, compete with ritual. However, I do argue that an analysis of the formal properties of ritual and anti-liberalism has much to contribute to current theoretical discussions of identity as well as to the formulation of hypotheses regarding the emergence of new or unstable political identities. Geographically bounded territories where established regimes have collapsed and long-established nation-states confronted with a flow of immigrants
both face an attenuation of shared national meanings and culture. The weakening of established political identities forces nation-states to rewrite the rules of national belonging as well as to rebuild or to amend the formal institutions of governance and membership.\textsuperscript{19}

In conclusion, I will spell out more concretely how the general claims which I advance in this chapter might contribute to a reframing of discussions of the resurgence of ethnic nationalism and the emotions (not to mention carnage) it has generated, as well as the problems of identity that influxes of immigrants have posed to long-established nation states (for summaries, see Brubaker and Laitin 1998; Calhoun 1997). I will focus on the key concepts of this chapter: emotion, ritual, and “hierarchies of identity.”

To structure my discussion of these concepts, I shall return to the issue of citizenship that I raised at the beginning of this chapter. As I noted, citizenship has become the vehicle for current sociological discussions of political identity. Rather than engaging this literature directly, my purpose here is to borrow from its prominent exponents to draw out the contemporary implications of my argument. Broadly conceived, citizenship emphasizes the legal relation between an individual and a national state—as such, it is an intrinsically modern phenomenon linked in time and space to the formation of national states. Soysal (1994) in her discussion of guestworkers in contemporary Europe decouples citizenship from space; whereas, Somers (1993, 1995) in her work on the development of popular political rights in England decouples citizenship from time.\textsuperscript{20} If both of these arguments are correct, then they bear powerfully on the issues that I have raised in this article.

First, if we accept Soysal’s (1994) claim that a form of “post-national” citizenship is emerging that divorces rights from territory, then the feeling of national belonging takes precedence to whatever territory one happens to inhabit. One may “feel” Turkish or Algerian, even if one spends one’s entire life in France or Germany. These are more than simply abstract feelings, as anti-immigrant violence and the resistance to cultural incorporation are salient in both cases. Brubaker’s (1992) discussion of the anti-immigrant sentiments of French nationalists indirectly corroborates Soysal’s argument. The citation that he offers from a French nationalist supports the relation between “feeling” and citizenship: “It’s detestable. Many sons of Algerians found themselves French without having asked for it: one made them citizens by force. These people don’t necessarily share our values. If they don’t feel [emphasis added] French, well, we don’t want them either!” (Brubaker 1992: 147). Soysal’s work underscores the emotional dimension of political identity—the fusing of self
and other captured in the notion of community. Both Soysal and Bru-  
baker suggest how difficult it is to create and maintain political identity  
even in long-established nation states.

The decoupling of citizenship and space legitimates my claim to  
the emotional dimension of political identity; Somers’s (1993, 1995) de-  
coupling of citizenship from time legitimates my choice of anti-liberal  
states as objects of political participation. Somers’s location of activities  
that look very much like democratic participation in a public sphere in  
fourteenth century England suggests that institutions, or mechanisms, of  
political participation do not have to follow the development of nation  
states or democratic practices. During the period which Somers discusses  
England was hardly democratic. Her argument is similar to Putnam’s  
(1993) research that links institutional effectiveness in late-twentieth-  
century Italy to practices of cooperation and trust that developed in the  
early fourteenth century. Scholars have criticized Putnam (particularly  
chapter 5) for the historicism of his argument. What his critics have failed  
to note is that the areas which Putnam associates with deep civic tradi- 
tions were also the areas where the fascist party was strong. Traditions  
and practices of cooperation and organization need not lead to democ-  

cracy.

If Somers and Putnam are correct, then the form of the state is  
not always congruent with the political practices of its members. Demo-  
cratic states may incorporate nondemocratic sentiments. Conversely, anti-  
liberal states may orchestrate alternative modes of political participation,  
i.e., the reliance on emotional politics and public ritual, that are decidedly  
nondemocratic and antirational in spirit. This is congruent with Lefort’s  
discussion of democracy as an open interpretive space which I discuss in  
an earlier part of this chapter, and it calls into question Habermas’s link- 
ing of a public sphere to democratic practice. Amassing bodies in public  
space creates an alternative public sphere aimed at creating new feelings  
of belonging to a polity. The outcome of this public fusion of self and  
other is as indeterminate as the type of politics that cooperation and trust  
produce.

If identity, as I suggest, is the recognition of multiple communities  
of similar selves, then any national identity project must become part of  
a repertoire of communities of selves to which individuals feel belonging.  
In contrast to other discussions of politics and identity, I emphasize that  
individuals do not experience identities as equivalent. Exclusively private  
identities, such as kinship identities, are salient, as well as identities such  
as those involving religion and localism, which veer toward the private  
on the public/private continuum. Political identity requires the reordering
of the felt “hierarchies of identity” so that feelings of national belonging are as salient as other forms of identity.

The state, democratic or antidemocratic, is the central institutional actor in the creation of national identities. But it is not the only actor, and it exists in sharp competition with the institutions which organize other forms of identity. When the state collapses as it did in the revolutions of 1989 in Eastern Europe it is not surprising that the feelings of ethnic nationalism—a strongly felt cultural identity tied to place—would emerge to fill the void. The dissolution of the state leaves a free field where members find communities of similar selves and reorder their own identities. In these, increasingly less rare, instances, deeply felt identities gain ascendance. But more importantly, the logic of my argument suggests that emotion as the basis of identity and political practice is neither primordial nor irrational but represents an alternative political logic.

Acknowledgments

This essay has benefited from the helpful comments of Jeff Goodwin, James M. Jasper, and Frank Dobbin.

Endnotes

1. Identity qua identity is a relatively novel preoccupation of macrosociology, and as an analytical concept, its dimensions are inchoate. For a summary of the social science approaches to identity, see Cerulo 1997; for a summary of recent writing on the subject, see the essays in Calhoun 1993c.


3. For an analytic argument, somewhat consonant with the one I offer here, that covers the salient themes in the literature, see Offe 1998.

4. This section appears in fuller form in Berezin 1999b.


9. Recent theoretical and empirical work (Verdery 1994; Borneman 1992; Hunt 1992), such as Connell’s, that weds notions of gender to concepts of state formation can serve as useful analytic starting points. In a similar vein, Goodwin (1997) explores the relation between “libidinal” energy and social movement commitment.

10. For fuller discussion of what follows, see Berezin 1999a.
11. Public and private are terms used with more frequency than precision. For an overview of recent uses of the terms, see Weintraub 1995: 280–319 and the essays in Kumar and Weintraub 1997.

12. For a discussion of public and private that is consonant with my use of the terms, see Brewer 1995.

13. One has only to remember that both Hitler and Mussolini came to political power through essentially parliamentary and legal means. The retreat to ethnic identities and the contemporary resurgence of nationalism as well as racist violence in Europe may be interpreted as a retreat to private identities. Whether these emerging phenomena will result in a resacralization of politics is a separate and historically contingent issue.


15. It is highly unlikely that the men and women who were the objects of these identity projects, or their designers, would have used the term “identity.” “Identity” is historically specific, but this in no way obviates its use if we are cautious as to how we employ it and recognize when we are using it either transculturally or transhistorically. On the transcultural use of the term, see Handler 1994. On the analytic use of historically specific terms, see Calhoun 1993b.

16. Anti-liberal states, states based upon the blurring of the boundary between public and private, are frequently, but not necessarily, antidemocratic. They range from totalitarian, to colonial, to forms of patrimonialism. I am using the standard Weberian conception of patrimonialism here (Weber 1978: 1006–69)—although it is rarely compared to the nondemocratic state forms of the early twentieth century.

17. The narratives in this section are drawn from Italian newspaper accounts.


19. Perez-Diaz (1998: 211–21) offers an argument similar to the one that I am advancing.

20. Somers (1993) also makes an argument about space, but in my view her originality lies in her discussion of timing.
During the 1830s, organized efforts to abolish slavery in the United States experienced a sea change. In this decade not only did anti-slavery activism become both contentious and popular; but in addition, its fundamental character was transformed. From 1832 to 1838 an estimated one hundred twenty thousand Northerners rallied around calls for the immediate emancipation of slaves and rejected schemes for the gradual abolition of slavery. This movement challenged the arguments of Protestant benevolent societies that African-Americans should be colonized in Liberia, and it demanded a commitment to racial equality within the United States. Why did this radical shift in antislavery occur in the 1830s? After all, antislavery sentiments and organized opposition to the South’s “peculiar institution” were not new. Why did the uncompromising message of immediate abolition gain the following of a vocal and committed minority at this time? In this chapter, I argue that this change in the course of antislavery, and its timing, cannot be faithfully tracked by standard social movement theories. The dramatic conversion of activists to radical and immediate abolitionism requires an appreciation of the emotional resonance of a tight set of moral claims that triggered personal transformations and motivated bold collective action. It requires explaining how slavery managed to shock evangelicals in the 1830s in the ways it did and also how it could not just a generation earlier. I argue that this explanation must account for the development of a historically
new religious temperament and emotional culture. Immediatism sparked emotional commitments in young evangelicals who came of age in the 1830s because it resonated with a broader pattern of affective commitments: a pattern unique to the generations of evangelicals born after the American Revolution.

**Immediate Abolitionism as a Transformative Movement**

In 1933, the economist Gilbert H. Barnes revolutionized the historiography of the white abolitionist movement in the United States. Focusing on the work of western abolitionists, Barnes uncovered the profound influence of the religious revivals of the 1820s and 1830s on the rise and spread of immediate abolition. His study placed Theodore Weld, the convert and disciple of the famous reviver Charles Grandison Finney, at the center of the history of immediate abolitionism and recast that movement as a religious revival against the sin of slavery. A letter from Weld used by Barnes to open the central chapter of his seminal book *The Anti-slavery Impulse* provides a capsule of the character of immediatism among western evangelicals. Writing to New York philanthropist and reformer Lewis Tappan in the early spring of 1834 about events at Lane Seminary in Ohio, Weld reported:

> The Lord has done great things for us here. Eight months ago there was not a single immediate abolitionist in this seminary. Many students were from slave states, and some of them the most influential and intelligent in the institution. A large colonization society existed, and abolitionism was regarded as the climax of absurdity, fanaticism and blood.
>
> The first change was brought about in some of the first minds in the seminary, and especially in an individual of great sway among the students, who was from Alabama; born, bred, and educated in the midst of slavery; his father an owner of slaves, and himself heir to a slave inheritance. After some weeks of inquiry, and struggling with conscience, his noble soul broke loose from its shackles. He is now President of our Anti-Slavery Society. (Barnes and Dumond 1965: 132)

In a speech to the second annual meeting of the American Anti-slavery Society and published by William Lloyd Garrison in a widely distributed pamphlet, another Southerner and student from the Lane Seminary described the influence of immediatism on his conscience with the
same sense of personal transformation. James A. Thome started with a description of his initial state of depravity:

The associations of youth and the attachments of growing years; prejudices, opinions and habits forming and fixing during my whole life, conspire to make me a Kentuckian indeed. More than this; I breathed my first breath in the atmosphere of slavery; I was suckled at its breast and dandled on its knee. . . . Permit me to say, sir, I was for several years a member of the Colonization Society. . . . Duty bids me state, solemnly and deliberately, that its direct influence upon my mind was to lessen my conviction of the evil of slavery, and to deepen and sanctify my prejudice against the colored race. But, sir, far otherwise with abolition.—Within a few months residence at Lane Seminary, and by means of discussion unparalleled in the brotherly feeling and fairness which characterized it, and the results which it brought out, the great principles of duty stood forth, sin revived, and I died. (Thome 1834)

Born again as an immediate abolitionist, most everything in Thome’s life recrystallized around the revived sin of slavery. Few, if any, of the students at Lane had ever doubted that slavery was evil, but they had never felt it a personally punishable sin—they had never felt it as immediate. Barnes concluded that the impact of the Lane Debate was “more than a change of opinion; for scores of the students it meant a change in their lives” (Barnes 1933: 68). Sixty-five subsequent years of historical research have amended but not overturned Barnes’s conclusions about immediatism (Goodman 1998). No historian disputes the central role of western evangelicals in the dramatic rise of immediate abolition from 1832 to 1838. Few other Southerners and slaveholders converted to immediatism, but tens of thousands of nonslaveholders in northern Ohio, upstate New York, and northern and western New England confessed to immediatism (see table 1). Historians generally agree that with this core constituency immediatism emerged and developed as a religious revival demanding personal as well as social and political change.

During these six years, immediatism not only usurped gradualism as the dominant approach of organized antislavery, but initiated a movement against racial prejudice (Goodman 1998). As the self-appointed name of the movement, “immediatism” confounded opponents of abolition and many historians because it combined multiple meanings (Davis 1967). At a most obvious level, immediatism suggested that opponents of slavery had lost patience with gradual approaches to abolition. At an-
TABLE 1  Number of Auxiliary Societies to the American Antislavery Societies, 1932–38

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1832</th>
<th>1833</th>
<th>1834</th>
<th>1835</th>
<th>1836</th>
<th>1837</th>
<th>1838</th>
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<td>12</td>
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<td>79</td>
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<td>75</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>525</td>
<td>1005</td>
<td>1348</td>
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</table>

fection than practical solutions to a complex social problem (see Elkins 1959). There is more than a little truth to this harsh judgment. Immediatists were not always practical in their pursuit of emancipation—in part, because they shunned expediency. On the other hand, from the perspective of reformers like Weld, the sin of slavery was embedded deep in the hearts of white Americans. To condemn slavery as an unjust institution was to touch only the surface. But to redeem America, and that is what Weld and most immediatists wanted to do, required rooting out racial prejudice in the hearts of white Christians. Speaking of the means to awaken sin, Weld commented: “If it is not _FELT_ in the very _vital tissues of the spirit_, all the reasoning in the world is a feather thrown against the wind” (also quoted in Abzug 1980: 129; Barnes and Dumond 1965: 455).

### Applying Social Movement Theories to Explain Immediatism

The reigning paradigm in social movement theory cannot easily explicate the rise of immediatism and the character of the commitments that propelled it. Over the last two decades, political process theory has sought to establish “links between institutionalized and insurgent politics” (McAdam 1982: 3). While this research project has made great advances in the explanation of certain types of social movements, these advances have often come at the expense of broader cultural links, and certainly with a general disregard for the social psychology of protest (Goodwin and Jasper 1999). Moral protests are perhaps the type of movements that best expose this weakness. The political process project has assumed that there exists no fundamental divide between insurgent and institutional politics. Political structures and the rational pursuit of interests shape both types of power struggles. Interests motivate action, political structures open and close to encourage or discourage this action, and framing processes _mediate_ between the two (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996: 5).

Political opportunity structures, however, are particularly deficient in explaining the emergence of immediate abolitionism and its early advances. Until 1839, abolitionists purposefully restrained from articulating political goals.¹ In the early days of recruitment or evangelism, immediatism expanded without targeting elected officials, state administrators, or courts. Indeed, what impact can be attributed to political structures stemmed from the highly conscious attempt by early immediatists to keep their distance from the political arena as they understood it. Electoral politics, in particular, were deemed corrupt. To engage in them was to
compromise moral principles for expediency, to temporize with worldli-
ness. In fact, expediency—the pursuit of self-interest—is precisely the
charge immediatists leveled against members of the colonization society.
Organized abolitionism, therefore, emerged and developed within civil-
religious society while carefully avoiding contact with legislative bodies.
Abolitionists thought that through the churches, benevolent societies,
fairs, lyceums, debating societies, schools, mails, and presses of the coun-
try they could operate directly on the conscience of the public and turn
sentiments against slavery. Their core moral claims and social constitu-
ency were built at a conscious remove from the institutions of electoral
politics and legitimate coercion. It is therefore highly improbable that
changes in the configuration of political power in the late 1820s and early
1830s had anything more than a very indirect impact on the timing and
pattern of immediate abolition’s emergence.

Recent social movement theory has generated some dissent on the
political process view of movement emergence. Grappling with the sig-
nificance of late-twentieth-century movements, some theorists convinc-
ingly argue that many collective actors are best understood as normative
and communicative challengers seeking to influence social institutions
by means other than instrumental politics (Cohen 1985; Cohen and
These new perspectives raise doubts that institutional politics are driven
by the same normative, communicative, and affective commitments of
many contemporary social movements. This recent theorizing and the
flurry of research on so-called new social movements point to a category
of protest that may not be felicitously explained by a political process
approach.

In part as a response to this criticism, political process theorists have
added framing processes to their explanatory tool kit. The explanatory
power of frame alignment theories rests with the interaction between cul-
tural schemas embedded in preexisting social networks and the skills of
movement entrepreneurs to successfully transform these schemas into
mobilizing structures. Unfortunately, framing processes, as employed in
the social movement literature, are almost always treated as cognitive
processes. The irony here is that David Snow’s work on conversion influ-
enced the original articulation of framing processes within social move-
ment theory, but the emotional and transformative implications of con-
versions have not been picked up by other researchers (Smith 1996b: 3;
Snow and Benford 1988; Snow and Benford 1992; Snow and Machalek
1984; Jasper and Poulsen 1995). Instead, most assume that cognitive
agreement within a social group—over objective political opportunities,
over attribution of blame, and over the means for redress—propels collective action. Moreover, the framing approach to social movements, particularly as integrated within the political process model, has linked personal change and social reform only in a weak instrumental and intermediate sense. Movement entrepreneurs employ frames to mediate between a social group’s organized interests and the political opportunities they face (McAdam 1982: 51; McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996: 5–8). But some forms of contentious politics, it seems to me, present a fundamental link between transformation of the self and transformation of society, an immediate relation between the two that is not only thought but felt. As in the case of immediate abolition, these forms of collective action often emerge through interaction with the institutions of civil society, insulated from the expediency of instrumental politics. Operating on the sentiments of those they hope to influence, these movements mobilize around institutions much closer to the spheres of intimacy than the agencies of state power.

In contrast, theories of collective identity and their role in the research on new social movements have linked personal change and public activism as potentially constitutive of each other (Melucci 1995). Again, however, the instrumental appropriation of this concept by political process students robs the process of much of its cultural, not to mention emotional, significance. Political identities are reduced to almost routine strategies in the competition for political power within the polity (see Bernstein 1997). Collective identity is also widely seen as an essential process in the emergence of all movements, an indispensable means to build solidarity or cohesion in any and all collective actors (Gould 1995). In discovering identity processes in all movements, the strong and emotional link between personal change and public activism suggested in movements for black power, gay pride, women’s liberation, and immediate abolitionism is in danger of being lost. In these cases, framing and identity processes cannot be reduced to a mediating process between interests and political structures, routine deployment strategies in the competition for political and civil rights, or very general mobilizing processes present in all collective actors. In these cases, identity transformations or conversions, understood as radical and emotional alterations of the self, are constitutive of radical collective action. Appreciating them as such requires attending to the emotional dynamic of transformative cultural schemas: it requires that one explore how beliefs and feelings could shift from the periphery to the center, or, as the student from Lane expressed it, how a weak conviction could be made to stand forth as a personally redefining duty.
Orthodox Modes of Piety and Antislavery Sentiments
Prior to 1830

The astonishing impact of the call for immediate abolition in the 1830s rested on a pattern of religious affections that developed within evangelical communities toward the end of the first quarter of the nineteenth century. This call could not have resonated as it did a generation earlier. It would not have changed, and arguably similar calls by maverick Quakers did not change, the lives of the parents of the immediatists in the preceding decades. In a recent article, James Jasper (1998) presents a model for interaction between short-term reactive emotions and more stable patterns of affections or loyalties to explain moral shocks and their role in social movement formation. He argues that in the case of moral shocks, reactive emotions resonate with more stable commitments to motivate action for a cause. I build on this general process to illuminate what occurred with antislavery sentiments in the 1830s and to provide a stronger reading of the impact of transformative cultural schemas on certain types of moral protest. To this end, I describe changes in the religious temperament of Northern evangelicals in the early nineteenth century and discuss the role of the sin of slavery in this context of change.

Prior to immediatism, Northern antislavery was primarily organized within the benevolent societies of America’s mainline denominations. Through the first quarter of the nineteenth century, Presbyterians and Congregationalists built a network of national missionary societies to spread and support orthodox Calvinism across the nation (Banner 1973; Foster 1960; Griffin 1960). As an adjunct to these broad evangelical organizations, organized benevolence founded a series of special-purpose societies like the American Colonization Society (ACS) (Friedman 1982). In the North, the reputed mission of the society was to set the groundwork for the safe and gradual abolition of slavery through the expatriation of Americans of African descent. William Lloyd Garrison, Lewis and Arthur Tappan, Elizur Wright, Joshua Leavitt, James Birney, Gerrit Smith, and many other famous immediatists were supporters of ACS in the 1820s. Indeed, as first articulated by Garrison and as understood by its earliest adherents, immediatism was a direct repudiation of their prior commitment to colonization. It was a confession of past error. It is not an overstatement to claim that immediate abolition emerged as an insurgency within organized benevolence against the ACS (Richards 1970). Before the radical break, colonization organized most of antislavery sentiment. For this rea-
son, the cosmology and religious temperament that structured organized benevolence and colonization is instructive as a contrast to the religious structure of immediatism in the 1830s.

Conservative forces within organized benevolence, those that would fight the immediatist reformulation of antislavery, stubbornly cleaved to what in the early nineteenth century stood for orthodox Calvinism. When it came to a matter of public evil, and that is what they considered slavery to be, this conservative elite still worked within a modified covenant theology as famously described by the historian Perry Miller (1984: chap. 3). As heirs of the Puritans, the conservative leaders of organized benevolence still held strong theocratic views and remained emotionally embedded in the corporate structure of eighteenth-century America (Bodo 1954). They felt the New Republic’s relationship with God to be one of a collective contract like that of the Israelites with the Old Testament God. The Rev. Lyman Beecher, possibly the nation’s most renowned minister and an architect of organized benevolence, expressed this sentiment concisely: “Civil government is a divine ordinance. The particular form is left to the discretion of men, but the character of rulers God himself prescribed. They must be just men. Such as fear God—a terror to evil doers, and a praise to them that do well” (Beecher 1807). Violations of that contract would meet with divine disfavor and certain punishment in the here and now—e.g., war, disease, internal schism. The “federal” covenant, however, separated public and personal sin. External obedience by the community to God’s commandments governed civil and polity issues. Public sin involved external transgressions by the collective; public virtue demanded outward conformity by the community. As Moses had instructed the Israelites before they entered their covenanted land, “the secret things belong to the Lord our God; but the things that are revealed belong to us” (Deut. 29: 29). Personal grace, what was in man’s heart, was of a different order. The saints were, in essence, invisible. Personal grace did not issue from external works but from internal faith; and judgment of the individual did not unfold in the here and now but in the afterlife. The two forms of grace—public and private, visible and invisible, revealed and secret—were disassociated but held in creative tension. Invisible saints could be harmed by divine judgment in this life because of public sins, and the condemned could enjoy divine favor in the here and now stemming from public virtue. As a practical matter, the disassociation was not so complete (Miller 1953: chap. 1). Public matters of sin and virtue were best recognized and regulated by saints. For this reason, the theocrats associated with organized benevolence expected popular deference to be shown to the pious in matters of civil governance.
The pious, moreover, had a right to protect themselves from violations of the public covenant even against the interests of the irreligious.

The covenant theology and the corporate structure of covenant communities extended into the nineteenth century for many heirs of Calvinism, particularly orthodox Congregationalists, Presbyterians, and Reformed Christians (Hall 1984; Scott 1978). John Mitchell Mason of New York City, who presided in his life over Presbyterian and Reformed Christian pulpits, published as a pamphlet in 1800 a sermon nicely capturing the disassociation of public and personal within the orthodox cosmology. The pamphlet concerned itself with Thomas Jefferson’s candidacy for president. Mason warned that Christians must not vote an infidel into civil office:

But there is no prospect you say, of obtaining a real Christian, and we had better choose an infidel than a hypocrite. By no means. Supposing that a man professes Christianity, and evinces in his general deportment a regard for its doctrines, its worship, and its laws; though he be rotten at heart, he is infinitely preferable to a known infidel. His hypocrisy is before God. It may ruin his own soul; but while it is without detection, can do no hurt to men. . . . In short, your president, if an open infidel, will be a centre of contagion to the whole continent. If a professed Christian, he will honor the institutions of God; and though his hypocrisy, should he prove a hypocrite, may be a fire to consume his own vitals, it cannot become a wide-spreading conflagration. (Mason 1991: 1468–69)

Mason punctuated his sermon by invoking the ominous tones of the jeremiad: “Arise, O Lord, and let not man prevail!” (1476).

As late as 1830, the Presbyterian senator from New Jersey and leading member of the ACS, Theodore Frelinghuysen, gave testament on the floor of the Senate that the covenant theology still impressed itself on the hearts and minds of leading Protestants. Responding to the Jacksonian policy of Cherokee removal, he warned the chair of the chamber of the Senate “if the deed be done, Sir, how it is regarded in Heaven will, sooner or later, be known on earth: for this is the judgment place of public sins” (in Griffin 1960: 57–58). Frelinghuysen and like-minded leaders of benevolence held similar views about slavery. They saw it as a public sin that could be allowed to spread only under penalty from God. Moreover, it was a contagion that led to other sins like idleness, licentiousness, and drunkenness. It threatened the country’s relationship with God and like
a weed in a garden had to be removed. Racist to the core, this conservative leadership thought blacks had to be removed with slavery. It was beyond question that an “inferior race” could not live side-by-side with whites in freedom. In the minds of the conservative leadership of the ACS, colonization represented the best chance to gradually rid America of blacks. In the interim, slavery remained a necessary evil. There was nothing in this moral argument linking personal sanctification with the removal slavery. Indeed, slaveholders were members of the ACS and were treated as Christian brethren. Slavery was an inherited public sin, and they were as much victims of the public evil of slavery as transgressors. Slaveholding was not felt as an individual failing or even as a sign of a lack of grace.

**New Modes of Piety in Early Nineteenth Century:**

**Breaking the Chains of Sin**

The conservative leaders of organized benevolence did not direct religious affairs to the extent their fathers and grandfathers had in the eighteenth century. Americans after the revolution grew spiritually, as they did politically, increasingly democratic in their sentiments. Methodists, Baptists, Cumberland Presbyterians, and Christians or Disciples of Christ experienced dramatic growth in membership. The success of these populist groups came at the expense of the established and dominant denominations of the eighteenth century, particularly Congregationalists and Presbyterians (Finke and Stark 1992; Hatch 1989). In terms of theology, the growth of these populist groups resulted in the Arminianization of Calvinism. Doctrines of free will and even human perfectibility usurped notions of predestination and total human depravity in the popular religion of the nineteenth century. A popular sentiment of liberty informed spiritual matters as it did political and economic ones. For the piety of common churchgoers this Arminian trend meant a new confidence that people were endowed with the God-given ability to break the chains of sin. This religious movement was exemplified in Wesleyan Methodism, where freedom to overcome sin was pushed to a logical extreme of potential human perfectibility.

At first, Presbyterians and Congregationalists resisted this movement as heresy. The doctrines of human ability and potential perfectibility had, however, strong elective affinities with the democratic spirit and the economic ethic generated by political and market revolutions (Hatch 1989). By the 1820s, these doctrines had been smuggled into orthodoxy by prominent theologians such as Nathaniel Taylor at Yale (Conkin 1995: 211–20). Taylor’s “New Haven theology” was at the center of the
New School-Old School conflict that ultimately divided Presbyterians in the 1830s. It provided a theology behind the Methodist-like revivals that started to rock orthodox congregations in the 1820s. Particularly west of the northeastern “strand,” Presbyterians and Congregationalists were beginning to flock to the revivals of Charles Grandison Finney and of similar itinerant preachers set free from the orthodoxy that remained regnant back east. The children of frontier Calvinists had been exposed to the hot religion of circuit-riding Methodists and warmed to a more democratic and optimistic cosmology. The ruddy individualism and religious pluralism of the western states worked against the ethos and temperament of the covenant theology. The individual in democratic aggregation was the nation. The nation’s redemption was to be pursued through him or her, erasing the public-private split in spirit and politics. No one denomination or set of clerics could speak for the good of the collective or represent and interpret the covenant with God. God spoke and moved the nation equally through all. From the millennial perspective of the western revivals, what stood in the way of national redemption was personal sin. Revivals assailed individuals to break the chains of sin and set free the nation.

For a minority of evangelicals in this religious context, the sin of slavery became axial to their own conversions and, in their minds and hearts, to the redemption of the nation. This was most true for the Presbyterians and Congregationalists living in northern Ohio, upstate New York, and western and northern New England. Fifty years after the Declaration of Independence, slavery had both remote and immediate significance for these white Americans in free states. Most had no personal experience or history with the institution of slaveholding, and understood this institution of chattel slavery to be the peculiar provenance of their Southern compatriots and of remote concern (Huston 1990). Northern print media kept chattel slavery within public view but represented it as something of a foreign curiosity. On a personal or immediate level, however, slavery was for evangelical Christians an increasingly popular, religious metaphor for the condition of sinners. Sin, as that which violates the will of a transcendent and inscrutable God, could, like God himself, only be grasped through metonymy. Slavery gradually became the primary metonym for sin in the imagination of early-nineteenth-century evangelicals. Describing the human condition as slavery to sin was not exactly new for Protestants. Calvin had himself described it as such (see Niebuhr 1988: 24–25). In the orthodox mindset, however, personal enslavement to sin and the absolute sovereignty of God worked against
messages of liberation. Self-possession was inconceivable or an abomina-
tion because humanity was totally depraved. As slavery to sin became
articulated in an Arminianized cosmology, its significance became oppo-
site. As Weld described the Lane convert, the soul was noble, not de-
praved, but shackled by sin.

Before 1830, for all but a very small minority of Christians, the two
senses of slavery—chattel slavery and slavery to sin—were disassociated
in the mind. As Victor Turner (1974) discussed of the interaction of sub-
jects in a metaphor, for white Christians the primary subject was their
slavery to sin. Chattel slavery was employed as a “dark companion” to
the slavery of sin, informing the latter by applying “associated implica-
tions” of the former. “The metaphor selects, emphasizes, suppresses, and
organizes features of the principle subject by implying statements that
normally apply to the subsidiary subject” (Turner 1974: 30). Changes in
the sense of the self’s relation to sin, however, opened the possibility of
changes in the associated implications of chattel slavery. This did not,
however, automatically mean that chattel slavery evoked a strong nega-
tive reaction. Again, the disassociation was powerful. This was sup-
ported, in no small part, by the continuation of the disassociation of pub-
lic and private sin within orthodox Calvinism, but the covenant theology
was crumbling. In the second quarter of the nineteenth century, for many
heirs of Calvinism personal sin and public sin, personal sanctification and
public reform, were becoming emotionally fused.

The story of antislavery, therefore, runs deep into the temperament
of evangelicals. For a younger generation, raised under a modified Calvin-
ism concerned with human ability, public and personal sins were being
drawn closer. For some, slavery as the prime metonymy for sin became
a radical touchstone in this process. For most evangelicals the direction
of interpretation flowed exclusively from the subsidiary subject of chattel
slavery to the prime subject of the slavery of sin. However, what the
immediate abolitionists accomplished was to reverse the direction of the
flow of meaning, or better said, allow it to flow in both directions and
in such a broad current as to challenge the divide that had structured
more orthodox sentiments. With immediate abolitionism, personal op-
pression of sin flowed back to illuminate the horrors of chattel slavery.
Slavery was sin! For those that experienced this, their dislike for chattel
slavery was opened to the intensity of their loathing of personal sin, a
most powerful emotional energy in evangelicals. This was not so much
thought as felt. As Weld learned from his mentor Finney, redemption
turned on affections: “We have reason to believe that holy angels and
devils apprehend and embrace *intellectually* the same truths, and yet how differently they are affected. . . . The difference in effect consists [in] the heart of affections” (quoted in Hardman 1987: 115–16).

The call to immediatism would not have resonated as it did in the 1830s just a generation earlier. It would not have resonated on a personal and public register. It would have sounded hollow, as an impractical solution to a complex social problem. Instead, for a committed minority of evangelicals raised and converted under warm feelings of human ability and perfectibility and with a heartfelt desire to break the chains of sin, calls for the immediate repentance resonated as a public and personal challenge. It is precisely because it resonated on both levels that so many whites in places like northern Ohio, upstate New York, and northern and western New England, where slavery was a relatively remote issue, took it up with such fervor. The impact relied on a broader shift in the temperament and cosmology of evangelicals that took hold in the first decades of the nineteenth century. As Jasper (1998) argues in the case of moral shocks, reactive emotions resonate with more stable commitments to motivate action for a cause. This general process illuminates nicely what occurred with antislavery sentiments in the 1830s. Immediatism resonated with the new but relatively stable religious temperament of evangelicals. In short, the resonance of the call depended on a broad shift in the cosmology and temperament of evangelicals, a change in their emotional culture.

This impact is poorly captured as the instrumental “framing work” of movement entrepreneurs. Cognitive mediation between organized interest and objective opportunities fails to grasp how abolitionists made slavery immediate to northerners—made it *felt*. To modify Doug McAdam’s famous phrase, immediatism offered emotional liberation. Sensing this liberation, white abolitionists felt the need for their own emancipation from the slavery of sin and the sin of slavery, as well as the liberation of Southern slaves. The following letter to Weld from a Mr. Smuller of Geneva, New York, dated May 12, 1836, captures this dual register of immediatism’s resonance. In this letter, Weld, the agent of the American Antislavery Society, is invited to Smuller’s village to deliver a “course of lectures on the subject of abolition” at the local lyceum.

Come my Bro. because the voice of my poor brothers cries up from the ground, and his distressed and abject condition, and the principles of the eternal throne violated in his subjection demand the influence,—the intelligent well directed influence of this learned village. . . . Come because we need light! light! Come and
we will pray that God the Eternal spirit of Truth and wisdom and Grace may come with you. (Barnes and Dumond 1965: 303)

Immediate emancipation promised light to evangelicals with remote connections to the institution of chattel slavery. Abolitionist agents sought converts with no clear instrumental value to the emancipation of actual slaves. The movement’s form of collective action in the 1830s was often only obliquely related to practical measures to undermine the Southern institution. Henry C. Wright’s work as Children’s Antislavery Agent exemplifies the practical distance between the salvific ideal of abolition and practices that actually placed political pressure on slaveholders. He sought access to Sunday Schools, churches, and homes to work on the tender moral sentiments of children. Reporting on his work in Paterson, New Jersey, Wright wrote to the Evangelist:

Children’s prayer meetings are held—children take the anxious seat, asking the prayers of God’s people—children love to converse about Christ, and his dying love for them and the poor slaves—children pray for souls in Paterson, and for the slave, in their closets, and in the prayer-meetings. One little girl of four years said, “Ma, I want to go and pray for the poor slaves.” “Go then my dear.” She did. Soon she said, again, “Ma, I want to pray for Mr. Wright, the children’s agent.” Such is the spirit that pervades many tender little hearts in Paterson. (New York Evangelist, Feb. 25, 1837)

Placing children on the anxious seat to pray over slavery was interpreted by some as a nefarious plan to operate on the most vulnerable to spread fanaticism, but this was a stretch. The reality is that the salvific ideal of immediatists cared as much for white children in Paterson as it did for the slave. This may sound like an indictment, but it points to the broad horizon of the movement. Abolitionists sought a pervasive and permanent reformation of public sentiments regarding African-Americans through emotional conversions to repudiate racial hatred. Anything less smacked of expediency. As Elizur Wright observed, immediatism sought a moral revolution that necessitated “an entire change of thought and feeling, a revolution of the soul” (quoted in Goodheart 1990: 43).

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1. Apart from the highly symbolic act of petitioning Congress to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia, the immediatist political strategy in the 1830s is best described as an end-run around political institutions, directly targeting public sentiments and avoiding political mediations.

2. Though in different ways and through different historical trajectories, both Presbyterianism in the middle states and New England Congregationalism were shaped by seventeenth-century Puritanism (Conkin 1995).

3. For a clear example of the covenant theology still operating during the Revolutionary period, see Jacob Cushing’s Lexington sermon (1991: 609–26).

4. The seventeenth-century Reformed Confession of Dort established the contentious distinction between Calvinist and Arminian, a distinction that endured in the United States well into the antebellum period. Both Congregationalist and Presbyterians subscribed to the Dort Confession and remained avowedly anti-Arminian in the nineteenth century. In very simple terms, Jacob Harmensen (Arminius) opposed the doctrine of double predestination—that God chooses the elect and the damned. It is significant to note that this doctrine played nowhere near as central a role in Calvin’s work as it would in doctrines of those Reformed groups that took his name into the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Arminius smuggled human choice into God’s schema of saving grace. Individuals were free to respond to or to resist the covenant of grace. For the orthodox this seemed a heretical affront to the sovereignty of God. While Arminius and his early followers considered themselves Calvinists, the Dort Confession monopolized the label for the anti-Arminian camp (Conkin 1995: 36–37, 48).

5. The anxious seat or bench was a revival technique that placed individuals under the conviction of sin on conspicuous display before a religious assembly. It was probably a Methodist technique but made most famous by Charles Grandison Finney. It violated orthodox sensibilities suspicious of public displays of piety.
The activists of the Christian right share a certainty that things have gone radically wrong, and that Christian-based values, based upon a “strict father” morality, are the only sure way to correct those wrongs (Lakoff 1996). Their worldview is an extension of their image of the good family: good families value strength and obedience and do not tolerate weakness and dependence; they develop self-discipline in children by using rewards and punishments. Punishment is nurturing in that it teaches discipline, self-reliance, and respect for authority. In contrast, self-indulgence and lack of discipline lead to poverty, drug addiction, and a host of other problems—including homosexuality. They wish to restore rules, order, and authority—structures that give shape and meaning to a world out of bounds, and which guide individual actions in a world of bewildering choices and changes. They wish to construct a conception of the world that is secure, unambiguous, where there are good people and bad people, and where they themselves are clearly on the side of the good and true.

Christian conservatives defend their moral visions in terms of religious beliefs: they understand the truth in terms of an external, definable, and transcendent authority. They hold fairly consistent views on a cluster of issues such as abortion, gay rights, and welfare reform. And they define themselves against those who see truth as constantly in flux. On one level, this is evidence of a “culture war” (Hunter 1991). But on another level,
their activism is more than a quest to repair the world and transform culture. It is an effort to repair themselves, and in this it is a deeply personal quest. Conservative activists are not unique in this sense: social movements seek to change the world, gain concessions from the state, or alter the way that people view particular problems, but they almost always embody expressive goals as well. By joining with other like-minded souls, individuals become activists to affirm both themselves and their vision of the world (Calhoun 1993a; Darnovsky, Epstein, and Flacks 1995).

While Christian conservatives are fond of speaking of their motives as a selfless commitment to higher authorities—family, nation, God—as I listened to their stories it became evident that their activism is not reducible to external goals; it offers the hope of self-realization as well. This quest for meaning encompasses emotional as well as cognitive dimensions. Christian activists try to construct a positive sense of themselves and their families as strong and independent, in contrast to weak, shameful others. Their activism is a reparative act.

The Culture War

Five years ago, dozens of small Oregon communities became the site of bitter battles over the issue of homosexuality. The Oregon Citizens Alliance, then an affiliate of the Christian Coalition, sponsored a ballot measure that sought to deny civil rights protections to lesbians and gay men. In January 1993, the OCA selected eight counties and thirty-five cities for initiatives that would prevent antidiscrimination protections for gays and lesbians and prohibit government spending to promote homosexuality. These charter amendments, toned-down versions of an earlier statewide measure which was narrowly defeated, brought the issue of homosexuality to rural Oregon in an unprecedented way. Neighbors debated with neighbors, husbands and wives disagreed, people wrote letters to the local paper, and homeowners placed signs on their lawns. Why did sexuality become such a salient issue in towns where lesbians and gay men were virtually absent, or at least invisible? How did various sectors of the targeted communities respond to this campaign? To find out, I looked at what people said publicly in the debate about homosexuality in one small Oregon town during this period, tracking newspaper articles, letters to the editor, and published flyers and pamphlets. I also interviewed people who participated in these debates to try to figure out what homosexuality symbolized for people on a deeper level—both for those who sought to legislate against gay rights, for those who sought to
defend these rights, and those who were ambivalent on the matter. Among these interviewees were a number of local activists against gay rights, members of the Oregon Citizens Alliance. With these individuals I conducted eight semistructured in-depth interviews, averaging ninety minutes in length. I wanted to “get into their heads” and figure out who they were, how they understood their world, and how a Christian right organization channels their discontent toward political ends.

During the course of my interviews, Christian conservatives wept with joy in my presence, as they recounted how they found the Lord and spun elaborate tales of apocalyptic end-times. It quickly became clear to me that this was a movement with profound emotional dimensions. As Jasper (1998: 215) suggests, “protest always combines strategic purpose, pleasures and pains in the doing, and a variety of emotions that both motivate and accompany action.” Indeed, recent literature on the interaction of social movements and emotions has looked at such topics as the role of emotion in constructing collective identities and understandings of grievances and opportunities in motivating activism, and in creating a sense of community within social movements; the mobilization of emotions in the process of becoming a movement participant; and the emotional culture, rituals, work, and rules of social movements—what Morgen (1995) calls the “politics of feeling” (see also Melucci 1995; Taylor 1996; Taylor and Whittier 1995).

Yet there has been little research on how the right taps into emotional needs. This is surprising in view of an earlier tradition of research that examined the psychological dimensions of right-wing activism, seeing such movements as an irrational playing out of paranoid fantasies (Hofstadter 1967) or as disorganized, relatively spontaneous “panics” (Goode and BenYehuda 1994). Certainly, many movements embody irrational dimensions. But moral movements such as the contemporary Christian right, much like their counterparts on the left, are much more complex, and more organized, than this. As Kintz suggests, we must move beyond the view of emotions and fantasy as “an unbridled irrationalism without any logic” (1997: 67). Emotions do possess a logic, and movements give shape and public voice to those emotions.

The Logic of Emotions

Individuals come to know themselves through interactions with others; the self is a social construct (Cooley in Scheff 1990). It should come as no surprise that emotions, both positive and negative, are inseparable from social interactions. Individuals are continuously involved in a
quest to abide by “feeling rules” in order to “protect face” and minimize
the public display of negative emotions (Goffman 1967; Hochschild
1983).

Scheff (1999) suggests that shame, a widespread, negative emotion,
is the “premier social emotion,” influencing all sorts of social interac-
tions, often in unacknowledged ways. Shame differs from guilt—“some-
thing specific about which the self is critical” (Lewis 1971: 251). In
shame, “criticism or disapproval seems to emanate from ‘the other’ and
to envelope the whole self.” It is the “social emotion” that arises from
the “monitoring of one’s own actions by viewing one’s self from the
standpoint of others” (Scheff 1990b: 281). In shame, hostility against the
self is “experienced in the passive mode,” causing individuals to feel
“small, helpless and childish,” vulnerable, victimized, rejected, passive,
and not in control (Lewis 1971: 41). Psychoanalytic literature suggests
that individuals with soft self-boundaries, who are highly conscious of
themselves in relation to others, are most prone to shame, and since
shame is a painful emotion, the result of the perception of negative evalu-
ations of the self by others, it has an “intrinsic tendency to encourage
hiding” (Lewis 1971).

There are two different types of shame: overt shame, in which an
individual says “I am ashamed,” where one’s emotions are relatively ac-
cessible and therefore less potent and destructive; and “bypassed shame,”
which begins, says Lewis (1971), with a perception of the negative evalua-
tion of self where the individual is overly conscious of his/her self-image
from the other’s viewpoint. However, unlike the markers of overt, undif-
ferentiated shame, which are often flagrant and overt, those of bypassed
shame may be subtle and covert. They include thought and speech that
“takes a speeded up but repetitive quality” which might be seen as “ob-
cessive.” Typically, Lewis says, “individuals repeat a story or series of
stories, talking rapidly and fluently, but not quite to the point. They com-
plain of endless internal replaying of a scene in which they felt criticized
or in error.” And they are distracted. Both types of shame create rigid
and distorted reactions to reality, but because bypassed shame tends to
be ignored it becomes exceedingly destructive. The shamed person “avoids
the shame before it can be completely experienced, through rapid thought,
speech, or actions” (Lewis 1971: 197). And she/he compensates for shame
by displaying incessant thought, speech, and/or action, and frequently by
shows of “overt hostility” and retaliation (Scheff 1990: 298).

My interviews suggest that the emotion of shame, particularly by-
passed shame, figures prominently in the narratives of Christian conserva-
tive activists. Though my small sample makes any claims speculative (and
I would not go so far as to suggest that there is a monolithic Christian right personality type), the role that shame plays in the emotional dispositions of the Christian right activists I spoke with seems undeniable. To make this argument, I provide examples of some recurring interactional dynamics between myself and my subjects that indicated shameful feelings.

My second argument is that religious right organizations frame their appeals in order to mobilize shameful emotions toward political ends. In this the religious right is not unique. Indeed, during the past three decades, one of the primary goals of the lesbian/gay liberation movement has been to encourage people to “come out” and declare their sexual identifications proudly and publicly, as a means of countering the shame and secrecy associated with homosexuality in our culture (Stein 1997). The Christian right, in contrast, mobilizes around a felt sense of shame in their constituency, promising the hope of alleviating it, but its strategy of targeting other shamed populations (such as lesbians and gay men) in order to transform shame into rage, provides temporary relief at best.

**They’re Pointing Fingers at Us**

“I’m one of those nasty right wing nuts,” says sixty-five-year-old Jeri Cooksson facetiously.¹ She distrusts me, sees me as an outsider, someone who’s out to make them look bad, yet at the same time she is pleased, flattered that I’m taking the time to ask for her opinions. Despite her initial hesitation to talk with me, Jeri held forth for several hours. “You know I don’t usually talk to people like you,” she tells me. “I don’t think a whole lot of those people up at the university.” For Jeri, university teachers are liberal, morally lax secular humanists who can’t be trusted. She wonders whether I will portray her as a shrill, intolerant old biddy. Like most of the other activists I interviewed, she is guarded, leery of my intentions.

Though I did not originally set out to consider the field of emotions in relation to these interviews, in the course of speaking with my subjects, I was quickly struck by several recurring dynamics: their tendency to speak rapidly and obsessively, to the point where I could barely get a word in edgewise; their tendency to avert their eyes while they interacted with me; their unwillingness to openly acknowledge feelings of embarrassment; and their overriding feelings of victimization. These interactions led me to consider whether deep emotions might be at play, emotions that go far beyond the standard feelings of stress and anxiety that accompany many interview settings.
Sally Humphries, a forty-five-year-old mother of two, said in the middle of our interview, “I just feel beet red. I’m not an expert on any of this stuff, you know”—a response that in itself was not all that surprising in view of the fact that Sally, who had never finished high school, was talking one-on-one for the first time in her life with someone who held a doctorate. Still, at several points during the interview, she seemed overly concerned with what I thought of her, and she told me that she worried that I might think she “is crazy.” Often during the course of these interviews individuals also exhibited thought and speech which took a speeded up but repetitive quality which might be seen as obsessive. For example, in telling me that Christian right activists were labelled as “Nazis” during their Oregon campaign against gay rights, Erica Williams trailed off onto a discussion of a job she once held in Alaska:

What they were doing is what the Nazis have done. They started with name calling. They didn’t say, you’re an evil person, you’re taking all of our money. And they may not have ever had anything to do with anybody’s money. And that’s the way it began. The job I had in Alaska, after I was healed. I came outside, and my dear sister, now dead, could never just say hello or goodbye. Somebody called her because they had her telephone number and asked if I would like this job as a historian. So she called me in Tucson and I came and we had this wonderful talk.

Erica Williams was an extreme case of the tendency of individuals to “spill over” a series of unorganized feelings and ideas. But when I observed variations of these patterns in nearly all of my interviews with religious conservatives, I began to wonder why this might be the case.² What was I observing? Was it the function of the interview setting, or of my interviewees’ psychological dispositions?

After consulting the psychoanalytic literature, I began to recognize many of these recurring dynamics as markers of shame. In her therapeutic practice Lewis (1971) noticed that shamed persons have a propensity to “spill over” relatively unorganized feelings and ideas and to repeat a story or series of stories, talking rapidly and fluently, but not quite to the point (186–89). During the course of my interviews with religious conservatives, I became, analogous to a therapist, the person through which my subjects acted out their feelings of shame and played out their “internal” conversations. Since Christian conservative activists define themselves against secular humanist elites, whom they believe to be destroying the nation’s moral fabric, I became, by virtue of my academic position, a
representative of that population and therefore the perfect foil against which they could define themselves. This was less evident in what people said than by how they said it; the different behavioral cues in the course of our interactions were as important as the actual content of our conversations.

Psychoanalytic accounts suggest that the experience of shame often occurs in the form of imagery, of looking or being looked at. Shame “may also be played out in imagery of an internal auditory colloquy in which the whole self is condemned by the other” (Lewis 1971: 37). When Sally Humphries, who had just finished telling me about how she became “born again,” became ashamed of what she had told me, worrying that it might signify that she is crazy, she implicated me as a participant in her “private theater” (Lewis 1971: 218). As a witness to the subject’s shame I became a shaming agent myself.

When asked how she would describe her religious beliefs, Erica Williams replied: “I’m a very conservative, Bible-believing Christian, one of those ‘mean-spirited’ ones.” When I asked her if that is how she considers herself, she replied: “Well, that’s what they describe people who are very conservative Christians: mean spirited.” Which people? I asked her. “The people in the press, people around town,” she replied. Has anyone in town ever called her these things? “Not to my face, no. But I’m sure they say it in private,” she replied.

Christian conservative activists believe they are the innocent victims of numerous injustices. Living in an ostensibly secular society, they believe they are persecuted for their beliefs, as the following exchange suggests:

Craig Miller: Just because I believe in Jesus Christ, I don’t think anyone should be pointing their finger at me.
Interviewer: Is someone pointing their finger?
Craig: Yeah, the left is very much doing that, you know?
Interviewer: Who in particular?
Craig: Everyone.

Similarly, when asked to describe the Oregon Citizens Alliance, Barney Wooten replied: “Mostly conservative, traditional values people—we’ve been enormously demonized in this state. They label us as ‘hateful’ or ‘bigoted’ or ‘narrow-minded.’ ” These activists frequently used the word “they” to refer to their enemies: they do this; they think this; they have an “agenda”; they are trying to “indoctrinate” people, responses which attest to the feeling that they are being victimized by liberal, secular society.
It is true that Christian conservatives are sometimes vilified by the left and mocked by the media. Christian conservative views do not play well in a society steeped in the liberal pluralist we’re-all-different ethos, an ethos consonant with commercial media imperatives. As Joshua Gansson (1998) shows in his study of tabloid television, when religious conservatives appear on tabloid talk shows, the “bigot becomes the freak”: the audience and hosts often turn against antigay guests such as Paul Cameron, head of the right-wing Family Research Institute, turning those who impose antigay morality into “sick, ungodly, bigoted, un-American freaks.” The therapeutic-pluralism-turned-entertainment, he says, is much more sympathetic to liberal approaches to sexual nonconformity than to conservative condemnations of it. I found that a similar dynamic was true of the media in the small Oregon town I studied.

Still, religious conservatives tended to exaggerate the extent of their victimhood, often even staging confrontations which permitted them to claim they were being vilified by the left. For example, in the midst of the campaign against gay rights in Oregon in 1993, members of the OCA appeared in a “diversity awareness” parade in a nearby town, courting confrontation with gay rights supporters by appearing in a float depicting three family-values scenes. As the float went by, thousands of onlookers turned their backs, and a handful of people threw eggs at the float and attempted to block the route. The OCA responded with outrage: “Traditional Christianity is now the Evil Empire for the politically correct.” Religious conservatives usurped the left’s rhetoric, redefining themselves in the language of interest group liberalism and identity politics, and shifting from an earlier notion of Christians as guardians of the status quo who represent the “moral majority” to the view that they are an oppressed minority comprised of social outcasts (Johnston 1994; Steinfels 1996). At the same time, they embrace a highly individualistic ethos which denies their feelings of shame.

“I’ve Fought My Demons on My Own”

The conservative activists I interviewed are people who have struggled against a variety of demons: poverty, drugs, family turmoil, illness; they lack education and sophistication, mispeak, use bad grammar, and have never traveled abroad. While they acknowledge having had drug habits, checkered work histories, and relationship problems, their discussions of these problems were always accompanied by explanations of how they struggled to overcome them. In psychoanalytic terms, shame
is the opposite of autonomy (Erikson 1956). To admit weakness is therefore to admit shame, something which few are willing to do.

Thirty-six-year-old Craig Miller talked about his drug addiction. “You know, I’ve had my share of problems and my share of downfalls in life,” he told me. “And I’ve got no problem with that. Some people have tried to throw those in my face from time to time. And I’ve got no problems with my past and stuff. I’ve gotten in trouble with the law. But I learned some lessons from that.” Like Craig, the conservative activists I interviewed were, on the whole, working folks who made good, who owned a little property and had some money in the bank. They embrace a “middle-class morality,” striving to earn enough money so that they feel that their economic fate is in their own hands, but also trying to live by principles such as individual responsibility, the importance of family, obligations to others, and a belief in something outside oneself (Wolfe 1998). At the same time, they live in an era of “declining fortunes,” a time when many Americans’ sense of entitlement to the trappings of middle-class life such as home ownership, occupational security, mobility on the job, and a decent standard of living is eroding (Newman 1993). Even as the stock market soars to unprecedented levels and many industries enjoy the fruits of a globalizing economy, few of the post-industrial economy’s winners are to be found among these conservative activists. At a time when the fastest growing sectors of the economy require mental labor, they work with their hands.

Jeri Cooksson described her family’s changing economic fortunes. “We were poor. Very poor. My husband and I grew up in the Depression. I’ve been very very poor,” she said. Jeri and her husband moved to Oregon from Southern California in 1968, looking for a better place to raise kids and work. Jack was a carpenter, like his father before him. Jeri was a full-time homemaker who occasionally worked outside the home once their kids got older, as a cashier at Sears, selling real estate on the side. She asks me if I have ever seen the movie *The Grapes of Wrath*. When I reply that I have, she tells me that it’s the story of her husband’s family. “He had a rough life, believe me.” When he was in school, she says, his mother and father paid scant attention to his progress. “They never looked at one of his report cards . . . they didn’t care. He was a good kid, he worked hard, he never did anything wrong. They didn’t care whether he learned to spell or not.”

Nonetheless, she told me, “we were happy, and responsible, and we took care of ourselves, and we loved each other. We didn’t have a Little Beaver type family, no we didn’t. But we stuck together, and we
were independent and we took care of ourselves.” Jeri shows me around her home, a modest but pleasant 1920s bungalow located in the middle of town which she and her husband bought on the cheap and fixed up. They just redid the floors, and her husband installed new kitchen cabinets. The house means a lot to them. It’s their security in old age, but more than that, it symbolizes how far they’ve come. When Jack retired they started a small janitorial service, cleaning offices around town. They work one or two nights a week to supplement their social security, and they derive additional income from two rental properties in town. “We’ve been very blessed because we earned every dime we got,” she says proudly.

Though they have come to enjoy a bit of economic security and respectability, their hold on middle-class status remains tenuous, and there is shame in their voices when they speak of a past which lingers, shaping their sense of themselves. Many individuals hold multiple jobs to make ends meet, and anxieties about future employment and about the fate of their children loom. Jeri, for example, spoke at great length about how she feels the educational system, with its declining standards, is selling her grandchildren short, and she expressed fears about the decline of her small timber community. Yet she reserved most of her wrath for those who are “taking advantage of the system” and collecting welfare at her “family’s expense.” She and other conservative activists feel themselves to be victimized as hardy individualists who have had to pull themselves up by their bootstraps, living in a society which coddles individuals and squelches self-reliance. Jeri, for example, is firmly committed to the belief in the possibility of upward mobility for all and to the notion that individuals, through hard work, strength, and family solidarity, can help themselves:

I think, in this country, people should be hired or fired, or rented to or not rented to, or whatever, by whether or not they are going to take care of the property, or not take care of the property, pay the rent . . . not pay the rent, do the job . . . not do the job. If somebody is not capable of making it at the university, I don’t think they should be let in, and make a special case for them, or any special privileges because he’s black, or white, or green, or purple, or homosexual or not. He either passes the course and he can make it in there, or he can’t. And if he can’t, set up some special school to prepare him to go into that, you know. I can see where if somebody . . . You don’t have to say okay, this is school for black kids . . . this is school for kids that didn’t quite make it in high school and needs a little more education before they go to
Jeri sees herself as having achieved economic independence alone, with little help from the world beyond. She and other conservative activists feel that all around them others face the same struggles but suffer few of the consequences; they are being coddled by society, receiving a variety of handouts and entitlements, and this is unfair. A belief in the loss of standards, as in the “dumbing down” of education, is a theme that comes up in conversations with conservative activists again and again. The state has intervened, fulfilling the role that family once played. It takes over the role of educating and socializing the child. It even takes over the role of providing for the child. A system of entitlements benefits the least deserving: the lazy, the slothful, the morally suspect. It has created, in their eyes, a dysfunctional society, filled with people who are trying to get something for nothing, who don’t know the value of discipline and hard work. Individuals are no longer given incentives to work hard. Certain groups in society are taking advantage of the flaws in the system, and hardworking people pay the price. On one level, this is fairly predictable conservative rhetoric. But on another level, it plays into feelings of unacknowledged shame, and it accounts for the rise of a rhetoric of victimhood that is now pervasive on the right.

The white, predominantly working-class religious conservatives I interviewed tend to see themselves as victims of forces beyond their control, and yet, at the same time, they are firmly committed to an individualistic ethos which suggests that they hold their destinies in their own hands. To be morally strong, they believe, one must be self-disciplined and self-denying. Moral flabbiness ultimately helps the forces of evil. Carried into the political realm, this moral system—with strength at the top of the list of values—leads to the belief that poverty, drug habits, and illegitimate children can be explained only as moral weakness, from which it follows that any discussion of social causes is irrelevant (Lakoff 1996). Their individualism helps them deny their shame, but it also exacerbates it and prevents them from seeing the structural roots of their malaise. Consequently, they harbor a series of resentments against the world around them.

The Politics of Shame Reduction

In psychoanalytic understandings of shame, the loss of self-esteem drives the person to repair the loss (Lewis 1971: 26). In Goffman’s (1967)
terms, the individual wishes to “save face.” She/he wants to “right” a “wrong” and prevent the loss of self. But rage originating in shame is trapped, or “silent rage” (Lewis 1971: 407). Social movement leaders must articulate this sense of shame in order to transform it into focused rage; so the skilled organizers of the right have to tap into the “bypassed shame” of their audience and devise rhetoric that speaks to it and promises to alleviate it. If religious conservatives’ shame is linked to a sense of victimhood, they are drawn to political rhetoric which identifies this victimhood, locates a cause, and offers them the possibility of seeing themselves as strong, independent beings. This rhetoric functions to permit shamed individuals to feel rage and to imagine themselves as members of a collective identity of similarly raged people. In the process, they affirm a sense of themselves as independent, as strong, and as bearers of the truth.

Aided by the belief that they are engaged in a “culture war” for the preservation of American morality, Christian right activists imagine themselves as fighting the good fight (Hunter 1991). One of the best ways of creating solidarity among one’s adherents is by using polarizing rhetoric which pits “us” against “them”: insiders and outsiders, saints and sinners, purity within and danger and pollution without (Alexander 1992). By imagining Christians as a group excluded from the culture, OCA leaders stoked the fires of the culture war, transforming a vague, amorphous sense of threat and dis-ease into an attribution of blame. “We’re the 82nd airborne of the pro-family movement,” Lon Mabon, the OCA’s head proclaimed. “We drop behind the enemy lines. We take the most casualties. We take the most hits.” This rhetoric worked on several levels. It played on a masculinist fascination with war—what Richard Slotkin (1973) has called “regeneration through violence”—and the widespread belief in the coming apocalypse (Strozier 1998). At the same time, it evoked the image of “good Christian soldiers” doing battle for the Lord, an image that appealed to evangelical Christians who saw themselves as excluded from the culture by liberals, homosexuals, and their secular humanist cronies. And it lent an air of immediacy to the struggle: they were winning the battle for the hearts and minds of America. We must respond—swiftly and strongly. This is serious business, Mabon told conservative Christians throughout the state, we must not delay.

In an evil-filled world, Christian conservatives believe that only a blessed few can see through the moral murk and point the way to a better understanding of things on Earth. Those who have “a personal relationship with the Lord” are these people. They are the witnesses who testify
against the ugliness they see around them, the troubadours who lead us back to our moral sensibilities, before it is too late. A sense of identity is founded upon “intimate familiarity” (Kintz 1997: 67), the recreation of familial bonds among unrelated intimates. In the pentecostal and charismatic congregations that comprise the base of the religious right, individuals are encouraged to express emotions in prayer. Religious right organizations draw upon these emotional bonds to mobilize believers to take action.

This sense of identity is constructed through opposition to “others”—nonbelievers and sinners—whom the shamed individual can triumph over or humiliate. Since shame is the function of a preoccupation with an “other,” shame-reparation or reduction involves retaliation against an “other” who, it is suggested, is the shame-agent. For Christian conservatives, homosexuality has during the past fifteen years served as the “other.” Christians see gay people—affirming relationships which have no strings attached, no mutual duty, and no guarantee of duration—as the antithesis of the good society, the embodiment of a world in which rules, order, self-discipline, and stability are severely lacking. Christian right organizations have sponsored a number of ballot initiatives designed to deny civil rights to lesbians and gay men. In 1994, there were over twenty antigay measures on state and local ballots, many of which garnered considerable support (Duggan 1994; Herman 1997).

In rural Oregon, in the early 1990s, the OCA mounted a series of campaigns to amend local charters so that they “shall not make, pass, adopt, or enforce any ordinance, rule, regulation, policy or resolution that extends minority status, affirmative action, quotas, special class status, or any similar concepts, based on homosexuality or which establishes any categorical provision such as ‘sexual orientation,’ ‘sexual preference,’ or any similar provision which includes homosexuality.” Since the vast majority of these localities had never considered passing any such gay rights ordinances, or if they had done so they would have a negligible effect, these campaigns were largely symbolic. These campaigns were much more about consolidating a religious right collective identity than about affecting public policy.

When I asked Jeri Cooksson why she was active against gay rights, she replied, fusing a belief in moral and medical contagion: “It’s a lifestyle that is harmful to our country because it tears down family values, harmful to the individuals involved because it is unhealthy.” According to “reputable studies,” she says, people involved in homosexual activities are twelve times more likely to develop hepatitis B than people who are not. During the local campaign against gay rights in Oregon in
1993–94, homosexual “atrocity tales” filled the press. The schools were infested with “militant, avowed homosexuals” who were teaching preschoolers that “masculine and feminine roles are not a matter of anatomy but of choice.” If students or parents challenge such a view, one woman charged, they are met with “name calling, ridicule and half truths.” ⁶ In another story, the middle school had invited two gay people to speak to their students about their lives. They were “practicing homosexuals who had AIDS” who presented their lives as perfectly natural and normal. When asked by one sixth-grader what they did sexually, they explicitly described some of their unconventional sexual activities, including fisting—or so it was claimed.⁷

Clearly, the impressions OCA activists hold of gay people are rooted partly in misunderstanding of the Other. In diverse societies, Zygmunt Bauman writes, individuals are forced to live with those who may be different from themselves, but we construct defenses so that we do not have to come to really know them. Confronted with strangers on a daily basis, we are practiced in the “art of mismeeting and the avoidance of eye contact.” We create social distances that evict from social space the others who are otherwise within reach. We deny them admittance, and we prevent ourselves from acquiring knowledge about them. But these evicted others, in Bauman’s words, continue to hover in the background of our perceptions, remaining “featureless, faceless” (Bauman 1991: 155). Indeed, OCA activists’ knowledge of homosexuality derived less from personal experience than from watching television, or from a one-time foray on a tour bus into San Francisco’s Castro District, or from reading Christian right political materials. The superficiality of this contact allowed them to inflate their targets into folk devils whom they imagined were posing a threat to their conception of the good society. By constructing the other as an abstract category, they were able to separate the fate of gay people as a group from gay people as individuals. The lack of sustained contact and knowledge of homosexual culture bred feelings of repulsion and subdued hostility that were ready, given the right political rhetoric, to condense into hatred (Bauman 1991: 156).

Authoritarian individuals, according to Theodor Adorno, project their unacceptable feelings—especially sexual feelings—onto a minority group and thereby create a scapegoat. Once the group has been vilified, acting out one’s rage against them becomes acceptable and logical. Indeed, some have suggested that antigay activists’ fervor is fueled by their desire to compensate for their own homosexual desires. Perhaps this is true, but a more powerful explanation links shame to sexual desire in general. Sexual desires call up emotions—love, rage, shame—that are
repressed in our sex-obsessed and sex-repressed culture. Advertising images and other forms of popular culture draw upon and elicit sexual feelings, and at the same time banish them from critical scrutiny and public discussion. Conservative Christians, like all Americans, experience sexual desires in a society which condemns their open expression. How can they not feel torn between conflicting impulses? Prominent evangelicals such as Jim Bakker and Jimmy Swaggart crusade against premarital sex and are caught with their pants down. In rural Oregon, rumors of preachers kicked out of congregations for sexual indiscretions abounded, and many people seemed to think that children in evangelical families were even more likely to transgress sexual and other norms.

Psychoanalytic theories suggest that shame is closely linked to sexual failure, and that masculinity is extremely fragile and always needs to be carefully fostered and protected (Chodorow 1998). Male homosexuality is particularly threatening because it calls “normal” masculinity, founded upon identification with the aggressive father, into question. Because desire is so powerful, and prohibitions against nonnormative sexuality so central to Christian orthodoxy, is it any wonder that people would seek to project their unacceptable sexual feelings upon others, and seek to punish those who openly flaunt these desires? It makes sense, then, that conservatives would seize upon the “homosexual problem” as a means of constituting themselves as a collective identity. In the antigay campaigns of the right, conservatives deploy homophobia in order to affirm a father-dominant social order; the shamed parties turn the tables, enacting a “triumphant sexual fantasy” that imagines “the other” in shame (Lewis 1971: 411).

While OCA activists railed against homosexuality as a threat to the health and well-being of all, they often qualified their claims with professions of sympathy for individual gay people. “There’s quite a few here in town. I’ve met several of them,” said Jeri. “Very very nice people. Extremely nice people.” Barney Wooten tells me about gay people he works with, one of whom refuses to talk with him because of his beliefs. “He has more negative feelings about me than I do about him.” But when it comes down to it, the conservative activists I speak with don’t really know any living, breathing lesbians or gay men. Their descriptions are shot through with stereotypes, cardboard characterizations, and distortions. Homosexuals, Sally Humphries tells me, are “highly talented people, very artistic people,” and since she considers herself artistic, she feels a particular affinity for them. She admits to having gay friends. “I’m drawn to them. They’re into art and color. They’re more caring sometimes.”8
Christian love-the-sinner-hate-the-sin rhetoric permits OCA activists to hate gays and love them at the same time. While passing a ballot measure to prevent homosexual “special rights” might not change very much, Christian right activists believe it is a first step. Through their activism, they are taking a stand against the rise of a permissive society and are affirming a sense of themselves as strong and independent. They are assuming the role of parent, disciplining the moral flabbiness of those around them. Extending the metaphor of the child in need of discipline, they believe that homosexuals are wayward children, the children who got away, who need to be punished in order to get them back on track. It makes no logical sense that the government would come to protect their rights. Like a good child gone bad, they need to be shown a little tough love: sometimes you have to be cruel to be kind.

Conclusion

Christian conservatism and the activist projects it is associated with may be less a distinct set of beliefs than a generalized “state of mind” (Strozier 1998). The conservative Christian activists I interviewed are people who have struggled against a variety of demons. A precarious sense of achievement fuels their quest for respectability. Yet shame and anxiety linger in their out-of-bounds world, a late-modern scenario in which the familiar structures of family, work, and community are rapidly being redefined, where women find themselves caught between competing loyalties to family and work, where communities are increasingly segmented, and where child abuse and other problems appear to be rising.

Christian conservatives strongly believe that good families value strength and obedience and do not tolerate weakness and dependence. In a just society, good families are rewarded and bad families punished. But all around them, they see those who face the same struggles as they do but who suffer few of the consequences. They imagine that they are being coddled by society, receiving a variety of handouts and entitlements, and they see this as unfair. A sense of resentment fuels their anger, and their activism. No one helped me. Why should they receive more? If some can receive handouts without working, the value of work is diminished. If homosexuality is affirmed along with heterosexuality, then the meaning of heterosexual marriage is diminished.

Through their activism, Christian conservatives construct a conception of the world that is secure and unambiguous, where their own lives and their own struggles have meaning and purpose, where they feel strong and powerful. Their activism is a reparative action that seeks to make
the blurry clear, to classify clear, definable, morally inferior Others. The
culture war, then, is about more than the realization of cognitive beliefs.
There is a profound emotional dimension as well: a quest to transform
shame into pride.

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Endnotes

1. All individuals except for Lon Mabon, the OCA head, are named by pseudo-
nyms, as is the town where most of this research was conducted.
2. Women may be more prone to shame because of their greater relationality,
and their feelings of powerlessness. During the course of our interview, women were
more likely to ask me if I thought they were “making any sense,” whether they were
“giving me what I wanted,” whether they were being coherent.
3. Loretta Neet, Letter to Editor, Eugene Register-Guard, June 6, 1993.
Register-Guard, January 15, 1994.
Part Three

Recruitment and Internal Dynamics
Arguing that the time had come to take direct action, militant AIDS activist groups began to emerge in 1986–87 in various lesbian and gay communities around the United States.¹ With cumulative deaths from AIDS-related complications nearing and soon surpassing 20,000 nationally, lesbian and gay AIDS activists in San Francisco formed the direct-action group Citizens for Medical Justice in the summer of 1986; a similarly action-oriented group, the Lavender Hill Mob, formed that same summer in New York City; DAGMAR (Dykes And Gay Men Against Repression) began to incorporate militant AIDS activism into their anti-imperialist, antiracist work in Chicago in early 1987.² The first ACT UP (AIDS Coalition To Unleash Power) chapter appeared in New York City in March 1987 with a demonstration on Wall Street that brought seventeen arrests; other ACT UP chapters soon sprouted up across the country. With civil disobedience, disruptions, die-ins, and eye-catching agitprop, ACT UP and similar AIDS activist groups brought a new militance to lesbian and gay activism, unsettling “business as usual” in both straight and gay worlds. Why did lesbians and gay men become politically active in the face of AIDS (never an inevitable development), and why did they embrace angry and militant street activism after a generation of engagement in routine interest group politics? In an account that challenges standard social movement theory, I demonstrate how emotions and their expression—notably shame, fear, pride, grief, indignation, and anger—
shaped lesbian and gay responses to the AIDS epidemic, sometimes encouraging lesbian and gay quiescence or community self-help, at other times animating militant political activism. I draw on evidence from Chicago, New York City, and San Francisco.

**Social Movement Theory and the Emergence of ACT UP**

Standard social movement theory cannot easily account for ACT UP’s emergence.3 My research suggests, precisely contrary to the dominant “political-opportunity” model, that ACT UP emerged despite, and in fact partially because of, tightly constricted political opportunities. ACT UP arose as a national movement in 1987, amidst the growing conservatism of the Reagan/Bush years. Lesbians, gay men, and AIDS advocates lacked meaningful access to power and influential allies, and benefited from no significant splits in the ruling alignment or cleavages among elites.4 In the early years of the AIDS epidemic, all levels of government responded with a deafening silence that was supplanted in the mid-1980s with inadequate funding and increasingly repressive legislation. Following the political-opportunity model, one would conclude that ACT UP (inexplicably) emerged at an inopportune moment. My analysis of ACT UP troubles, and indeed, inverts, the political-opportunity model, providing students of social movements with a theoretical challenge and an opportunity to look critically at, recognize the limits of, and further specify, this dominant model of social movement emergence and decline.

An illuminating route of inquiry for understanding lesbian and gay political mobilization in response to AIDS, and for expanding social movement theory, is to explore the interaction between the external context that the political-opportunity model has flagged and factors internal to the communities out of which ACT UP arose, including the sexual and political subjectivities of lesbians and gay men, their ever-shifting interpretations of and feelings about themselves and the AIDS epidemic, and their variable aspirations vis-à-vis dominant, heterosexual society.

**Lesbian and Gay Ambivalence**

In the thirty years since the Stonewall Rebellion that marked the emergence of the modern lesbian and gay rights/liberation movement and the wide circulation of the “gay pride” slogan, lesbians and gay men have demonstrated a persistent ambivalence about their own homosexuality and about dominant, heterosexual U.S. society; sometimes consciously
experienced but also occurring on a less than fully conscious level, this ambivalence, and efforts to navigate it, significantly affected lesbians’ and gay men’s organized political responses to the AIDS epidemic. This ambivalence, a simultaneous acceptance and rejection of one’s sexual desires along with both an attraction to and a repulsion from dominant society, is socially structured (Merton and Barber 1963). That is, rather than deriving from the idiosyncrasies of individual lesbians and gay men, the ambivalence arises from and is reinforced by social relations of marginalization. While the composition and extent of ambivalent feelings shift through time and vary depending on individuals’ different positions in hierarchies of race, class, and gender and on their different personal experiences, the marginalized status of all lesbians and gay men in a heterosexist society structures a constellation of contradictory emotions that is hard to avoid. Dominant institutions construct lesbians and gay men as an abnormal, deviant, perverted “other” and relegate them to an outsider status. The heteronormative, heterosexist common sense is that there are heterosexuals and homosexuals and the former are the moral ideal while the latter will never measure up. Homosexual desires, practices, and lives are thereby linked to shame and guilt. The institution of the nuclear family is particularly significant in generating lesbian and gay ambivalence. Children typically grow up in a heterosexual family whose structure is naturalized, normativized, and reinforced by nearly every other institution of U.S. society. They are generally presumed to be heterosexual and are encouraged to assume their own heterosexuality; consequently, those who feel an attraction to people of the same sex tend to feel that they are different from parents and peers and that something is therefore wrong with them. In this context, lesbians and gay men are hard-pressed to avoid conscious and unconscious feelings of shame, guilt, self-doubt, and even self-hatred regarding their sexual desires, sexual practices, and/or gender expression, even while simultaneously deriving pleasure, joy, and fulfillment from them.

Because one’s sense of self is in part related to one’s conscious and unconscious anxieties about one’s place in society, it makes sense that, in addition to ambivalence about self, lesbians and gay men experience a related ambivalence about dominant heterosexual society. The following statement by early gay liberationist Martha Shelley points to a connection between ambivalence about self and ambivalence about society: “You [heterosexuals] have managed . . . to drive us down and out into the gutter of self-contempt. We, ever since we became aware of being gay, have each day been forced to internalize the labels: ‘I am a pervert, a
dyke, a fag, etc.’ And the days pass, until we look at you out of our homosexual bodies. . . . Sometimes we wish we were like you, sometimes we wonder how you can stand yourselves” (Shelley 1992: 33–34). The other side of self-hatred is both attraction toward, and hatred of, a society that makes one hate oneself.

Gay writer Jeffrey Escoffier suggests another source of this ambivalence toward heterosexual society. “We are members of the dominant society and yet we are not really members” (1998: 27, his emphasis; see also Fuss 1991: 5). That contradictory status mixes with heterosexism to produce multiple, and often conflicting, desires vis-à-vis dominant society. On the one hand, lesbians and gay men are attracted to it. From early childhood, they are socialized into, and often assumed to be fully part of, that society. Many of their significant relationships are with heterosexuals, and they often share many of the same hopes and expectations as straight people. Their social conditioning and consequent ambivalence about their sexuality might bolster their attraction to society and their desire for social acceptance by arousing an anxiety that heterosexuals are in some sense right in their condemnation of homosexuality. On the other hand and simultaneously, lesbians and gay men have historically articulated disillusionment, anger, and antipathy toward a state that institutionalizes inequality and a dominant society that sanctions hatred toward “queers.” Lesbian and gay attraction to society is diminished by what many see as state and societal allowance, even approval, of the deaths of hundreds of thousands of gay men from AIDS and laws that criminalize homosexual sex, prohibit homosexual marriage, expel homosexuals from the military, and exclude lesbians and gay men from antidiscrimination protection. Even while fearing that dominant discourses about homosexuality might be right, lesbians and gay men mix ideas of rights and justice that prevail in the U.S. with their same-sex experiences of sexual pleasure and emotional connection, nourishing a belief that in fact they are normal and right and that a homophobic society is the problem.

Since Stonewall, pride has been the normative emotion for lesbians and gay men who are open about their sexuality; lesbian and gay institutions and leaders promote, produce, even require a dominant narrative of pride. Sally Munt argues, “Coming out into the modern lesbian and gay movement we have celebrated a rubric of pride.” But as Munt notes, “Pride is dependent on shame; pride is predicated on the denial of its own ostracized corollary, shame. This explains the hegemony of pride in the post-Stonewall era, as a strategic deployment against the pathological
Repeated expressions of gay pride are supposed to have unmade gay shame. However, as the ubiquitous articulations of gay pride might suggest, the ambivalence persists. The ambivalence helps to create an “emotion culture” among lesbians and gay men that includes shame about homosexuality and fear of social rejection, along with gay pride and anger about heterosexist oppression.

It is controversial to disrupt the dominant lesbian and gay narrative of pride and acknowledge the persistence of ambivalence. Some might argue that to do so risks playing into the hands of the antigay right wing who could use it to justify their bigotry: “Even lesbians and gay men hate themselves.” However, while we should be aware of the risks, neither scholars nor activists will understand the dynamics of lesbian and gay politics without assessing the psychological repercussions of growing up and living in a heterosexist society and exploring these subtle disciplinary effects of power.

Conventions about Emotions and the Management of Deep Ambivalence

Ambivalence, whether experienced consciously or unconsciously, provokes discomfort and anxiety. The desire to resolve it is intense, as are efforts to do so. Freud argued that one way people defend against it is by repressing one of the contradictory emotions and zealously embracing the other. William Reddy (1997: 333) suggests that a social group’s conventions about feelings and about emotional expression help members navigate intense ambivalence. He argues that emotional utterances (emotives) actually alter the feelings to which they refer. The inability of language to adequately represent an “inner” feeling state means that when an emotive is articulated (e.g., “I’m angry”), it names and categorizes the “inner” feeling state, making legible and verbal what was previously nonverbal, but it does so by necessarily eliding the gap between language and the subjectively experienced feeling. In the process, some components of one’s “inner” feelings fail to be brought into the verbal realm; they might be repressed, or displaced, or simply never made meaningful through language. That which goes unnamed drops out, and the feeling is thereby made legible or understandable by being named. The speaker might end up feeling angry as it is defined by the socially-constructed meaning system in which she is embedded, or she might realize that in fact she is not angry and she may then start the process again by searching for a more accurate emotive; in either case, the emotive “I’m
Deborah Gould

“angry” alters the feeling(s) to which it refers by enacting a slippage through an always imperfect naming and categorization process that produces an unnamed and unnamable residuum. Emotives, then, are “instruments for directly changing, building, hiding, intensifying emotions” (331).

Reddy writes that a community’s emotional rules and conventions produce normative emotives that, repeated over time, can affect a pervasive and intense ambivalence by magnifying one side of the contradictory feelings and submerging the other. The emotive conventions effectively “tip” the balance of ambivalence in one direction rather than the other, providing a “resolution,” of sorts, to the opposing feelings and thereby shaping how people feel. I would only add that the process is interactive and continuous; any temporary “resolution” to an intense ambivalence in turn affects prevalent feelings and the social group’s conventions about emotions and their expression. As I demonstrate below, a lesbian and gay community’s emotion culture both derives from (at least to some extent) and helps to manage the widespread ambivalence, in part by setting forth rules and norms about feelings and emotives, and in part by actually affecting how lesbians and gay men feel.

Lesbian and gay ambivalence about self and society is unstable. Feelings of self-love can attenuate feelings of self-hate; attraction to society can supersede repulsion toward society. Neither side of either ambivalence easily dominates, since its opposite is always present even if submerged. The very instability and uncertainty of any given “resolution” to the ambivalence requires vigilant, if less than fully conscious, management, through, for example, the consistent repetition of emotives that bolster feelings on one side of the ambivalence and repress feelings on the other side. Because lesbian and gay ambivalence revolves around self and society, these emotion management processes occur in all arenas where there are lesbian and gay selves, and perhaps most pointedly, wherever lesbian and gay selves interact with society, such as in the political realm. The AIDS epidemic brought new visibility and public scrutiny to lesbians and gay men. Ambivalence and efforts to manage it were thus central components in lesbian and gay responses to AIDS. Before turning to an analysis of the role of ambivalence in AIDS activism specifically, in the section below I outline the more general relationship between lesbian and gay politics on the one hand and ambivalence about self and society on the other, and argue for the necessity of investigating the relationship between these psychological dynamics and political practices.
Ambivalence and Lesbian/Gay Politics: What Do We Want, When Do We Want It?

Darrell Yates Rist suggests a connection between what I am calling ambivalence and lesbian and gay politics:

Whatever the state of our ‘gay pride,’ our politeness sticks to us all. It oozes from a well of acquiescence deep within, down where we still can’t quite believe that we’re as good as straights and deserve all of the heterosexual prerogatives: kissing lovers on the street, holding hands in front of Mom and Dad . . . , marrying. This politeness, which we nurture as though it were a virtue, emanates from dark convictions—lying dogmas we grew up with—that tell us we aren’t quite right. . . . When it comes to taking hold of freedom, our politeness shuts us out. (Rist 1987: 54)

Rist intimates that lesbian and gay self-hatred and self-doubt emanate from, and animate, a deep concern with social acceptance that translates into political quiescence. In arguing that gay shame persists and sometimes trumps gay pride, Rist reminds us that prior to making political demands, lesbians and gay men must believe that they deserve to be treated better. Shame and self-doubt potentially gnaw away at any such conviction even while gay pride and indignation about homophobia might bolster it. Ambivalence about dominant society also introduces uncertainty into any political course of action; lesbians and gay men want to accommodate to, but also to confront, society’s norms, values, and institutions.

Lesbian and gay political discourse reveals a relationship between lesbian and gay politics and ambivalence about self and society. As is true of most identity-based politics, lesbian and gay politics in large part revolve around questions of lesbian and gay selves in relation to society—who are we and how are we treated in relation to others; where do we fit in this society and where do we want to fit; how might we best achieve our goals? Given such concerns it is no surprise that the language of lesbian and gay politics is saturated with emotions about self and society. Emotions justify and explain lesbian and gay political actions (e.g., “our rage made us turn to civil disobedience”); are blamed for and credited with lesbians’ and gay men’s political stands vis-à-vis dominant society (e.g., “our shame makes us too accommodating in the political realm”); are invoked to advocate one strategy over another (e.g., “if we’re proud,
we’ll act responsibly and take care of our own”); are evoked to condemn and discourage those who engage in a politics of respectability as well as those who disregard such politics (e.g., “gay men who condemn promiscuity are self-hating”; “promiscuous gay men are self-hating”); are linked to specific political acts (e.g., “our leaders should feel ashamed about groveling for crumbs”); are credited with political successes (e.g., “our calm, reasonable tone made them respond to our demands”).

In short, emotions suffuse lesbian and gay political discourse, proclaiming how, in light of specific political actions, lesbians and gay men supposedly feel, should feel, should not feel, will feel, about themselves and about society. Various, and sometimes conflicting, emotions are incessantly reiterated, indicating both an instability in how lesbians and gay men feel about themselves in the context of a hostile society as well as conscious and less than fully conscious attempts to affect those feelings and thereby influence lesbian and gay politics. It seems clear that this highly emotional language of politics—in its focus on the relationship of lesbian and gay selves to society—is centrally engaged with lesbian and gay ambivalence, with all of its instabilities. The emotional content of the political discourse, in fact, suggests an indissociable relationship between lesbian and gay politics, on the one hand, and lesbian and gay ambivalence about self and society, on the other. Again, the fluidity and instability of the ambivalence invite efforts to bolster each side of it; as lesbian and gay political discourse reveals, efforts at such emotion management in the political realm effectively encourage some activist practices while discouraging others. That is not to say that ambivalence and efforts to navigate it produce lesbian and gay political practices in some easily mapped, one-to-one causal equation. But I am arguing that we cannot adequately understand lesbian and gay politics—and more specifically, responses to AIDS—without paying close attention to the role that ambivalence and attempts to manage it play in shaping lesbians’ and gay men’s self-understandings, feelings about themselves and society, interpretations of their situations, and political subjectivities and actions.12

As a further point of clarification, let me emphasize that I am not arguing that individuals or institutions intentionally mobilize certain emotions and downplay others in order to bolster one or the other side of the ambivalence and direct lesbian and gay politics toward either moderation or confrontation. The ambivalence itself occurs on a conscious and unconscious level, as do attempts to resolve it. Regardless of intent, expressions of emotions affect lesbians’ and gay men’s feelings and their ambivalence, and often point toward a specific political course of action.
Ambivalence and Early Lesbian and Gay Responses to AIDS

Throughout the AIDS epidemic, the evocation and expression of certain emotions have produced constellations of feelings and of emotion rules and norms that have effectively, if only temporarily, helped to “resolve” lesbian and gay ambivalence; these processes helped to shape lesbian and gay responses to AIDS. For example, during the first years of the AIDS epidemic, the prevalent and already existing ambivalent emotion culture animated feelings and articulations of shame (“our perverted sexual practices are killing us”) linked to fear (“we now will surely be rejected by family, friends, and society”), and submerged the few early articulations of anger directed at the government. In bolstering negative feelings about homosexuality and appealing to a strong desire for social acceptance, this constellation of emotions heightened lesbian and gay concerns about respectability and assimilation into society, providing a “resolution” to lesbian and gay ambivalence that encouraged a nonconfrontational political response to AIDS that consisted mostly of service provision and lobbying.

During the mid-1980s, this emotion culture shifted slightly. There was an increase in expressions of anger about the government’s inadequate response to AIDS. However, lesbian and gay ambivalence worked to delink that anger from militant political activism and channeled it instead in the direction of an internally oriented community pride that encouraged lesbians and gay men to continue on the commendable path of nobly, responsibly, and quietly taking care of their own in the face of little outside help. This constellation of emotions discouraged militant activism, pointing instead toward volunteerism, community-based service provision, and lobbying. The following example, where anger was articulated and elicited, but quickly defused and directed toward compassion rather than activism, illustrates these dynamics. At an AIDS memorial candlelight procession in Chicago, one speaker asked the crowd, “Are you mad? Are you angry?” He continued by saying that he was “pissed” because no one outside the lesbian and gay community was doing anything about AIDS. The crowd loudly agreed with him. He then concluded by advising: “Take your anger and turn it into love for your brothers.” Perhaps following his suggestion, the procession concluded with marchers singing the refrain “We are a gentle, angry people” from Holly Near’s song, “Singing for our Lives” (Cotton 1985). In this period, editorials in Chicago’s lesbian/gay newspaper Gay Life consistently criticized the government’s homophobic and negligent response to AIDS, but rather than calling for activism, the editorials all simply commended the com-
community for its strength in the face of such adversity. A typical editorial angrily indicted the government, but issued no activist call and instead focused on an inward-directed pride: “Where others might have caved in under the pressure of the killer AIDS, our community has grown in strength during this tremendous crisis. . . . June is Gay and Lesbian Pride Month, and in Chicago we can truly be proud” (“Off to a Good Start,” 1985).

The repeated invocations to feel pride might have been animated by a desire to bolster lesbian and gay self-esteem and to fight the greater stigma attached to homosexuality in the context of AIDS; they also might have been motivated by a need to increase the resource and volunteer base to fight AIDS. Equally important, however, seems to be the role that such elicitations of pride played in submerging a growing anger; each time anger began to be articulated, pride about the community’s response to AIDS was immediately evoked and affirmed as the proper emotion to feel amidst this dire crisis. Regardless of their intent, the political effect of these expressions of pride was to submerge anger and to encourage an inward orientation that trumpeted volunteerism and community self-help rather than a more externally oriented activist response. When “gay pride” was first coined as a slogan by lesbian and gay liberationists in 1969, it was linked to militant activism. In the mid-1980s, it had an altogether different flavor. In a moment when a public health epidemic intensified gay shame and fear of social rejection, and when government response to AIDS was negligent at best and punitive at worst, gay pride now encouraged volunteerism, remembrance of the dead, relative quietude despite the government’s glaring failures, and a stoic nobility in the face of a deadly epidemic, rather than confrontational or oppositional politics.15

According to Reddy, because emotives can alter feelings, emotive conventions strongly influence individual and community-wide emotions over time. The evidence suggests that lesbian and gay communities’ emotive conventions very much affected feelings about AIDS, largely submerging anger for the first four or five years of the crisis by rechanneling it toward fear of social rejection, shame, community pride, and tranquil nobility whenever it threatened to surface. The promotion of certain emotives over others, however, did not rid lesbian and gay communities of anger; it simply reduced its expression and seemingly reduced the feeling itself. But as Reddy points out, individuals vary in their responses to emotive convention. That variation “provides an initial reservoir of possibilities for change . . . that can be drawn upon when ideological, economic, or political factors put pressure on the system” (Reddy 1997: 334–35).
In other words, emotive conventions are subject to contestation, particularly in times of crisis.

**The Management of a Growing Anger**

Specific events in San Francisco and New York and comments of lesbian and gay leaders at the end of 1985 reveal the beginning of a shift in the mood of lesbians and gay men. At the end of October, nine individuals camped out in front of the old Federal Building in San Francisco to protest the government’s response to AIDS. Two gay men with AIDS chained themselves to the doors. Their continuous vigil grew over the succeeding months (Hippler 1986: 42–47). Meanwhile, activists in New York City who were “fearful, angry and frustrated over mushrooming AIDS hysteria” (Freiberg 1985: 14) formed the Gay and Lesbian Anti-Defamation League (GLADL). More than six hundred lesbians and gays attended a mass meeting called by GLADL to discuss AIDS hysteria stirred up by the media and politicians; the next day one hundred protested outside City Hall during a committee hearing on closing gay sex establishments. In December, five hundred lesbians and gay men joined GLADL in a demonstration against the sensationalistic, antigay AIDS coverage of the *New York Post* (Freiberg 1985, 1986a). These more oppositional politics were not yet widespread, but their occurrence indicated a shifting emotional climate and the growing instability of accommodationist politics.

Comments made at a meeting of elected and appointed lesbian and gay officials by the executive director of the National Gay Task Force, Virginia Apuzzo, and by Massachusetts representative Barney Frank revealed their awareness of rumblings among some lesbians and gay men for more militant action. Apuzzo’s comments indicated her perception that widespread ambivalence about self and society had translated into anxiety about lesbian and gay expressions of anger and militant political practices. She attempted to alleviate lesbian and gay anxieties about rocking the boat:

> For those of us who have earned . . . the respect and regard of [the political] system, we must be willing to spend it on this issue. We must be willing to mount a multiple offensive on what is coming down on us. Yes, we must negotiate. Yes, we must lobby. Yes, we must litigate. . . . But we must also remember where we come from, and return to allowing that rage to be expressed and not think for a minute that there is something not respectable about that. (Walter 1985: 11)
Frank, in contrast, tried to dampen the anger and steady the boat: “The political system has responded better [to the AIDS crisis] at this point than I would have hoped. . . . [That means] in my judgment, that the political course of action that has been chosen [by the lesbian and gay community] is correct” (Walter 1985: 13).

Although there was movement toward greater militance, Frank’s cautionary note was the more typical expression during this period. A standard editorial in Chicago’s lesbian/gay Windy City Times, for example, advocated “loving ourselves, as a community” as “the only way through this crisis.” It continued: “Yes, we mourn the loss of thousands. . . . But we do not let their deaths set us back. Instead, we gain from their loss, and as a community we get ever-stronger” (“Memorials across America,” 1986). Love and pride in the community, rather than political action, were offered as solutions to the growing AIDS crisis; grief over the mounting deaths was similarly redirected toward community pride.

Prevailing lesbian and gay conventions about emotions—conventions that in part constituted, derived from, and helped to manage lesbian and gay ambivalence—elevated some feelings and suppressed others, helping to “resolve” the widespread ambivalence in a manner that prevented many lesbians and gay men from even conceiving of more oppositional politics, even while they acknowledged and criticized the government’s negligent response to the crisis. For those who might have considered confrontational activism, ambivalence about their own sexuality and about dominant society and the management of that ambivalence through emotional utterances encouraged caution and moderation. The articulation and elicitation of specific emotions—first fear and shame and later an internally oriented community pride and tranquil nobility—heightened one side of the balance of lesbian and gay ambivalence and, by helping to redirect growing anger and grief, bolstered lesbian and gay commitment to moderate politics.

Events and a New Constellation of Emotions

In the middle of 1986, there was a marked and widespread shift in lesbian and gay rhetoric about the AIDS crisis. In the context of ever-increasing AIDS deaths, government failure to address the crisis, and growing calls for more repressive AIDS legislation, the U.S. Supreme Court’s Bowers v. Hardwick decision, announced in June 1986, was a turning point, an event that, primarily as a result of its emotional effects, animated a transformation in lesbian and gay political responses to AIDS.16
Comparing gay sex to “adultery, incest, and other sexual crimes,” the Court upheld a Georgia statute that denied homosexuals the constitutional right to engage in consensual, private sexual acts (Walter 1986). Lesbians and gay men experienced the decision as “a declaration of war” (Deitcher 1995: 140). Deitcher writes that “news of the Hardwick decision was enough to awaken the radical in most apolitical queers. . . . Protests erupted in cities across the country as the news reached communities in which frustration and rage had been mounting over the loss of lovers and friends, the accelerating rate and intensity of bias-related violence, and the unprecedented challenge to queer social identity that the epidemic posed” (148–49). Accounts of the demonstrations remind one of Durkheim’s notion of “collective effervescence,” brimming with the emotional energy generated by the amassing of large numbers of people who see themselves as in some way connected. In New York City, lesbians and gay men “took to the streets for two angry, militant demonstrations,” the largest since the 1970s; many engaged in civil disobedience. According to one reporter, “time and again . . . demonstrators called for a ‘new militancy,’ for fighting back” (d’Adesky 1986: 8). Some participants urged others to “show our rage” with a disruption of the upcoming July 4th celebration of the 100th anniversary of the Statue of Liberty. More than six thousand lesbian and gay protesters attempted to do so, circumventing police barricades along the way and angrily chanting “civil rights or civil war!” Lesbians and gay men across the country angrily called for “active resistance,” “riots,” “massive protests,” “law-breaking,” another “Stonewall,” a “return to the streets.”

The new militance grew quickly, delineating a politics that linked emotions such as indignation, anger, self-respect, fear of death and inaction, and grief to militant, confrontational AIDS activism. This new cluster of emotions prevailed over the previous evocations of pride about the community’s self-help, faith in the government’s goodwill, and stoicism in the face of death. Lesbian and gay newspapers both recorded and helped to generate the shifting emotion culture, running ever more op-eds and articles that indicted the government, articulated a growing anger, expressed dissatisfaction with the lesbian and gay community’s moderate response to AIDS, and suggested the need for more confrontational AIDS activism. Militant AIDS activist groups began to emerge. In September 1986, a San Francisco-based group of lesbians and gay men, Citizens for Medical Justice, staged a sit-in at California governor George Deukmeji-
an’s office to protest his veto of an AIDS antidiscrimination bill and his nonaction on twelve other AIDS bills; eight were arrested. Late in 1986, a group of activist artists began to plaster New York City with posters that had a pink triangle (a gay right’s symbol) above the slogan “SILENCE = DEATH.” Text at the bottom reflected and reinforced the new mood in the community, encouraging lesbians and gay men to “turn anger, fear, grief into action.” In March 1987, members of the Silence = Death Project attended the founding meeting of ACT UP/NY and contributed their graphic to the burgeoning militant AIDS movement. Also early in 1987, Dykes and Gay Men Against Repression (DAGMAR) began strategizing a militant response to the AIDS crisis; they later became ACT UP/Chicago. Even mainstream lesbian and gay groups called for more confrontational politics. Speaking at a gay health conference, Duke Comegys, the president of the establishment-oriented Human Rights Campaign Fund (the lesbian and gay PAC), received a standing ovation when he asserted, “I am personally ready to go to jail to save my life and the lives of my family and friends. I cannot take any more death” (Vandervelden 1987).

Why did the Hardwick ruling—which, following McAdam (1982), we should consider as a tightening in political opportunities—provoke such a militant response by lesbians and gay men, and why did the ruling prompt lesbians and gay men to embrace militant AIDS activism? For years, lesbians and gay men had suffered through punitive AIDS legislation, inadequate AIDS funding, calls to tattoo and quarantine people with AIDS (PWAs), and so on; in response, they had strongly criticized, lobbied, held candlelight vigils, and sometimes protested, but lesbian and gay militance after Hardwick was much more pronounced, widespread, and lasting. One explanation for the response to Hardwick may be found in Jasper’s (1997) concept of “moral shock.” Hardwick was experienced as an unexpected and outrageous legal decision, particularly to lesbians and gay men who believed in American democracy’s proclamation that equality was the law of the land. In denying them basic rights, the ruling confronted lesbians and gay men with the extent of their outsider status, forcing them to reconceptualize the U.S. as the land of justice for all—except “queers.” In tandem with the government’s inadequate response to AIDS, the ruling confounded the sense of belonging to dominant society and the sense of entitlement to citizen rights and privileges felt by many members of the lesbian and gay community, particularly those who were white, male, and middle class. They were newly indignant that their rights could be so thoroughly abrogated. As Jasper argues, a moral shock “helps a person think about her basic values and how the world diverges...
from them” (106) and can propel that person into political activism. Two pressing questions remain unanswered, however. First, given their past experiences with numerous indignities, why did lesbians and gay men experience _Hardwick_ as a moral shock? Second, why did they respond with militant activism? As Jasper writes, “responses to moral shocks vary greatly. Most people, in most cases, resign themselves to unpleasant changes” (106) and do not embrace militant activism even in the face of such a shock.

To understand lesbians’ and gay men’s experiences of and political reactions to _Hardwick_, then, we must consider the context in which the ruling occurred as well as the already shifting emotion culture that both derived from and reinforced lesbian and gay understandings of that context. By the middle of 1986, lesbians and gay men were facing a horrific and devastating social, political, and health crisis. _Hardwick_ was announced five years into the AIDS epidemic when the number of AIDS cases reported to the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) had surpassed 30,000, more than half of whom had already died (CDC 1997: 14). President Reagan had yet to utter the word “AIDS” in public. Lyndon LaRouche’s initiative to quarantine persons testing HIV-positive had recently garnered well over the required 394,000 signatures to be placed on the California ballot, and other state legislatures were increasingly considering similar laws (Freiberg 1986c: 10; Fall 1986: 9). Emanating from the highest echelons of the state and amidst increasingly repressive legislation, government negligence, and the ever-increasing AIDS deaths, the _Hardwick_ ruling shocked lesbians and gay men into a greater recognition of the life-threatening nature of state-sponsored and socially sanctioned homophobia. As I have argued, in the year prior to _Hardwick_, lesbians and gay men were increasingly feeling anger toward the government; the shift in the emotion culture then reigning in lesbian and gay communities was occurring quite gradually, however. The _Hardwick_ ruling greatly quickened the pace, shattering the previous “resolution” to ambivalence and the concomitant constellation of emotions that had prevailed in lesbian and gay communities during the first years of the AIDS epidemic. The ruling radically transformed lesbians’ and gay men’s feelings about self and society, accelerated a shift in their emotion norms and rules, and provoked a new “resolution” to lesbian and gay ambivalence, all of which stimulated new understandings of the AIDS crisis and encouraged militant activism. To understand why _Hardwick_ animated lesbians and gay men to embrace militant AIDS activism, then, requires an investigation of the ruling’s emotional effects.

First and foremost, _Hardwick_ amplified shifts in lesbian and gay
community emotion cultures that had already begun to occur as a result of the mounting deaths and the government’s negligent and punitive handling of the AIDS crisis. A new configuration of emotions is apparent in lesbian and gay activist documents and newspapers after Hardwick. Indignation, born from a sense of entitlement betrayed, was pronounced, complementing frequent expressions of self-respect; anger and animosity toward the government were increasingly articulated; fear about the consequences of lesbian and gay inaction was heightened. Emotions like shame, pride in the community’s self-help, fear of social rejection, and tranquil nobility in the face of death and government negligence, which had previously dominated and had encouraged community-based service provision, volunteerism, candlelight vigils, and lobbying, were rarely elicited or articulated during this period. The now-normative emotion culture offered a new constellation of emotions about self and society—i.e., a new “resolution” to lesbian and gay ambivalence—that encouraged militance and profoundly shook up the orthodoxy of political moderation and accommodation that had dominated lesbian and gay politics since the mid-1970s.

Although itself not directly about AIDS, Hardwick punctuated and gave new meaning to the ongoing epidemic; it crystallized and heightened feelings about and interpretations of the epidemic that had previously been more or less inchoate. By exposing the state’s willingness, even eagerness, to exclude an entire class of people from constitutional protections, the Hardwick ruling encouraged a more politicized analysis of the government’s response to AIDS, making it increasingly difficult to reduce the epidemic to a string of individual deaths and to isolated feelings of grief. Before the ruling, a number of lesbians and gay men had begun arguing that the government’s response to the AIDS crisis was proof that gay men were seen as expendable; as the highest court in the land was now willing to espouse homophobic justifications in denying privacy rights to a group of citizens, who was to say that quarantine of HIV-positive people would not now be implemented? If state and society saw homosexual love (and thus homosexual lives) as criminal, they certainly would not suddenly become concerned about homosexual deaths. After Hardwick, framings of AIDS that invoked the Nazi holocaust and accused the government of genocide by intentional neglect became more resonant. Lesbians’ and gay men’s growing fear, grief, and anger supported an interpretation of AIDS as genocide, and, at the same time, this new and apocalyptic framing amplified those very emotions.

Lesbians and gay men experienced Hardwick as a moral shock because the content of the decision itself along with the majority opinion’s
blatantly homophobic justifications, occurring amidst an already horrific crisis, brought into stark and unmistakable relief the contours and depth of homosexual exclusion and oppression. Hardwick encouraged militance because, occurring in the context of the increasingly devastating AIDS epidemic, the ruling deeply affected the way that lesbians and gay men thought and felt about themselves, about dominant society, and about the AIDS crisis; these events provoked a marked shift both in the prevalent emotion cultures in lesbian and gay communities around the country and in lesbian and gay ambivalence; together, these events transformed views long-entrenched among lesbians and gay men about what kinds of politics were acceptable, possible, and necessary. For all of these reasons, Hardwick altered the course of lesbian and gay politics, providing a crucial spark to the militant AIDS activist movement. Rather than inhibiting political action as the political-opportunity model would predict, the tightening of political opportunities that resulted from the Hardwick decision encouraged lesbians and gay men to take to the streets.

It should be clear that there was nothing inevitable about the response of lesbians and gay men to the Hardwick decision, and there was no necessary connection between Hardwick and the emergence of militant AIDS activism. To understand why Hardwick amplified lesbian and gay anger at state and society rather than shame about homosexuality, and why it encouraged confrontational politics rather than more lobbying or paralysis born of despair, we need to consider the context of shifting emotions and political subjectivities that lesbians and gay men were experiencing when the ruling occurred. As stated above, the Court’s decision was announced at a moment when the prevailing lesbian and gay emotion culture was already shifting as a result of other, more gradual processes and occurrences—a steady (although of course alarming) increase in cases and deaths, government inaction, and repressive legislation—that had by then spanned five years. Similarly, pockets of more militant AIDS activism were already slowly beginning to emerge to protest the closing of gay bathhouses, the growing AIDS hysteria in the media, and government inaction. Hardwick, then, had the impact that it did because it occurred at a moment when anger toward the government was increasingly being articulated and felt, and because some lesbians and gay men were beginning to channel that anger into more militant politics. The ruling allowed for the mobilization of indignation rather than shame because the years of elicitations and articulations of pride about the lesbian and gay community’s response to AIDS had already altered lesbian and gay ambivalence about self: shame was being submerged (although not thoroughly or permanently), people were feeling proud as members of a community
that alone was responding to the crisis, and a sense of entitlement to citizen rights and privileges could effectively be mobilized. In this context, the extreme and blatant homophobia of the Supreme Court’s decision accelerated a shift in what had been the prevalent lesbian and gay emotion culture: anger and indignation were no longer easily submerged but to the contrary were quickly becoming normative, replacing shame, fear of social rejection, and stoicism in the face of death. This shifting emotion culture offered a new “resolution” to lesbian and gay ambivalence that joined self-respect, self-love, and pride about being gay to indignation, anger, and animosity toward society. This new constellation of emotions pointed in the direction of militant AIDS activism.

The shift towards militance was not a linear progression. That is, there was not a singular, steady movement away from moderation and towards oppositional rhetoric and tactics. To the contrary, the period immediately prior to the emergence of militant AIDS activism shows a continuing oscillation. For example, even on the heels of the Court’s decision, ambivalence about militant, oppositional politics was evident; the night after the Hardwick decision was announced, lesbian and gay leaders in New York tried to get those sitting down in the streets to end their sit-in after half an hour. Longtime political activist Maxine Wolfe recalled that members of the Gay and Lesbian Alliance Against Defamation (GLAAD, previously GLADL) “panicked at the militance and the anger in the street” and tried to get people to “go home” (Wolfe 1993). The mood, however, was decidedly more confrontational than it had been over the previous decade; protesters did not heed the call to disperse and instead continued blocking traffic for almost four hours (Freiberg 1986b). During the following months, lesbians and gay men increasingly embraced militant AIDS activism.

**Conclusion: Emotions and the Emergence of ACT UP**

Emotions played a determining role in the emergence of militant AIDS activism. A tightening of political opportunities helped to crystallize more oppositional emotions and reconfigure the prevailing emotion culture in lesbian and gay communities, animating a new “resolution” to lesbian and gay ambivalence about homosexuality and about dominant society. Less restrained by fears of social rejection or by shame about homosexuality, thousands of lesbians and gay men no longer submerged their indignation and anger but instead directed such feelings toward the government, the scientific-medical establishment, the media, and society as a whole. Whereas before, the emotion culture and efforts to manage
lesbian and gay ambivalence together had reinforced accommodation to dominant society, now the two, still buttressing one another, encouraged angry, confrontational AIDS activism.

In the wake of *Hardwick*, the lesbian and gay community’s calm and reasoned appeals for government action seemed more and more out of synch with the latter’s punitive and negligent response and with lesbians’ and gay men’s fear and swelling grief and anger. For many, the illnesses and deaths, government inaction, the attacks on lesbian and gay sexuality, the ease with which pundits and politicians called for quarantine, could no longer be assessed as abstract phenomena. Among many lesbians and gay men, there was a growing sense that their everyday routines, and for an increasing number, their very lives, were imperiled. In Rosaldo’s (1984) view of emotions as embodied thoughts, the crisis facing lesbians and gay men was now acutely *felt*. More and more lesbians and gay men had to acknowledge that the AIDS crisis was affecting “me.” Increasingly besieged, the community’s noble acceptance of its plight and internally oriented pride transformed into painful disillusionment with the workings of democracy, a sense of entitlement betrayed, and anger.

Ambivalence about self and society persisted, of course, but widespread articulation of these newly normative, confrontational emotions that were evoked by the context of dire crisis and the impotence of existing lobbying efforts by lesbian and gay organizations encouraged a new “resolution” to that ambivalence and a shift in politics from accommodation toward confrontation. Tapping into the grief, fear, indignation, and anger felt by many lesbians and gay men, activists articulated a compelling and militant collective action frame that in turn legitimated previously “outlaw” emotions (Jaggar 1989). Activists asserted that AIDS was genocide—a worsening holocaust caused by institutionalized homophobia; the government would continue to treat “faggots” as expendable and would thus continue to be unresponsive to routine political efforts; the costs of inaction by the community—more deaths and increasing state repression—were unacceptably high; there was thus a desperate need for militant, collective action. “SILENCE = DEATH” was the call to arms. Large numbers of lesbians and gay men responded, seemingly no longer restrained by fears of social rejection or by shame about homosexuality. The dire situation animated both the articulation of now-normative oppositional emotions and a new “resolution” to lesbian and gay ambivalence; together, these factors strongly affected people’s interpretations of themselves and their situations and made engagement in militant action imperative.

In conclusion, I’d like to suggest how my analysis of the emergence
of ACT UP might assist our studies of social movements more generally. First, an exploration of the role played by emotions and emotives in the negotiation of an intense ambivalence among a marginalized group of people helps to explain why and how a movement can emerge in the context of few political opportunities, and perhaps even in response to such a context. Second, my analysis suggests the important role that emotions and their expression play in interpretive processes, including framing as well as less purposive activities. Scholars point to the important role that framing activities play in movement emergence and development, but their accounts typically emphasize the cognitive rather than emotional components of framing. Moreover, scholars tend to define framing as a strategic, purposive activity and fail to link it to broader, less intentional, interpretive processes. Perhaps as a result of both their cognitive bias and the emphasis they place on strategic behavior, the crucial question of frame resonance often remains unanswered. What seems to be missing in the current conceptualization of framing is a consideration of interpretive processes that include conscious, strategic thinking as well as less than fully conscious or purposive processes, all of which are always saturated with emotions; we need to consider how people make sense of themselves, their situations, and their political options and then explore how those emotion-saturated understandings affect their political actions. If we ignore all such processes or subsume them into strategic, purposive activity, we risk simplifying the complicated interpretive tasks that humans engage in, and we will neglect the questions which might help us to understand why people sometimes disrupt their routine daily lives and take to the streets.

Third, my analysis suggests alternative lines of inquiry in studies of social movements. The questions that are able to be asked about movements tend to be limited by scholars’ undue emphasis on rationality and cognition to the neglect of emotions and emotionality. The literature’s biases are surprising if we pause to think about the subject we are studying. Protests, strikes, sit-ins, and the like engage groups of people in sometimes dangerous, and often risky, intense, dramatic, and exhilarating activities. Additionally, the issues around which movement participants mobilize are usually highly emotionally charged. A cursory look at the realities of movements points to the significance of emotions in all movement processes. An analytical focus on emotions raises new questions and modifies those that already dominate the field. Just as culturalists have argued for the necessity of exploring how opportunities, resources, and other structural concepts are interpreted, we must now also recognize the necessity of investigating the emotional causes and effects of those
factors, including interpretation itself. Newer, previously unasked, questions also arise: how do emotions animate protest; how do a community’s emotion rules and norms inspire or discourage protest, and conversely, how does protest affect a community’s emotion rules and norms; when are people willing to defy feeling and expression rules; how does the privileging of rationality in the United States affect the life of social movements; how do movements challenge and/or uphold this valuation of rationality; what role do emotions play in the knowledge-producing, interpretive work in which movements engage; in what ways are social movements engaged in a struggle to legitimate ways of understanding and knowing that challenge the hegemony of rationality and objectivity; how do emotions affect the subjectivities and identities of movement participants?

We cannot make sense of ACT UP’s emergence without exploring the role played by feelings and their expression as lesbians and gay men attempted to understand, respond to, and mobilize others to fight the AIDS epidemic. Attention to emotions would enhance our understanding of most, if not all, other movements.

**Acknowledgments**

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**Endnotes**

1. All invocations of “community” should be questioned because the term tends to obscure the struggles over its meaning—among those who are included in, as well as excluded from, its definition. “Community” erroneously suggests its own natural occurrence, an unchanging character across time and space, and a commonality among members that transcends their differences. At the same time, the term is useful in acknowledging the social phenomenon of people identifying with groups of people whom they see as sharing something that differentiates them from others. One way to understand the term, then, is to acknowledge “community” as a useful fiction that is always in process, a becoming rather than a being, and one that is always unsettled. Prior to AIDS, lesbians and gay men formed largely separate communities, but with its onslaught, many lesbians and gay men began to work together. The term “lesbian and gay communities” usefully references the visible, urban-based, largely white and middle-class, groupings of lesbian and gay individuals and institutions around the country out of which militant
AIDS activism emerged. However, in using the term “community,” I do not mean to obscure the fact that its meaning is historically contingent and hotly contested. Naming the members of a social group is also an imperfect undertaking. Although the term “lesbian and gay” was commonly used during the historical moment under study, it obscured the lives of other sexual minorities who were subsumed under that category. Many actors in my narrative likely engaged in sexual or gender practices that today might furnish one with a transgender, bisexual, or other sexual identity. However, since those identities rose in salience after the period under study, I have decided to stick with the imperfect nomenclature of the period—“lesbian and gay.”

2. Each of these groups was a precursor to an ACT UP chapter in its respective city.

3. I use the name “ACT UP” when referring to the national, militant, street-activist AIDS movement even though ACT UP was neither the first nor the only militant AIDS activist group.

4. Tarrow (1994: 18) lists these as the most salient components of the political opportunity structure. He reaffirms this list in the second edition of his book (1998: 76), but also reintroduces the concept of threat and suggests that, when present in a context of increasing opportunities for action, threats too can play a role in stimulating contention by increasing the costs of inaction (72). Even with this recognition of threats, however, I would still argue that the political-opportunity model cannot account for ACT UP’s emergence; although militant AIDS activism arose as threats against lesbians and gay men were increasing, political opportunities were perceived to be tightly constricted. For a view that sees threats as playing a more autonomous role, see Jasper 1997.

5. In focusing on lesbian and gay ambivalence, I do not mean to imply that heterosexuals are free of intense and contradictory emotions. Following Freud (1953 [1900], 1955 [1909], 1958 [1912]), I would contend that ambivalence is widespread among individuals in the modern bourgeois West. While some types of ambivalence seem to be widely shared, other types are specific to a particular geographic context, to a moment in time, or, in this case, to a particular social group in a particular place and time. On ambivalence in social life, see Merton and Barber 1963, Weigert and Franks 1989, and Smelser 1998. For a theorization that links ambivalence to modernity, see Bauman 1991. For an exploration of ambivalence in organizational settings, see Meyer and Scully 1995, 1997.

6. Fanon (1982) wrote of a similarly socially structured ambivalence among blacks who had come into contact with whites through colonization. “Above all, he [the black man] wants to prove to the [white] others that he is a man, their equal. But let us not be misled: [he] is the man who has to be convinced. It is in the roots of his soul . . . that the doubt persists” (66). The ambivalence about self was “inherent in the colonial situation” (83) rather than innate in the black man’s “soul” (213).


8. The term “emotion culture” denotes both the emotions that are prevalent within a social group as well as the group’s rules and norms about feelings and their expression. See Gordon 1989 and Hochschild 1979, 1983, 1990, 1998. In positing the ex-
istence of an emotion culture, I do not mean to say that it prevails in a manner free of contestation, or that it is uniform or static. Every emotional utterance, gesture, or evocation, particularly those that are public and that are repeated over time, has the potential to alter the prevailing emotion culture. A given “emotion culture,” then, should be understood as prevalent but also as unsettled and mutable.

9. Reddy’s exploration of emotions has had an enormous impact on my work. My account of how emotional utterances help to manage intense ambivalence among lesbians and gay men builds on his conceptualization.

10. Reddy also uses quotation marks around the word “inner.” I do so to suggest that even while feelings are in large part socially constructed, there is a nonquantifiable, nonmeasurable residuum that is outside language, defying naming and categorization, but that we experience within our bodies. Because it is extradiscursive, we cannot describe this residuum. It is important to note, however, that this residuum is produced through the emotional utterance or gesture (i.e., the emotive), meaning that it is not “natural” (as opposed to social) but rather is an extradiscursive byproduct of discursive processes.

11. I use quotation marks around the word “resolve” to indicate that ambivalence is fundamentally unresolvable. A person can repress one of the contradictory feelings, but not in a manner that rids her of it completely, and thus any “resolution” is of a temporary and unstable nature.

12. The frequency with which lesbian and gay political discourse links specific political practices—including those about which the community is often divided—to emotions about self and society suggests the possibility that lesbian and gay ambivalence may be one of the central forces driving the ideological cleavages that have divided lesbian and gay movements between militants and moderates since the 1950s.

13. Larry Kramer (a co-founder of ACT UP/New York) was already voicing his anger and indignation as early as 1983, but lesbians and gay men did not heed his call for militant action for approximately four more years. See Kramer 1983; for an explanation of the failure of his collective action frame, see Gould 2000, chap. 3.


15. My analysis of pride during this period is more fully developed in Gould 2000, chap. 3.

16. For an analysis of the significant role that events play in history, specifically in terms of structural transformation, and an appeal to theorize historical events in this light, see Sewell 1996.

17. See, for example, letters in the 21 July 1986, 28 July 1986, and 1 September 1986 issues of the New York Native, and the following opinion pieces in the same paper: Apuzzo 1986; Gans 1986; Morris 1986; Bockman 1986.

The Social Structure of Moral Outrage in Recruitment to the U.S. Central America Peace Movement

Sharon Erickson Nepstad and Christian Smith

The “classical” model of collective behavior unfairly portrayed social movement protestors as alienated irrational malcontents who were highly susceptible to manipulative calls to action by demagogues. In reaction, proponents of the currently dominant models—notably the resource mobilization and political process perspectives—have emphasized structural factors and the rationality of activists. However, the overemphasis on irrational emotions that existed in the classical tradition has caused the pendulum to swing too far, leading structural theorists to view all emotion as illogical and counterproductive. Therefore, an analysis of affect has been virtually nonexistent in the contemporary study of collective behavior. Most thinking regarding the role of emotions in social movements has been erroneously dichotomous. Movement recruits do not fall neatly into one of two categories: logical or emotional. For the most part, they are both. In this chapter, we propose that moral outrage was a logical emotional response to information about human rights abuses and atrocities in Central America. We note that structural factors were central in determining who had access to credible sources of information that formed the basis of this moral outrage. Yet this information did not lead to the same emotional reaction by all U.S. citizens. One’s values and identity shape the way the information is perceived and the degree of importance placed upon responding to the situation (Harré
Moral outrage was a driving force in the Central America peace movement of the 1980s. This movement emerged in response to the civil wars in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala. Thousands of North Americans organized to curtail U.S. political and military involvement in these countries and to stand in solidarity with the poor of Central America in their struggle for a just social order. Several campaigns within this movement involved high-risk and high-cost actions, including traveling to the war zones of Nicaragua to deter violence (Nepstad and Smith 1999), illegally harboring Central American refugees within the United States (Crittenden 1988; Lorentzen 1991), and mass campaigns of civil disobedience (Hannon 1991; Smith 1996a). These actions had the potential to incur prison sentences, injury, even death. It is difficult to believe that individuals would commit themselves to such high-risk actions without a passionate commitment to the goals of the movement. While there have been efforts to amend the heavily structural approaches by incorporating social-psychological concepts such as “cognitive liberation” (McAdam 1982) and “frame alignment” (Snow et al. 1986), these remain largely cerebral and do not adequately convey the emotional commitment needed to carry through with high-risk actions (Smith 1991: 245, n. 12). An intellectual decision to travel to a war zone is undoubtedly accompanied by an array of emotions.

Yet precisely how did North Americans learn about the situation in Central America? Who was most likely to develop an emotional conviction that compelled them to act? Based on survey data and in-depth interviews with Central American peace activists, we contend that the American religious community had structural access to information that generated indignation at U.S. involvement in Central America. It also possessed network ties that increased the likelihood that its members would come into personal contact with Central Americans. Finally, religious teachings and theological traditions helped shape a Christian identity that emphasized a commitment to social justice and peace. Hence people of faith were more likely to receive information about the situation in Central America, to become personally linked to it through relational ties, to believe that a response was imperative due to their Christian commitment, and that the human rights violations were intolerable infractions of moral norms. The confluence of all these factors generated moral outrage.
Cognitive Accessibility

The wars of Central America were being waged thousands of miles from the United States. And, during the height of the cold war, national attention was focused on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Thus most Americans knew little about Central America prior to the 1980s. A precondition to developing moral outrage about a situation is to receive information about it. In other words, individuals must enjoy “cognitive accessibility,” which Smith (1996a: 166) defines as “organizational and relational positioning that affords exposure to norm-violating information.” How, then, was the American religious community positioned to receive credible, detailed knowledge about the conditions in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala? The information came through North American missionaries who had worked in Central America.

Prior to the 1960s, only a small number of North American missionaries worked in Central America (Connors 1973). This changed dramatically after the Second Vatican Council (1962–65), when the Roman Catholic church initiated a number of significant reforms. One of these aimed to win back the poor masses in Latin America who had been neglected due to a shortage of priests and the clergy’s tradition of serving the elite, primarily in private schools. To help bring them back to the institutional church, the Vatican mandated that 6 percent of North American and European church workers be sent to Latin America. The increased missionary activity of the Catholic church also rejuvenated Protestant work. The result was that an estimated 3,900 North American missionaries served in Central America from 1959 until the beginning of the Reagan era (Smith 1996a: 141). This church involvement corresponded precisely to the years prior to and during the Salvadoran insurrection and civil war, the establishment of a military dictatorship in Guatemala, and the Sandinista revolutionary movement that eventually ousted the Somoza regime.

The vast majority of these missionaries were sent to live and work with the poor, whose suffering and oppression they began to witness first hand. Church workers developed personal bonds with Central Americans and began questioning why the U.S. supported a system that created so much misery and violence. One former missionary, who later became a key movement leader, reflected on her experience:

I lived in a gold-mining town in Nicaragua, where they literally flew gold bricks out of this town. I worked with the miners and their children. The people who owned the mine—the Canadians
and Americans—lived on a hill with palm trees and swimming pools and the people who worked the mine lived in this pit below. I saw children die of measles and malnutrition mostly. And I began to question what was going on. The miners tried to organize but the company called in the National Guard, so I knew something was really wrong. It was probably one of the worst cases of . . . exploitation that you could possibly see. By the time I left Nicaragua, I was very aware that there was something wrong with U.S. policy.²

Out of these experiences, many missionaries returned to the U.S. to raise awareness in their home congregations about conditions in Central America. The result was a bridging between communities of faith in these regions. The missionaries’ work had two important results: (1) it established a sense of personal identification with the people of Nicaragua, Guatemala, and El Salvador as fellow Christians; and (2) it primed the religious community to be receptive to and interested in the situation in Central America. One activist summarized the influence of these missionaries:

There was a group of North Americans who had served in Central America mostly as missionaries, and had grown to love it and understand it as much as any North American can. They functioned as a constituency that was constantly trying to draw people’s attention to the concerns of Central America. Their work helped prepare the ground over several decades. When things began to happen there in the 1970s and 80s, they became an important resource, particularly for the religious community.

Not only was the religious community receptive to Central American concerns, but once U.S. involvement became a national issue in the 1980s, people of faith had access to alternative information through these missionaries.

**Personal Encounters with Central Americans**

Missionaries were not the only source of information available to the American religious community. As these civil wars continued and intensified, millions fled their homes and thousands sought asylum in the United States. Between 1979 and 1982, a half-million Salvadorans had been driven from their country due to political violence and had come
to North America. By 1982, approximately 10 percent of the Nicaraguan population had fled the revolution and the Contra war and emigrated to the U.S. (Pastor 1982: 36). Guatemala’s civil war produced one million displaced people—around 14 percent of its population (Jonas 1991: 164). When these refugees arrived in the U.S., the faith community was one of the first groups to respond.

Beginning with a few churches in Tucson, the Sanctuary movement was launched in 1982 when a number of individuals who had been working with Salvadoran and Guatemalan refugees realized that they could not ensure their safety through legal means. Unable to prove the origins of their torture scars and incapable of providing documentation and corroboration of their stories of political repression, these Central Americans were denied political asylum because they were considered economic refugees seeking a better standard of living. The reality, however, was that the U.S. government did not want to reveal the oppressive nature of the regimes from which these refugees were fleeing precisely because the U.S. was offering them both military and financial support. As a consequence, a number of Tucson churches put forth a national call for congregations to join them in declaring their churches a sanctuary to protect the refugees from deportation, which would likely result in death. By the beginning of 1983, more than 45 churches and synagogues had responded and refugees were being transported from coast to coast (Crittenden 1988; Davidson 1988).

The Sanctuary movement had set up a network—a “new underground railroad”—to transport these refugees. As they were traveling to their destinations, they would stop at congregations along the way and tell their stories. These contacts had tremendous consequences. Many people of faith—who had become interested in Central America through the stories of these missionaries—were suddenly sitting face to face with people who had fled these wars. Their stories moved North Americans both emotionally and politically, as the following activists reflect:

Initially, I disbelieved our refugee’s stories of personal peril, bestial treatment by the army, rampant murder of villagers, and persecution of family. It was too incredible to me. Eventually, I realized he was telling the truth. I saw the terrible toll this experience had had on this man and his family. It was very disturbing.

Listening to Guatemalan Indians profoundly changed our view of things. Spending this time with people who are the victims of U.S. policy intensified my commitment to resist it. Through them, I saw
the grotesque genocidal behavior of our government and our complicity with it through tax dollars.

It was the network ties of the American religious community that facilitated these face-to-face encounters with refugees and increased the likelihood that North American people of faith would receive direct information about the atrocities committed in Central America.

As refugees brought their stories to the United States, person-to-person contact was also occurring through delegations of U.S. citizens traveling to Central America. Often sponsored by denominational groups, tens of thousands of North Americans traveled to Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala throughout the 1980s. The results were similar to those produced by the refugees’ stories told in the U.S.: people were indignant at the suffering and violence they witnessed and even more outraged that these injustices were sponsored by U.S. tax dollars. One activist reflected on how this evoked an emotional response:

You go to Nicaragua with a nice concern for the poor and anxiety over a U.S. invasion. But then you get there and are hit with three very strong emotions. One is guilt, when you see what your country is doing. The second is outrage. You get absolutely galvanized by anger. The third emotion is hope—not your hope, but theirs. The hope of the Nicaraguans was just a marvelous thing, as they struggled to build a new society. And the idea that we could help them by getting the U.S. off their backs was inspiring. Together, these three emotions provided a powerful impetus for activism.

These personal encounters had two important effects. First, social ties were strengthened as people of faith in the U.S. moved from indirect ties through missionaries to direct relational ties to refugees and to the people they encountered on their trips. A great deal of empirical research has indicated the importance of strong social ties in activism (Barnes and Kaase 1979; Bolton 1972; Fernandez and McAdam 1986; Marwell et al. 1988; Snow et al. 1980; Zurcher and Kirkpatrick 1976). Recent literature has argued that it is not merely the number of social ties that count, but the quality and effect of these ties (Gould 1991, 1993; McAdam and Paulsen 1997). Stronger relational ties have a greater influence as well as ties that are central to a person’s identity (McAdam 1986, 1988). Since connections to Central Americans were established through the church, they were infused with considerable significance due to the saliency of the Christian identity. Second, these personal encounters brought a distant,
remote conflict close to home by putting a face, a name, and a personal story to these wars.

**Physical Brutality of the Injustices**

The American religious community had structural access to information about Central America. But the type of information they received included graphic details of physical brutality and human rights abuses. While the entire U.S. population had access to some coverage of the situation through mainstream news accounts, they were much less likely to hear about the atrocities committed by forces sponsored by the U.S. The military governments of El Salvador and Guatemala and the Nicaraguan Contras took measures to hide any information that might jeopardize their military and financial support. North American missionaries, who were working and living among the people who suffered at the hands of these military forces, could render eyewitness accounts of these abuses. As they recounted these stories in their home parishes and congregations, they were not censored, edited, or told it was not newsworthy. They offered a view of the situation from the grassroots level instead of the official government position put forth by the mainstream media.

Torture in Central America was part of the strategy of “low-intensity warfare.” A key component of this strategy was the use of “selective repression.” Developed by Central American military leaders and U.S. advisors, the main idea was to target community leaders who were considered sympathetic to the enemy. They were harassed, tortured, and/or killed to set an example to others of the consequences of community organizing. In Guatemala, selective repression was carried out along carefully planned guidelines:

First, government security forces chose selected community leaders for kidnapping, torture, and assassination. . . . Second, the government threatened and killed religious leaders, because it believed that they served as a major link between the peasants and the guerrillas. . . . Third, the army bombed and harassed key villages, on the pretext that these villages served as strategic support populations for the guerrillas. (Davis 1983: 166–67)

In El Salvador, right-wing death squads became infamous for brutal acts of torture and for tens of thousands of targeted executions. One former Treasury police officer described this in gruesome detail during an interview on British television:
Putting people’s heads in buckets of excrement, electrical torture? Oh, this is nothing. Electric shocks—nobody will die unless it is too severe. But if you cut somebody . . . or you take somebody’s eyes, this is actually what they did at the torture. With a pencil, you take one eye out and you say, “If you don’t talk I will take another one.” And you say, “I will pull your teeth out,” and they do—one by one . . . And this person bleeds to death . . . [and then] you throw this person away . . . This is how they fight terrorists, Communists. (Quoted in Fish and Sganga 1988: 108)

Often the disfigured bodies would be left in public as a further means of intimidation.

In Nicaragua, the counter-revolutionary forces known as the Contras also employed selective repression. Americas Watch, a human rights organization, documented that the Contras commonly practiced politically targeted gang rapes, emasculation, premortem skinning, and eye gouging (Smith 1996: 48). The Contras particularly targeted civilians who worked in the social services and projects that the Sandinistas developed as part of their revolutionary social reform. Specifically, the Contras attacked schools and day care centers, health clinics, and cooperative farms. The intention was to stimulate popular discontent with the Sandinistas by obstructing their efforts to improve the quality of life for Nicaraguans and to inflict economic hardship (Booth and Walker 1993; Stephens 1990). As a result, hundreds of health care workers, teachers, technicians, and other professionals were killed by the Contras (Vanden and Walker 1991).

The wars of Central America were being fought at the grassroots level, with many civilian casualties, and it was precisely to this grassroots level that most U.S. missionaries had been sent. Thus these church workers were keenly aware of the consequences of the low-intensity warfare that was carried out by Central American military personnel with the support of U.S. military leaders. They were in a unique position to pass on the grisly details of the torture and human rights abuses to the American religious community.

The first events that conveyed the brutality of the Central American wars to people of faith in the U.S. were the murders of Archbishop Oscar Romero and four North American churchwomen in El Salvador. On March 24, 1980, a death squad assassin shot Romero while he was celebrating mass. The archbishop had been an outspoken advocate of the poor and had confronted military and political leaders about the violent repression. In a homily given a few days before his death, Romero had
Sharon Erickson Nepstad and Christian Smith

implored Salvadoran soldiers to disobey orders to kill civilians. He had pleaded with President Jimmy Carter to stop sending aid to a regime that killed thousands, including many priests and lay workers. Less than nine months later, four North American churchwomen—three nuns and one lay missionary—were abducted by government security forces, raped, and killed. Their bodies were found in shallow graves by the roadside (Berryman 1984; Brett and Brett 1988).

These attacks had a twofold effect on the American religious community. First, the religious nature of these murders left an impact on U.S. Christians who had developed a sense of identification with the Central American church due to these missionary connections. Second, the murders exposed the viciousness and impunity of the Salvadoran regime. While violations of human rights can take many forms, we believe that the brutality of torture and assassination provoked a stronger response than, for instance, press censorship or restrictions on voting would.

Subjective Engageability

The American religious community had structural access, through the missionaries, to alternative information about Central America. That is, they were cognitively accessible. Yet one’s reaction to this information—as well as the degree of importance placed upon responding to the situation—is a reflection of one’s values and identity. In other words, the cultural and social values connected to a group identity may infuse this information with a sense of urgency and a compelling need to respond. This is what Smith refers to as “subjective engageability” (1996a: 167).

People of faith—both Christians and Jews—were particularly subjectively engageable for a couple of reasons. First, many embraced social teachings that emphasize peace, justice, and political engagement as essential expressions of religious commitment. These traditions gave the religious community a greater sense that a response to the situation in Central America was imperative and that there was a theological basis for action in solidarity with the poor and oppressed. Second, their common collective identity as people of faith took greater precedence over their identity as Americans. Because their loyalty to God took precedence over their loyalty to nation, concern for fellow Christians and being faithful to religious teachings generated a sense of urgency. Members of the religious community could not allow these injustices to remain remote and detached from the immediate affairs that took precedence in their lives. The cultural and social beliefs that were central to their identity made people of faith “subjectively engageable.”
Religious Teachings on Social Justice and Peace

Modern Catholic social teachings began in 1891 with the publication of Pope Leo XIII’s encyclical *Rerum Novarum* (translated “Of Things New” but often referred to as “The Condition of the Working Classes”). This laid the foundation for succeeding generations of clergy to develop stronger, more progressive stands on social and political concerns. Numerous papal documents emphasized the injustice of economic exploitation, the right of laborers to fair wages, the need for an equitable distribution of wealth, and the importance of prioritizing communal well-being over rights to private property (Dorr 1983; Smith 1996b). Pope John XXIII took an even stronger stance in the early 1960s with the publication of his encyclicals *Mater et Magistra* (“Christianity and Social Progress”) and *Pacem in Terris* (“Peace on Earth”). In these documents he stressed the danger of neocolonialism in the third world and the social responsibilities of private property, and he stated that it was legitimate for Christians to work together with non-Christians for socially respectable goals. Several years later, Pope Paul VI called for major social transformations to end poverty and the suffering of the poor in his encyclical *Populorum Progressio* (“On the Progress of the Peoples”). Furthermore, he critiqued liberal capitalism as being incompatible with a just social order and argued that people are entitled to be agents of history by shaping their futures (Dorr 1983). Numerous episcopal documents were produced throughout the 1970s and 1980s that continued to emphasize peace, justice, and the right of all people to live with dignity.

Christian commitment to political action was emphasized within Protestant traditions as well. Mainline Protestant social ethics are rooted in nineteenth-century efforts to abolish slavery, a tradition that continued into the twentieth century with progressive social gospel advocates who preached reforms of urban industrial America according to Christian principles of equality and love (Fishburn 1993; Smith 1996b; White and Hopkins 1976). In the second half of this century, the U.S. National Council of Churches also advocated political activism for peace and justice (Billingsley 1990). The historic peace churches—the Mennonites, Quakers, and Church of the Brethren—whose peace tradition dates back several hundred years, also contributed theological teachings and years of experience to this growing religious emphasis on peace and justice.

The social teachings of the Jewish tradition also supported political engagement to establish justice and peace. Jewish social ethics are grounded in the belief that all are created with dignity in God’s image. Jewish teachings also emphasize the need to oppose social injustice and
to create a peaceful society that is concerned with all people’s well-being (shalom) and with the mandate to defend the weak and poor, tikkun olam (“healing the world”) (M. Greenberg 1970; Shapiro 1978). These beliefs were further strengthened by a number of events in the twentieth century, notably the Holocaust and the Nuremberg war trials. These events reinforced the conviction that proactive confrontation with social evils is morally imperative; such action could, if necessary, include non-compliance with governmental or military orders that violate human rights (Broude 1970; Breslauer 1983). The Vietnam war also stimulated Jewish leaders to respond to the war and the ethical questions it raised particularly for Jewish youth (Wein 1969; Winston 1978). This led to a body of literature that included a Jewish justification for pacifism and civil disobedience against an unjust state (Broude 1970; Gendler 1978; S. Greenberg 1977; Kimmelman 1968, 1970; Kirschenbaum 1974; Konvitz 1978; Landman 1969; Roth 1971; Schwarzchild 1966; Siegman 1966; Simonson 1968; Zimmerman 1971). These traditions helped to establish norms and values that made concern for human rights and social justice a high priority. That is, these progressive religious teachings fostered “subjective engageability,” which made people of faith likely to develop moral outrage.

The other factor that contributed to “subjective engageability” was a common collective identity as people of faith. The church connection reinforced this shared identity that transcended national differences and enabled Nicaraguans to feel solidarity and empathy with U.S. Christians, when they might have otherwise felt anger or enmity since the U.S. was the source of much of their suffering. One activist described how the shared Christian identity helped overcome barriers:

I remember my first trip to Nicaragua in 1983. The Contra war was beginning to heat up but the ideals of the revolution were still very much a part of the people. The first day there, we went to this mass in a barrio in Managua that had been very active in the revolution. It was a funeral mass, a memorial mass, because a number of people had gone to fight the Contras and a number of them had been killed. I'll never forget it. The priest who was celebrating mass knew the priest [who was leading our delegation]. So at the time of the Our Father, he invited us all to come up. We held hands with the Mothers of the Heroes and Martyrs. And some kids were there from the war front, still wearing their khakis. During the sign of peace, all these people were embracing
us. They said to us, “Your country is doing terrible things but we
know it’s not you. We forgive you and we love you. Please go
back and tell what is happening to us.”

These interpersonal contacts and a common collective identity built
solidarity between Central and North Americans. No longer were they
strangers; they were part of the same body of believers. Therefore, the
Central American crisis took on a greater sense of immediacy since it
affected all who considered themselves people of faith.

Affect Intensification

Based upon the information received from church workers and in-
terpersonal contacts with Central Americans, the American religious
community experienced “cognitive accessibility.” There was also a high
level of “subjective engageability” due to the religious teachings on peace
and justice and the shared identity as people of faith. Together, this gener-
ated a great degree of outrage. This indignation intensified through a se-
ries of “moral shocks” that ultimately motivated people to act. Similar
to Walsh’s (1981) notion of “sudden grievances,” Jasper defines a moral
shock as “an unexpected event or piece of information [that] raises such
a sense of outrage in a person that she becomes inclined toward political
action” (1998: 409). Whereas a “sudden grievance” implies a cognitive
response to a dramatic, highly publicized occurrence, a “moral shock”
conveys the emotional dimension. While there were numerous events that
constituted moral shocks, from the point of view of movement partici-
pants, a few were particularly influential.

One of the first moral shocks that transformed the American reli-
gious community’s concern into outrage was the mining of Nicaragua’s
harbors in January 1984. The mining was carried out by a CIA-supported
commando team in an attempt to disrupt international trade. Although
it violated international law, this act of sabotage was part of the strategy
of low-intensity warfare that aimed to crush the revolutionary govern-
ment’s economic infrastructure. The mining killed or injured seventeen
people, damaged ten ships from six countries, and significantly impaired
Nicaragua’s sea trade. In addition, these mines continued to explode for
six months (Conroy 1987; Kornbluh 1987). Many North Americans were
incredulous that the U.S. government would blatantly disregard interna-
tional law and endanger the lives of innocent civilians. This moral shock
heightened the American population’s awareness of the extent of U.S.
involvement in Nicaragua and generated opposition to the use of such illegal tactics.

The second moral shock occurred nine months later when the national press reported the discovery of two secret training manuals produced by the CIA and disseminated to Nicaraguan Contras (Sklar 1988). The first manual detailed thirty-eight methods of sabotage to destroy government-owned property and the economic infrastructure. The second manual, entitled *Psychological Operations in Guerrilla Warfare*, provoked a greater reaction within the United States. This manual offered lessons on how to terrorize a population through kidnappings and selective assassinations of civilians and political authorities. One part of the manual noted: “It is possible to neutralize [i.e. murder] carefully selected and planned targets, such as court judges, magistrates, police and state security officials, etc.” (quoted in Kornbluh 1987: 45). This manual, which became known as “The CIA’s Murder Manual,” directly violated a 1976 Presidential Executive Order that forbade U.S. government involvement in assassinations. The exposure of these manuals intensified concerns as many North Americans began to realize that the U.S. was not only aware of the acts of violence and turning a blind eye, but was actually training Central American forces to commit these atrocities.

The Iran-Contra Scandal again revealed the extent to which some political leaders were willing to go to defeat the Nicaraguan revolution—even when it required a subversion of the Constitution and the violation of international law. In October 1986, an American mercenary’s plane was shot down in Nicaragua. He was captured and the Nicaraguan troops discovered that he had been transporting 10,000 pounds of U.S. ammunition, guns, and grenade launchers for the Contras. This discovery eventually led to a paper trail of evidence that revealed a major illegal White House action to assist the Contras. In the succeeding months, the American public learned that the National Security Council—headed by Oliver North—had furtively raised millions of dollars for the Contras from private donors and foreign countries. Moreover, it had illegally sold arms to Iran and diverted the profits to the Contras. The Tower Commission’s investigation of the Iran-Contra scandal concluded:

The National Security Council [was] led by reckless cowboys, off on their own wild ride, taking direct operational control of matters that are the customary province of more sober agencies. . . . A kind of parallel government came into being, operating in secret, paying scant heed to laws, deceiving Congress and avoiding oversight of any kind. (Barry, Vergara, and Castro 1988: 80)
Many within the religious community were incensed by the blatant lies that the Security Council had told Congress and the American people. The principles of democracy—a government for, of, and by the people—had been subverted, even though this was purportedly what was being fought for in Central America. Even when activists worked within the political system to change U.S. foreign policy, their efforts had been undermined by members of the National Security Council, who had taken matters into their own hands. Many indignant people of faith began to demand change.

One of the final moral shocks occurred on September 1, 1987. A group of Vietnam veterans had organized a “Nuremberg Action” at Concord Naval Weapons station in Northern California. This particular weapons facility was selected because it was the major military transit-point on the West Coast and is believed to have sent as much as 95 percent of the weapons that were shipped to El Salvador, including antipersonnel weaponry. Part of the Nuremberg action was a forty-day fast and the nonviolent blockade of trains headed for Central America. During one of these blockades, an oncoming train ran over one of the veterans, Brian Wilsson. Both of his legs were severed and he suffered serious head injuries, but he miraculously survived. The willingness of the U.S. military to assault its own citizens, if they dared to interfere with its plans, further intensified the anger about Central America into outrage. In response, 10,000 protestors gathered to demand an end to U.S. involvement in Central America. Several hundred demonstrators destroyed a section of the train tracks and others mounted a continuous, twenty-four-hour human blockade of trains that lasted more than two years and involved more than a thousand people.

Moral Outrage as Motivation for Movement Participation

Emotional reactions to moral shocks can vary widely. Some may respond with a defeatist sense of resignation while others become indignant. Yet not all emotional reactions are conducive to collective action. Resignation, for instance, is paralyzing, and therefore activists may try to encourage emotional responses that are more likely to be a mobilizing force. Moral outrage, for example, can be a powerful motivation for protest when there is someone to blame for the injustice (Gamson 1992). And the clearer the target, the greater the likelihood of outrage and opposition (Jasper 1998).

Regarding Central America, there were competing interpretations—or “frames”—about who was responsible for the conflicts in the
region. Frame analysis has been used as a means of bridging structural approaches to the study of social movements with social-psychological understandings of movement participation. “Frames” are understood as interpretive schemas that assign meaning to and interpret relevant events by emphasizing certain aspects to formulate particular story lines (Snow et al. 1986). An abundance of empirical research has given us greater insight into framing processes. For example, Snow and Benford (1988: 200–202) have described three distinct tasks of framing. First, diagnostic framing identifies a problem and attributes blame and causality. Second, prognostic framing offers a solution to the problem and proposes a target for action. Finally, motivational framing provides a “call to arms.” While this is an important advance, framing has been studied as a predominantly cognitive phenomenon that more or less lacks affect. We know little about the emotional effects of frames and framing tasks.

Returning missionaries from Latin America provided clear diagnostic and prognostic frames regarding who was to blame for these moral shocks. Their diagnosis held that the Reagan administration was primarily responsible for exacerbating tensions and for further polarizing the region by arming murderers, teaching them torture techniques, and snubbing the World Court’s condemnation of illegal acts of aggression undertaken by the U.S. in Central America. Their prognosis, which provided a target for action, was therefore clear: stop U.S. involvement in the region. The Reagan administration promoted frames that almost completely contradicted those put forth by the peace movement. The White House argued that Soviet and Cuban-style communism was responsible for the Central American wars. Antidemocratic groups were threatening to extinguish freedom. The prognosis, then, was that the U.S. must provide economic aid, military assistance, and political support to the fledgling democracies in El Salvador and Guatemala, and to the “freedom fighters” in Nicaragua.

The American religious community, already incensed at the atrocities in Central America, were faced with “frame contradictions” (Nepstad 1997) about who was responsible for these moral shocks. Likewise, for this outrage to become a powerful motivating force for action, people of faith had to decide who was the appropriate target for action. The decision was quite simple. Given the aftermath of Vietnam and Watergate, and the lies exposed in the Iran-Contra hearings, there was serious doubt about the government’s credibility on Central America. Missionaries, however, were trusted as fellow Christians and had years of first-hand experience in these countries. Once people of faith adopted the mission-
ary frame, the source of these injustices and responsibility for these moral shocks was clear. Those who were outraged had a precise target of action.

**Conclusion**

Moral outrage was an essential motivating factor for many activists in the Central America peace movement. This emotion was not an irrational outburst or an impulsive reflex ignited by “magical beliefs” (Smelser 1963). These were not alienated malcontents who were easily manipulated by authoritarian figures (Adorno et al. 1950; Hoffer 1951; Lipset 1960). These were rational actors who felt deeply indignant as a result of their analysis of the situation in Central America and of the importance of social justice in their Christian commitment. We need to cease viewing emotions and rationality as dichotomous. Moral outrage is a logical reaction to the torture, disappearances, and assassinations of innocent civilians and to the lies disseminated by a government to cover its role as an accomplice to these atrocities.

We want to emphasize that the members of the American religious community were not naturally more predisposed toward outrage than the rest of the U.S. population. They did not possess a particular personality trait; all people have the capacity to feel indignation. However, people of faith did possess social ties that provided them access to credible, alternative information about Central America. While much attention has been devoted to the role of social networks in movement recruitment, most scholars tend to view them merely as a given without analyzing the elements that make these structures so influential in terms of the values or emotions they transmit. As Jasper notes: “Part of their importance, certainly, is that they represent already shared assumptions and beliefs” (1998: 413). Therefore, these ties were particularly influential because they were intrinsically related to the values of these religious traditions. These ties were not only information sources; they were infused with compassion for the poor and oppressed, and love for one’s fellow Christians. In addition, the information from the missionaries and Central American refugees was more likely to be accepted because of the trust and respect afforded to church leaders. These network ties must be looked at not merely as conduits of information but as transmitters of various values that in turn shaped emotional responses.

Direct relational ties to Central Americans were also vital to the development of outrage because they were so closely connected to the collective religious identity. Refugees were brought to church sanctuaries
and fellowship halls to tell their stories of persecution and oppression. The physical setting created an intimacy that facilitated an emotional engagement with the victims of U.S. policy toward Central America, who were also fellow believers. The physical connection to the church or synagogue was a further reminder that a response from the religious community was imperative. This collective identity was vital for several reasons: it generated mutual affection and solidarity between Central and North American Christians; it created trust with a group that the U.S. government wanted the population to distrust; and it strengthened the social ties between the two regions, thereby enabling them to transcend national, cultural, language, class, and racial differences. It had a powerful unifying influence.

Social networks and collective identity are familiar concepts within the study of social movements. Yet only by examining the emotional dimensions and the values connected to social ties and identities can we fully understand the influence they have in generating moral outrage.

Endnotes

1. It is important to note that the term “people of faith” does not imply that all U.S. Christians had a homogenous response to the White House policy toward Central America. Many in the Christian right strongly supported the Reagan administration. We use the phrase “people of faith” to denote the progressive sector of American Christianity and Judaism; nevertheless, we want to point out that many individuals from conservative traditions were drawn into this movement even though they previously had been politically inactive.

2. Quotations are drawn from nearly sixty in-depth interviews conducted by both authors with Central American activists. For further information about our methodology, see Smith 1996a and Nepstad 1996.
Chapter Ten

Fear, Laughter, and Collective Power:
The Making of Solidarity at the Lenin Shipyard
in Gdansk, Poland, August 1980

Colin Barker

Every record of August 1980 at Gdansk, where the Solidarity movement was founded, is packed with incidents of human emotionality. Fear, courage, anger, laughter, nervous breakdowns, pride, and solidarity appear at peak intensity during those astonishing seventeen days. The narrative is punctuated by displays of feeling, including tears, cheering, booing, whistling, open-air Masses, public readings of workers’ poetry, presentations of flowers. From the organized flood of feeling which focused on the Lenin shipyard between Thursday the 14th and Sunday the 31st of August was born the fastest-growing trade-union movement in world history. Within three months of its recognition, Solidarity recruited ten million members and inspired parallel movements among students, peasants, shoppers in queues, prisoners in jails, and even philatelists.¹

A View of Emotion

My thinking about emotion is influenced by that most social and historical of psychologies, the dialogical school whose foundations were laid during the 1920s by such figures as Bakhtin, Volosinov, and Vygotsky. These writers developed a highly dialectical approach to human thought, speech, and action, and to the relation between these and social structure, whose possibilities are only beginning to be explored in social movement studies.² From their ideas we can deduce a number of
propositions: First, there are no such “things” as emotions. In grammatical terms, we should talk about them not as *nouns* but as *adjectives* or *adverbs*, denoting qualities of action, speech, and thought. As Crossley expresses the matter, “We can perform the same behaviours lovingly, angrily, etc., and it is the way that we do it which constitutes the emotional aspect of the behaviour” (Crossley 1998: 23). For the dialogicians, every act has its own “emotional-volitional tone” (Bakhtin 1993: 32–37); every *utterance*, however mundane, possesses what Volosinov (1986) terms an “evaluative accent.” This is variously emotional, moral, aesthetic.

Second, the cognitive and the affectual are not distinct, and especially *not opposed*, spheres, but are rather inseparable aspects of each other. There are no emotions without ideas (contrary to some symbolic interactionists, e.g. Blumer 1969), and no ideas without emotions. Treating them as distinct and opposed opens the way both to what Sarbin (1986: 86) terms a “faculty psychology,” where various aspects of human experience and action are dissociated from each other, and to the deeply rooted prejudice that Emotion is distinct from and antagonistic to Reason, and is indeed linked strongly to “irrationality.” Rather than treat the different *aspects* of human activity—for example, cognition, emotion, memory, thought, volition, etc.—as distinct (often mutually exclusive) entities, we should explore the “dynamic unity of functions” in which different aspects of human action and mind are seen to affect each other, in “inter-functional wholes” (Vygotsky 1986).

Third, all action, speech, and thought possesses these emotional-volitional tones, or colors, and these indeed convey much of their particular *sense*. We take words embodying socially shared meanings from the mouths of others, but we return them bearing our own intentions and nuances, giving them individual accents and senses. Emotional tone and gesture are important means by which we achieve this. Communicative interaction and practical action are always creative processes, much of that creativity consisting in the emotional, moral, and aesthetic *tone* with which we invest what we say and do.

Fourth, we need to grasp ideas, speech, and actions, with their accents, tones, colors, and gestural qualities, in the intersubjective contexts in which they occur. That is, we need to grasp them as part of *dialogical* processes occurring in concrete historical settings.

Fifth, one element of variation in emotional-volitional tones is their *intensity*, or their “organismic involvement” (Sarbin 1986: 93). This is an aspect of the degree of the *investment* (Barker and Brooks 1998)—
that is, their degree of attention, care, and concern—people make in a
given topic, activity, or relationship.

Sixth, emotional tones and colors switch and change in inter-
actional settings, producing “qualitative breaks” and reconfigurations,
“transmutations” of thought (Vygotsky 1986). A shift in context can pro-
duce rapid, and more or less dramatic, refocusings of feelings and ideas.
How we orient to something is itself affected by our orientation to other
objects and topics, as it is also affected by the orientations of other people
around us. Our emotional tones are crucial and changing aspects of our
many-sided activities and understandings. In this light, this chapter ex-
plores some of the emotional dynamics at work in Gdansk.

**The Strike Movement Begins**

Over two weeks in August, some three million Polish workers orga-
nized occupation strikes in perhaps 1,500 workplaces, coordinating their
activities through regional Inter-Factory Strike Committees (in Polish
MKS). The strikers empowered their MKS leaderships to negotiate pub-
licly with the government, who finally conceded all twenty-one points of
the workers’ demands. First among these was the call for new, indepen-
dent unions.

A tiny network of opposition activists provided the initiative. In
Gdansk, a small group openly announced themselves as a Founding Com-
mittee of Free Trade Unions of the Coast (Bernhard 1993) and began
running their own illegal news sheet, the *Coastal Worker*. To succeed,
they needed to break out of the world of propaganda and to involve large
numbers of workers in organized collective action. Their opportunities
improved when, on 1 July 1980, the regime raised food prices. Strikes
erupted across Poland and the government responded with pay conces-
sions. Although Gdansk was relatively untouched by this strike wave,
popular confidence was generally enhanced. Then, in early August, one
local Gdansk activist, Anna Walentynowicz, was sacked from the Lenin
shipyard. The local oppositionists decided to risk calling a protest strike.
At the time, they only gave themselves a “50 per cent chance” of rallying
their fellow-workers (Borowczak 1982: 72). Walentynowicz herself
thought they would fail, thinking local workers were “not yet ready”
(Kemp-Welch 1983: 17).

On Thursday morning, 14 August, a handful of shipyard activists
went into their departments to argue for immediate strike action in de-
fence of Walentynowicz. Jerzy Borowczak described the emotional-intel-
lectual dynamics in his section: workers were initially hesitant, until he told them other departments were already striking:

Finally the urge to get out won the day. I gathered a group of about thirty people. We took our banner, the posters and leaflets, and began marching across the whole shipyard to Ludwig’s department. On our way, we stopped a tow-motor, and it went ahead to the other departments to tell them that we were already marching towards them, which helped to mobilize people. You know, one department is already on strike . . . so that makes everybody more courageous. (Borowczak 1982: 75)

In department W-3, Bogdan Felski and two co-workers also started arguing for a strike. As he talked, Felski sensed a growth in self-confidence among his listeners, and gathered some fifty around a banner. After a confrontation with the department party secretary, they also marched out (Solidarity Strike Bulletin 11, 30 August 1980: 30).

As they marched, Borowczak’s group picked up other workers. Decisive action by a minority started a snowball, increasing the numbers committed to the strike and adding to the voices calling others to join. The risk was paying off. The procession continued through the shipyard, gathering numbers. Eventually some 8,000 demonstrators (about half the workforce) halted at the shipyard’s Second Gate, to hold a minute’s silence in honor of workers killed there in a previous movement in 1970.

As yet, the strikers composed a still disorganized collective crowd with a common sentiment but no clear organization and shared purpose. Outside the management offices, Borowczak called for nominations to a strike committee—“people we can trust.” Some twenty names were suggested, mostly the young activists who had started the strike in their departments. The shipyard director’s attempt to get the crowd to call the strike off was met with derisive whistles. Lech Walesa, who had climbed over the shipyard wall, now appeared at the director’s shoulder. Identifying himself as someone they all knew, an electrician previously sacked from the shipyard for militant activity, he confidently announced an occupation strike. He was immediately adopted as strike committee chairman. Walentynowicz, at the strikers’ insistence, was fetched from home in the director’s car. Her arrival was greeted by a cheering, singing crowd of thousands, as she took off her glasses to wipe away her tears.

The shipyard stoppage was itself a signal to other Gdansk workplaces, where activists also organized occupation-strikes. In one morning, a small activist group had stopped a huge workplace, employing 16,000,
and then spread the strike to more than a dozen others. They had mobilized their immediate periphery—a minority of bolder, mostly younger workers—and this larger group had pulled the more timid behind them, isolating regime loyalists. The activists had successfully read the Gdansk workers’ general mood and internal relations.

**Ideologeme and Structure of Feeling**

Survey evidence before August 1980 suggests that Polish workers were widely mistrustful of a regime they believed founded in lies and capable of bloody violence against them (Mason 1985; Nowak 1980, 1981; Vale 1981). A widespread “unofficial consciousness” manifested itself in political jokes about official corruption, privilege, inefficiency, and injustice, and in a sense of moral disgust and emotional withdrawal from identification with the regime. Any sense of authenticity in social life was restricted to the privatized world of relations within families and among friends, where relations of honest speech, trust, and relative equality were seen to reign. Many declared their support for illegal methods as a means of resolving conflicts, including strikes, absenteeism, slowdowns, even industrial sabotage (Bernhard 1993: 152). Until August 1980, however, Polish workers had difficulty converting their feelings (their “inner speech”) about social and public life into forms of outward speech, in which they might gain clarity and vigor through dialogical development (Volosinov 1976a: 89). Popular critical thought had the character of an ideologeme, a feeling which, while the product of social experience, still lacks “embodiment in the context of a discipline constituting some unified ideological system” (Volosinov 1986: 33). To be developed and elaborated, an ideologeme requires “choral support” from others (Volosinov 1986: 33, 152–53; 1976b: 103).

The literary critic Raymond Williams (1977, 1979) offers the related notion of a *structure of feeling*. The term indexes a tension between official ideas and practical experience which has not yet found adequate expression, and which may remain latent for a long period. While Williams focuses on how certain new artistic works can act to reveal submerged forms of feeling in a “sudden shock of recognition” (Williams 1979: 164), his insight can be generalized beyond the reception of specifically literary works.

At Gdansk a *new work* did produce a shock of recognition—only this was not a book or film but the emerging strike movement itself. The opposition activists had found a way by which workers’ feelings about the regime and about themselves could be practically articulated. This
work was authored by those who read it, made more powerful by its very form, and its shock itself involved self-recognition.

From 14 August, growing numbers of workers began to discover and develop a new environment of practical and communicative possibilities among themselves. This involved a high degree of emotional investment of care and energy, as one aspect of a whole cognitive and practical reorientation of social relations. It involved collective empowerment, the development of new social and personal identities, and a self-recognition of themselves as history-makers.

**Crisis and Development**

In its first phase the movement did not directly pose the question of free trade unions. The shipyard strikers demanded a substantial pay raise, reinstatement for Walentynowicz and Walesa, and the right to construct a monument to their slaughtered colleagues of 1970. In other workplaces that joined the strike, too, demands were predominantly local and “economic.” The advance to larger demands occurred through a major crisis in the movement’s development.

That crisis was induced by a management ploy. The newly elected strike committee, in the name of democracy, compelled the management to negotiate in front of open microphones, so that the whole shipyard could listen to the talks. But the shipyard director also used the term democracy to propose that a more representative strike committee be elected. The activists could hardly refuse, but the larger body turned out—as the director had calculated—to include numbers of Communist Party supporters, foremen, and others. By Saturday afternoon, the initial demands had been conceded. The director now urged, with the support of his allies on the enlarged strike committee, that the strike finish. The activists, arguing to continue the occupation until other striking workplaces had also won, were outvoted. Walesa, as chairman, was trapped into agreeing. At three o’clock on Saturday afternoon, his voice echoed across the shipyard, announcing the occupation was over.

Workers began to stream home. There was confusion, angry shouting, uncertainty. If the shipyard returned to work, then the smaller strategic workplaces would be isolated. “You can’t fight tanks with trams,” Krystyna Krzywonos, a tram workers’ strike leader, told Walesa: “We’ll be crushed like flies.” Some activists from other workplaces marched off angrily. Facing a still fair-sized crowd, Walesa gambled. “Who wants to continue the strike?” he asked, winning back a roar of assent. The strike continues, he announced.
Walentynowicz and Alina Pienkowska (a nurse from the shipyard hospital) ran to use the microphones in the conference hall. They had been shut off. Outside, they could hear the shipyard director’s voice booming from loudspeakers: “The strike is over; everyone must leave the shipyard by six o’clock, or the agreement will be canceled.” The two women rushed to Gate 3, where they met a crowd leaving. Walentynowicz tried to speak to them, to be faced with an angry worker challenging her right to declare the strike. “I’ve got a family, I’ve got children,” he yelled, “I’m going home.” She burst into tears. Pienkowska, who had never spoken publicly before, took charge, ordering the strikers’ militia to lock the gates while a few minutes’ meeting was held. “The strike is still on,” she told them: “Walesa was outvoted, but most workers want to continue, because there are no guarantees, and no free trade unions. If you leave, the activists will be sacked again. The most important thing is the solidarity of all the factories.” When the gates were reopened, some of the crowd stayed.

Quite likely less than a thousand of the 16,000 workforce remained. Certainly the big majority had gone. However, two days of strike activity had considerably expanded the numbers of the activist minority, for only the most committed stayed. Nonetheless, the strike was now in crisis. Bogdan Lis and Andrzej Gwiazda, feeling betrayed by the ending of the Lenin shipyard strike, had gone back to the Elmor factory, where they delivered bitter speeches and won agreement to continue that strike. They toured other factories by car, bringing their delegates back to Elmor, to form a new battle-center. Gradually the situation clarified. Some workers learned at home that the shipyard strike was on again, and returned. The delegates gathered at Elmor decamped back to the shipyard.

That Saturday evening, in the shipyard hall, the somewhat battered activists assessed the situation. No compromisers now muddied their debates. For good or ill, they had full charge. Twenty-one enterprises were represented, and the strike was holding at all of them. However, the crucial Lenin shipyard workforce was divided between an occupying minority and the rest who had dispersed—and whose feelings could only be guessed. Could they win the shipyard again, especially now that the workforce had enjoyed a taste of practical solidarity? The tension was considerable. From moment to moment the activists did not know if the security forces might attack.

Whatever their fears, they had committed themselves. That night, they formed a new organization: the Inter-Factory Strike Committee (MKS). They elected a Praesidium, renewed the workers’ militia with warnings to be extra vigilant, and proceeded to draw up demands. The
MKS had a precedent, for such bodies had emerged in both Szczecin and Gdansk in the insurgency of 1970–71 (Laba 1991), but now they went beyond anything previously declared. Their demands, eventually twenty-one in number, were now general, addressing the conditions facing the Polish working class at large. At their head was a call for new, free trade unions, smartly followed by the guaranteed right to strike, the release of political prisoners, controls over censorship, and a series of specific economic demands about wages, pensions, health services, and social equality. They were launching the strike movement onto a quite new path, challenging the very basis of the regime.

Now their mobilization problem had also shifted. To succeed, they must simultaneously win back the shipyard workforce—or the heart of the scheme would collapse—and spread the strike far beyond the enterprises around the shipyards. They proceeded energetically and imaginatively. They sent out messengers with news of the MKS and its new demands to every workplace in the region they could reach. And, during Saturday evening’s crucial meeting, they resolved to hold a public Mass at the shipyard gates.

A local priest was found to perform the ceremony. He was so nervous that, before he set out, he made his will (Bloom forthcoming, chap. 8). At nine o’clock on Sunday morning, before gates bedecked with flowers, ribbons, and flags, the priest began a Field Mass, beside a wooden cross at the spot where workers had been killed ten years before. The Mass, to be sure, had religious significance for many. But it also performed a huge mobilizing function. Thousands attended.

But still everything hung on Monday morning. The main body of the shipyard workforce gathered outside. On the gate stood Lech Walesa with a bull-horn. “Come in,” he urged cheerfully, “join us, it will be safe.” The large crowd hesitated, still uncertain. Then a group of young workers, cheering, marched in to rejoin the strike, pulling the rest of the crowd in behind them. The strike was secured again.

Now the MKS took control again of the loudspeaker system. The main hall became a permanent meeting place, all its sessions and discussions broadcast across the shipyard and outside to the square beyond. Again, with redoubled energy, the whole shipyard area was placed under the control of the strike committee. The bond between the activists and the workforce was rebuilt.

Now the movement turned its attentions and its energies outward, toward the rest of the Polish working class and toward the regime. During the first Monday, delegations from additional striking workplaces
began arriving at the shipyard gates, to join the MKS. Their credentials were checked by the workers’ militia, and they were admitted to the shipyard hall. As they arrived, each was announced and each explained where they were from, what was happening in their workplace, and why they were joining (for examples, see Potel 1982: 57–65). Every arrival, every addition, enhanced the sense of collective power. By nightfall, one hundred fifty-six workplaces from the Gdansk region had formally affiliated with the Inter-Factory Strike Committee and had added their delegates to the roll of those entitled to vote—an astonishing feat of mobilization.

The events of that weekend are filled with highly charged emotional activity: people shout at each other, rush about desperately, burst into tears, stomp off in fury, plead for solidarity, achieve reconciliation. Observing their behavior from a distance, we might feel inclined to describe them in the terminology of “collective behavior” theory (e.g., Blumer 1969): people seem to “mill about” under the influence of “social unrest” and “collective excitement,” to be neurotically “prowling without the regulation of group norms.” But such a description focuses only on the emotional quality of action, and disregards its intellectual and purposive content.

The activist leadership had been taken by surprise, and disoriented, by management’s tactics. During Saturday afternoon’s confusion, they faced a new and unexpected set of problems which threw them into massive uncertainty. Some felt Walesa had conceded to their opponents, inducing feelings of hot mistrust, a breakdown of communications as they retreated bitterly to their own workplaces to regroup. Within the shipyard, activists argued with workers to stay, often with frustrating results. Certainly, there was a high level of emotionality, but it was an emotionality of people struggling to make sense of a sharply reconfigured situation, and searching creatively for solutions and understandings. It was full of cognitive content.

The Saturday afternoon crisis represented a fork in the development of the strike movement. Finding adequate solutions required a furious dialogical exchange, over a period of a few hours. In the process, some actors drew on their personal resources to achieve new things (Pienkowska, for example, spoke publicly for the first time in her life). Had the activists not developed close relations of trust among themselves in the period before the strike, Saturday afternoon’s sharp antagonisms might have prevented the continuation of talk among them, making the new Saturday evening resolution of their difficulties impossible. As matters turned out, the crisis proved to be a moment of considerable creativity,
during which people formed provisional conclusions, revised them, re-negotiated the social relations among themselves, and recast their goals and their tactics, developing new organizational structures and new collective leadership. The very emotional tensions and antagonisms were signals of a whole complex which required restructuring, of a process of mutual exploration and very energetic talk.

**Feelings and Practicality**

Workplace occupations were already a recognized element in Polish workers’ repertoire of contention (Laba 1991; Goodwyn 1991), and people knew what to do. The strike committee appointed a workers’ militia, and banned alcohol from the workplace. They prepared gas canisters for use if tanks burst in. They organized blankets, mattresses, and food. Using local materials, occupiers constructed a tent city across the shipyard, unleashing playful imagination (there were workers’ *dachas* built like “a small villa with a porch and a quasi-colonnade” (Kuczma 1982: 261)). The strikers were imposing their own collective order, developing a new self-organized division of labor, thus enhancing confidence.

When, after the first Monday, the whole movement fell under the coordinated direction of the MKS, practical control of features of everyday life across the Gdansk region was further wrested from the regime. Striking public transport workers returned to work on MKS instructions, now sporting strike posters and Polish flags. Trucks and taxis moved with written permits from the MKS. Food distribution was falling under the workers’ control. Links with local farmers brought food supplies to the shipyard. On MKS instructions, a canning factory returned to work, so as not to waste the fish brought in by Baltic fishermen returning to port. Local artists came in to some workplaces to perform music, plays, poetry readings.

Each small practical extension of their own control over the environment had a significant emotional and intellectual aspect. Collective control was itself an embodied demonstration of the movement’s effectiveness, affecting confidence in the movement and its leadership, drawing further layers into active involvement in the collective work, into taking personal responsibility and leadership roles.³

Workplaces became relatively secure appropriated spaces, their boundaries carefully guarded, with state and employer access denied except on the workers’ terms. The occupations provided strikers with room and time to order their thoughts and their demands. Organized democ-
racy is a useful means, it seems, to fight for organized democracy. Though there were apparently no calls for workers’ ownership during the August strikes, the strikers did assert a kind of usufruct, turning workplaces into sites where their writ alone would run. Here the center of a partial new social order began to be created, symbolically represented through practical action.

**Division and Development**

The whole development occurred under conditions of high tension, with telephone links between Gdansk and the rest of Poland cut, hostile media declaring that “anti-socialist” forces were intimidating people, rumors of troop movements, helicopters buzzing over workplaces and dropping leaflets, and hard-liners in the ruling Party urging the use of force. Memories of the deaths in 1970 were never far away.

The MKS was undertaking an immense organizational struggle (Goodwyn 1991). Couriers went out to every part of Poland, armed with messages from the MKS. Many were stopped, arrested, and beaten in police cells. Yet each day new delegates affiliated to the MKS. Over two weeks, the Gdansk Committee expanded its coverage to over 600 workplaces. Down the coast, at Szczecin, a parallel MKS grew to 740 workplaces. There was a further MKS at Elblag, and then later at Wroclaw in Upper Silesia, in southwestern Poland.

During the MKS’s first week, a government delegation attempted to divide and rule Gdansk, offering separate agreements to individual workplaces. Seventeen factories joined these talks, refusing contact with the MKS for a couple of worrying days. Eventually, the government initiative collapsed, and the seventeen rejoined the MKS, the delegates hailing their return with relieved applause and singing.

Regime loyalists spied for the police or tried to sow division and in numbers of cases were formally expelled from the occupations (Gajda 1982: 243; Kuczma 1982: 264–65; Kaszuba 1982: 285; Bloom forthcoming: chap. 8). In the middle of a Gdansk MKS delegates’ meeting on the first Thursday, a Lenin shipyard personnel officer read a ten-minute statement over the microphone. In tones “clogged with pathos,” he appealed to the Party leader to come to the shipyard as he had in 1971: “You, Edward Gierek, who alone we trust, because you are to us like a father.” This statement was received with resounding applause, until Anna Walentynowicz identified the speaker: “I know Mr. Lesniak . . . he has persecuted me for years—it was he who sacked me two weeks ago.” The meet-
ing erupted in fury, and the man had to be escorted from the shipyard for his own safety (Ash 1983: 53–54). The sudden emotional switch from applause to excoriation among many of the delegates is revealing: they were still learning how far the movement was traveling compared with 1970–71. Then, Gierek could end a strike movement by appealing to workers for “help,” and strike committees had still, in a sense, pleaded with the government. Now, that language was outmoded, indeed had become part of the way “they” talked. A new articulation of the structure of feeling was still being refined. Events like this provided moments of danger but also possibilities of clarification, persuasively tying the delegates closer to the core activists’ understandings and aims.

Although the strike movement grew and consolidated, fear still competed with confident solidarity. Joanna Duda-Gwiazdza, a member of the MKS Praesidium, was hospitalized for the remainder of the strike with a nervous breakdown (Kemp-Welch 1983: 51, 184); there were other reports of workers collapsing under nervous strain (Gajda 1982: 245). At the Paris Commune shipyard, scene of the worst slaughter of 1970, several workers had epileptic attacks (Pawelec 1982: 274). In Gdynia, for some time, workers were afraid to let their names go forward as members of the strike committee (Bloom forthcoming: chap. 8). At Szczecin, Aleksander Krystosiak reported:

> The vice-chair of my strike committee resigned on the fourth or fifth day of the strike. His wife, a young woman with children, came to the fence to talk to him. She started crying about what could happen, that he could get killed, that he would be jailed, that they would send him to hunt Polar bears in Siberia—and he quit. So I lost one of my best people. In other factories, sometimes as much as half the strike committee had to be reelected because the people would give up out of fear. (Bloom forthcoming: chap. 8)

But not everyone manifested fear. Strikers’ memoirs recall time spent fishing in a workplace canal, playing practical jokes, running card games, reading and writing poetry and songs, organizing sports, and building up souvenir collections of strike memorabilia (Gajda 1982; Kuczma 1982; Pawelec 1982).

The meaning of the activity and social relations Gdansk workers were shaping was itself undergoing constant evaluation and development. The occupations provided a space for testing social relations, sometimes through sharp internal conflicts. There was an outbreak of talk. As
Trotsky once noted, revolutions are “very wordy affairs” (cf. Laba 1991: 129). Workers turned to writing poetry, the more popular productions read out on the shipyard microphone. With additional workplaces affiliating to the MKS and sending their delegates to the shipyard, there was a continual process of mutual self-education, a new making of shared identities. It took argument and experiment to develop certainty of direction within the MKS and the wider movement they were working to lead. There were many shaky moments. Collective self-confidence had to be constructed, tested against adversities, through ongoing dialogue between the activists and their growing periphery. Each time they overcame an obstacle, confidence and collective clarity were enhanced. But unity was always provisional, open to new affective impulses from within and without, and thus had always to be secured.

**Rituals and Symbols**

Throughout the Gdansk events workers employed ritual and symbolic forms of action. The initial shipyard march held a one-minute moment of silence in memory of the workers killed in 1970. Singing of national and other songs was a regular feature of MKS proceedings. Ritualized forms of collective expression such as clapping, cheering, booing, and whistling signaled workers’ approval and disapproval of speakers and actors. Catholic Masses were held at workplaces. New adherents to the MKS were formally announced, like new arrivals at some aristocratic ball. Proceedings at MKS meetings were often conducted with great formality, as indeed were the talks with the government delegation. The final, televised ceremony, where Walesa for the MKS and Deputy Prime Minister Jagielski exchanged signed copies of the agreement, conveyed the air of a peace treaty between sovereign powers—as, indeed, it partly was.

The Lenin shipyard gates became a place of secular pilgrimage, acquiring symbolic significance as a place where huge transformations might be accomplished. Thousands would gather outside, to watch, to talk, to listen, to grab strike bulletins, to ponder on the messages and posters, to bring flowers, to learn. People holidaying on the coast brought their children to see history being made, and to carry the strike message back to their own regions. On the wall by the gates were the MKS’s twenty-one demands. Across the gates, above the Pope’s portrait and flowers and ribbons, was a banner: “Workers of all factories, unite!” The gates were a place to laugh, to be solemn and anxious, to weep, to hope.
Rituals and symbols are collective means of emotional communication, ways of formalizing shared feelings. Existing as repertoires of already learned forms of action, they are adaptable to various circumstances. They are pregnant with complex meanings.

Rituals, Strathern and Stewart (1998: 237–39) suggest, can be considered from two complementary standpoints, that of embodiment, or their effects on participants, and that of the actors’ communicative purposes. Ritual acts “form a body language, producing a ritualized agent, always acting however within a historic context. . . . By means of the body . . . performers personify who they are, and what they intend to become in relation to the forces about them.” Rituals possess sensuous, aesthetic qualities, drawing people into collective performances where bodies are meaningfully active together. But these emotion-laden qualities do not exist apart from content, meanings, reasons, perceptions, memories, aspirations.

Participants in rituals communicate whole complexes of ideas and embodied feelings. Ritualized action is a form of emotional self-presentation which is itself a “sign” (for example, of calm self-confidence, of solidarity, of enthusiasm, of discipline) to onlookers and opponents and to self. Rituals and shared symbols are choral, multivocal forms of communication. They are shorthand means of communication, capable of unifying actors whose particular ideas are not all the same, focusing attention on elements of shared experience. Being public, they have a binding quality, embodying a promise to align with others. Rituals affirm, by communicating affirmation. They enhance solidarity, binding participants more closely to the shared purpose.

While all the ritualized actions at Gdansk shared the common idea of workers’ solidarity, various forms each articulated different aspects. The one minute’s silence at the shipyard gate, in honor of the dead of 1970, betokened a narrative connection between the immediate battle and a history of workers’ struggles in Poland; formal patterns of address at MKS sessions or at workplace Masses communicated the high seriousness of the proceedings; carrying Walesa shoulder-high to the shipyard gates after the final ceremony signaled the triumphant overcoming of difficulties.

There were occasions for such forms of action: they punctuated, almost in a grammatical sense, the patterns of action. There was little ritual action during the crisis of the first Saturday afternoon; ritual action tended to follow and in a sense to interpret and summarize “turning points” in the movement’s development once they had been achieved.
Rituals were moments for breath, for shared statements about progress to date, and for linking the present to its history and its future becoming.

**The Negotiations**

The whole region’s attention focused on the MKS when, finally, the regime agreed to formal talks, led by Deputy Prime Minister Jagielski. With the strikes still spreading, the government was compelled to recognize the workers’ new institutions and demands. At the workers’ insistence, the talks were held in front of microphones at the shipyard, in the presence of the full MKS. It is doubtful that union negotiations have ever been so public. There were five meetings in total, climaxing on Sunday, 31 August, in a televised ceremony, where, finally, the regime would publicly accept all the MKS’s demands. The MKS Praesidium did the actual talking with government, taking its key cues from the delegates, whose comments, sarcastic laughter, and applause could be heard throughout. The MKS leadership both gave expression to a developed oppositional discourse of collective identity and emphasized its meaning to the audience, who rallied behind them vocally. If the audience was a “chorus” in the drama of the talks, it also disciplined the MKS speakers, who spoke for the people, but under their control, and from a broad script that had been agreed to earlier within the delegate body. At the end of the talks, Walesa felt impelled to ask the delegates, “Did we do okay?”

The strikers’ spokespeople hurled an enhanced sense of workers’ dignity and moral value in the face of a regime they declared incapable of honesty and competence, laying claim to a revalued status for themselves and the Polish people at large. The regime’s representatives had to put up with their boldness.

Praesidium members spoke very plainly, contradicting official accounts of reality and giving public expression to popular feelings and experiences. Some important moments during the talks consisted, simply, in their uttering aloud truths that had been hidden or euphemized. Jagielski told the first meeting that the safety of all strikers and their helpers was guaranteed. Walesa replied, “We don’t see it quite like this. Plenty of people are sitting in prison, and plenty more are beaten up. These are the facts” (Kemp-Welch 1983: 43). On the question of trials for political offenses, Walesa declared:

> We know what kind of trials they were . . . for the truth is we attended these trials. I was here, and others too. I can say straight
out because I am a worker and don’t mince words that they were rigged.

The delegates’ hall applauded loudly. Florian Wisniewski, a building worker, added: “People can be done for anything. I know such cases. I know life. I know how careful you must be” (Kemp-Welch 1983: 48).

At the first meeting, on Saturday, 23 August, the MKS set a precondition for further talks: telephone links with other centers must be re-opened. The regime had tried to blockade Gdansk, to stop the strikes’ spreading further. The MKS knew their strength lay in strikers’ capacity to communicate freely with each other and to extend the scope of their new democratic struggle to wider layers of the Polish working class. The government side wriggled and resisted, sometimes with blatant lies that confirmed workers’ opinion of them: Zielinski, a Politbureau member, declared, to a chorus of protest:

A hurricane passed through Warsaw last night, destroying buildings in large areas of the city. . . . The central telephone exchange was completely demolished.

Henryka Krzywonos, a tram driver, bluntly explained why they needed the telephones, both asserting the general nature of their movement and their calm confidence:

We want, in fact we demand, that the whole of Poland knows what is happening here. We are fighting on behalf of the whole population—workers, employees, peasants. . . . We have waited a long time. Now we are in no hurry. [Applause] (Kemp-Welch 1983: 55)

After two days’ prevarication, the telephone lines were re-opened. MKS determination had won a further victory, which they promptly used to spread the strikes further. In any case, events were running the strikers’ way. By Tuesday, the day of the second talks, a further MKS had been created in Wroclaw, and strikes were underway in Lodz, Krakow, Poznan and smaller towns, many declaring solidarity with the workers of the coast and with the twenty-one demands (Kemp-Welch 188).

Laughter at government statements punctuated the negotiations. There was especial mirth at Jagielski’s suggestion that secret policemen needed more pay—because their hours of work were not fixed (Kemp-Welch 1983: 61–62). How liberating, to be able to laugh at the secret
police! The *Solidarnosc* strike bulletin commented in print, after the second talks:

> The atmosphere of this meeting is totally different from the old ones. Many things have changed certainly. People laugh, laugh more and more, more and more freely!

> We could however take a poll to find out how the words of Mr. Deputy Premier, who reiterates his sincerity and his truthfulness, were received. The answer was unanimous: “The more the Deputy Premier insists on his sincerity, the more sincere our laughter becomes in the hall.” (Solidarity Strike Bulletin No. 6, 27 August 1980: 18)

The MKS offered theorized analyses of the causes for economic and political failures, declaring roundly that, as a condition for social renewal, they must be admitted into the polity on their own terms. They declared not only the “worthiness” that Tilly (1994) finds at the heart of social movement claims, but their own competence. As Gwiazda asserted about the Polish working class:

> Polish society, as seen here on the Coast, has demonstrated its rationality, calmness, and maturity. The applause we hear from the hall every time the words “free unions” are mentioned is evidence that people have already matured. (Kemp-Welch 1983: 78–79)

The workers’ organizations were bidding, with assurance, for a central place in a new Polish power set-up. The MKS speakers were saying aloud things which nobody had been allowed to utter in public, and tying their analysis of society’s ills to a definite institutional proposal. The audience, whose own self-organization made such speech possible, were themselves electrified.

At the next meeting, Gwiazda addressed the question of political prisoners. He detailed several cases, and then generalized:

> We are guaranteed personal safety for those taking strike action and their supporters and they will not be repressed, but how can we be sure that false witnesses will not be found, and a rigged trial held, to reveal that the entire Interfactory Strike Committee is a gang of criminals? This causes us great anxiety [applause]. . . . This a matter of the utmost importance. On it, depends whether our country can be described as a democracy or a police state.
We live in a land where national unity is imposed by the police truncheon. . . . [applause].

Jagielski expostulated, “These statements are very far-reaching. . . . It seems to me that you are taking matters very far.” We are, replied Gwiazda, but people now live in generalized fear:

Prime Minister, we do not expect you to know the details of every transgression and explain them. But we do intend that a picture of life as it really is should emerge from them. Life as experienced by an ordinary person. (Kemp-Welch 1983: 109)

During the second week, it became clear that the government’s game was up. Strikes began in the last major industrial region, the mining area of Lower Silesia. The government accepted all the twenty-one demands. In the final talks, the MKS mood was buoyant, for victory was clearly in their grasp. Indeed, they were already looking forward to what they might achieve with their new unions. To Jagielski’s denial that the pay demands could be met, Walesa responded that the money was there “in the swollen state apparatus.” When we get our unions, he declared, we’ll strike if the money is not taken from the state administration: “We shall demand to know why they take this money that should be ours.” And when the now familiar liar, Zielinski, protested that there were no privileges for Party members, Walesa swept the issue aside with the threatening promise: “We’ll investigate as unions. We’ll get to the bottom of it. Our journals will publish whatever is found. We’ll clean it up! So let’s not make it a problem now. We’ll investigate!” (Kemp-Welch 1983: 133).

The final signing of the agreement, including all twenty-one demands and the promised release within twenty-four hours of the detainees, took on a ceremonial air, with applause and singing before the world’s TV cameras. Walesa, carried shoulder-high to the shipyard gates, addressed a huge cheering and singing throng.

**Conclusion**

Episodes of collective action like that in Gdansk have strong emotional components. If we reject simplistic associations between emotionality and irrationality, what part does emotion play in these processes of cognitive and organizational development?

There is, I think, no warrant for treating the emotional aspects of
behavior in isolation. They make no sense apart from other aspects of action, speech, and thought (Coulter 1986). Rather, the “emotional-volitional tone” or “evaluative accent” of people’s acts and speeches is an essential element of the particular creative sense they make of situations. Emotions do not “hang over the entire event in a numinous manner,” but are always tied to particular moments of action, dialogue, mobilization, are always situational and relational. They define features of interaction as this alters through the narrative.

The emotional tone of the different actors at Gdansk was not fixed, but flickered and changed color to express their developing senses of particular situations. People acted and expressed themselves fearfully, for example, but they were not always afraid. What they remembered about the events, as their memoirs show, were alterations in emotions: fear then laughter, doubt and pleasure, solidarity and contempt, solemn silences and fierce shouting, moments of panic and idylls. It is precisely through the shifts in emotional expression that they (and we) make much of the sense of the story of the events at Gdansk.

What was especially significant in those events was the emergence of new ideas and feelings, embodied in new social relationships, institutions, and collective power. They were produced intersubjectively, not from isolated psyches but in communicative social agency. The idea of new free unions was both shared and enriched by passing through many voices who began to make it their own. In August workers began learning to feel easy with new terms and social relations, making them into common sense by rooting the narratives of the strikes within their own autobiographies. That process was always risky, open-ended, and capable of turning out differently. If a preexisting structure of feeling found practical articulation, its particular shape had to be argued for persuasively and given practical forms validated by experience.

The leading activists never shaped the whole development alone. Certainly, they had first articulated the general aspiration to free trade unions, but only in practical interaction with many others could they explore the possible meanings and viability of their orienting idea and give it concrete shape. Mobilizing large numbers to their cause added innumerable voices to the overall decision-making process, and as the enlarging body of strikers discussed—sometimes very acrimoniously—in a continually shifting field of constraints and possibilities, a huge and passionate collective dialogue crystallized their ideas and cemented new patterns of social organization. Thus the processes at Gdansk were of interactive discovery.

In the tradition deriving from Le Bon, individuals engaging in col-
lective action lose their identities and their rationality, overcome by crowd emotions. It is surely more useful to suggest that they change their identities and rationalities. In a dialogical account, we see people shifting the meanings of their identities, adopting new ones, both personal and social, in processes of communicative action full of their own emotional colors. The salience of different identities (Reicher 1996a, 1996b) shifts through their interactions with the regime and among themselves, in a making, not a loss, of identities.

What we see at Gdansk is the transformation of whole configurations of ideas and feelings, in ways that enable and constrain new possibilities of action and thought. Because of the content of their achievement, the passionate voices of Gdansk should be heard again.

Endnotes


3. The effects of poor organization were tangible: at the Predom Metrix factory, a strike committee member recalls, “I must admit that part of our people were not quite in high spirits. Probably because we had not solved well the problems of sleeping accommodations and food as a sit-down strike required” (Szylak 1982: 298).

4. At the Szczecin MKS, down the coast, the main shipyard gates became a place for bridal couples to place their bouquets at the end of local weddings (Bloom forthcoming: chap. 9). Elsewhere, strike gates also projected such messages as “humankind is born and lives free” (Laba 1991: 135).

5. A complete transcript of the talks is translated in Kemp-Welch 1983.

6. Marc Steinberg, personal communication.
Chapter Eleven

The Felt Politics of Charity: Serving
“The Ambassadors of God” and Saving
“The Sinking Classes”

Rebecca Anne Allahyari

Charitable action and social movement activism are often understood as incongruent, even contradictory. I began fieldwork among volunteers in the two largest charitable organizations dedicated to feeding the poor in Sacramento, California, to understand how volunteers experienced their relationship to the homeless.¹ My interest in the charitable relationship and its micropolitics of place (Clark 1990) developed into a more specific focus on the striving toward moral self-betterment among the most committed of these two very different groups of volunteers. I framed this study around a consideration of what I came to call moral selving: the creation of oneself as a more virtuous, and often more spiritual, person. I observed how this concern with personal virtue extended beyond the everyday work of caring for the homeless and into the realm of political action, either in outreach work or social movement activism.

Moral selving is deeply emotional, but it is not simply about experiencing or managing emotions. Rather, the focus is on creating a better person. This directs the individual not simply inward but outward. At Loaves & Fishes, a Catholic Worker charity, the staff and “routine volunteers” (mostly middle class and predominantly white) strove to treat the poor with more compassion and love, while at The Salvation Army, kitchen staff and the “drafted volunteers” (mostly working class and male, many of color, and many formerly homeless) labored alike to be more responsible toward others. We see in both settings how emotions, in the
The words of anthropologist Catherine A. Lutz (1988: 213), “are first, in a sense, about values and commitments felt.” The charitable work of feeding the poor requires engagement with the ethical and emotional consequences of political ideologies about the right ordering of the welfare state.

Drawing upon my participant-observation, intensive interviewing, and content analysis of organizational publications and local newspaper stories, I consider here what I call the felt politics of caring for the poor. Felt politics signify the emotions and morality evoked in and by participants in civic associations. Just as emotions swirl “in and around social movements” (Jasper 1998), so do emotions and morality swirl in and around civic groups, be they contentious communities, collectivities of moral protest (Jasper 1997), charitable or voluntary organizations, or various combinations of these. The experience of feeling emotions such as gratitude (Hochschild 1989) and sympathy (Clark 1997) shapes our commitments to others and to civic associations, including social movements. Felt politics, in contrast to the slightly more disembodied “politics of feeling” (Morgen 1995), highlights the importance of experiencing, or feeling, politics and its implicit morality as embodied participants in organizational cultures. If feelings may be explained as “embodied thoughts” in which the thought/affect divide dissolves (Rosaldo, 1984: 143), then felt politics draws our attention to how morality too is embodied thought. That is, we feel politics to be right or wrong.

Of course, contentious communities, charitable organizations, and social movements represent different forms of social organization. I intend this story of the felt politics of charity in Sacramento, California, between 1994 and 1998 to trouble overly stark boundaries, especially between charitable organizations and social movement organizations. To understand how either The Salvation Army or Loaves & Fishes fared in the contentious politics of caring for the homeless during this period, we need to consider when and how compassionate organizations may become social movement players. We need to consider how relations to state policy and local politics shape contending felt communities of resistance and support, sometimes shaping the latter into powerfully moral conscience constituencies. Finally, we need to be careful to consider the hybridity of organizations. For example, how might organizations provide arenas for seemingly incongruent practices such as charity work and social movement activism?

The felt politics of caring at Loaves & Fishes and The Salvation Army spanned three mutually constitutive horizons: the moral selving of individuals, the emotion cultures of the organizations, and the local politics of charity and social change. The analysis here will focus on the latter
two in order to turn our attention most directly to social movement politics. I begin with a brief description of the two settings and their moral rhetorics of charitable action. To volunteer at one of these two places was to step into a particular organizational rhetoric of charity, or “ideology in action” (Fine and Sandstrom 1993). These brief descriptions are intended to provide a sense of the very different emotion cultures of the two places, dependent as they were upon aesthetics of place and organizational ideology. I then turn attention to local social movements against homelessness and the placement within these politics of Loaves & Fishes and The Salvation Army. The felt politics of charity at Loaves & Fishes and The Salvation Army reflected two very different visions of how best to address this growing urban crisis.

The Settings: Creating Emotion Cultures to Ameliorate Poverty

With its green-trimmed buildings and landscaped streets, Loaves & Fishes presented a welcoming facade for the many volunteer groups and poor people who visited daily its social services complex (including dining room, library, park, and school). Founded by Catholic Workers, Loaves & Fishes relied solely upon private donations and volunteers to serve between 600 and 1,300 meals daily at 11:30 a.m. Each day of the month a different group, organized by a religious or civic association, predominantly white and often predominantly female, took responsibility for providing Loaves & Fishes with meat, or money for meat, as well as a pool of volunteers to prepare the meal, from approximately eight in the morning to eleven, and then to serve the midday meal to Sacramento’s poor.

The poor are understood within the Loaves & Fishes moral rhetoric to be the “Ambassadors of God,” and they received food from the volunteers in a setting decorated with flowers and wooden chairs. Within this vision of the poor as God’s children, our brothers and sisters, Loaves & Fishes recognized “guests,” not “clients,” according to the Easter/Spring 1992 newsletter. In the words of the October 1993 newsletter, considering the poor to be guests “reminds us that these folks who find themselves at the door of our modest facility belong to someone. They are someone’s brother, someone’s daughter. We at Loaves & Fishes are not here with them primarily to rehabilitate or save them or to retrain them.” Catholic Worker Personalist Hospitality challenged the individual to take responsibility for the poor, to treat all with dignity, and to turn not to the state to provide charity but rather to welcome the poor with love as the Ambassadors of God.
Few rules governed the behavior of the guests, beyond the principles of nonviolence, enforced by the Loaves & Fishes staff and “street monitors.” Women and children could choose to eat separately from men. The guests could choose to take the bread and fruit provided with each meal with them, or to eat it at Loaves & Fishes. Choice underlay personalist hospitality at Loaves & Fishes, not only for the guests but also for the volunteers. In this modification of the practices of earlier Houses of Hospitality, volunteers could choose whether or not to take on work they might experience as either emotionally fraught or physically demanding or even dirty. For example, volunteers could choose whether to help the paid staff (mostly men of color) who monitored the waiting line and eased tensions among waiting guests; few volunteers (and mostly men) assisted the staff (mostly men of color) who did the demanding work of cleaning dishes and the floor after the meal. More volunteers (both men and women) chose to help the staff (more predominantly women) who assisted with hospitality and cleaning-up in the dining room during the meal itself. Many volunteers came earlier in the morning and prepared food and left before serving time; others came only to assist with serving the meal. In short, the practice of charity at Loaves & Fishes highlighted dignity, respect, and choice for the guests and, in an odd twist of personalist hospitality, for the volunteers.

Across an intersection and about one and a half blocks down a major thoroughfare stands The Salvation Army Shelter Services Center, enclosed within a chain-link fence. Homeless people can live there for thirty days, as the “In-house.” This setting remained ideologically true to General William Booth’s envisioning of “Harbours of Refuge” in 1890: “These Harbours will gather up the poor destitute creatures, supply their immediate pressing necessities, furnish temporary employment, inspire them with hope for the future, and commence at once a course of regeneration by moral and religious influences” (Booth 1890: 92).

At the Shelter Services Center in Sacramento, some of the In-house residents, most of whom were working-class men, and many of whom are men of color, volunteered in the industrially spare kitchen. Others, who were excused from looking for work during the day, ate lunch at noon, following the feeding of The Salvation Army staff. During the winter months, the kitchen also prepared a late-afternoon meal for the “overflow,” those who are bussed offsite to an emergency shelter operated by the Salvationists on behalf of Sacramento County in a former 4-H barn converted into a dormitory with bunk beds at Cal Expo, the Sacramento exposition center. Volunteers at The Salvation Army included the In-house, some of the overflow, a few previously In-house, and people or-
dered by the court to do community service hours through the California State Alternative Sentencing Program. At The Salvation Army, there were few church volunteers, and Burns Security Guards patrolled the grounds.

The military model of The Salvation Army featured a chain of command (complete with military titles) wherein Salvationists and civilian staff extended, in the words of their motto, “Heart to God and Hand to Man” to rescue those trapped in “The Sinking Classes.” In this tradition of “Muscular Christianity” the emphasis on the virility of Protestantism along with the development of character put men’s work roles at the center of a religious identity (Bederman 1989; Bendroth 1993). New recruits joined the staff to receive discipline in a work ethic that valued sobriety and productivity. In contrast to Loaves & Fishes’ volunteers, within this predominantly male, working-class setting, many of the volunteers battled alcohol and drug problems, or the stigma of ASP (Alternative Sentencing Program) court-ordered volunteer hours. The Alcoholics Anonymous rhetoric of moral reform converged easily with The Salvationist work-ethic rhetoric. A.A. principles and the rules of the Shelter Services structured a masculinist culture wherein volunteers might become staff, and both struggled to help others out of poverty and despair through hard work and self-discipline.

While by no means a prison, aspects of the constructed environment at The Salvation Army mimicked the disciplining, with its attention to timetables, gestures, surveillance, and a precise system of commands, described by Michel Foucault in his classic work, Discipline and Punish (1979). Yet, in spite of the strict rules, a feeling of camaraderie often dominated the Shelter Services Center. While at Loaves & Fishes interactions with the poor oftentimes remained couched in quiet middle-class etiquette that eased the discomfort of volunteers unsettled by class and race divides, at The Salvation Army bantering and singing along with the kitchen radio reflected the greater familiarity of shared experience. Many of the men who embraced Salvationism endorsed its rigid hierarchy, and they portrayed Loaves & Fishes as a good organization for its treatment of women and children, but as inappropriate for men. These same men often portrayed the minimal rules at Loaves & Fishes as morally bankrupt. Far fewer women, however, felt The Salvation Army to be the haven they welcomed at Loaves & Fishes.

Both organizations relied heavily upon those I called the committed volunteers to do the work of feeding the poor. At Loaves & Fishes the routine volunteers (either religiously or nonreligiously based), and at The Salvation Army the drafted volunteers (both In-house residents composed oftentimes of the formerly homeless and Alternative Sentenc-
ing Program court-ordered volunteers), committed themselves to self-betterment through adherence to the site-specific moral rhetoric of charitable action. Of course, for most of the volunteers at The Salvation Army commitment to institutional rules was more fateful as they struggled to fulfill court sentences or establish financial independence. In both cases, though, the linkages of emotions and morality to charity and social movements were most explicit in the consideration of the staff. At both Loaves & Fishes and The Salvation Army, staff served in Howard Becker's terms as “moral entrepreneurs” who crusaded for the creation and enforcement of organizational structure and rules consistent with their vision of how to best help the poor:

Moral crusaders typically want to help those beneath them to achieve a better status. That those beneath them do not always like the means proposed for their salvation is another matter. But this fact—that moral crusades are typically dominated by those in the upper levels of the social structure—means that they add to the power they derive from the legitimacy of their moral position, the power they derive from their superior position in society.
(Becker 1973: 149)

My theoretical approach to this discussion of organizing dining rooms, emotions, and the social movement against homelessness in Sacramento thus follows the symbolic interactionist footsteps of Becker (1986: 13) as I trace how the staff “do culture” in each setting, with the assumption that culture “explains how people act in concert when they do share understandings.” This approach, which treats moral rhetorics as ideology in action, assumes that just as individuals and groups do culture, they do ideology through the creation, and re-creation, of moral rhetorics of charitable action. This examination of the moral rhetorics and their translations into policy reveals how the framing images and metaphors of each organization have become “sedimented into structure” (Busch quoted in Fine 1992: 96) through the very different felt politics of serving the Ambassadors of God and saving the Sinking Classes.

**The Interplay of Emotions and Morality in Felt Politics**

Volunteers, and especially the staff, at Loaves & Fishes and The Salvation Army entered into a political tradition of charitable action with unique and fateful relations to the state. As of 1982, federal and state governments provided an estimated 40 percent of social services, the for-
profit sector 4 percent, and the voluntary sector 56 percent (Salamon 1987: 103). Most of the voluntary sector, however, was subsidized by the government, thus residing in what urban geographer Jennifer Wolch (1990: xvi) has called “the shadow state”: “a para-state apparatus comprised of multiple voluntary sector organizations, administered outside of traditional democratic politics and charged with major collective service responsibilities previously shouldered by the public sector, yet remaining within the purview of state control.”

At The Salvation Army, firmly situated within the shadow state, the In-house and drafted volunteers registered with the state in compliance with government bureaucratic requirements. Clearly a “nonprofit for hire” (Smith and Lipsky 1993), The Salvation Army professionalized charity with the goal of rehabilitation, thereby doing the work of the nation’s social welfare policy. In contrast, Loaves & Fishes staff—with their rejection of most government funding and distance from most government programs—worked to remain outside even the shadow state. Loaves & Fishes staff made significant efforts to retain freedom of political action. Yet by the mid-1990s, Loaves & Fishes found itself mired in an emotionally charged struggle with the City of Sacramento with morally righteous accusations from all sides (neighbors, community members, government members, the poor, and Loaves & Fishes itself). Wolch (1990: 217) notes how voluntary organizations within the shadow state leave themselves particularly vulnerable to state regulation and withdrawal of funds. But The Salvation Army, although constantly lobbying for increased government monetary support, carried out local state policy of housing, feeding, and rehabilitating the poor rather uneventfully.

In the winter of 1994–95, the Sacramento Salvation Army received approximately $70,000 per month from Sacramento County’s Department of Human Services to run the overflow shelter at Cal Expo (Guyette 1994: 13), as well as other government funds for social service provision. The staff expected its recruits to abide by strict welfare provisions. At the Shelter Services Center, the Salvationists and many of the civilian staff and drafted volunteers regarded Sacramento’s social control measures with approval. The Sacramento Shelter Services work aligned clearly with the 1994 National Commander’s directive that Salvationists “speak unashamedly and act in the marketplace of State policy” based on their understanding of God:

With measured word and legitimate action, we request and expect our share in government largess for portions of complete Salvation Army programs that do not involve us in a conflict with the estab-
lishment or free exercise of religion. There is no reason at all why The Salvation Army should hold back from applying for governmental support of any program, if we are convinced that in so doing, we are not involving ourselves in a practice which could be interpreted as the establishment of a religion or an abuse of free exercise. (Hodder 1994: 4)

The Salvationists and civilian staff at the Social Services Center in Sacramento called for more governmental funding for rehabilitation and housing. Staff members could be understood as “street-level bureaucrats” (Lipsky 1980) who represented state policy in their face-to-face interaction with clients. They joined lobbying efforts to push the City Council for cottages for the homeless, and the City Council decided to build cottages on The Salvation Army property alongside a proposed rehabilitation center. This plan resonated with the staff’s concern, as expressed by Kevin, an intake counselor, to obtain more funding for social services:

What I see is if we could get more social services involved, I think what [a Salvationist] is planning to do is to make a more concerned effort to reach out and then I think we would get better success rates with the people here if we were more thorough and helpful.

Dave, the Residential Manager who served on the mayor’s committee on homelessness, echoed Kevin’s attitude:

They are having a workshop next month on mental health issues in Sacramento and it’s like a brainstorming meeting with all, all the decision-makers will be there, the police department, the mental health, [treatment centers], the shelters, and we are going to try to brainstorm, and come up with some answers.

Moral regeneration served as the primary focus of charitable work within this vision of charity. Kevin set modest goals for successful moral selving among his clients: “What I feel, is, what I see, is probably out of all the people we see, maybe ten, fifteen percent really latch on and go do something.” State resources aided The Salvation Army’s work to rescue the Sinking Classes.

Concern with rehabilitation and the good-provider role dovetailed with state concerns about creating independent workers. Muscular Christianity at The Salvation Army Shelter Services provided assistance in a
The Felt Politics of Charity

manner much less troubling to a traditional masculine identity. The attention to salvaging persons damaged by alcohol and drug use and creating workers, while welcomed by many of the men, led the Salvationist staff away from a strong critique of the structural causes of poverty in Northern California and into a symbiotic relationship with local government. The staff participated in local government-sponsored committees charged with the task of developing programs to help alleviate poverty. Unsurprisingly then, The Salvation Army perspective more closely resembled that of a social service agency than a social movement.

Differences in visions of charity infused relations between these two geographically close neighbors with tensions. For example, in response to whether The Salvation Army had any sort of working relation with Loaves & Fishes, Dave explained:

The Salvation Army, we’re the big kids on the block. We have more funding sources than most of the other service providers in Sacramento, because of that I, at least I, feel like there is a lot of resentment, from the other facilities. Now, I won’t say that we don’t work together ’cause we do. On a daily basis, not only Loaves & Fishes but all the other organizations. But, I feel like there is an underlying resentment towards us.

Dave criticized Loaves & Fishes’ lack of rules for its guests:

They are more, they don’t, don’t seem to give the clients a whole lot of guidelines, you know, they just kind of let them do their own thing. And, we tend to give a little more structure, I think . . . there’s a fine line between helping somebody and enabling somebody. You know, and I think that’s the bottom line, we kind of see things a little bit differently on that issue. But we work with them a lot.

The Salvation Army’s work ethic allowed Dave to characterize Loaves & Fishes as “enabling” its guests.

In contrast, Chris Delany (founding member of Loaves & Fishes with her husband Dan Delany) explained to participants at a spiritual retreat that rather than enabling the homeless, “We are just trying to help people survive from day to day.” In response to The Salvation Army’s plan to provide a one-year rehabilitation program, she declared that they need to “get real” in their expectations about what homeless people need. On another occasion, the volunteer coordinator explained that many of
the Loaves & Fishes guests do not like to go to The Salvation Army. In her words, “Our guests tell us that it reminds them of prison.” In the same orientation session, however, the volunteer coordinator acknowledged that the “pecking order” at Loaves & Fishes served best those with children. In her words, “We don’t offer as good services to the men.”

Catholic Workers, in marked contrast to Salvationists, have denounced participation in and funding from the shadow state. Although Loaves & Fishes accepted surplus government food, they shunned government funding. Their final tax report for 1993 showed almost one and three-quarter million dollars in private donations to its “Bank of Faith.” With their reliance on individual and small organizational donations, these progressives gained adherents among even so-called “civic conservatives” (Starobin cited in Skocpol and Fiorina 1999) who valorize private initiative efforts to solve social problems. Nonetheless, beginning with Dorothy Day (1963: 33), Catholic Workers have understood themselves to be not merely a charity but also a social movement for change: “The Catholic Worker is a movement rather than an accredited charitable organization.” At its most effective, the Catholic Workers use emotional pleas on behalf of the poor to spark the collective moral conscience.

Through its widely circulated monthly newsletter, spiritual retreats, and the work of feeding the poor, Loaves & Fishes consistently denounced the city for abandonment of its poor. The staff encouraged its followers to protest the policies and actions of the city council and police. They worked to transform rights for the poor into moral priorities for the community. For example, the lack of affordable housing for the poor became a Lenten-time vision of moral disgrace for Sacramento in the Easter 1995 newsletter:

In 1994, Loaves & Fishes interviewed 2,173 guests who came to Loaves & Fishes searching for affordable housing. Seventy-five percent of those we interviewed had lived in Sacramento for more than 2 years. Sadly, we could place only 17% into housing they could honestly afford. It’s tragic. It unravels the quality of life for all Sacramentans.

Yet in this setting, where some volunteers felt uncomfortable in face-to-face interactions unmediated by the serving-line counter and others struggled to accept all of the poor as deserving of charitable assistance, most remained separated from social movement activism. Just as the staff modified personalist hospitality to allow the volunteers the choice to engage in the interactive work of personalist hospitality, they provided op-
opportunities for service divorced from the obligation for political action. Weekly or monthly participation in the dining room seemed to dissolve the emotional isolation of their conscience constituencies, thereby providing the staff with more opportunity to underscore the moral component of political action. Most volunteers at Loaves & Fishes nonetheless limited their involvement with the organizational ideology to the confines of the kitchen and dining room.

The valorization of Catholic Worker Houses of Hospitality in some academic writing contrasts sharply with academic critiques of charitable organizations’ failure to agitate for social change. For example, scholars have argued that Catholic philanthropy brought charity, not social change (Katz 1986: 61), that the politics of compassion “reproduce the dependence in their clients they hope eventually to remove” (Hoch and Slayton 1989: 215), and that “organized private charity espouses an ideology of individualism, self-reliance, and minimal government” (Blau 1992: 5). In a recent work in this tradition, entitled Sweet Charity? Emergency Food and the End of Entitlement, Janet Poppendieck (1998) argues that the work of administering emergency food programs consumes the labor of many of those most dedicated to eradicating poverty. Poppendieck warns that charitable work effectively diverts much of the energy of those most likely to challenge the “distributional politics” that necessitate food assistance for the poor. Poppendieck’s concern, in short, is that charity is not only a symptom but also a cause of the growth of poverty. Many citizens give their time and money to charity rather than social change, and charity not only fails to meet the food needs of the poor but also diverts the poor out of the mainstream. Yet critiques in this tradition fail to consider the complexity of how charitable organizations may be simultaneously active in distributional politics and social service provision. Loaves & Fishes devoted organizational labor to both charitable good works and social change, and as such it underscores the false simplicity of an analysis that posits providing for the poor and social movement participation as mutually exclusive, mutually negating, or, as in Poppendieck’s more complicated formulation, as subversive of social change.

Loaves & Fishes thus provides a counterexample to conventional academic accounts of politics and charity that often consign charity to a position of appeasement and maintenance of the status quo. Loaves & Fishes seemed successful at mobilizing an emotional political-economy favorable to assistance for the poor. The routine volunteers joined a larger conscience community to form a “collective identity” that “derive[d] from members’ common interests, experiences, and solidarity”
Rebecca Anne Allahyari

(R)ecbecca A. Allahyari (Taylor and Whittier 1992: 105). Doug McAdam (1988: 50) similarly noted the importance of collective identity in his research on Freedom Summer volunteers: “The image of the activist as a lone individual driven only by the force of his or her conscience applies to very few of the applicants. Rather, the force of his or her involvement in the project seems to have been mediated through some combination of personal relationships and/or organizational ties.” A powerful affective and moral collective identity enabled Loaves & Fishes to feed and care for its guests as well as to provide an advocacy coalition, composed of both staff and volunteers, to maintain pressure upon city government.

In short, for a good decade Loaves & Fishes’ charitable work, with its emotional amplification in the Sacramento media, guided powerful compassionate sentiments into a moral conscience constituency (McCarthy and Zald 1977) to back its social change politics. Staff advocated vigorously on behalf of the homeless in Sacramento, thereby joining, in Charles Hoch and Robert A. Slayton’s terms (1989), the politics of compassion with the politics of entitlement. In his work on volunteers and the Gay Men’s Health Crisis, Philip Kayal (1990, 1993) argued that volunteers’ “carepartnering” work is political because it restructures ties among self, community, and society. While the staff at Loaves & Fishes shielded the volunteers from the “dirty work” of feeding the urban poor, they challenged themselves and volunteers within the Loaves & Fishes community, just as the AIDS volunteers Kayal studied, to “bear witness” to the suffering of others. That is, the staff encouraged the community to restructure felt ties to the Sacramento poor, thereby assuming responsibility to take action on behalf of the homeless members of the community.

Yet within the year after I ended my field research at Loaves & Fishes and The Salvation Army in 1994, the Sacramento Bee and the Loaves & Fishes newsletter began to chronicle what I came to think of as Loaves & Fishes’ “fall from grace.” To many, Loaves & Fishes, once seemingly a beloved model of private initiative within the community, especially as portrayed in the news media, lost its favored status as it and the homeless population grew in the mid-1990s. Loaves & Fishes seemed to claim that the moral call to bring justice to homeless people superseded other rights, like those of local property owners to regulate the growing influx of poor people into their neighborhoods. If, as sociologist Donileen R. Loseke (1997: 438) so convincingly argues, “The power of the idea of private charity is that it unites,” the collapse of the politics of compassion imploded the community of sympathy in Sacramento. Spurning state funding and charting a heartfelt progressive alternative to increasingly conservative welfare state policy left Loaves & Fishes vulnerable to an
angry and self-righteous moral backlash as the politics of compassion withered in the face of persistent poverty and as a “get-tough-on-welfare” ethos gained strength. In these reports, the *Bee*, which had previously focused on the charitable spirit of Sacramento, reconstructed the community as the victim of the million-dollar charitable business.

The following newspaper editorial illustrates how Loaves & Fishes was increasingly castigated for helping those understood in national welfare policy to be the unworthy poor:

Most troubling, by serving all who come no questions asked, Loaves & Fishes helps support the lifestyle of able-bodied men and women who have chosen to live on the streets. Thus, the charity puts itself in conflict with city policy, which demands some level of effort and responsibility from the people it helps. An alcoholic must be in treatment. The unemployed must try to get a job. (*Sacramento Bee*, 4 October 1995)

On 24 September 1995, just four days before Loaves & Fishes served its two millionth meal, the lead article of the *Sacramento Bee* proclaimed, “Bitter Expansion Dispute Clouds Ministry for Homeless” (Kollars 1995). This article described numerous alleged permit violations by Loaves & Fishes in its expansion efforts. A longtime supporter of Loaves & Fishes, city council member Heather Fargo, explained how she understood the unleashing of resentment toward Loaves & Fishes:

It’s not just frustration that we’re feeling. It’s almost a sense of betrayal. People are feeling abused. We have for so long been supportive and trying to do the right thing for the homeless. And I believe everyone out there is well intentioned. But they have been blind to the impacts they are creating in the community. (Kollars 1995)

The story of Loaves & Fishes’ “fall from grace” sounds a cautionary note about the potential volatility of the voluntary sector’s incorporation into the welfare state. Growth jeopardized not only the intimacy of personalist hospitality but also the organization’s favored status in the community as Loaves & Fishes ironically found itself subject to the critiques usually railed against big government. Loaves & Fishes offered its adherents social services detached from the ethos of state welfare politics through the donations and work of community members. Nonetheless, while in years past a model of private initiative outside of the shadow
state, the organization suffered censure as the politics of compassion faded and a “get-tough-on-welfare” ethos gained new strength in public discourse. Its fate may illustrate the illusory freedom achieved in distancing from the shadow state.

Seven months after the city first sued Loaves & Fishes and then Loaves & Fishes counter-sued, the charity and city reached a mediated settlement just as depositions of council members were to be taken and within days of a U.S. Supreme Court ruling invalidating the 1993 Religious Freedom Restoration Act to limit state and city’s ability to apply local zoning laws to religious organizations. Director LeRoy Chatfield said that in spite of the ruling, “we do not believe that we need the permission of the City Council to feed the hungry and shelter the homeless” (Epstein 1997). The close of 1997 also witnessed Sacramento County supervisors backing off of a plan to begin immediate substitution of rehabilitation in favor of emergency housing. While they did decide not to reopen the ten-year-old emergency shelter at Cal Expo, they provided 126 additional beds at two downtown sites to compensate for the 286 lost beds at Cal Expo. The county also funded an additional 36 beds at The Salvation Army Shelter Services Center. Transitional housing programs in Sacramento were expected to meet the needs of most homeless people: “The programs are part of the county’s shift to a ‘continuum of care’ philosophy for the homeless rather than just providing beds and hot meals without asking clients to work toward self-sufficiency, said Cheryl Davis, director of the county’s Department of Human Assistance” (Kollars 1997). However, Roman Catholic Bishop William K. Weigand, a friend of Loaves & Fishes, pleaded with the county supervisors to reopen the Cal Expo overflow shelter, citing the needs of those who slept on the steps of the downtown cathedral.

Citizens, politicians, and journalists held staff at each organization accountable for how its visions of charity affected the larger community. The radical underpinnings of social justice at Loaves & Fishes, that is, its social movement politics, became its downfall as the organization grew and its commitment to the works of mercy, or charity, put the surrounding community increasingly in face-to-face contact with the homeless. In this fall from grace, Loaves & Fishes staff formerly praised in the local media for their moral purity came to be censured for moral righteousness. With the loss of power in the realm of discursive politics (Katzenstein 1998) and the ability to frame all homeless people as worthy poor, the staff also lost power in local interest-group politics. Meanwhile, The Salvation Army further entrenched itself in the shadow state as it worked with local politicians to provide temporary housing and rehabili-
tation programs. This is an unfinished story, yet with meaning for other social service agencies as they attempt to help poor people through difficult times.

**Conclusion**

This treatment of felt politics in a contentious local social movement to end homelessness illustrates how the strategic social construction of good and bad people by social movement participants involves the simultaneous construction of both moral and emotional orientations to state policy (Loseke 1993). These charitable organizations attempted, in large part, to mobilize moral conscience constituencies around the production of good and bad people and their actions. This formulation of conscience constituencies displaces any simply rationalistic understanding of how such constituencies might figure in political process theory with an acknowledgment of the power of cultural meanings to shape political outcomes (Goodwin and Jasper 1999). In this case, staff as moral entrepreneurs at Loaves & Fishes and The Salvation Army told stories about their organization, the other organization, and made pleas about how best to help the poor based on their constructions of what it meant to be a caring person. The inseparability of emotions, morality, and cognitions colored these pleas.

Borrowing language from turn-of-the-century German sociologist Max Scheler (1992), Loaves & Fishes and The Salvation Army welcomed adherents into very different “communities of feelings” with distinct “styles of feeling.” These communities of feelings appeared to resonate with followers along raced, classed, and gendered styles of feeling. At The Salvation Army, the politics of respectability and muscular Christianity demanded self-disciplining and adherence to rehabilitation and hard work among the predominantly nonwhite, working-class men. At Loaves & Fishes, in keeping with the style of feeling lodged in personalism, staff struggled against compliance with state regulations bureaucratizing care of the poor and advocated for more jobs, better pay, and affordable housing. Many women and children found rejuvenation here. Although radical Christianity encouraged social movement activism, the staff gave the mostly white, middle-class volunteers the choice of whether to participate in protest activism. With the use of petitions, a Lenten-time vigil, and attendance at city council meetings, Loaves & Fishes activists oftentimes resembled the “polite protesters” of the 1980s peace movement with what John Lofland (1993: 7) described as their “remarkable degree of genteel civility, restraint, and even affability.” Nonetheless,
even their middle-class mores could not stave off an emotional backlash to their progressive politics. If we consider the storied character of representations of social movements (Polletta 1998), then the brief snippets of narratives here about how to best end homelessness reveal not only the emotions, morality, and cognitions wrapped-up in the self-work in and around social movements but also the possible instability and potential contradictions of the distinction between a charitable organization and a social movement organization. Organizations may be simultaneously dedicated to caring for people and to changing the social conditions producing the problematic condition. In reflections on how metaphors may both guide and obscure our vision of social protest, James M. Jasper (1997: 40) advises that “for each metaphor, we can work in its shadow but also outside it, with the grain but also against it.” In this case, when and how do compassionate organizations become social movement players?

The felt politics of community at Loaves & Fishes and The Salvation Army reveal two very different styles of emotional striving simultaneously toward self-betterment and social change. If religion and protest provide two ritualized practices for striving toward moral expression (Jasper 1997: 14), charity certainly provides yet another. The inextricable linking of religion and charity was sanctioned by the state under the guise of national “welfare reform” with the “Charitable Choice” provision of the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act which encouraged states to use “faith-based organizations in serving the poor and needy.” Emile Durkheim taught us many years ago how powerfully religion shapes our moral communities: “Religion is first and foremost a system of ideas by means of which individuals imagine the society of which they are members and the obscure yet intimate relations they have with it” (1995 [1912]: 227). Visions of charity at Loaves & Fishes and The Salvation Army captured, although not perfectly, competing progressive and conservative understandings of social service provision. Trying to understand simultaneously how these visions map both moral self-betterment and social change politics moves us toward a felt politics which takes to heart emotions, morality, and cognitions in and around welfare politics.

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Endnotes


2. The fieldwork took place from 1991 through 1994, while the content analysis of organizational literature drew from years both prior and concurrent. I followed the workings of the felt politics of both organizations, but particularly Loaves & Fishes, in the local paper, the *Sacramento Bee*, through 1998.

3. Consideration of organizational hybridity among compassionate organizations reveals that social movement activism may intersect with self-help politics, charity, or philanthropy. For example, the collection *Lady Bountiful Revisited: Women, Philanthropy, and Power* (McCarthy 1990) offers historical examples of how women have wed philanthropical giving with political activism. In a brief but sympathetic account of self-help groups among a homeless population, David Wagner (1993) notes that some street people merge self-help, charity, and politics into a strategy to help other street people. Verta Taylor (1996), in her consideration of feminism, self-help, and postpartum depression, argues that self-help groups organized in response to postpartum depression are not devoid of a feminist critique of women’s experiences of child rearing. Finally, fieldwork in a small philanthropical foundation committed to supporting “Change, Not Charity” resulted in Susan Ostrander’s (1995) consideration of what she calls “social movement philanthropy.”

4. Even with nonprofit status, organizations such as Loaves & Fishes remain within the purview of the state (McCarthy, Britt, and Wolfson 1991). For example, they must comply with tax and postage requirements, and probably most significantly, as we shall see later, they must also abide by local zoning laws and constraints upon support of political candidates. Yet, in a study of pathways to nonprofit incorporation among homeless social movement organizations, Daniel M. Cress (1997) argues that political moderation is a function not of nonprofit status per se but rather the pathway by which the organization came to adopt this form.

5. The stories of many of the committed formerly homeless volunteers I encountered working at The Salvation Army contrasted sharply with those found in the dominant ethnographic tradition, which argues that The Salvation Army, at best, is a beleaguered, accommodative charity and at worst a repressive, demeaning institution. My fieldwork suggests that some of the drafted volunteers welcomed the mental health and material benefits offered by The Salvation Army. See Allahyari 2000.

6. Most famously, Michael Harrington described the work of Catholic Workers to serve those who lived in the destitute class in *The Other America: Poverty in the United States* (1963). The tone of the academic literature on Catholic Workers (see, for example, Murray 1990 and Troester 1993) treats the Catholic Worker movement with great respect. Similarly the extensive writings of Dorothy Day, although not academic, receive respectful admiration from academics (see for example Coles 1973).
Chapter Twelve

Animal Rights and the Politics of Emotion:
Folk Constructs of Emotions in the
Animal Rights Movement

Julian McAllister Groves

The animal rights movement has traditionally been a women’s movement. Women dominated the early animal protection movements. In the late nineteenth century, animals, along with children, prisoners, and the poor, became the objects of compassion. Increasingly animals became part of the home and family (French 1975; Elston 1987; Sperling 1988). Animal protectionism, as with other reform movements, offered women a way to participate in public life at a time when men excluded them from it. Women defined their roles as caretakers against the harsh realities of factory life and working-class poverty, as well as against the increasingly powerful medical profession. Frances Power Cobbe, the founder of the first antivivisection society, warned that the “cold rational materialism of science” was threatening to “freeze human emotion and sensibility.” Antivivisection, she argued, “shielded the heart, the human spirit, from degradation at the hands of heartless science” (Donovan 1993: 168).

The recent animal rights movement has also been described as a “moral crusade” that criticizes the rational, calculating attitude of businessmen and scientists. James Jasper and Dorothy Nelkin (1992) identify the animal rights activists as having an anti-instrumental world view—meaning that they are against the utilitarian morality of large bureaucracies that pays attention to the ends over the means. Recent feminists have shown how women are more concerned than men about preserving rela-
tionships of responsibility and care (see, for example, Gilligan 1982). Ecofeminists argue that because of this, they are more receptive to ecological issues, thus once again defining animal protection as a women’s movement.

Yet many of the animal rights activists I met in a grassroots organization for animal rights in the southeastern United States are not traditional home-makers. They are established or becoming established in professional careers. They shun emotionalism in the movement in favor of what they consider the “rational” arguments of the organization’s philosophers. Animal rights activists are careful to use scientific arguments when criticizing animal research, and many of the prominent individuals in the organization are men. At the same time, activists still tolerate (although do not necessarily take part in) highly emotive protests and even violent acts. What cultural assumptions have supported this framing of animal protection? And how is it that, despite this “rational” approach, flamboyant protests and acts considered terrorist are still tolerated?

These questions can be answered by looking at the ways in which activists talk about their emotions. Instead of trying to identify specific emotions, or treating emotions as independent causal variables in social movement participation, I examine how social movement activists, specifically animal rights activists, talk about their feelings. My approach is basically that of symbolic interactionism. I look at how activists interpret their emotions in the context of their interactions with significant others—particularly the media and opponents from the biomedical research community. I treat emotions as “folk constructs.” I do not study them as objective psychological states. As folk constructs, activists use the term *emotional* rhetorically and ambiguously to negotiate situations that they face in the movement. In the setting that I studied, predominantly professional women in a grassroots animal rights organization try to gain legitimacy for their cause in a patriarchal community that trivializes issues that have been traditionally associated with women. The animal rights activists use the term *emotional* to describe those individuals whose approach to animal protection they consider to be less legitimate. The term “emotional” is thus used in a political way. This approach does not answer the traditional resource mobilization question of why individuals join the animal rights movement, or why women in particular join the animal rights movement (see, for example, Taylor 1999). Neither do I address the issue of whether or not the movement achieves its goals (see, for example, Einwohner 1999), or whether or not it is a particularly emotional movement, or even which emotions are present. Rather, my analysis looks at *why a social movement takes the form it does*. I seek
to explain why the animal rights movement embraces a scientifc, philosophical outlook rather than takes the form of a movement for compassion and kindness led by middle-class women—as its predecessor, the humane movement, did in the nineteenth century. At the same time, activists define “acceptable anger,” which allows the more flamboyant, even violent forms of protest to be romanticized, thus allowing alleged terrorist acts to coexist within the movement’s “rational,” professional, scientifc outlook.

The Cultural Context of Non-emotional Framing

This non-emotional framing needs to be situated in the cultural context of the late 1980s, during which the recent animal rights movement gained popularity. This was an age in which it became fashionable to show one’s emotions. After the Reagan and Thatcher years of self-interest and thrift, politicians began to speak of a “kinder, gentler nation.” Courses in ethics and values proliferated in business and professional schools. Centers and institutes were dedicated to studying and promoting human values in science, technology, and public policy. Feminists argued for a morality based on sensitivity and cooperation rather than on abstract principles and competition. The film industry turned Arnold Schwarzenegger from policeman to kindergarten teacher, and from stoic scientist to weepy expectant mother.

Women, however, pay a higher price than men for taking part in the expressive movement. When a man is caring or humble—as depicted in posters of half-naked, muscular men holding babies—he is likely to be praised. A recent advertisement for Philips shavers urges men to “shave with care,” because “showing your feelings is not a sign of weakness, it’s a sign of strength.” Men are rewarded for being angry too. Robert Bly, the influential writer in the men’s movement, encourages men to get in touch with the “Wild Man” that lurks at the bottom of their psyches. The Wild Man, Bly (1990) reminds us, is not to be confused with the Savage. In an age in which corporations produce “sanitized, hairless, shallow men,” the Wild Man is receptive and expressive. Women are less likely to be praised for being caring or angry: their emotions are often seen as irrational. Professional women feel threatened when their work becomes expressive because to some it seems less legitimate. In Equals Before God, Sherryl Kleinman (1984) describes women entering a humanistic seminary as cynical about training that encourages “womanly values,” such as egalitarianism, cooperation, and expressiveness. The women she interviewed wanted “intellectual” and “theological” justifi-
cations for women’s participation in the ministry. They believed that the
minister’s authority rests on male status, not womanly feelings.

This resistance is going on in the broader American educational
system. The growth of liberal arts and multicultural programs in U.S.
colleges has encouraged a view that knowledge is subjective and intuitive;
that women’s and minorities’ opinions carry equal validity to those of
mainstream thinkers. But some women resist what they regard as roman-
tic relativism. In *Women’s Ways of Knowing*, Mary Field Belenky and
her colleagues (1986) show that women in elite colleges continue to be-
lieve that, at least in their art classes, their teachers demand not just per-
sonal opinions but the procedures by which they arrive at them: “compo-
sition and texture and ‘all that garbage.’” The students learned that
“intuitions may deceive; that gut reactions can be irresponsible and no
one’s gut feeling is infallible; that some truths are truer than others; that
they can know things they have never seen or touched; that truth can
be shared; and that expertise can be respected” (Belenky et al. 1986:
91, 93).

Animal rights activists face a similar dilemma. Many of the career-
minded women I met in the animal rights movement believe that being
associated with compassion limits opportunities rather than expands
them. Such women know what it means when a female senator dissolves
in tears while taking part in a public debate, or when they feel tears of
anger welling during an argument at work, as they do when they appear
before television cameras to talk about animal cruelty: “Emotions don’t
win arguments.” These animal rights activists believe that they must find
“rational” ways to be emotional about animals in the context of tak-
ing part in a public debate with medical scientists—a group comprised
largely of men, and whose authority rests on highly prestigious medical
qualifications. I learned about these issues from many hours of observing
and listening to animal rights activists talk about their emotions while
conducting research for a book on the topic (Groves 1997).

**Emotion Talk in the Animal Rights Movement**

My data come from twenty in-depth interviews and three years of
participant observations that I conducted with a grassroots organization
for animal rights that met in a church hall in a mid-sized college town
in the southeastern United States. In these interviews, animal rights sup-
porters describe their journey into animal rights activism in terms of their
emotional attachments to animals. But they do not consider themselves
to be *emotional*. Most of those I interviewed use this term to criticize
others whom they believed are too unprofessional, too irrational, or too feminine. These activists favor a “rational” approach to dealing with animal cruelty. They emphasize scientific or philosophical justifications for animal protection. They advocate rights and justice for all animals rather than compassion for pets. Why should such appeals be so popular? For the older activists who hold professional values, being emotional makes animal protection look amateurish or feminine. For the younger, idealistic activists, being emotional about pets contaminates the purity of the movement’s ideology. For both groups, it trivializes animal protection.

By defining various people and situations as emotional or rational, animal rights activists attempt to construct for themselves a world in the animal rights movement that is consistent with how they want to live outside of it. Despite the emotional appeal of animal rights activism, this world is civil, scientific, and masculine.

Emotions as Unprofessional

Animal rights activists believe that being emotional is contrary to their professional identities. Activists who are frequently labeled emotional are typically the younger members of the movement. I often heard them referred to as “Radicals.” They are more involved in the national animal rights organizations, such as People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) and Trans-Species Unlimited, as opposed to the smaller grassroots groups. They also tend to live the more unconventional lifestyles—not eating or wearing any animal products. “My view of human beings,” one such radical told me, “is that when the world was created, people were a kind of mutation. Just like a disease they took over like a cancer cell.” Animal rights activism is, for such activists, a full-time job. They tend to be employed in nonprofessional, part-time jobs (such as waiting tables, or serving at the local food cooperative) that afford them the time to devote to animal rights activism. Their social lives are also restricted to the movement.

Activists also use the term emotional to describe certain forms of protest associated with the younger idealistic activists, which are designed to capture public attention at any expense. Such activists parade naked at anti-fur demonstrations. They wear cow costumes outside McDonald’s. And they mock hunters with derisive slogans, songs, and costumes. The radicals do “street theater”—as they call it—because, for them, the animal rights movement lives and dies by its ability to capture the media’s attention. “The press has better things to do than listen to animal rights activists,” one radical said at a meeting, reflecting on the
triviality that the public accords to animals. This results in an attitude, epitomized in various slogans, of doing “whatever it takes,” and when big news breaks, such as coverage of a PETA raid, of “striking while the iron’s hot.” What matters at the end of the day is that “you have a story.” The fickle media encourages this attitude. Activists have to compete with a cacophony of other groups and events shouting for attention. “You’ll make it in the news if no one gets killed,” I once heard at a meeting. “Bad coverage is better than no coverage.”

But the older, career-oriented women in the movement disagree. They emphasize their professional careers or their traditional, conservative up-bringings in the South when talking about their animal rights activism. They associate street theater and noisy protests with the young, idealistic protesters of the 1960s. A woman I call Linda is an attorney. Before coming to Animals Anon, however, she had spent polite afternoons in “upper-middle-class groups, such as church groups with a lot of southern belles, that did things the way they’d always been done.” “You didn’t rock the boat,” Linda recalls. “You went along with the group.” The animal rights movement was different, since the animal rights activists were challenging her “traditional, capitalistic beliefs.” These people were outspoken. They offended. “They challenged the old way of doing things: the old ways of research, the old ways of being fashionable.”

Linda worries that her friends will think that she is unprofessional too. She was relieved to find that the meetings were not full of “hippies from the 1960s standing out on the street with picket signs,” as she had expected of her first animal rights meeting. On the contrary, she was reunited with an old high school friend whose husband was now a doctor: “Somebody I could associate with in a professional sense. They were actually professional people who cared about animals, respected them.”

Hers is a world that requires a never-ending spiral of postgraduate degrees in order to keep up, to be credible. And for Clara, another activist in the group, it was the opposition—the animal researchers—who exemplify the professional qualities to which she aspires. “They of course come across as the pinnacles of respectability, educated and rational people that are respected by society,” she told me. “And I think that if we don’t try to exude that image, then trying to get our point listened to is certainly not going to work. We need to project a professional, well-educated, rational, non-emotional image in order to get our point across.” Other activists also worry about the younger people in the group. “I guess one thing that bothers me about [this group] is that there’s a lot of young people involved who think that the way to go is to get attention and cause
a ruckus and alienate people.” Indeed, such younger members, who are in floating part-time jobs, have no professional identity to preserve in the first place.

Acceptable Anger

Yet despite criticism directed against the emotional protests and activists, some emotions and emotional actions are tolerated. Having been asked by the pastor to leave the church hall to make room for other volunteer groups, the activists were now meeting in the offices of the law firm where Linda worked. One night, an intense discussion broke out about protest strategies. Someone mentioned that a PETA member had thrown a custard pie in the face of a recently crowned “Pork Queen” in a pageant organized by promoters for the meat industry. One activist, who worried about the professional image of the organization, said that she would never have supported this. It distracted the public from learning about vegetarianism and the plight of factory-farmed pigs. Another member had written an anonymous note to the group that was read out at the meeting that night. “We need more thoughtful, careful education,” it warned. “Stay away from publicly presenting the loony left with alienating antics and anger.” An older outspoken male activist, Douglas, disagreed. Although he was concerned about the movement’s professional image, to hide one’s anger, he believed, betrays the animals that suffer in silence. Flicking back his fine white hair, he cleared his throat, as if he were going to give a speech. “We have true education,” he reminded the group, referring to animal rights literature, films and seminars:

But every day millions of animals are dying behind closed doors and no one raises a voice. No one is angry. This is a betrayal to the animals. Some of us are outraged. We must let the nation know that some of us are outraged! We must let the nation know that some of us are angry! People must know that hunting is controversial. We must make people uncomfortable.

The room began to stir. Several activists broke into applause. “We need everything,” Douglas continued. “Even the civil rights activists became angry under the Black Panthers. These tactics have brought us our success.”

Douglas explained that he would not personally dress up in a costume. But he would not object to others who did. The young nonprofessional activists did things that the professionally minded members, like
Douglas, were not prepared to do in order to draw the media’s attention. This freed the older professional activists for more respectable activities, like giving talks at high schools and appearing on local radio shows. It also allowed professionals and radicals to work together in the same movement. Professionals could justify being in an angry movement if they could attribute those angry actions to others, who, they agreed, were understandably angry.

A few of the professionals in the organization even romanticized groups like the Animal Liberation Front (ALF)—the alleged terrorist wing of the animal rights movement. “I’m fascinated by them,” Linda said. “I think they know what they’re doing. They don’t just go in and steal animals and take them out of laboratories. They assess the situation; find out what’s going on inside; try to perhaps correct it in some other way.” To activists like Linda, ALF represented a kind of ordered anarchy, an appropriate anger, a rational response to the situation. Consequently, several activists who objected to the young activists’ protests still wanted to be a part of ALF.

Adding to ALF’s attractiveness is its exclusivity. Not just anyone can join. Many feel called, but few are chosen. Upon asking, “Who are the Animal Liberation Front?” one activist was mysteriously told by a radical, “You are.” This gives ALF’s radicalism a professionalism all its own, because few people know how to go about being a part of it. It is precisely this fascination with exclusivity that leads some activists to criticize emotional individuals as being irrational.

**Emotions as Irrational**

Activists contrast being emotional with being rational about animal cruelty. Emotional activists, for instance, are believed to rely mostly on their feelings for animals rather than on reasoned philosophy or scientific reasons for animal protection. Such activists are often referred to as “Animal Welfarists” because they are more concerned with the welfare of particular animals, rather than the rights of all animals. They include volunteers from the humane societies. Indeed, the events that the welfarists organize involve pets: sponsored dog washes, animal festivals, and Christmas parades with the humane society. Other activists call these “light animal rights events,” “social events,” or “low-key events.” The activists aptly call the welfarists “cat-and-dog people” or “animal lovers” because of their affection for pets.

Many activists also consider welfarists to be irrational because they are inconsistent in their convictions. Activists are aware that skeptics,
especially biomedical scientists, accuse the animal rights activists of being inconsistent when protecting pets while eating meat or wearing leather and thereby being irrationally emotional about pets. Yet animal welfarists openly eat meat and wear animal products. They also support some types of animal research. The staff at a local animal shelter will not sell their live animals to researchers, but they did once agree to donate tissue of animals that had already been euthanized to cystic fibrosis researchers at the local university medical school. The shelter manager explained that this was to “help children throughout the world.” The shelter staff are known to seek harmonious relations with the public. Being influenced by public opinion, using emotional appeals with children, and compromising one’s position on the ethics of animal research contradicts the animal rights activists’ image of themselves as impartial, scientific, and hence rational.

Most of all, however, welfarists trivialize animal protection because they do not provide persuasive justifications for joining the animal rights movement. Drawing on traditional dichotomies between rationality and emotionality, most activists believe that their emotions alone cannot justify to outsiders or themselves why they should take part in the movement. Feelings, they say, are “the fuel to” or the “passion behind” animal rights activism, but they are also “gut reactions,” “impulsive,” subjective, and therefore “irrational.” “Your emotion comes about because of things you’ve learned or things you’ve done, the ways you react to things,” Linda, the attorney, told me. “That’s not necessarily how the other person is going to react.” Linda knows that she is likely to be dismissed by skeptics on the basis of her emotions alone. She joined the animal rights movement after reading about cosmetics testing on rabbits. The rabbits reminded her of her pet beagles. It was, she said, “an emotional response.” “But,” she elaborated “animal rights issues tend to be very emotional, and a lot of laws can’t be changed with emotion”:

I think people can dismiss you and your statements and your actions as mere reactions. You’ve got to sit down and say, “We don’t need this any more. This experiment is outdated.” You’ve got to say why we don’t need to treat veal calves the way we do; that we can increase spacing of the crate. We need to have more shelters. The animals are roaming the streets. Their numbers are increasing. We need to do something about it—not, “I hate seeing an animal on the side of the road, underfed, abandoned, and so I think we should do this.”
In this way, Linda searches for the facts and figures of animal cruelty: “A fact or a figure has no emotion to it. It’s a statement. Something I can say, ‘Well that makes sense.’ Not ‘I just feel that way,’ but why I have that feeling.”

Activists like Linda do not want to abandon their feelings altogether. Although they have always loved pets and they cry over animal rights films about cruelty, they believe that they need intellectual justification for their feelings. Aside from statistics churned out in animal rights literature, they have found this justification in some of the philosophical writings on animal rights, such as those by Tom Regan. One activist explained:

I use Regan’s work mainly to investigate the nuts and bolts of the animal rights position as an ethical, philosophical position. My feeling is that it’s simply not good enough to have a sort of inchoate, sentimental feeling of good will toward animals. I mean, I think that’s great. But that in itself doesn’t really justify or legitimize it on intellectual terms.

Regan’s philosophy appeals to another activist because it does not initially talk about animals. It talks about rights:

*The Case for Animal Rights* is a very, very scholarly, dispassionate, philosophical work. In some 480 pages he goes through the arguments of the ethics that deal with some of the rights philosophy. I think in the first 100 pages he doesn’t even mention the word *animal*. He simply analyzes what previous philosophers have said about rights. The whole idea of rights has always fascinated me: civil rights or to what extent does America have the right to go into other countries.

Yet most activists accept that animals cannot have rights in the same way that humans can. They think that animals should be treated with “compassion” or “respect.” Animals are vulnerable. A more popular analogy is that animals should be treated like children. But the philosophical discussion of rights provides them with more impersonal and therefore acceptable ways of talking about animals. Thus the animal rights movement need no longer be seen as an organization for those who love pets or cute animals but as an intellectual movement of justice for all animals.
This had to be made particularly clear when talking about animal research. The popular host of a local radio health show invited Douglas, the male coordinator of the group, to debate animal researchers on the air. He began by asking Douglas to summarize for the listeners the animal rights position. Douglas cleared his throat. “Maybe the best way to explain what animal rights is, is to explain what it is not,” he said slowly and methodically:

Many people get emotionally wrought up if they walk through the woods and they stumble on a fox or a raccoon that sits in one of those steel jaw leg-hold traps and it’s in obvious agony and pain; the steel cutting into its flesh and it’s bleeding and it’s been there for many hours and you see the fear of death as you approach because it knows the trapper will come and stomp it to death. Or if they see the heart-wrenching sight of a calf that’s been torn from its mother immediately after birth and shoved into one of those regulation-size crates where it spends its entire life chained by the neck and it can never move and never chew.

Now these are strong emotions. Some people cry when they see extreme acts of cruelty. And these are certainly not emotions that any one of us needs to be ashamed of. On the contrary, these are emotions that I think we ought to nurture in ourselves. But the animal rights view says: “Let us push these emotions away for just a moment and be very cool and rational about this. And if we do, we will then discover that what is wrong here is not necessarily this or that act or degree of cruelty. But what is wrong here is something much larger. What is wrong here is the entire system. A system that has put in place a good half dozen huge industries which exploit and kill vast numbers of animals, literally billions of animals in this country alone.”

The animal rights philosophers have undertaken a very thorough inquiry into the ethical foundations that are involved here and have come to the conclusion that this situation and attitude is not justifiable in moral terms. And the bottom line is that what we owe the animals is not kindness and compassion but respect and justice.

And so I noticed a kind of hierarchy in the animal rights movement. The people that the activists most respect rarely talk about pets. They talk about philosophy. The philosophers themselves are the high priests of the animal rights movement. They write books. They teach at universities.
Don Barnes, the animal researcher who became an animal rights activist, even went as far as to deny his affection for animals. “I’m not an animal lover,” he told a group huddled around him at a protest against a researcher at a local university. “Some animals I like, others I don’t like. To say I’m an animal lover is the same as saying I’m a nigger lover.”

Besides the philosophy, these activists sought solace from emotionalism in science itself. One woman, for instance, recalled how her husband organized a candlelight vigil outside the chancellor’s house in the college town one evening, and how, instead of consulting her husband, the anchorman from the local TV station approached her for a statement. The cameraman and sound engineer began positioning themselves around her. “I was uncomfortable because I had never done it before—having a camera in front of me,” the woman recalled. “Too many times, people say ‘I’m in the movement because I love animals’,” she told me. “I think there’s more to it”:

I guess my concern is the kind of image that I want projected. For me the image needs to be people who are educated and aware and not emotional when it comes to the media. Because people who are opposed to us are very quick to jump on that. It’s not emotions that change policy, that change opinions. It’s being able to lay down a very logical argument for why you believe such a thing.

In front of the camera that night, she sought scientific justification for her emotions:

Taking it from the orientation that there are alternatives, there are other ways to do it [research] so we don’t have to inflict pain on the animals. I think you have to have the emotion. But in addition you can say, “I care. But what would be a more sound type of study?” So it’s sort of adding the component of justification for changing.

An understanding of science is crucial for these activists. Far from being anti-science, the activists embrace science. They read books written by medical scientists on vegetarianism. They watch science documentaries on the television. And they debate the merits of animal research in stopping cancer and AIDS. Science could only be criticized by science itself. Like the philosophers, the activists revere scientists in the move-
ment, along with those who are well-versed in the technical aspects of medical research.

This explains why animal research often appears to occupy so much of the animal rights activists’ attention, rather than, say, factory farming, where far more animals are killed. The media and research supporters most frequently challenge animal rights activists on their opposition to animal research, since this is where they appear most emotional. In order to avoid looking emotional, the activists have to come up with elaborate justifications against animal research. But this only reinforces their fixation with animal research—and their anti-science image.

**The Role of the Emotions**

The welfarists highlight the boundaries between being acceptably and unacceptably concerned about animals. All activists have to confront them at some point. They describe themselves as having been cat-and-dog people or animal lovers before getting involved with animal rights to show how they have progressed to having more sophisticated responses toward animal cruelty. “I think you go in under emotion,” Linda said. “The longer you stay in it, the more educated you become.” “The emotion is still there,” she added. “I don’t think it subsides. But it’s more a learned emotion.”

**Emotions as Feminine**

The activists most frequently associate being emotional with women. Women actually make up 80 percent of the animal rights organization that I studied. The older professional women in the movement, however, worry that there are too many women in it. They recalled for me their disappointment at finding mostly housewives sitting around the tables when they arrived at the church hall for their first meeting. They worried that they would not be able to learn the rational arguments for animal rights. “One thing that bothered me,” a female graduate student called Charlotte said recalling her early meetings as we were eating breakfast with her sister Annie at the cooperative, “was that attendance was practically all female. And some of the discussions at the meetings were real kind of emotional responses. Instead, I wanted to learn about different responses you could use—different arguments and how you respond to that. And sometimes at the meetings, they digress into these things where they say, ‘Isn’t that awful!’ ‘Isn’t this horrible!’ And they say, ‘I can’t believe that!’ ‘How could they do something like that?’”
If such women make the animal rights movement look emotional, then men make it look credible because men are supposed to be more rational than women. Annie and Charlotte got into their own conversation: “You start questioning,” Charlotte’s sister said:

Why is it that more men are not coming to these meetings? And you see individual men coming, and they never come back. And you wonder why. Is it because of the way that the material is presented? Is it presented through a more emotional thing?—“Isn’t that terrible isn’t that awful!” [She began to mock the women cruelly in a high-pitched voice.] I think part of it has to do with the fact that a lot of men are just brought up in a much more logical way. They like to have their rational arguments. They don’t like to act totally on their fears. It just started bothering me because I thought there should be more men here because a lot of men, especially in the South, are in the leadership positions, and we should be reaching out to those people.

“I guess it’s because whenever anything is given credibility, unfortunately, it is usually led by a man or a man is in the starring role,” Charlotte explained. “The society listens much more to a man than they would to a woman. And I recognize that women still don’t have equal status that a man has. And I guess in a way I want to take advantage of the fact that that’s the way society sees it. And in order for our group to gain the credibility it needs, that is one thing we could put forward—that these issues are important to men.”

Emotional Men

But the story is more complex. Animal rights activists admire the men, even when they are emotional. In particular, activists praise a man’s anger, but I never heard them praise a woman’s. They support street theater when a man in the group supports it, but not when a woman supports it. Moreover, men are praised not only for being angry—a few women admire the men in the movement because they see them as sensitive, caring, and compassionate, even though they believe men are less emotional than women and that “emotions don’t win arguments.” “I can’t think of any men in the movement that I don’t like,” one of the earliest members of the organization explained. “They are overwhelmingly compassionate and they’re feminist-oriented. It’s very easy to talk to them. It’s like talking to gay guys!” she laughed. “That’s why women
like having gay friends. The qualities that have led them into the movement are the reason I like them.”

“But don’t the same qualities lead women into the movement?” I asked. She explained:

Yeah. But you don’t find them as often in women. I mean I would much rather spend time with a guy—whether it’s in the animal rights movement or a working relationship or in a personal relationship or whatever—who agrees with my philosophy, who is willing to talk about emotions or make himself vulnerable by being in a protest movement. To me that’s a sign of masculinity, a lack of fear to put himself out there for abuse. I think it’s more admirable than Joe Blow who’s out there getting drunk.

The perceived scarcity of men who express their feelings for animals pushes up their value. Men pay their emotional dues simply in the shame they have to endure by being in an animal movement, a movement historically and culturally associated with women. Men’s willingness to express their feelings is considered a sign of fearlessness, but in women it is a sign of weakness. Being emotional becomes legitimate when men do it, and women can point to men’s participation in the movement to justify the legitimacy of their own feelings about animal cruelty. There was no more powerful an incentive for one woman I spoke with to quit eating meat than when her husband—“a big strapping male, who loves his red meat”—suggested it. And a man who refuses to buy his wife a fur coat is more persuasive than any anti-fur protest. “I had a law school classmate who’s an SBI (State Bureau of Investigation) agent,” Linda recalled. “A tough fellow, a very hard person. Used to deal in drug enforcement; solving the dregs of life, the bad, scenes of addiction and killing. And that hardens you after a while.” But what Linda remembers most about this man happened just after a lecture. “He pulled me aside, and he said, ‘You know, I really think that it’s very ugly for a woman to wear a fur coat. I would never buy my wife one and I think what you’re doing is great.’” Linda paused. “He never said any more after that, and he never said it in front of anybody. But that gave me a good feeling, because I always felt that he was a very insensitive person. A very hard person.”

Men are praised for being both emotional and rational. But women are criticized if they are not rational all of the time.

In sum, those who derisively criticize individuals, protests, and strategies for being emotional in the animal rights movement are usually those who feel the most vulnerable about being discredited outside the
movement for the same reason. Professional women who define their worlds in terms of hard-earned educational qualifications and careers are the most concerned about not being seen as emotional and not being tainted by the organization’s leftist hippie image. They had to fight this image to get where they were in their careers. The activists that I met in a neighboring town, who were less likely to be in professional occupations than the one in the college town that I studied, worried less about their emotional image. It was an altogether more relaxed organization, resembling any other civic group with its yard sales, pot-luck dinners, social gatherings, and cozy friendships.

Conclusion

By moving away from focusing on specific emotions and the internal psychological states of social movement activists, we may not be able to explain why social movements emerge at a certain time, or why particular individuals join, or why particular social movements are successful, or other such organizational concerns. We can, however, explain why movements take the form they do—why, for instance, the modern animal rights movement has embraced modern science and philosophy, and why it is that men occupy positions of power and greater responsibility in an organization comprised mostly of women, and why animal research has become the focus of the movement. And how it is that, in the face of all these concerns with rationality and emotional restraint, acts normally considered violent and even terrorist are tolerated.

The animal rights movement has traditionally been a women’s movement that has fought to infuse feelings into a male-dominated, competitive society. Indeed, recent feminists have tried to show how women are more concerned than men about relationships, responsibility, and care. And the ecofeminists say that this ethic should complement animal rights activism. But how do women really perceive this way of looking at the world? How does this academic discourse about women as nurturers enter into their everyday lives and situations?

In the context of taking part in a public debate about animal cruelty with medical scientists, the professional women that I met in the animal rights movement denigrate their feelings about animal cruelty as impulsive, irrational, and subjective. They criticize those who love pets. They put animals in the impersonal category of sentient beings, a culture unto themselves. Moral authority rests on substantiating feelings about animal cruelty with scientific, rational, or intellectual arguments. Once famous for criticizing the male-dominated medical profession for lack of compas-
sion, today’s animal rights activists embrace emotional neutrality, science, and ways of looking at the world that they consider masculine. Under special circumstances, however, these rules can be relaxed—for instance, when men are emotional or when it is necessary to capture the public’s attention, or when the act is perpetrated by an exclusive, esoteric, and knowledgeable organization (such as ALF). Then emotions are romanticized and even violent acts are tolerated.

Studying folk constructs of emotions frees us from having to get into the difficult process of inferring specific emotions or of reducing all social movement participation to the sum of individual emotional states. The emotion talk among animal rights activists emerges as a result of activists’ interactions with each other, as well as their interactions with outsiders to the movement, in this case, biomedical researchers. Indeed, focusing on folk constructs of emotions draws our attention to the relationship between social movements and society—in the case of animal rights activism, the dynamics of gender and power within American society. The animal rights movement is not just a movement about cruelty to animals. It is a debate about the place of emotions in public life. Women have traditionally been associated with animals and nature. They have been traditionally the unpaid nurturers, confined to the private sphere of home and family. Their feelings and issues are often dismissed as trivial. Conversely, medical scientists, who are predominantly men, are not expected to show their emotions. In their countermovements against animal rights activists, they are eager to show the public that they are emotional, have pets, and love animals. Whereas the animal activists rationalize their emotions for animals, animal researchers emotionalize their rationality.

Women face a double bind when it comes to emotional expression: If they express their compassion, they may be dismissed as trivial; if they express their anger, they may be dismissed as hysterical. Ironically, in denigrating their emotions as feminine, trivial, or hysterical, the activists contribute to the stereotypes they are fighting and denigrate the very reasons they join the animal rights movement—because of their empathy and compassion for animals, particularly pets. The animal rights movement unintentionally perpetuates the prestige accorded to men and medical science.

Being emotional is thus a label, a construct. It is not just an internal state. It is a label in the gender wars, and indeed in the social movement wars—as the fearful nineteenth-century social movement theorists illustrated when they criticized the passions of the crowd. Whether or not we
think persons or groups are *emotional* is really a statement about our own feelings toward them.

**Endnote**

1. Rachel Einwohner (1999) examines how animal rights activists’ class and gender influence the outcome of anti-hunting and anti-circus campaigns. In this chapter, however, I focus more (although not exclusively) on the activists’ opposition to biomedical research since it is in this campaign that the activists spoke the most with me about their emotions.
Part Four

The Emotions of Conflict
The fortyish woman on television tells a horrific story. Her speech is halting and her vocabulary childlike as she recounts her experience of physical and sexual abuse, and she periodically cries. She is accompanied by her male therapist, who pats her arm comfortingly and explains the nature of her symptoms and the prevalence of child sexual abuse to the audience.

Laughing and singing, thirty women march down Market Street in San Francisco, part of the massive annual Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual, and Transgender Pride Parade. They carry signs and are plastered with stickers reading “Proud Survivor,” “End Sexual Abuse Now,” and “Sex-Positive Survivor.” Raising their fists, they chant and whoop. An onlooker steps out to join them; she cries as she picks up a sign, and then she raises her voice with the rest.

A clinician and researcher who works with adults sexually abused as children testifies in a civil suit that a woman in her thirties has brought against her father, whom she accuses of raping her twenty years earlier. Called as a witness, the clinician describes the state of research about delayed recall of childhood memories and the nature of emotional and physical aftereffects suffered by victims. She is professional, credible, calm.
These participants in the movement against child sexual abuse construct and publicly deploy oppositional emotions as part of their strategies to bring about social change. Their public emotional displays grow from processes of emotional reconstruction and politicization that occur within movement organizations and communities. Yet the diverse contexts within which the movement against child sexual abuse operates possess their own emotion cultures. Within different institutional and cultural contexts, some emotions are more intelligible and more likely to promote movement goals or gain support, while others are incomprehensible, unsympathetic, or invisible. Activists negotiate oppositional emotions in these larger cultural and institutional contexts, and, in turn, a movement’s reconstruction of emotion has the potential to reshape external emotional contexts. Emotional displays may reinforce members’ own oppositional feelings, address countermovement claims, and influence targets and bystanders.

Social constructionist approaches to emotion view feelings as contextual and connected to larger cultural systems (Hochschild 1983; Taylor 1996, 2000; Hercus 1999). To conceptualize the social construction of emotions within social movements, I draw on theorizing on the collective, interactive construction of other attributes, most notably collective identity (Taylor and Whittier 1992; Whittier 1995; Lichterman 1996). Oppositional emotions, like collective identity, are constructed through interactive processes within micro-mobilization contexts and deployed publicly. They are disputed and debated, and can change over time. Participants experience and interpret feelings collectively as well as individually. They talk and write about (and disagree with or reinforce) these feelings and their meanings, and they make sense of and reconstruct emotions collectively through movement practices. My focus is on those aspects of emotion that are observable through practice rather than other (also important) questions of interiority.

Arlie Hochschild (1983) argues that flight attendants, as a requirement of their jobs, must produce a particular emotional state in passengers (a sort of calm, happy confidence). They do so through managing their own emotions. This process of managing one’s own emotions in order to promote a particular affective response in others is termed emotional labor. When activists display emotions in public contexts, they too are engaging in emotional labor. By managing the feelings that they express, they seek to influence the emotional responses of observers in order to promote movement goals. Of course, like the flight attendants, activists operate in contexts with emotional norms and structural constraints not
Oppositional Emotions in the Movement against Child Sexual Abuse

of their own choosing. It is the interaction and mutual influence between activists’ emotional labor and their contextual opportunities and constraints that interests me here.

In this chapter, I draw on the case of the movement against child sexual abuse to examine how the reconstruction and expression of oppositional emotions play out in various contexts. Internal movement processes interact with external institutions, the state, and other social movements to shape emotional displays and their ramifications both within movement contexts and within external settings of media, the state, and medical institutions. I will suggest that emotional displays that emerge in different contexts are shaped by three factors: the oppositional emotions activists construct in internal movement organizations; emotional labor in the public display of emotion; and the emotional opportunities afforded by the external context.

Methods and the Case

This chapter is drawn from a larger study of organizing against child sexual abuse in the U.S. over the past thirty years. The social movement against child sexual abuse is large and diverse, and it contains several main wings. Adult survivors of child sexual abuse have organized, both in self-help groups and in activist groups oriented toward changing the perception and treatment of adult survivors of child sexual abuse, prosecuting offenders, and reducing the occurrence of child sexual abuse. A prevention wing lobbies for legal and treatment changes in child protective services, the prosecution of offenders, and training children in assault prevention. Parents of children sexually abused by strangers or in group care settings have also organized. Most of my data focus on organizing by adult survivors (the largest wing of the movement).\(^1\) Within each of these wings, there is variation in political affiliation, organizational structure, strategies, and tactics. This movement initially emerged directly out of feminist anti-rape efforts and retains a strong feminist influence alongside many participants who are neutral regarding feminism. There is also a strong conservative Christian presence in some organizations, however, and these constituencies vary between coalition and disagreement. Movement strategies are a complex mix of political, cultural, and individual activism and transformation. They include service provision (treatment or support for adult survivors, child victims, or offenders), direct action and demonstrations, legislative campaigns (e.g. Megan’s Law, extensions on statutes of limitations), self-help and support groups, public education
and media campaigns, art and theater. There are several visible national organizations, but there are also countless grassroots groups, which are linked to each other to varying degrees.

There are three main data sources. First, I have conducted forty-five in-depth, semi-structured interviews with activists in this movement, ranging from 1.5 to 8 hours in length. Respondents reside in all regions of the country, with an over-representation of the west and east coasts. Eighty percent are white, approximately 10 percent African-American, and the remaining are divided among Asian-American, Latina, and Native American. Eighty-five percent are female, and ages range from 23 to 79. Demographically, they typify the movement against child sexual abuse. Second, I have analyzed documents from movement organizations, including newsletters, minutes of meetings, conference programs, and web sites. Third, I conducted participant observation at two national conferences of activist/advocacy organizations, a major demonstration organized by one organization I studied, and several smaller discussion meetings and actions sponsored by various groups.

Participants in the movement against child sexual abuse discuss and reconstruct emotions consciously, and the expression of a wide range of emotions is encouraged and common. I do not mean to imply that this movement is more emotional than others—rather, participants discuss and manage emotions overtly rather than covertly and see emotionality as enhancing credibility. The discourse of the adult survivors’ movement stresses the validity of “feeling all of one’s feelings,” valuing and accepting one’s emotional reactions, and expressing emotions freely.

These emotional norms, practices, and interpretations are drawn partly from politicized frameworks of feminism and other social movements. Activists view emotional expression as a way of breaking the silence and secrecy that characterize child sexual abuse, of releasing the emotions they were not allowed to express as children, and of learning to trust their own feelings after having been told to deny those feelings following abuse. The movement emphasizes transforming emotions of shame, grief, and fear (understood to result from the experience of being sexually abused as a child) into feelings of pride, anger, joy in life, and a sense of connection to others. Participants view this emotional transformation as important not just for individuals’ well-being, but also for achieving the movement’s goal of ending child sexual abuse and changing public response to adults and children who report child sexual abuse.

In addition, psychotherapy provides an important source of emo-
tional norms. Within the movement, there is widespread participation in individual therapy and support or in twelve-step groups and reading of therapeutic literature (both scholarly and popular). Therapeutic discourse contributes to how participants discuss emotions and their connections to life events (past and present) and to the value placed on open discussion of feelings. At a more mundane level, common terms like “recovery” or “feel your feelings” are drawn directly from various psychotherapeutic discourses.

**Emotional Labor and the Public Display of Feelings**

Activists in the survivors’ movement display various emotions in movement-sponsored events and in different institutional contexts. We can understand the variation in emotional displays in such public settings using three concepts. First, activists bring with them feeling and expression norms from the collective construction of *oppositional emotion* in internal movement contexts. Second, activists engage in *emotional labor*, that is, they attempt to produce particular emotional responses in observers/targets through the management of their own emotions. In order to perform emotional labor, activists manage their own emotions through what Hochschild terms surface acting and deep acting. Whereas Hochschild conceives of emotion management primarily at the individual level, we can see surface and deep acting at the collective level as well. Movement groups interactively construct feelings that are genuinely felt (deep acting) and they strategize about and collectively decide what emotions to display or acknowledge in order to promote particular responses in observers (surface acting). Third, the extra-movement contexts in which activists operate are structured according to their own feeling and expression norms, which are often quite different from the oppositional emotions constructed within movement contexts. Activists may challenge or conform to these, but in either case their emotional displays are structured in part by the *emotional opportunities* of the context. Oppositional emotions, emotional labor, and emotional opportunities influence each other and interact in shaping activists’ varying displays of emotion. In order to illustrate these complex processes, I discuss selected examples of contexts in which activists in the child sexual abuse survivors’ movement have displayed varying kinds of emotions. This description is meant to be suggestive rather than definitive, showing how distinct settings shape the emotions that are permissible, acceptable, challenging or oppositional, and strategically advantageous.
Movement Contexts and the Emotions of Trauma and Resistance

The child sexual abuse survivors’ movement includes many public events organized by social movement organizations that attract attendance by survivors of child sexual abuse, professionals in the field, and supporters. These sizeable and publicly visible events are open to the general public and include conferences, demonstrations (often survivors’ contingents in larger events sponsored by feminist or queer movements), artistic performances or exhibits, and publications. There are two main categories of emotion displayed in these movement contexts: the emotions of trauma which include grief, fear, shame, and helpless anger, and the emotions of resistance which include pride, happiness, love, safety or confidence, and righteous anger (that is, anger not associated with shame).

The politicized emotions of the survivors’ movement emerge from its roots in the women’s movement. The feminist anti-rape movement legitimized women’s claims against male violence, politicized private sexual experiences, and emphasized listening to and believing women’s narratives of previously invisible or unspeakable experiences. Feminist activists constructed a politicized discourse of trauma that stressed women’s victimization due to violence, the aftereffects of that victimization, and the importance of individual and collective recovery and resistance (Champagne 1996). Within the women’s movement, an emotional repertoire (Jasper 1998) emerged for the expression of oppositional feelings of hurt, grief, fear, anger, and resistance. For example, speakers at marches told their own stories of surviving violence. These stories have an emotional form to them, moving from fear and self-loathing, through grief, to anger, and finally to a sense of strength and freedom from shame. As adult survivors of child sexual abuse began to mobilize, they drew on the transformations wrought by feminism to construct an internal emotion culture and external emotional strategies and rhetoric that focused on telling and listening to stories of violence and survival, and on placing those experiences in political context both ideologically and emotionally through the expression of hurt (grief, victimization) and anger (calls to resist).

First, in keeping with the value placed by this movement on speaking without shame about experiences of abuse and on openly expressing the full range of emotions associated with trauma, participants openly exhibit feelings of grief, fear, shame, and anger, and such expressions are encouraged within movement organizations and culture. These emotions
are displayed most prominently in artistic contexts. Many conferences include an exhibit of art by survivors of child sexual abuse; theater and musical performances are also common. Conferences often include a talent night, where attendees read poetry, sing (often original compositions), and so forth. Such artistic productions depict the experience of abuse, the emotions felt by children and adult survivors, the brutality of offenders, or the indifference or cruelty of other adults. Songs and poetry may indicate emotions directly as one woman did in an original piece called “Teardrops,” about her effort to feel and express her pain. Collective art projects also are important. The largest of these, the Clothesline Project, hangs T-shirts painted by survivors and others depicting experiences of abuse and violence. Many shirts contain overt expressions of emotion through both words and visual images such as a child cowering or an oversized fist. It is not uncommon to see observers walking through an exhibit of the Clothesline Project weeping. Like the Names AIDS Memorial Quilt, the Clothesline Project promotes the collective expression and catharsis of the emotions associated with trauma.

Participants also display and discuss the emotions of trauma in interactions. For example, at one conference I attended, participants talked informally about “feeling really overwhelmed,” feeling “frightened by the False Memory people” [members of a countermovement organization who were picketing the conference], having trouble sleeping because of anxiety, and so forth. The expression of such emotions was encouraged in workshops on topics like “Coping with Depression,” or “Sexual Abuse: Is it Okay to Be Successful Now?” In such contexts, expressing the “emotions of trauma” is framed as a necessary part of ending the secrecy that often characterizes childhood sexual abuse and of freeing oneself from restrictive and painful feelings. Respondents reported consciously trying to structure organizations and activities in ways that would permit the expression of the feelings associated with trauma, as one explained:

Literally, how do we, as people who are managing a lot of histories and trying to walk out of abuse and torture, how do we stay so close to that issue without blowing ourselves up? . . . And [have] some ability within the culture of it for people to stop, have limits, have breakdowns, have flashbacks, and deal with the fact that people are dealing while we’re also organizing?

Second, more positive emotions of pride, joy, love, safety or confidence, happiness, and righteous anger are expressed and discussed in
movement contexts. Many of the same artistic expressions discussed above also depict the artist’s emotional recovery from abuse, her elation at surviving, or her joy in living a full life. For example, a T-shirt on the Clothesline Project read, “You can never touch me again.” Organizers also promote the emotions of resistance through policy and ritual. For example, a national publication, *The Healing Woman*, requests that contributors emphasize their recovery rather than the details of their abuse. Movement rituals such as a “drumming circle” at a conference also promote these emotions. At the drumming circle, a large number of women drummed, danced, shouted, hugged, and wept, creating a near-euphoric sense of physical power and emotion. Participants in turn spoke about “what space they were in and how they were feeling right now,” and then later about “what we would like to leave in this room, and what we’d like to take with us.” Participants said such things as, “I’d like to leave behind shame and take courage.”

These emotional processes are not only part of how participants construct their own oppositional feelings; they also constitute emotional labor because they encourage politicized emotional responses in others. Open display of the emotions of trauma can evoke similar feelings in others as they are reminded of their own experiences or feel that it is acceptable to express such feelings. They also evoke a feeling of anger (activists talk about how it is sometimes easier to feel angry about someone else’s mistreatment than one’s own), a sense of not being alone that includes feeling connected to others, supported, and “safe,” the absence of fear, and relief of shame (“I’m not the only one who experienced this, therefore it’s not my fault”). The display of the emotions of resistance can also evoke similar feelings in others—seeing that others feel strong or happy or unafraid makes it possible to feel that way oneself, partly because it changes the normative response to child sexual abuse of falling apart.

Several respondents discussed their attempts to promote the expression of the emotions of resistance without dismissing the difficult feelings many survivors experience. As one explained, “I think what we’ve kind of aimed for is a bit of a balance between, like, ‘We were totally victimized, and now we’re almighty and powerful,’ and saying, ‘We can speak up for ourselves. . . .’ A little bit of balance between what’s really vulnerable in our movement and what’s really strong about us.” And another commented that it was important to her that in her activism, “there’s actually fun integrated into it, that it’s not just about ‘This is so dire and this is what’s happening to us,’ but rather like, ‘You know, we are alive
and well, and we want violence-free lives for us, we want child sexual abuse to stop.’”

In another venue, a respondent described the theatrical performance she does as depicting both unrelenting violence and irrepressible strength and as intended to evoke both the emotions of trauma and those of resistance in her audience:

One piece was about . . . a fifteen year old African-American girl child who was raped and murdered in a schoolyard in Oakland, California. . . . It goes on to say, “I must speak, as survivor, for those who cannot speak for themselves . . .” And you start to hear [the murdered girl] speak, from the grave, as she is being murdered. [What theater does is] you can bring people in and you can knock them over the head, you know. . . . [laughing] [This piece], it always takes you over the edge. . . . The “Endangered Species” song, on the other hand—I get to belt, I get to be fierce in my indignation about this shit, you know? . . . By that time people are on their feet—you know—chanting, and screaming, and yelling, and whistling, and that’s a more empowering sort of thing.

Organizers engage in emotional labor when they structure events. The selection of workshop topics and presenters is one form of organizers’ emotional labor. The keynote address at the one conference was entitled “From Surviving to Thriving,” and workshops on topics such as “Sing Loud, Sing Proud,” “Courageous—Always Courageous” (with the description “We will ‘encourage’ each other. We will develop a vision of our power to heal others”) promoted similar themes. Organizers’ emotional labor serves two sometimes contradictory goals. On the one hand, the value placed on accepting and expressing one’s genuine feelings means that even non-normative or undesirable emotions are overtly welcomed. I heard attendees at one conference discuss their conflicted feelings of love and hate for an abuser, for example, or their despair that they would ever “feel like a survivor instead of a victim.” At the same time, though, organizers want to promote feelings associated with resistance and consistent with the movements’ understanding of how the emotional trajectory from damage to healing occurs. At one annual conference, for example, organizers provided a “safe room” staffed by therapists where participants could go to express their feelings; the assumption was that the conference might evoke difficult feelings for survivors of child sexual abuse. But at the most recent conference, organizers decided to discon-
continue the safe room. One respondent explained to me that they had concluded that the presence of the safe room was encouraging attendees to “regress,” to feel and express emotions associated with childhood vulnerability, and that they wanted to encourage people to move toward being “thrivers” who feel strong, powerful, unafraid, and in control of their lives.

In demonstrations that I have observed, activists strongly express emotions of resistance and evoke a range of emotions in observers. The survivors’ movement draws on the notion of “coming out” to understand being open about being a survivor of child sexual abuse in public spaces such as demonstrations. Survivor activists and organizations construct a politicized emotional interpretation of the experience and impact of coming out, drawing from the gay/lesbian/bisexual movement, which links coming out with feelings of pride in and solidarity with the larger community. Coming out as a survivor is seen as powerfully transformative both for individuals (as they come to terms with their own experiences) and for the larger society, as people speak out about their experiences. Not speaking about one’s experiences is assumed to reinforce feelings of shame or fear, and speaking out is seen as transforming those feelings into pride, comfort, and strength. Publicly declaring one’s identity as a survivor of child sexual abuse is understood to carry particular emotional costs and transformative potential, analogized to those of coming out about sexuality. One respondent described her experience of marching in a contingent of child sexual abuse survivors at a large demonstration in these terms:

It was very profound, and . . . it was so deeply empowering. We were elated afterwards. . . . There’s just this sense of, like, “I can do it!,” this sense of “I can tell!,” this sense of “We can have an impact, we’re not alone!” There’s just really something about coming out on more of a mass level that I think, personally, is going to be one of the strategies that will get us to move. It’s like the queer movement, like “Come out, come out, wherever you are!”

Another respondent described her impressions of the crowd reaction when the survivors’ group RunRiot marched in the San Francisco gay pride parade:

There was a very consistent response. First there was this look of shock, confusion, it was almost like this disbelief that survivors were being so out. And then people would sort of melt, and then
start cheering. . . . This group of Latinas, we passed them on the street, they were screaming, and they’re like, “You’re marching for me too!” It was such a profound experience for me.

Emotional display at a demonstration, then, is also partly emotional labor, as activists manage their own feelings, and express oppositional emotions, in part in order to evoke politicized feelings in others.

Emotional displays within movement contexts differ considerably from those elsewhere. This is not coincidental. At conferences or in movement publications, the emotional norms are established by the movement itself. There is little attempt to influence external institutions, and so no need to modulate the emotion norms of the movement. In fact, if the attempt is to influence participants, consistency with practices of emotional expression that are familiar from self-help groups or therapy is an advantage. Even in demonstrations within larger events organized by feminist or queer movements, survivor activists are operating within a friendly movement context in which the idea of speaking one’s experience and expressing associated feelings is familiar. Both feminist and queer movements value the expression of emotion, and “coming out,” with its emotional components of shedding shame in favor of pride, and of fear in favor of strength, is a familiar strategy. Such assumptions about emotional transformation and expression are by no means universal.

**Talk Shows and the Display of Pain**

Beginning in the early 1980s, child sexual abuse was a frequent topic on television talk shows, as guests who had been sexually abused as children told their stories of abuse. Guests framed their stories in various ways in terms of the kinds of experiences and aftermath effects described, the explanations offered for the actions of the abuser, and the larger phenomenon of child sexual abuse (Champagne 1996). My concern here is with the emotions displayed by survivors in this context, and with the kind of emotional labor that occurred. Most often, guests describe their childhood experiences and the effects of those experiences while showing sadness, particularly crying. In addition, there may be displays of fear, through actions such as holding teddy bears or reporting persistent fears in the present. These emotions are displayed in a childlike context—framed by the use of props such as stuffed animals, childlike voices, and hesitations in speech and by therapists who accompany survivor guests, serving as the adult interpreter of their experiences (Champagne 1996; Abt and Mustaza 1997). Further, by the late 1980s, child sexual abuse
was often represented as having extreme aftereffects, such as multiple personality disorder; when guests with multiple personalities appeared in the mass media, they could express childlike emotions (and a wide variety of emotions) by “switching” personalities. The alternate personalities present a guest’s feelings and narrative of trauma as if it were occurring in the present, highlighting the emotions of trauma rather than those of resistance.

Many respondents acknowledged the importance of mass media coverage in raising awareness of the problem of child sexual abuse but were critical of “the image of survivors clutching their teddy bears” largely because of its emotional implications. They believed that the display of feelings of strength, pride, or anger is strategically stronger than the display of grief, pain, or fear. The emotions of trauma, they argue, suggest that people are permanently damaged by child sexual abuse and, ironically, ultimately contribute to perceptions of survivors as unreliable witnesses who are incapable of shaping policy on the issue. In contrast, they see the emotions of resistance as suggesting that people can recover from child sexual abuse and as encouraging survivors to mobilize in order to prevent others from being abused. In addition, they base their criticism on the different emotions evoked in onlookers by displays of grief and displays of pride. That is, they are conscious of the emotional labor that movement spokespeople engage in when they speak in public. Displays of pain evoke feeling responses of pity and horror in observers, which in turn reify the boundaries between people who have been sexually abused and others by suggesting that the pain and experience of child sexual abuse is so severe as to be incomparable to any other experience. By rendering child sexual abuse so horrific as to be outside everyday experience, displays of hurt make it easier to see abuse as a rare aberration rather than a widespread social problem. Further, feelings of pity and horror are not particularly conducive to mobilization. Activist respondents believed that if they could evoke feelings of anger and efficacy in observers, they would be more successful in mobilizing opposition to child sexual abuse. They believed that displaying their own pride (lack of shame) and feelings of strength would evoke such reactions.

Activists may be right in this assessment. However, it is untested because the talk show format has only rarely contained displays of strength, pride, or joy after recovery from child sexual abuse. This is not coincidental; the format makes space for certain kinds of emotions and not for others. Survivors’ presentations of self on talk shows—like that of other guests—reflect the complex mixture of producers’ selection of guests and structuring of background information, hosts’ questioning and
management of the audience, and the survivors’ own agenda (J. Gamson 1997). Hosts report an interest in the social benefit of publicizing incest (Stark 1997) but clearly are also driven by other motives. Talk shows’ framing of public confession as the route to therapeutic catharsis and transformation helps to steer survivors toward a simple telling of their story of hurt rather than a more complex account of both injury and resistance or a political analysis of why child sexual abuse occurs and the social changes that would end it (Gamson 1998; Rapping 1996; Abt and Mustazza 1997).

**State Institutions and the Bifurcation of Injury and Rationality**

Several legislative and judicial changes during the 1980s created openings for child sexual abuse activists and survivors and brought them onto the terrain of the state; these openings were emotional as well as organizational. Survivors engaged with the state over crime victims’ compensation legislation, extensions of statutes of limitations to allow adult survivors of child sexual abuse to bring criminal or civil cases against alleged perpetrators, and state funding of child assault prevention programs in schools. The popularization of therapeutic discourse rendered the emotional narratives offered by the survivors’ movement comprehensible and credible. Agencies drew on therapeutic discourses and strategies in their management of clients/subjects, most notably in social services, including child protective services (Polisky 1991). This helped create an opening for therapists and activists drawing on a self-help approach to participate in policy-making on treatment and prevention of child sexual abuse and meant that participants in these state agencies were familiar with some of the same feeling and expression norms as participants in the survivors’ movement.

Just as state opportunities shaped movements’ goals, organizational structures, tactics, and ideological frames (Matthews 1994), they also shaped the movement’s emotional displays. Some kinds of emotions make sense within state contexts, and others do not. For example, crime victims’ compensation accounts may make payments to victims for pain and suffering and often to cover psychotherapy, and awards in civil suits require evidence of damages. Within such contexts, displaying grief, hurt, lack of trust, fear, or shame is virtually mandated in order to be a legitimate subject deserving of compensation. Other kinds of emotions, such as anger or pride, become inappropriate or unsuccessful in these contexts.

Even as survivors of child sexual abuse had to demonstrate the emotional injury they had sustained, the judicial and policy contexts pro-
moted a second type of emotional display. In tandem with victims, professionals and expert witnesses legitimated victims’ claims to damage as a result of childhood abuse, testified about the phenomenon of memory repression, or shaped policy for dealing with alleged cases of child abuse. Such individuals often define themselves as activists as well as professionals. These experts display a very different set of emotions from survivors. Aside from a quiet warmth or sympathy toward victims of child sexual abuse, their presentation is rational, devoid of emotion, and hence of bias. Rationality or lack of affect is a strategy of emotional display that not surprisingly is strategically useful within state institutions.

Both the display of victimization and that of rationality constitute emotional labor. Designed to gain the sympathy of judges or juries, the expression of grief or shame does more than meet the requirements of showing damage sustained. It establishes the victim’s credibility and places her/him as a weak subject in need of governmental intervention (in the form of assistance from a Crime Victims Compensation Fund or a civil settlement). Rationality, on the other hand, is intended to evoke a mirror emotional response—the rational ability to weigh evidence, to recognize the occurrence of child sexual abuse despite the societal taboo and invisibility associated with it.

While state institutions exert a strong pressure on actors within them, the internal emotion culture of the movement also affects emotional displays in state contexts. For example, in advice articles on “taking your perpetrator to court,” survivors are told that this is a difficult, draining experience and that they may re-experience the emotions of the trauma. But pressing charges, filing a civil suit, or establishing a claim under the Crime Victims’ Compensation Act is also framed as an act of strength and assertiveness, an opportunity to confront a perpetrator and bring him/her to justice. There is some recognition within the movement, then, that the legal system operates by its own rules—emotional and otherwise—and litigants are advised to accept that and find ongoing support elsewhere. Part of this outside support entails ensuring the space to express oppositional emotions (with friends, support groups, or therapists) that must be suppressed in the courtroom. Expert witnesses, too, draw on external emotional resources to learn to manage their own emotional displays and maintain a calm demeanor. For example, a respected book aimed at therapists includes a section on forensic issues that advises therapists of the need to be knowledgeable about scientific research on memory and legal standards of testimony and that stresses that therapists should obtain emotional support to deal with their feelings about being called into court (Pope and Brown 1996).
Rationality and Debates with Countermovements

In the late 1980s an active countermovement emerged and rapidly gained strength. Made up primarily of parents accused by grown children, by ex-spouses, or by state agencies of child sexual abuse, this countermovement argues that many self-declared survivors of sexual abuse are in fact imagining their experiences. The countermovement has bolstered this claim by appealing to scientific evidence about the suggestibility of memory, the unreliability of so-called recovered memories of child sexual abuse or even of continuously held memories, and the medically and ethically unsound practices of psychotherapists and child protective workers. In the case of accusations by children (or in custody disputes involving allegations of child abuse) the countermovement has argued that children’s testimony is highly suggestible, again using scientific discourse.3

Despite debate over the science that underlies these claims, the countermovement has successfully reframed the public debate over child sexual abuse in terms of assessing the reliability of recovered memories and children’s reports according to scientific evidence. This is a significant change from the previous decade, when survivors’ testimonies were seen as evidence of their experience, and clinicians’ writings and observations of clients were considered authoritative. By the mid-1990s, individuals’ descriptions of their own experiences became suspect both because they might be based on “false memories” and because they did not meet the criteria for scientific evidence. Among professionals, a divide arose between clinicians and those who conduct experimental research on memory, with the latter having more authority in the discourse about child sexual abuse.

The countermovement’s arguments have rested in part on depicting the survivors’ movement (and individual survivors) as hysterical, unscientific, and built more on emotion than reason. Swayed by naive or unscrupulous therapists, the argument goes, emotionally vulnerable women (mostly) come to believe that their parents committed horrific acts. This belief then renders the deluded “survivor” hysterical, unreasonable, unable to cope with life, and overcome by irrational fear, grief, and anger (Pendergrast 1995). The countermovement criticizes social movement organizations for failing to challenge destructive “false memories” and labels therapists and researchers who support the existence of recovered memories unscientific and ignorant of the research on memory.

In response, the survivors’ movement has adjusted its public displays of emotion for strategic reasons. Researchers conduct counterstudies and public spokespeople use scientific refutation of evidence and
a rational tone, avoiding emotional displays that might enable the accusation of hysteria. Such displays of rationality occur in two main contexts in addition to the legal system. First, in the mass media, countermovement and survivors’ movement representatives often appear on the same programs, serving as talking heads for opposing points of view. Ten years ago the representative of the survivors’ perspective might have been an individual who had experienced sexual abuse and who spoke about her own experience in an emotional as well as cognitive/descriptive way. Now such representatives are often professionals or representatives of advocacy organizations who speak about scientific research on memory, point out the continuing occurrence and prevalence of child sexual abuse, and generally debate the countermovement on the evidence.

The second context in which displays of rationality have become increasingly important is in professional settings, where debates rage among clinicians, researchers, and other treatment professionals over recovered memory, treatment of trauma, and forensic interviewing techniques with child victims. Reflecting larger changes in the academy (social work, like women’s studies and ethnic studies, has moved away from the connections to social movements that flourished in the 1970s and into the 1980s), such debates are not won by recourse to clinical evidence (i.e., the experiences of clients) but rather by experimental or retrospective studies. “Good science” becomes important to professional standing and to the ways that movement advocates within the treatment professions stake out and support their positions (see, e.g., Pope and Brown 1996; Schacter 1996). As in state settings, the management of emotions to behave rationally, without affect, is a form of emotional labor, intended to provoke a rational response in the listener and to bypass the listener’s potential fear, disbelief, or revulsion associated with the topic of child sexual abuse.

Changes in the structure and practice of psychotherapy underlie the growing bifurcation between emotional/clinical/unreliable and rational/research-based/accurate within professional settings. First, the growth of self-help groups, including the phenomenal explosion of groups based on the twelve-step model of Alcoholics Anonymous, democratized the practices of listening to others’ stories, of interpreting one’s own and others’ experiences and emotions, and of suggesting alternate ways of thinking and feeling about one’s experiences. Participants in the survivors’ movement, in other words, felt entitled to engage in these activities that had formerly been seen as requiring professional expertise. This was arguably a genuine threat to the interests secured by credentialed psychotherapists’ claims to expert knowledge. Clinicians who allied with grassroots, lay-led self-help groups or bibliotherapy (Steinem 1992; Taylor
1996), as many did, were tarred as similarly unskilled. Second, by the late 1970s large segments of the psychotherapeutic profession had been influenced by the social movements of the previous two decades. As large numbers of feminists became therapists (and, to a lesser extent, academic researchers and faculty in psychology and social work departments), they brought feminism’s links between the personal and political into their practice (Whittier 1995). Feminist therapists see therapy as a way of empowering women and creating feminist social change (Brown 1997). This solidified the links between emotional expression and recovery, politics, and social change that are central to the survivors’ movement, even as it reinforced the divide between feminist clinicians and those who saw themselves as scientists.

Rationality is emerging as a dominant public emotional display regarding child sexual abuse both because of countermovement success and because countermovement claims dovetail with other social shifts. The dominance of HMOs and managed care, along with the rise of successful drug treatments for depression and anxiety, for example, have led to a decline in the practice and credibility of long-term insight-oriented therapy (aimed at changing emotions) in favor of short-term behavioral therapy and drug treatment. Cutbacks in government funding for social services have decreased the credibility and influence of both social work and child protective services. And the vulnerability of therapists to lawsuits from the parents of their adult clients (a very effective tactic promoted by countermovement organizations) necessitates “good science” to provide the kind of evidence that is acceptable in court.

**Conclusion**

The presentation and reconstruction of oppositional emotions in public contexts are shaped by the intersections of movements’ internal interpretive processes and the external contexts in which they operate. First, internal movement dynamics and discussions, that is, collective interpretive emotional processes, reshape both the reconstruction of emotions within movement settings and their public presentation. Second, participants manage their own emotions strategically in public displays. Other social movements have important influences on these processes, sometimes through a sort of “emotional spillover.” In particular, the women’s movement and the gay/lesbian/bisexual movement have been enormously influential through their development of emotional strategies for speaking out about violence and coming out. Countermovements also reshape movements’ emotional displays and the strategic implications of
those displays. Third, “emotional opportunities” are important: the institutions within which the social movement operates carry their own emotional expectations, permitting and rewarding some feeling displays and rendering others futile or unintelligible.

Contexts undeniably structure the feelings that people experience, and nevertheless people really feel both permitted and forbidden emotions. We construct and understand our feelings at the individual as well as collective level; although I have dealt with the collective level here, the dimensions are not neatly separable. Suggesting that contexts shape activists’ display of oppositional emotions does not mean that people never feel angry in court, or proud of themselves when they file for crime victims’ compensation payments, or happy when they appear on talk shows, or despairing when they march in demonstrations. Rather, they engage in emotional labor and attempt to display the emotions that are defined as appropriate in particular contexts. Individual feelings, movement interpretive processes, the influences of allied and opposed social movements, and the state and other institutions all influence each other. Together, they shape movements’ construction and display of oppositional emotions.

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Endnotes

1. I will refer to this movement interchangeably as “the movement against child sexual abuse” and “the survivors’ movement” (its self-label).

2. Many critics of contemporary feminism decry its focus on what they call “victim feminism” (Roiphe 1993; Paglia 1990; Sommers 1994). My argument is different from theirs. Empirically, I suggest that activists who call attention to sexual victimization also often stress resistance and empowerment; theoretically, I suggest that when feminist activists have stressed victimization, they have done so strategically, in response to cultural and institutional contexts and internal movement dialogues. This action is neither strategically misguided nor grounded in a view of women as helpless.

3. There is a vast and growing literature on the debates over the veracity of “recovered memories,” the reliability of children’s testimony, and the effects of various kinds of questioning by therapists on adults’ and children’s reports of their experiences. This debate is beyond the scope of this chapter. For overviews from a variety of perspectives, see Freyd 1996; Loftus and Ketcham 1994; Pope and Brown 1996; Schacter 1996; L. Williams 1994.
In Ireland between 1879 and 1882, a collection of diverse social groups forged a political alliance, built a social movement, and waged an active campaign of revolt against the landlord system and British domination. This campaign is known as the Irish Land War. The movement succeeded, and it led to the immediate restructuring of the Irish land tenure system and soon afterward to the dismantling of landlordism in Ireland. It also contributed mightily to the end of British rule in Ireland. As important as the success of the movement is to Irish history, what concerns this chapter is how unlikely this success was, given the diversity and contention among the constituent members of the Irish land movement. How was it that diverse social groups—tenant farmers, nationalists, clergy, and townspeople—with conflicting agendas built enough solidarity for a successful social movement against the combination power structure of landlordism and British rule?

In my work on the Irish Land War, I have demonstrated how solidarity and political alliance between diverse groups in social movements is made possible through the construction of symbolic systems of meaning, such as ideology and identity structures (Kane 1996 and 1997). Like other analysts of social movements, my thinking about meaning construction in collective action is informed by Durkheim’s (1965) theory of ritual and social solidarity, and of the pivotal role of emotion in this process. Yet the claim, in my work and that of others, that meaning construc-
tion—and other key movement processes, such as mobilization, building solidarity, forging alliances, and identity construction—is as emotional as it is cognitive and strategic (Alexander et al. 1993; Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994; Kane 1997) remains largely unproven and vastly under-theorized.

One major problem confronting social movement scholars is identifying the emotional component of the movement processes. In this chapter, I argue that the place to look for emotions in social movements is in the structure of symbolic models and systems. I elaborate on a multidisciplinary theoretical perspective positing that emotions are metaphorically conditioned and organized, and often complexly structured in narratives. Using the case of the Irish Land War, I once again focus on how a political alliance between diverse groups in social movements is made possible through the narrative reconstruction of meaning. This time, I show how the structure of narratives is often based on metaphoric conceptualizations of emotion, and how this emotional conceptualization contributes to meaning transformation and to the possibility for political alliance and movement solidarity.

### The Metaphoric Structures and Scenarios of Emotions

In previous work, I have asserted that the autonomous quality of culture rests on the *metaphoric* nature of symbols and the patterned relationship of symbols within a structure, and that this metaphoric characteristic of symbols is fundamental to meaning construction and transformation (Kane 1997). As metaphors, symbols signify social relationships, conditions, and experiences through associations of similarity and difference between separate entities. Though often strong and enduring, symbols are also ambiguous and “opaque” since they are “given by means of analogy based on literal signification” (Ricoeur 1974: 317). Symbolic creativity is possible because of symbolic ambiguity and opacity: one meaning (the literal) analogically indicates a second meaning. This extension is both enabled and constrained by the number of analogies indicated by the first meaning, and by the realm of personal or collective experience (Ricoeur 1976: 45–69).

Everyday life rarely stimulates such creative extension. However, because our “ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which we both think and act, is fundamentally metaphorical in nature” (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 3), “every act of symbolic attribution puts the symbols at risk, makes it possible that the meanings of the symbols will be inflected or transformed by the uncertain consequences of practice” (Sewell 1999:...
As individuals and collectives try to make sense of novel or difficult situations, this analogically creative process is set in motion, generating new ideas, thoughts, and emotional sentiments.

Researchers in many fields—cognitive linguistics, anthropology, philosophy, and psychology—recognize that much of understanding and knowledge is metaphorically conditioned. Metaphor is especially important when people try to understand difficult, complex, abstract, or less delineated experience (Lakoff and Johnson 1980). Emotion is such an experience: emotions are often difficult to understand, and even more difficult to express. For example, I may feel depressed but not understand the underlying source of this emotion—which could be frustration, or shame, or fear. And even if I do understand both the emotion and its source, how do I articulate this emotional state to others? There is a parallel problem in observing emotional behavior or articulation: the person screaming on the podium is obviously emotionally excited, but what is the emotion being expressed, and what is the source of the emotion?

Conceptualizing and describing emotions—the sensation, the experience, and the action emotions motivate—is facilitated by metaphoric expression. For instance, anger is often expressed in metaphors of heat, love in metaphors of nutrition, shame in metaphors of weight (Lakoff and Kövecses 1987). Some figurative expressions for describing the experience of these emotions include “I was boiling with rage,” “I was starved for her attention,” “They are down in the world.” Metaphors describing behavior that results from these emotions include “I blew off steam,” “I could eat you up,” and “I hung my head.”

Thus, emotions are situated in elaborate metaphorically conceptualized structures. These structures are anchored by central metaphors, such as Anger is Heat, whose articulation in detailed words and expressions produces a rich system of “metaphorical entailments.” These systems become cultural models of emotion, and these models have temporal dimensions. Indeed, Lakoff and Kövecses, as well as Ronald de Sousa, theorize narratives of emotion, what they term respectively “prototypical scenarios” and “paradigm scenarios.” Lakoff and Kövecses (1987) conceptualize prototypical scenarios as models of emotion, complete with actors, conditions, and stages of emotional experience—what narrative theorists term “plots” (Somers 1994). Importantly, they point out that in prototypical scenarios, various central metaphors and their entailments (related and derived metaphors) converge (Lakoff and Kövecses 1987). For de Sousa, emotions derive their meaning “from their relation to a situation type, a kind of original drama that defines the roles, feelings and
reactions characteristic of that emotion” (1987: xvi). These narratives of emotion are how we learn and understand our emotions.

Thomas Scheff proposes that collectivities, indeed societies, may operate according to certain “master” emotional paradigms, which he likens to Geertz’s idea of “common sense” and Bourdieu’s notion of habitus. Habitus, according to Scheff (1997: 219), is the “taken for granted” part of the culture that guides so much of social action. Drawing on Norbert Elias’s work, Scheff discusses, as an example, the German habitus of humiliation after World War I: the German people suffered a series of defeats and humiliations historically, and could not deal with their emotions peacefully. Thus, the analysis goes, the German emotional reaction to their habitus of humiliation was shame and anger, which led to aggressive behavior. Of course, this reaction of social aggression is not inherent in a habitus of humiliation: the shame that a society feels may lead to lack of self-confidence, hopelessness, and passivity, as in the case of Mexico (Paz 1985, cited in Scheff) or anger, feelings of betrayal, and finally militant resistance, as I will discuss in the case of Ireland. What might account for the various paradigm scenarios of a collective’s or a society’s emotional habitus, and what might spur various types of action based on that scenario?

Clearly, specific historical experience—such as colonial subjugation—structures a collective’s emotional habitus, and particular conditions and contingent events affect what type of action will be motivated by a master paradigm of emotion. But in terms of action and transformation, it is critical to understand that the structure of emotion is changeable. According to de Sousa, emotions are not fixed forever by a paradigm scenario. Emotions can change and be changed; thus, meaning and understandings can change. The restructuring of emotions, what some think of as “consciousness raising,” is based on what de Sousa terms “the principle of emotional continence”: “Let your emotions be appropriate to the widest possible range of available scenarios” (de Sousa 1987: 187). Encountering a new or different paradigm scenario of an emotion—for example, a narrative of humiliation in which the response is resistance and the outcome regeneration, instead of cowering and hopelessness—may transform how an individual or collective conceptualizes that emotion, and possibly more importantly, the appropriate response of action. Again, it is the metaphor and polysemy of the symbols in these narratives of emotion that allow transformation; the possibility for change is opened up through social interaction in which different narratives are shared.
In the remainder of this chapter, I employ these conceptualizations of emotional structure, metaphors of emotions, and paradigm scenarios in analyzing meaning construction, solidarity, and political alliance in the Irish land movement. I present portions of narratives shared at large gatherings, “monster meetings,”1 of movement participants, and analyze them for their emotional structure. I demonstrate the “master narratives” of emotions which prevailed among the Irish at the beginning of the Land War—narratives of humiliation, shame and anger; and the transformation of these narratives during the struggle which led to reconstructed emotions and militant movement action. I start with a brief discussion of the emergence and social structure of the movement.

Narrative, Emotion, and Solidarity during the Irish Land War

Despite the overall prosperity that tenant farmers enjoyed in post-Famine Ireland, an economic downturn in the late 1870s forcefully exposed the problems inherent in the landlord system (Vaughan 1994). The land movement began in the western province of Connaught, in Co. Mayo, which contained the bulk of the smallest and poorest tenancies in the country, and those hardest hit by the depression and failed harvests of 1878 and 1879.2 The idea for organizing tenant farmer grievances and protest into a social movement came primarily from radical nationalist leaders, such as the former Fenian, Michael Davitt,3 who understood the urgency of the land question and how it could be used to mobilize the majority of the Irish against Britain. Local leaders of both the nationalist and agrarian causes organized the first mass meetings in Co. Mayo, which immediately mobilized tenant farmers (Bew 1978; Jordan 1994; Moody 1982). Soon, large “monster” meetings were taking place weekly in Connaught. The strength of the western movement indicated to constitutional nationalist Charles Stewart Parnell, M.P., then head of the Irish Home Rule movement and soon to be president of the Irish Parliamentary Party, that the agrarian movement could be the vehicle to further the nationalist cause. When the Irish National Land League (INLL) was established in Dublin in October 1879, Parnell accepted the position of president.4

By the end of 1880, most tenant farmers and nationalists in Ireland, as well as the majority of the church (most of the clergy, about half of the hierarchy), supported the land movement (Clark 1979; Moody 1982). Local branches of the Land League sprang up throughout the country, even in the north.5 Crucial movement activity involved eviction resistance—demonstrations at sites of eviction and legal action in the courts;
parliamentary action including reform proposals and obstructionist tactics; and intimidation of those who might take the farm of an evicted farmer. But the most prominent and symbolic manifestation of movement activity were the massive land meetings which took place every week, sometimes up to ten meetings on any given weekend (Moody 1982; Townsend 1983).

These meetings were ritualistic in their ceremonal form (Alter 1987). More importantly, these meetings were ritualistic in their content: it was in land meetings that symbolic and meaning construction occurred (Kane 1996). Substantial numbers of people—usually between 2,000 and 20,000—attended most meetings; and audiences consisted of poor, middling, and substantial farmers, laborers, merchants, and professionals. On the speakers platform sat local leaders, including tenant farmers and clergy, and often a couple of national leaders, central Land League organizers, and/or “advanced” Irish M.P.s. At these ritualistic events, speakers delivered emotionally charged speeches articulating movement demands and goals. For the most part, speeches took the form of narratives, recounting essential Irish history and myths—the conquest, the confiscations, the repression, the Famine—and expressing the aspirations and visions held by the Irish people. Of course, “the Irish” and their interests and worldviews were not homogenous. Visions for change varied greatly from group to group, and often conflicted. Thus, the land meetings, as well as the local branch meetings, were sites of meaning contention and collision. And as local and national newspapers gave almost verbatim accounts of both “monster” and branch meetings as well as eviction processes, demonstrations, and court proceedings, virtually everyone in the country became involved in the discursive contention and meaning construction of the land movement.

**The Habitus of Humiliation**

The thousands of documented speeches delivered during the Land War at mass meetings and various other ritualistic events abound with metaphors and emotional narratives. The most prevalent emotions are shame, fear, sorrow, humiliation, indignation, disgust, anger, hatred (of England and landlords), love (of Ireland and the land), pride, empowerment, enthusiasm, solidarity, vengefulness, and righteousness. Clearly the emotions in the first half of this list are almost the opposite of those in the latter part. The former emotions, especially shame, fear, sorrow, and disgust, formed a “habitus of humiliation” shared by the Irish as the land movement began; the growing hatred, anger, and indignation are
emotions demonstrated in hundreds of narratives as the land movement grew; and these emotions, nurtured by narrative sharing and movement activity, blossomed into emotions of solidarity, enthusiasm, pride, love, and empowerment, greatly solidifying the alliance of movement participants and contributing to the successes of the movement.

**Narratives of Oppression, Metaphors of Shame**

Throughout the movement, but especially during the first year, many narratives of oppression were recounted; and in these narratives the central metaphors of humiliation, shame, and sorrow were graphed together. At a land meeting in Athenry, Co. Mayo, on November 2, 1979, the parish priest, Father P. J. O’Brien, greeted those gathered with the following:

> It is with a soul overwhelmed by grief and humiliation that I am here. [We are assembled today] to try to heave off the country a burden more oppressive than the mountains which crushed the giants of old—the intolerable incubus of an iniquitous land code. . . . It is to lift up our voices in a loud wail of wretchedness . . . to call in tones of piercing sadness upon those who are responsible for the lives of our people. . . . Until Ireland has wrung her autonomy from the fears of England . . . never until self-government becomes an accomplished fact . . . will those melancholy meetings fade away into mere memories of her mournful doom under the Saxon’s yoke. (Western News, Nov. 8, 1879)

Father O’Brien’s words contain a number of emotional expressions, metaphorical combinations, and structural elements prevalent during the Land War. First, he refers to ancient Irish myths of heroic giants to help people understand the burden of their oppression: the wretchedness that the land system subjected the Irish to was like mountains crushing them. Another symbolic structure composed of emotional metaphors widespread in land movement narratives was the demonization (“the intolerable incubus”) of landlords, the land system, and the British government. Indeed, narratives often connected and combined the three and their symbolization. For example, here British domination is the “Saxon yoke” which ultimately leads to “mournful doom” (the latter could be literal or metaphoric, or both). Finally, Father O’Brien portrays the tenant farmers’ appeal for help to the government, a process normally thought of as reasoned and political, as “a wail . . . in tones of piercing sadness.” This
metaphor is similar to one provided by Thomas Power O’Connor—a journalist, and future Land League M.P.—at a monster meeting in Tipperary on July 13, 1879:

[The] splendid phalanx of Tipperary men . . . occupied a very humiliating position. . . . They were on their knees today begging from their deities, the landlords, to permit them to live. . . . They were met that day to crave for justice from the landlords . . . like spaniels with upraised paws to plead for justice and their rights. (Freeman’s Journal, July 14, 1879)

In these narratives of humiliation, Britain (and her “garrison,” the landlords) is an oppressive master, the Irish downtrodden minions, slaves even. As slaves, the Irish had to beg, plead, and crave for any concession of justice.

In fact, slavery and extermination at the hands of evil rulers are central metaphors within the narratives of the land movement. As the emotions expressed in the above narratives demonstrate, humiliation causes one to feel and act subordinate, worthless, sometimes inhuman—like slaves, beggars, dogs; and in many of the early narratives, the Irish, especially the tenant farmers, are portrayed as such. But the cause of this humiliation and Ireland’s state of wretchedness is Britain, the landlords, and the land system.

The land system is likened variously to robbery, feudalism (and tenants are serfs and slaves), and a killer. For example, John Louden, a barrister and rancher, provided this account of Ireland’s misfortune at a large demonstration in Tuam, Co. Galway, on September 21, 1979:

The poverty of the country was owning to the accursed system of land tenure, which enabled the few to confiscate the property which the tiller of the soil created by his industry and labor. . . . The tenant was robbed as effectually as the passenger on the road by the highwayman. (Freeman’s Journal, Sept. 22, 1879)

At Milltown, Co. Galway, Michael Davitt referred to the land system as “a vampire system . . . which sucks the very life-blood of a people” (Connaught Telegraph, June 21, 1879). Father Matthew Ryan, the parish priest at Latten, Co. Tipperary, told listeners at the above-mentioned meeting in Tipperary that “the feudal system . . . is a disgrace to modern civilization . . . a damning blot on the vaunted Christianity of [our] rulers (the British)” (Freeman’s Journal, Sept. 22, 1879).
The following is a narrative of indignation, an emotion emerging from anger and humiliation, presented by Thomas Hastings at the June 15, 1879, Milltown meeting in Co. Galway. The story concerns Lord Sligo forcing his tenants to sign away rights to improvements and agree to unjust land valuations. This narrative is structured like the prototypical scenarios modeled by Lakoff and Kövecses: stage 1: the conditions and cause of emotion; stage 2: the action that might occur; and stage 3: its possible result. The landlord is the perpetrator of an offense, and the tenant farmers are the victims:

I remember . . . my indignation to see those miserable slaves crouching down in the dust before the landlord, and signing away the last particle of right, which secured them a guarantee for their daily food. Behold . . . the two spectacles . . . a landed aristocracy, pitilessly driving the people to madness and despair . . . and an up-risen people demanding the right to live on their own soil, and if this attitude is firmly maintained . . . it will shame the government into giving the people food . . . and a right to their homes. (Connaught Telegraph, June 21, 1879)

In this narrative, the landlord’s iniquitous treatment of the tenants provokes the anger and indignation of the observer, Hastings. We can reasonably assume that his metaphorical description of the scene provokes similar indignation among his listeners. In the second stage, the tenants respond first with despair, and then they also become angry and demand their rights. In its denouement, the narrative envisions the action of the tenants shaming the British government so deeply that it assists the tenants and passes new laws in their favor.

**Narrative Confrontation of Shame**

Many narratives rehearsed during the Land War maintained a similar “prototypical” structure of offense, emotional response and active resistance to the offense, and finally a victorious result for the tenants. However, before these scenarios could really take hold and transform the emotional structure of the movement, the Irish had to confront another emotion—shame. The following narratives recount the role the Irish played in their own immiseration, and the shame they lived in, a debilitating shame that had to be overcome.

At a land meeting in Castlebar, Co. Mayo, James Daly, editor of the Connaught Telegraph and tenant rights activist, reminded the tenants
that their weakness and deference to landlords contributed to the results of the famine:

Were they to wait as they did in ’46 and ’47 until they allowed themselves to be evicted from their homesteads and be left no alternative but to take the ocean-hearse, or seek the shelter for the palaces of despair, the workhouses. (*Connaught Telegraph*, Oct. 4, 1879)

Not only does this narrative of the famine provoke shame, it instills fear through the metaphors for the emigrant ships and workhouse: if the tenants do not act in their own behalf, they will face the emigrant ship and workhouses.

Another cause of shame was the rampant practice of “land-grabbing,” taking the land of others who have been evicted. In the following narrative, presented at the land meeting in Curry, Co. Sligo, on January 18, 1880, Father John Gunning predicts the outcome of the tenants’ shameful action in order to shame the tenants into virtuous action:

The farmers themselves . . . are to a large extent the cause of their own misery . . . willing and anxious to take the land of his neighbor . . . co-operating with the landlord to make Ireland what it is today. . . . If you are weak enough, foolish enough, wicked enough to go on in the same old track . . . you will sink back into the same slough of misery from which you are endeavoring to escape. (*Connaught Telegraph*, Jan. 20, 1880)

The final example is a prototypical scenario, delivered at a land meeting in Co. Roscommon, by a tenant farmer and president of the Ballinasloe Tenant Defense Association, James Kilmartin. In this narrative, the tenant farmers realize that their shame and misery are due to cowardice in the face of the landlords, and that they must change their action:

I believe that an angry Providence has sent us these unpropitious seasons to punish us for our criminal folly . . . our cowardice [in] submitting so long to those rackrents. . . . Fellow tenant farmers, it is time that we should . . . tell the people, the landlords, and the world that too long we have been slaves, that we are now determined to stand erect like men and Irishmen . . . that the tenant farmers are not going to bow down their heads beneath the iron rule of landlordism. (*Western News*, Nov. 22, 1879)
This narrative demonstrates two important characteristics of emotional paradigms. First, it confirms Lakoff and Kövecses’s contention that several central metaphors are often graphed together into one scenario. In this narrative, we see the central metaphors of tenant farmers as slaves, landlords as merciless rulers, and the economic downturn as the wrath of God combined in order to evoke shame, fear, and the resolute determination to change. Second, the narrative tells a story of how one emotion (courage and determination) can replace another (cowardice and shame), of how one type of action is causing shame, and that another type of action will empower. Thus the emotional narrative provides a vision for action and change.

Let me now turn to an exposition of how metaphors and narratives of emotion contributed to emotion and meaning transformation, and movement solidarity, during the Land War.

**Scenarios of Resistance: Transforming the Meaning of “Constitutional”**

It is impossible here to analyze and discuss all the transformations of meaning throughout the Land War. Therefore, I examine a major symbolic concept of land movement ideology whose reconfiguration through narrative sharing contributed to movement solidarity. At the outset of the movement, the question of whether the movement should present itself as “constitutional,” and pursue a constitutional strategy, generated much debate and conflict. Basically, radical nationalists and small farmers believed that a constitutional movement would fail: “constitutional” meant British law, and this law was believed to be the source of Irish oppression. Constituted of radical nationalists and small farmers, the early western phase of symbolic construction in the land movement profaned the meaning of constitutional: if it was British, constitutional meant unjust. The more moderate tenant farmers in the south and east, as well as much of the Catholic clergy and hierarchy, believed only a constitutional movement could reform the land system and end British domination.

However, in November 1880 the British government arrested Charles Parnell and thirteen other League leaders on charges of sedition. The arrests and the threat of coercion and movement repression, which became reality a few months later, provoked a profound sense of outrage and indignation among the previously cautious and moderate members of the Irish middle class, both farmer and nonagrarian. They now doubted that the British government would accord them the right to fight
a constitutional struggle. An introductory paragraph to an article document-
meting a fundraising meeting (for the defense of the arrested leaders) in
Enniscorthy, in the southern county of Wexford, describes the high emo-
tion of the tenant farmers:

The meeting was an exceedingly large, influential and respectable
one. Though it was not intended at first that there should be any
expression of feeling beyond the receiving of subscriptions . . .
such was the force of the indignation felt at the conduct of the
Government, that the meeting could not rest satisfied with a silent
protest, or that the enthusiasm which the occasion had evoked
should be permitted to be evanescent, or allowed to pass away
without leaving some practical results behind. (Wexford People,
Nov. 24, 1880)

In defiance of the government and landlords, tenant farmers and
their supporters opened thirty-six new branches between the time of the
arrests and the end of the year. As the movement grew and strengthened,
the cultural models of the radicals and the moderates clashed and con-
verged; and the sharing of often emotionally structured narratives con-
tributed to a transformed understanding of “constitutional.”

At a meeting to form a league branch in Ballyclough, Co. Cork, Dr.
G. J. Nealon provided a narrative, repeated many times in various forms,
about why the leaders had been arrested and how the Irish must respond:

A great crisis has arisen . . . the leaders of the Irish people are
about to be imprisoned for . . . working to keep the people from
famine and starvation. . . . How was the land system to be abol-
ished? Not through the British parliament but by the might,
strength and determination of the people. The Irish farmers should
then stand together . . . show they are bound together as one
man, determined to be free. They must declare . . . in a voice that
would shake the empire . . . that they would no longer submit to
the cruelty of those landlords. (Cork Daily Herald, Nov. 8, 1880)

Nealon’s narrative undermines the government’s claim that the arrests
are constitutional by using the emotionally charged metaphor of famine
and starvation to symbolize the result of “lawful” landlordism. Once the
audience’s anger over both the arrests and the consequences of the land
system are aroused, he inspires a feeling of unified resistance to injustice:
one body, one voice, powerful enough to “shake,” to defy Britain.
Thus, for the moderate farmers, the arrests and imminent coercion measures exemplified the tyranny of English rule. As Father John Robinson, curate for Dunsany, declared at a demonstration in county Meath, “we . . . look on the Government prosecution of the noble Parnell and his colleagues as a vile and degrading movement to place the iron heel of despotism on the neck of our suffering country” (Dundalk Democrat, Dec. 24, 1880). The metaphors here—“vile and degrading movement” symbolizing the government’s action, and “iron heel” and “despotism” symbolizing constitutionalism, and “the neck” symbolizing the land movement leaders—articulate the horror and anger at the arrests and prosecution felt by most of the Irish.

On January 24, 1881, Chief Secretary (for Ireland) Forster’s “Protection of Person and Property Bill,” empowering the government “to suspend the ordinary law in selected districts of Ireland whenever that was deemed necessary,” was introduced. In effect, the Irish executive could arrest and imprison without trial any person reasonably suspected of treasonable practices or agrarian offenses. The coercion measures confronted the larger farmers of southern and eastern Ireland with the reality of a so-called Liberal British government not tolerating a constitutional struggle for social justice in Ireland.

At a great protest demonstration in Borris, Co. Carlow, on January 30, 1881, Michael Davitt narrated the betrayal of Ireland by the Liberals:

> We see now the [Liberal] party . . . allying itself with the deadly enemies of the people in order to rob you of the little liberty you are now struggling to maintain. We see the philanthropic Gladstone, the humane and justice loving John Bright, and the Chief Slanderer of Ireland Mr. Outrage Forster (groans from the audience) falling back on . . . coercion in order to sustain a system which is a blasphemy on the providence of God, an outrage upon reason, a crime against humanity, a scourge to Ireland. Never has an English statesman shown such contempt for a people . . . as has this unveiled prophet when he declares he will restore our country to “a Christian and civilised existence” by the employment of brute force. (Freeman’s Journal, Jan. 31, 1881)

In this narrative of indignation, Davitt combines metaphors and irony to indict Gladstone, Forster, and other members of the Liberal Party for treachery against Ireland.

Two speeches delivered at the Mullingar Demonstration, in the rich grazing county of Westmeath, on March 3, 1881 provided a “prototypi-
In order to suspend the Habeas Corpus Act, [Parliament] had . . . to suspend the British constitution. . . . [The Irish members] had torn off the mask of hypocrisy of English statesmen who pretended to fight for the liberties of other peoples . . . but who, as soon as it came to be a question of the liberties of the Irish people . . . showed they could treat people . . . as cruelly as the Russians ever treated the Poles. (Freeman’s Journal, March 7, 1881)

Gill’s part of the narrative reveals the cause of Irish outrage at Britain: Parliament’s hypocritical and cruel action in robbing the Irish of liberty. The second part of the narrative, or scenario, provided by the parish priest of Mullingar, Father Gaughran, suggests the appropriate action the Irish should take, and what its consequences might be:

In this crisis, what is your duty? Shall you cower beneath the threat of coercion and abandon the cause you have . . . so nobly sustained? Men of Westmeath . . . the eyes of Europe are upon you, Europe watches with bated breath what action you take in this momentous crisis of Irish history. Let coercion do its worst, it can never quench the claims . . . and never succeed in silencing the spirit of your earnestness. (Freeman’s Journal, March 7, 1881)

With the emotional connotations of this part of the narrative, Father Gaughran attempts to dispel the fear that coercion measures may provoke, and he admonishes the tenant farmers to continue their brave struggle against British injustice. The metaphor of Europe watching the Irish and the action they take in the face of extreme danger and English tyranny is especially inspiring: it motivates movement participants to maintain determined resistance instead of backing down and repairing to their habitus of humiliation.

**Conclusion**

Though brief, the preceding analysis illustrates how the land movement participants transformed the meaning of “constitutional,” partially through the sharing of emotional narratives. This process in turn helped build solidarity between disparate groups within the movement. Though
these groups joined the movement with conflicting conceptualizations of British constitutionalism and authority, the British government’s coercion measures provoked shock, a sense of betrayal, anger and indignation among them all. Tenant farmers, clergy, and movement leaders expressed and shared these emotions through narratives laden with metaphors symbolizing the British government and its actions, and the Irish and their reactions. These narratives portrayed land movement participants acting lawfully and constitutionally; the British government and landlords violated the “constitution” by not upholding the rights of the Irish. Thus, “constitutional” became the badge of the land movement, not the British government. The concept of “constitutionalism” (though now in a more militant configuration) regained a sacred status and developed into the accepted route to justice, because it had been symbolically disconnected from the British government.

The theory that emotions are metaphorically conceptualized and structured has important implications for studying and understanding the emotional component of social movements. First, if emotions are articulated through metaphors and embedded in “prototypical scenarios,” then the project of identifying emotional expression in movement rhetoric is greatly facilitated. Metaphors are like windows on emotions. Take, for example, the following narrative excerpt: “[The land system] is the bastard offspring of force and wrong, the Ishmael of the social commonwealth, and every man’s hand should be against what has proved itself to be the scourge of our race since it first made Ireland a land of misery and poverty” (Michael Davitt, Connaught Telegraph, June 14, 1879).

These metaphors of the land system express and evoke disgust and anger. Aware of the metaphoric structure of emotions, an analyst can readily see the emotional dimension of this narrative. In the larger study of a social movement, the metaphoric structure and expression of emotions reveals affective orientations of a collective, as illustrated by my reconstruction of the Irish habitus of humiliation.

Secondly, if it is true that emotions motivate action by helping individuals and collectives evaluate and decide what is important (Jasper 1998), identifying and understanding emotional structures embedded in spoken narratives may help us understand action in social movements. The emotions of anger, the feelings of betrayal, the outrage the Irish felt surely contributed to a militant response, instead of submission, to the government’s repression of the movement. And we see these emotions articulated through metaphors in the narratives shared at land meetings during the period of repression.

Finally, paying attention to changing concepts and structures of
emotion may provide a deeper understanding of the processes of meaning, identity, and ideological construction in social movements. Above, I tried to illustrate the transformation of emotions by first analyzing the narratives of humiliation and shame which were so prevalent at the beginning of the movement, and then examining narratives expressing militancy, resistance, and pride at the peak of the movement. It’s reasonable to claim that these changing emotions, while themselves a result partially of movement ideology and action, contributed to new understandings, transformed meanings, and symbolic systems configured during the course of the land movement.

Endnotes

1. Since Daniel O’Connell’s Repeal Movement of the 1820s, the metaphor “monster” has been used to describe massive demonstrations in Ireland. Many newspaper accounts of land movement meetings led off with the title “Monster Meeting in . . .” See Owens 1999.

2. See Gaventa 1980 for a theoretical discussion and empirical illustration of a collective’s (emotional) sense of powerlessness due to their history of oppression.

3. “Fenian” was the commonly used term for members of the radical secret society, the Irish Republican Brotherhood, established in the late 1840s. The goal of the IRB was complete separation from Britain, and it advocated physical force and other “non-constitutional” methods to attain Irish independence (Comerford 1985).

4. Michael Davitt was a co-founder of the Irish National Land League and, along with Charles Parnell, the co-leader of the Land War.

5. Despite the movement’s stated nonsectarian nature, Protestant farmers in the north were put off by the Catholic Church’s involvement, in the same way that its nationalist component alienated tenant farmers loyal to Britain (see Thompson 1985 and Wright 1996).
Beginning in the mid-1970s, Salvadoran peasants joined in a broad social movement against long-standing patterns of political and economic exclusion. Despite brutal repression by state security forces, some continued to participate throughout the subsequent civil war as members of the guerrilla forces, as civilian collaborators providing intelligence and supplies, and as members of opposition organizations aligned with the insurgent guerrilla force (the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front, FMLN).

The conventional explanations for collective action, with their varied emphases on material interests, benefits directly resulting from participation, and widening political opportunities (Olson 1965; Popkin 1979; McAdam 1982), do not adequately explain political mobilization in the Salvadoran context of high risk and uncertainty. The material benefits made possible by the guerrilla movement and its affiliated organizations, such as access to land and (relative) autonomy from state forces, were available to residents of contested areas whether they participated in opposition organizations or not.1 Moreover, at a number of key junctures, political participation deepened as political opportunities narrowed, contrary to the expected pattern (Brockett 1991; Goodwin and Jasper 1999).

Interviews with more than two hundred participating peasants carried out in militarily contested areas of El Salvador between 1987 and 1996 suggest a different account. Campesinos rebelled, I conclude, in
order to defy long-resented authorities, to repudiate perceived injustices (particularly, egregious repressive acts by security forces), to claim what they considered their material interests, and to assert—and thereby to constitute—their dignity. The key to the logic of insurgent collective action emerging from these interviews is the assertion of dignity and defiance through the act of rebelling. Unlike other benefits of the insurgency, these emotional benefits were available only to participants.

This interpretation radically extends the usual account of in-process benefits: these reasons for action are *emotional in-process benefits*, by which I mean emotion-laden consequences of action experienced only by those participating in that action. That these reasons were emotional does not imply that participants were irrational: like conventional explanations, this interpretation emphasizes intentional action taken with the purpose of realizing one’s interests or values as the key element of the microfoundations of collective action. In short, despite the risks involved, peasants had cogent and enduring reasons for participating.

The particular emotional in-process benefits emphasized here have a specific form (not necessarily common to all such benefits). While the actions taken were intentional activities to realize interests and therefore of course involved the agency of participants, the particular emotional benefits turned on a more profound role for agency: for both moral outrage and pride, the *assertion of agency* itself constituted part of the meaning of those acts. Participation per se expressed moral outrage, asserted a claim to dignity, and gave grounds for pride.

My explanation emphasizes distinct combinations of motivations at different periods of the movement. Particularly early in the war, some campesinos acted *in order to act*: this assertion of agency (and thus a reclaiming of dignity) was itself a reason for acting—a constitutive and expressive reason. To express rage at the arbitrary and brutal violence of authorities was perceived by some campesinos as a necessary expression of being human, while not to do so was to be less than human. Later in the war, participants in the mobilization experienced a deepening pride—and indeed, pleasure—in their exercise of agency in the realization of their interests. To occupy properties, to refute elite perceptions of one’s incapacities, and to defy the state was a pleasure, both individually experienced (as pleasure must be) and collectively expressed (shared with other participants as they jointly asserted their capacity for agency and their dignity as actors). Thus moral outrage, pride, and pleasure, along with more conventional reasons such as access to land, impelled the insurgency despite the high risk and uncertainty.²
Setting and Method

One way to find out why peasants act collectively is to ask peasants themselves why they collaborated, or why they didn’t, and what the relevant conditions were at the time. As Nora Kriger (1992) noted, much of the literature on peasant rebellion relies on government documents, police reports, or sources written by the intellectual leadership of revolutionary movements. There is no doubt that insight can be gleaned by reinterpret- ing the “prose of counter-insurgency” (Guha 1983). But the first-hand accounts of participants may add insights unavailable in these conventional sources; nor do such sources exist where authorities act with great autonomy and little accountability. For the Salvadoran case, it was possible during the civil war and the subsequent cease-fire to record detailed accounts by participating campesinos as to why they collaborated with opposition organizations.

The interpretation presented here draws principally on interviews I carried out in the town of Tenancingo and the department of Usulután between 1987 and 1996. Both sites were contested territory throughout the war: unlike many areas, neither the government nor the insurgents controlled the area. Many interviews were with individual campesinos or guerrilla members, others were with groups of representatives of cooperatives and other peasant organizations. Many informants were interviewed repeatedly over a period of four or five years. Here I focus on campesinos in their supporting role, not on those campesinos who joined the military ranks of the FMLN as full-time permanent members or on those who did not participate on the side of the insurrection.

An initial observation is that the campesinos interviewed responded to my questions at considerable length and sacrifice. Whether in private settings or in public meetings, campesinos of Tenancingo and Usulután appeared eager to participate in this research project, recounting the history of the war in their communities. With groups I interviewed repeatedly over months and sometimes years, enthusiasm for this project was particularly evident on my return after an absence. I would often be greeted with words such as “Well, Elisabeth, do we have something to tell you!” or (to each other), “What did we say we should remember to tell Elisabeth?”

This joy in collaborating in this project appeared to reflect an impulse to testify, to recount the experiences of the war, and to celebrate the achievements of the cooperatives and other organizations. While many stories were histories of violence, suffering, loss, and injustice, many were
also proudly told stories of the achievements of the conflict: of land occupied and defended, of new organizations founded, of new identities asserted. As Marcelo Suarez-Orozco argues, testimony plays a dual role in the aftermath of political violence: “testimony [is] a ritual of both healing and a condemnation of injustice—the concept of testimony contains both connotations of something subjective and private and something objective, judicial, and political” (cited in Green 1994: 244).

One indication of this commitment was the willingness of many campesinos to make pairs of maps showing the local area before and after the war. I asked a dozen teams of campesinos from across Usulutan to draw (free-hand) such maps in order to understand how property boundaries and land use had changed during the course of the war, thus documenting how campesino collective action literally redrew the boundaries of class relationships during the war years. These map-drawing workshops involved considerable sacrifice of work time (with no recompense) on the part of individuals and forgone opportunities on the part of the campesino organizations: each pair of maps took two full days to draw, given the unfamiliarity of the task, the minimal literacy of participants, and the care with which they responded. While I promised that the maps would be returned to the communities, which may have provided some incentive, my impression was that they were motivated primarily by their commitment to recounting their history. The resulting maps not only documented the changes in de facto property rights and cropping patterns but documented cultural changes as well. I return to the maps below.

Reliance on personal interviews of course introduces other complications, among them the retrospective nature of some of the evidence. While the interviews suggest that the pride and pleasure that the campesino activists took in their achievements was not only an outcome of the movement but also directly motivated ongoing participation at the time, many of the interviews were carried out in the last months of the war and during the cease-fire. Retrospective reporting of participants in a social movement as to why, earlier, they had joined may reflect present interests as well as the intervening period of their own interpretation of their participation. Given the absence of surveys (until the close of the civil war), indeed their impossibility given the highly violent conditions in the case-study areas, this problem is not easy to address.

I suggest that the following observations adequately ground empirically my assumption that the pride and pleasure evident in the later interviews was also an important factor in motivating participation earlier. Many of the interviews did occur earlier (in Tenancingo, 1987–91). In
contrast to conventional explanations, my interpretation does account for the salient facts of mobilization in the case-study areas. Moreover, the existence of a distinct rebellious political culture is confirmed by a 1991 survey of contested areas in which those campesinos who had occupied land by the end of the civil war expressed a distinctly more rebellious set of political attitudes than farmers who owned land. For example, 69 percent of campesinos occupying land stated that one should trust the army “almost never”; only 19 percent of those who owned land held that opinion (Seligson et al. 1993: 2.25).

Peasant mobilization in El Salvador was characterized by three features. First, political mobilization took place in a context where protest was highly dangerous. Consider the risks that participants ran. While the degree of danger varied, declining in the later years of the war, the threat of loss of life or severe abuse was very real throughout the war. In interview after interview during and immediately after the civil war, residents described in credible detail and with enduring grief the loss of family members, friends, and fellow participants:

Some armed themselves, others fled. We were all seen as guerrillas. Every time we went to the coast, we were searched at the intersection. Nineteen eighty-two was a year of desperation, almost everyone left. My brother disappeared in that year, one of hundreds who disappeared in 1982 and 1983—every day there were two or three bodies at the intersection. After all these years of war, the dead weigh heavily. (Resident, Comunidad La Peña, 1992)

Second, nonparticipants as well as participants could share in the material benefits of the insurgency throughout much of the war. The obvious benefits that the insurgency offered—access to abandoned land and some autonomy from the daily authority of landlords and security forces—were available to everyone who remained in these contested areas, and thus did not have the requisite structure (available only to those actually participating) required to overcome the obstacles to collective action in the usual account based on in-process benefits. In short, free-riding was possible. Indeed, most peasants in the case-study areas did “free-ride” in the sense that they benefited from the absence of landlords as long as they paid the (coerced) minimal cost of staying in the area (occasional provision of tortillas and water to guerrilla forces) and refrained from informing on them to the authorities. By a necessarily rough estimate, about a third of peasants who stayed in the areas directly supported the guerrillas beyond the coerced minimum.
Third, the trajectory of participation evolved from traditional political mobilization, to covert collaboration with the insurgent guerilla forces, to overt support for the insurgents, to mobilization directly for land. Before the civil war, collective action took the form of widespread political protest: national rallies and marches drew tens of thousands of participants, many of whom were mobilized by networks of religious activists. Within the ruling regime, hardliners opposed to reform repeatedly defeated reformist elements and intensified repression of the movement. Participants faced difficult choices—to flee, to stay neutral, to collaborate with one side or the other. Some began working directly as civilian collaborators or as armed guerrillas with various small armed groups, which merged into the FMLN. As the rapidly growing FMLN proved strong enough to force landlords and the state to retreat from many areas of the countryside, a distinct second phase of collaboration began as participants began experiencing the pleasure of successful rebellion as they founded cooperatives, occupied land, and defended their holdings against efforts by the landlords to reclaim their property. Because access to land did not depend on participation, I argue that the pleasure of agency was increasingly the principal motivation for participants. Finally, once it was evident that negotiations would resolve the civil war and would include a transfer of land to peasants occupying land, the numbers of participants rapidly increased and a wave of land occupations occurred at the close of the war (indeed, occupations threatened the fragile cease-fire in early 1992). Because participation in this last period poses no collective action puzzle (benefits outweighed the costs for each participant), I here focus on the earlier periods when there was a puzzle—one not accounted for by conventional explanations.

**Moral Outrage and Pride in Agency**

Given that participants faced high risks and that free-riders could also enjoy the immediate benefits, it is quite unlikely that the expected benefits should the revolutionary forces win were high enough to justify participation. Some other “benefits” must distinguish participants from nonparticipants. I suggest that *emotional in-process benefits* provide the key to explaining peasant political mobilization in support of the FMLN during the Salvadoran civil war. There are two such benefits that emerge from the interviews: expressing moral outrage and experiencing the pleasure of agency. As we shall see, participants were morally outraged at the social relations that prevailed before the war and at the repression that greeted initial protest. Participants also took profound pride and
The Emotional Benefits of Insurgency in El Salvador

pleasure in their insurrectionary activities: they had proved capable of transforming those social relations in acting effectively to realize their interests in land and autonomy. As their activities were increasingly successful, their pride and pleasure increased as well as did their numbers as others joined. The interviews generally suggest that moral outrage provided initial motivation early in the war for those who participated then, and that pride and pleasure of agency later supplemented or replaced outrage for those participating as well as motivating participation for others. But because these two themes of moral outrage and pride were closely intertwined in the interviews—note that the pride expressed draws in large degree on the contrast with the humiliating deference that characterized relations with landlords before the war—I analyze them together.

For those who collaborated with the FMLN from early on, the motives appear to have been largely an expressive commitment to defiance, a refusal to acquiesce, and perhaps a desire for revenge against those who had wronged their family, friends, or even strangers. In this first phase of collaboration with the insurgents, support was largely covert and on an individual basis:

Quite a few people didn’t want to do it, they were still terrified—they’ve experienced it [violence, the war] in their own body. I used to say, look, this struggle and the effort of the FMLN have cost blood. We have present this bloody body [Tenemos presente este cuerpo sangriente]. (Member, Cooperativa Loma Alegre, July 1992)

When asked to describe local conditions before the war, interviewees typically responded with detailed statements describing wages and working conditions as well as their resentment toward those conditions. One activist of a peasant organization closely allied with the FMLN stated:

How did I become a militant of the popular movement? It was born out of social resentment, that’s how to understand it. I am an unskilled farm worker, my father never gave me anything. I worked for the rich, it was heavy labor. I felt rage, resentment. It was a hard life, sometimes I would cry with resentment when I couldn’t finish the assigned task. (FENACOA activist, April, 1992.)

One suggestion implicit in this statement, as in many others, is that this activist saw himself not as choosing among a given set of alternatives but
as acting on the only real choice available: to rebel against the injustice of a social structure that offered no choice or to acquiesce to it. Particularly resented was the arbitrariness with which authority was exercised before the war:

We colonos had to behave with such obedience—we couldn’t even disagree with whatever the authorities said. The only refuge: to go live alongside the national roadways when they kicked you out. The human person was just one more farming implement. (Leader, Cooperativa El Carrizal, 1992)

That labor relations before the war were governed by extra-economic coercive means rather than market mechanisms is shown by the inclusion on some of the maps of symbols indicating the presence of National Guardsmen billeted on large estates to quell nascent unrest, a traditional practice in agro-export areas before the war. One campesino, when asked what it had been like before the war and how it was different now, performed an elaborate pantomime of exaggerated deference to the landlord (hands together, head humbly bent, chest and head bowing without eye contact) in sharp contrast to his subsequent pantomime of the wartime attitude (shoulders back, head pridefully up, fist beating the air). This could of course be mere bravado, but the successful defense of several properties against the threat of occupation by the landlords testifies instead to a significant transformation of attitude toward erstwhile patrons.

In contrast to the descriptions of poverty and humiliation endured before the war, reiterated assertions of pride and accomplishment characterize campesinos’ descriptions of the legacy of the war:

There were so many deaths of cooperative promoters—half a battalion of dead for the simple crime of lending help to the cooperatives. But I would say that this “crime” has been, simply, my accomplishment. (Leader, Cooperative Nuevo Amanecer, June 1992)

For some, persisting and enduring was itself an achievement:

There was no opportunity to work your own land, only to work as a laborer. In 1979, the conflict began, and it began with a wave of violence. We suffered in all aspects, it became very difficult. They took out a brother of mine. But here we are, living here still. (Member, Cooperativa San Judas Escobares, March 1992)
Many interviewees reported with pride the tenaciousness that had enabled them to remain on their land, whether acquired legally or by occupation, despite frequent military conflicts in the area:

Here, there is perhaps no one who has not collaborated. The truth is that it has been a deeply suffered war. We have suffered hunger, sometimes eating only bombs. It is God who has made us still be here. Here, the bombs have rained like water. (Resident, Comunidad La Peña, April 1992)

Essential to these assertions of pride is an undercurrent of asserted political and social equality, in sharp contrast to their experience of prewar social relations. This emphatic leveling of social status marks a conscious shift in perceived relations, and was sometimes very explicit:

My opinion is this: God the Father made the land for everyone. He didn’t make the land for the rich—we are all sons of Mother Earth. We are in this struggle so that the land would belong to those who work it. The rich man is also the son of Mother Earth, and he has the right to land—but only to the same size of parcel, we don’t want any haciendas. (Member, Comunidad El Palmo, April 1992)

This leveling of status draws on both Christian and indigenous cosmologies to justify the struggle for land.

Campesinos drew as well on agrarian images and practices:

I was born here, my umbilical cord is buried here. Blood has run, many have died, but the harvest is at hand. But it’s not everything, we have to keep fighting, although now without arms. We know from where we have come, and where we want to go. (Leader, Cooperativa La Maroma, January 1992)

Similarly, the following simple affirmation resounds with pride and the assertion of equality:

We are capable of managing these properties. (Leader, Cooperativa San Judas Escobar, March 1992)

This is an assertion—in the face of landlords’ expressed contempt toward campesinos, a frequent theme in interviews—of campesino capacities that
before the war were denied in order to justify the hegemony of the land-
lords on the basis of their superior abilities:

Before the war, we were despised by the rich. We were seen as ani-
mals, working all day and still without even enough to put the
kids in school. This is the origin of the war: there was no alterna-
tive. The only alternative was the madness of desperation. (Mem-
ber, Cooperativa Los Ensayo, March 1992)

In many interviews, the litany of achievements of the war mixes with a
recitation of the injustices of prewar social relations to retrospectively
justify the war itself. The language is frequently one of freedom, of politi-
cal equality, and of rights, set against the context of repression and diffi-
culty.

In the interviews, this assertion of equality was closely associated
both with access to land and with pride in the achievements of activists
and their organizations. Militants consistently claimed *authorship* of the
changes that they identified as their work:

I woke up during the process of the war and I collaborated in the
midst of the war. We have already seen a new dawn—we created
it despite the great pressure brought to bear by the army. (Leader,
Cooperativa La Conciencia, 1992)

This desire for and claim to authorship would be difficult to account for
on most accounts of collective action.

Some leaders and activists offer more nuanced assessments of the
achievements of the war, while similarly emphasizing the justice of its
aims and accomplishments to date. One activist, noting that access to
land and better wages were not secure, remarked:

This is what I think: what was the war for? For the solution to the
land problem. We feel something already, and we’re sure that we
will be free—that is a point of the war that we have won. Salaries,
who knows? But that we not be seen as slaves, that we’ve won.
(Member of the Land Defense Committee, Las Marías, May 1992)

A similarly measured assessment of the achievements of the war was this:

We passed these years with great suffering, it was difficult for us.
In 11 years of war, we were never tranquil. But now, we feel a bit
free, and not oppressed. Before we didn’t have a single freedom, now we have begun to taste freedom. (Member, Cooperativa San Pedro Arenales, June 1992)

The benefits realized during the war are sometimes explicitly weighed against the costs:

The war has given us land. This war—well, those of us who haven’t died, we’re living on a bigger piece.

The war did both: it hit us hard but we benefited too—a bit of fertilizer and a bit of suffering. (Member, Cooperativa Loma Alegre, July 1992)

According to one campesina:

We now work in a cooperative, we grow our food, and the kids are studying in school, we’re no longer dominated by the landlord. How shameful that so many had to die to achieve these changes! (Resident, Comunidad La Noria, 1992)

As these excerpts from my interviews indicate, memories of fear and violence, evident in the reiterated images of blood and bodies as well as in explicit statements, remained troubling to many even in the relative security of the cease-fire. As Linda Green (1995) subtly explores in her work on war-torn areas of Guatemala, violence and terror leave behind a legacy of silence, fear, and uncertainty that can be deeply corrosive of self-confidence, trust, and hope. Yet—remarkably given this level of violence—activists in the case-study areas of El Salvador had continued to organize during the war. According to Juan Corradi (1992: 282), the clue to overcoming the culture of fear lies in breaking the sense of inevitability and inertia experienced during periods of extreme repression. The achievements of campesino organizations in these contested areas are a direct indication of their having overcome the effects of the repression that swept through their communities.

Supporting evidence for this emphasis on emotional in-process benefits comes from the mapmaking workshops described above. It was evident during the workshops that participants took pleasure and pride in the task, which was seen as an invitation to document the achievements of their cooperative. As well as much teasing of each other, particularly at the beginning of the out-of-the-ordinary task, the mapmaking occasioned
explicit expressions of solidarity with fellow participants and pride in
the redrawing of property boundaries and in the drawing of the maps.
According to the mapmakers, secure access to land was one important
motive for collaboration with opposition organizations. The maps them-
selves as well as the sacrifice involved suggest that an account of sustained
collaboration requires a consideration of the emotional dimensions of
participation as well. For example, the authors of one pair of maps wrote
the following—unprompted—notations (with the original idiosyncratic
spelling):

Ası´ a el serro del taurete propiedades tomadas por personas campe-
sinas [This is how the Taburete hill was, properties taken by peas-
ant peoples]. (Member, Cooperativa El Jobalito)

Gracias por un recuerdo de mi trabajo [Thank you for a remem-
brance of my work]. (Member, Cooperativa El Jobalito)

These notations on the maps suggest that cooperative members saw the
building of cooperatives in the difficult conditions of the war as a source
of pride in the effectiveness of their historical intervention. The map-
maker clearly intended this last phrase as a conscious play on “my work”
as referring to the drawing itself and to the achievements of the coopera-
tive (and perhaps also intended as a reminder that I return the maps).

As in the anecdote recounted above, the naming of names was also
a powerful element of the mapmaking. Participants were not asked to
sign the maps, but most chose to do so. Nearly all identified themselves
with their titles as the leaders of the cooperative, a symbolic assertion of
authority and ownership of the properties claimed. The mapmakers who
inscribed their names did so after a discussion amongst themselves of the
purpose of the exercise (eventual publication) and, among some of the
groups, of the potential risks given the uncertain conditions of the cease-
fire at the time. Judging by these conversations, to do so was an expres-
sion of commitment to tell their communal history. The naming of names,
particularly for the express purpose of having them published with the
maps, thus seemed to be an indication of a deep need to testify to the
community’s history.

Conclusion

What we hope for is to be equal before the law. We have lost the
fear we had before the war, we have lost the fear. (Leader, Co-
operativa La Maroma, January 1992)
My account of peasant political mobilization in El Salvador emphasizes the emotional benefits of participation, a particular kind of in-process benefit, as the key to understanding the willingness of campesinos to support the FMLN and its sister organizations. In the early years of the war, when the circumstances of risk and the uncertainty of material benefits meant that other reasons for acting were insufficient, acting against the state—in defiance, in outrage, for revenge, for justice, against the fear that could be paralyzing—brought emotional “benefits” to exactly that subset of campesinos who participated. As repression lessened and initial networks emerged, increasing numbers of peasants participated in the founding of cooperatives, the occupation of properties, and the building of organizations to articulate and defend their interests. A remarkable number of participants expressed the pleasure that they took in their unprecedented exercise of agency. This exercise of agency in the realization of their interests was experienced by participants as profoundly transformative: interviews demonstrate the emergence of a new insurgent political culture based on solidarity, citizenship, equality, and entitlement to contest the old-regime culture rooted in clientelism and coercion. The argument also suggests that agency per se may contribute to the “management of fear” (Goodwin and Pfaff, chap. 16 of this volume) among participants in social movements suffering a repressive response by the state.

A few qualifications of the argument should be kept in mind. Not all (or even most) residents of the contested areas of El Salvador participated in the movement, nor was all of El Salvador contested. Whether the transformation of political identity and culture in the field sites endured past the end of the civil war is not explored here.\textsuperscript{10} Finally, the retrospective nature of many of the interviews may overemphasize the importance of pride-in-agency as a motivation in the earlier period; however, I have suggested reasons why it does not.\textsuperscript{11}

This interpretation of political mobilization in El Salvador is similar to other analyses of social movements that emphasize dignity, citizenship, and emotional “returns” to participation.\textsuperscript{12} In his study of peasant insurgency in colonial India, Ranajit Guha argues that the “urge to self-respect” and “prestige” was more important in rebellion than economic gains—indeed, he suggests that peasants may rebel even against their economic interests (Guha 1983: 59, 143–46). Sue Stokes, in her study of urban political culture in Peru, found that a new “rights-oriented militant version of citizenship” was one cause of the social movement that contributed to the end of military rule (Stokes 1995: 47). Similar arguments were advanced by Deborah Levenson-Estrada (1994) in her study of trade unionists active in Guatemala in the 1980s and by Gay Seidman (1994)
in her analysis of the emergence of trade unions in South Africa in the 1970s. Dennis Chong similarly stresses the social and psychological benefits accruing to participants in the civil rights movement in the U.S. What my interpretation contributes to this literature is an emphasis on pleasure in agency itself.

While various emotional benefits may motivate participation in a range of social movements, the particular emotional benefit emphasized here—pride in agency—will not be a powerful motivation in all social movements. For example, middle-class participants in environmental movements may experience and be motivated by the expression of moral outrage and the various pleasures of collective action such as marching, chanting, and singing together, but they are likely to take their agency for granted. In contrast, as suggested by the Salvadoran insurgency and the cases referred to above, where long-subordinate people act to reject their subordination and to create or affirm a more equal identity in which equality is claimed and rights asserted, pride in agency and the reassertion of a dignity long suppressed may be a powerful motivation for participation.

Acknowledgments


Endnotes

1. During much of the war, most residents of the field sites (particularly those in more remote areas where the guerrillas were more persistently present) had to contribute a (coerced) minimum amount of tortillas and water to the FMLN in order to stay in the area. But with the exception of a short period in 1986, participation was not otherwise coerced. Government forces also extracted food and water when present.

2. To refer to the “pleasure” of rebellion may evoke Banfield’s “Rioting Mainly for Fun and Profit,” in which he famously argued that the inner-city riots of the mid-1960s were not caused by race and could not be prevented by addressing the mistreatment of African-Americans (Banfield 1968). My argument differs from his in my empha-
sis on the pleasure subordinate people may take in exercising agency, a human function from which they had long been excluded. This is distinct from Banfield’s “animal spirits” for thrills and from pillage due to the temporary suspension of law enforcement.

3. One clarification is important: very few of the communities of Usulután had been visited by journalists or researchers, in contrast to some of the communities of the “controlled zones” in the northern strongholds of the FMLN such as Perquín. In organizations that frequently host such visitors, there is a distinctly professional tenor to the testimonials offered, as if a script were being played once again. Tenancingo, on the other hand, had been much visited by journalists, development specialists, and diplomats. However, few lingered long enough to interview residents other than a few members of the community council.

4. In introducing the project to local organizations and again at some length at the beginning of the meeting, I always did my best to clarify that I did not represent any potential funding for community projects. I believe I succeeded, as I visited the case-study areas over an extended period of time without providing any material benefits and did not observe a decline in enthusiasm on the part of those interviewed.

5. However, I cannot tell from my interviews whether in the first instance the pleasure of pride-in-agency was anticipated or was an unintended consequence of participation. In any case, the interviews provide ample evidence that once experienced, such pleasure motivated continuing participation.

6. A detailed analysis is presented in Wood, forthcoming.

7. The pattern of abuse and terror in the case-study areas reflects the general pattern throughout the country. The definitive assessment of human rights violations during the civil war is the report of the Truth Commission for El Salvador, the U.N.-sponsored organization mandated by the peace agreement to analyze the general pattern of violations as well as particularly salient or egregious cases (Truth Commission for El Salvador 1993).

8. All interviews were carried out by the author.

9. Nor does interpreting the insurgent movement as an alternative state offering “state-like collective goods” or an alternative social contract resolve this conundrum (Skocpol 1982; Goodwin and Skocpol 1989; Wickham Crowley 1987). The FMLN did indeed become an alternative governing authority to some extent in Tenancingo and Usulután. But campesinos could enjoy those benefits without directly supporting the FMLN beyond the coerced minimum. Nor do these authors adequately theorize the process through which such innovations come about.

10. Even if some “rollback” toward clientelist social relations occurred, it will probably not be the case that social relations returned to the status quo ante.

11. For a full discussion and detailed argument concerning insurgent participation, see Wood, forthcoming.

12. See Jasper 1998 for an extended argument concerning the role of emotions in motivating participation in social movements.

13. Chong (1991) presents a similar stylized trajectory where “unconditional cooperators” build the movement initially, gaining interim victories demonstrating the possibilities of success until conditional cooperation becomes a rational response. However, Chong’s argument emphasizes social sanctions and concerns for reputation rather than the pleasure in agency emphasized here.

14. Russell Hardin (1982: 108–12) and Albert Hirschman (1982: 89–90) also suggest that taking part in the making of history may motivate participation by the hitherto excluded or powerless.
Chapter Sixteen

Emotion Work in High-Risk Social Movements:
Managing Fear in the U.S. and East German Civil Rights Movements

Jeff Goodwin and Steven Pfaff

When you get caught up in the Movement, you just lose some of your fear. It’s an amazing kind of thing. I can look back now at some of the situations we got involved in and I didn’t think about it to be afraid. At the time. But when you look back at some of the situations we were in, you kind of shudder afterwards. But when you are caught up in the emotion of the Movement and you commit yourself, you really don’t worry about what’s going to happen to you.

—Abraham Wood (quoted in Raines 1977: 151)

One of the preconditions for active opposition on the part of individuals [in East Germany] was overcoming fear. The overwhelming power of the [Communist Party] apparatus was based on social exclusion. Intimidation, isolation, and moral discrediting all served to create the conditions under which broad sections of the society conformed their behavior in accord with power relations. This left the nonconformists insecure and feeling threatened. . . . Civil courage had to be achieved through lengthy experience and required social support that could be gained through solidarity relations in the Church or through membership in opposition groups.

Many analysts of social movements have sought to reconstruct the culture, ideologies, lifeworld, “frames,” or mentalities of the participants in these movements. We have witnessed an important “cultural turn” in recent thinking about social movements, as in sociology generally. Yet most of this new scholarship exhibits what might be called an ideational or cognitive bias. This work focuses, that is, on actors’ articulated or implicit beliefs and assumptions, but neglects their moods, emotions, and cathexes, that is, their quite variable emotional attachment to or investment in particular “objects” (in the psychoanalytic sense), including specific people, groups, institutions, and ideas. For social movement analysts, accordingly, emotions remain what Garfinkel (1967: chap. 2) calls a “seen but unnoticed” background feature of social life, always lurking in the crevices and shadows of what presumably “really” matters for social actors.

As part of the cultural turn, some sociologists have argued that what the discipline needs today is not so much a sociology of culture as a cultural sociology—a sociology, that is, which necessarily encompasses cultural analysis because all social practices, relations, and institutions (even the most “structural” and seemingly impersonal) are shaped by, or embody, specific shared beliefs and assumptions (see, e.g., Alexander 1996). Analogously, we see a need today not just for a historical sociology of emotions, although that is certainly a fascinating and important project (see, e.g., the work of Peter Stearns [1994] and his collaborators [Stearns and Stearns 1986; Stearns and Lewis 1998]), but also for an emotional sociology. By this we mean not a sociology that exudes passion and excitement—although that is perhaps not a bad idea! (see Game and Metcalfe 1996)—but rather a sociology that recognizes the ubiquity of emotions, moods, and affect in social life and which treats emotions as potential causal mechanisms, or components of such mechanisms, and not simply as epiphenomena or dependent variables. In other words, because emotions are constitutive of social relations and action—and not simply as individual, psychological reactions but as intersubjective, collective experiences—sociologists should always be attuned to their potential causal significance. More specifically, we believe that most of the key causal factors emphasized by analysts of social movements—including such factors as social networks, grievances, collective identities, cultural frames and ideologies, even shifting political opportunity structures—derive much of their causal power from the strong emotions that they embody or evoke among actors (see Goodwin 1997; Jasper 1998; Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta 2000).


**Emotion Management and Encouragement Mechanisms**

This chapter seeks to contribute to such an emotional sociology by examining the role of emotions in the U.S. civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s and in the East German civil rights or civic movement of the late 1980s. In the process, we hope to uncover causal mechanisms that may matter for a wide range of social movements (see Hedström and Swedberg 1998). More specifically, we examine the *management of fear* in these two “high-risk” movements (McAdam 1986), drawing upon the “emotion management” perspective of Arlie Hochschild (1983). Hochschild’s key idea is that in their ongoing social interactions people more or less self-consciously “induce or suppress feeling in order to sustain the outward countenance that produces the proper state of mind in others” (1983: 7). Hochschild’s own work focuses on the ways in which individuals manage emotions in the workplace, but emotion management or “emotional labor” may also occur at a collective or group level. The management of emotions, moreover, is shaped by shared norms about appropriate or legitimate feelings and emotional displays; Hochschild calls these norms “feeling rules”—“standards used in emotional conversation to determine what is rightly owed and owing in the currency of feeling” (1983: 18). We also depart from Hochschild in emphasizing that the management of emotions is not simply a self-conscious and instrumental effort by actors, individual or collective, but may also be the unintended result of social interactions or beliefs that have other manifest purposes.

Curiously, emotion management has received virtually no attention from contemporary social movement theorists, even though it clearly occurs within social movement organizations as well as during contentious interactions between movements and their opponents. What Charles Tilly terms “repertoires” of contention—and what others refer to as movement “dramaturgy”—typically entail distinctive forms of emotion management. Some movements, in fact, necessarily require a great deal of emotional labor in order to sustain themselves. It has been suggested, for example, that ethnic mobilization typically requires the positive inducement of a collective (and often exaggerated) fear of “the other” (Brubaker and Laitin 1998: 442). Conversely, when protest is extremely risky or dangerous, fear may inhibit collective action (or certain forms of collective action), and so it must be suppressed or at least mitigated, not necessarily in purposive or self-conscious ways, if such action is to occur at all.

As J. M. Barbalet has noted, fear is not wholly disadvantageous
to social movements: “fear leads to an actor’s realization of where their interests lie, and points in the direction of what might be done to achieve them” (1998: 149). A movement that did not sufficiently fear its enemies might undertake reckless and self-defeating actions. Still, an “emotional climate” of fear can obviously stifle protest (see Barbalet 1998: 157-61, on the concept of “emotional climate”). So movement activists and participants themselves may have to manage, but not eliminate, their fears in more or less explicit and self-conscious ways; alternatively, fear may be mitigated as an unintended consequence of certain practices or shared understandings of social movement participants.

This chapter describes a variety of mechanisms by which fear was managed or mitigated, and courage or risk-taking behavior generated, whether intentionally or otherwise, in two important social movements. We do not assume, of course, that all high-risk movements manage fear in precisely the same ways. In fact, our focus on these two rather distinctive movements—which arose in quite different societies in opposition to quite different forms of oppression—is intended in part to uncover the range, or at least part of the range, of mechanisms that may reduce fear in high-risk movements. Some of these mechanisms may be general or “modular”—they may be found, that is to say, in many or even all high-risk movements (an important question for future research)—while others may be peculiar to specific movements. As we shall see, in fact, two encouragement mechanisms that we discovered for the U.S. case did not play a role in the East German movement. The “comparative logic” of this chapter, in any event, is neither statistical correlation nor Mills’s “method of difference” but a modest attempt at what Tilly terms “variation-finding” (1984: 80–84).

There are, needless to say, a wide range of emotions besides fear which were important for the two movements that we are examining, including, for example, anger, happiness, shame, and pride. Fear was not evenly distributed, moreover, among movement participants, and in many situations the management of anger was a more pressing concern than the management of fear. Yet our focus on fear is not arbitrary. We undertook a content analysis of several important oral histories of these movements, which revealed that fear was in fact the emotion most frequently noted or invoked in an explicit way by activists and participants in both movements. Indeed, fear was mentioned by participants even more frequently than were anger and outrage combined—emotions that presumably helped to motivate the protests that did occur. Our analysis of these texts revealed many hundreds of instances (n = 498) in which one or another emotion was explicitly cited, and nearly 84 percent of
TABLE 1  Emotions Expressed in Oral Histories of the U.S. and East German Civil Rights Movements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Emotion</th>
<th>No. of statements</th>
<th>Total (%)</th>
<th>U.S. (%)</th>
<th>G.D.R. (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fear</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>36.9</td>
<td>46.4</td>
<td>22.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anger</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>14.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Happiness</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sadness</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outrage</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surprise</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agitation</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fearlessness</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excitement</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togetherness</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pride</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anxiety</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals:</td>
<td>414</td>
<td>83.9</td>
<td>85.9</td>
<td>78.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: See endnote 2.

these references (n = 414) were to twelve specific emotions. Table 1 summarizes the findings of this content analysis.

Having thus established the prevalence of fear for participants in these movements, we then returned to the oral histories, as well as to several memoirs and the secondary literature on these movements, to discern exactly how fears were managed, consciously or otherwise, within these movements. Specifically, we looked for the precise ways in which participants were either individually or collectively encouraged to persist in high-risk activism despite quite rational fears of economic reprisals (especially the loss of paid work), verbal and physical harassment, imprisonment, bodily injury, and even death. What sort of “encouragement mechanisms,” as we call them, served to manage or mitigate fears among participants in these two movements? (We model this concept on Kanter’s [1972] notion of “commitment mechanisms”—the practices and arrangements through which the communes that she studied generated commitment or attachment to such communes among their members.)

Our research uncovered eight main encouragement mechanisms, or sets of mechanisms, which were operative in these movements. Six of these mechanisms were found, more or less, in both movements: (1) the “intimate social networks” that underpinned these movements; (2) the
dynamics of mass meetings and other communal gatherings of movement participants; (3) the strong identification of activists with the movements, grounded in a belief in both their righteousness and inevitable victory; (4) shaming and “degradation ceremonies” (Garfinkel 1956); (5) formal training in the techniques of civil disobedience; and (6) mass-media coverage of movement activities and protest events. Two additional encouragement mechanisms were found on a significant scale only in the U.S. case: (7) the possession of firearms; and (8) the belief among some movement participants in what we might term their divine protection. Space limitations prevent us from adequately analyzing (or explaining the origins of) all of these mechanisms. In the remaining sections of this chapter, however, we discuss several of them in some detail, providing examples of exactly how these factors mitigated fears in one or both of these movements.

**Intimate Social Networks**

Social movement scholars have long recognized the potential importance of social networks for movement recruitment, communication, the coordination of activities, resource mobilization, and collective identities. What has been less remarked upon is the way in which networks—especially face-to-face, intimate ties—offer moral support and encouragement to activists in high-risk movements. Because the role of “indigenous social organization” has been discussed extensively in the case of the U.S. civil rights movement (see, e.g., McAdam 1982; Morris 1984), we focus in this section on the less well-known role of intimate support networks in the case of the East German civic movement.

The East German civic movement of the 1980s was loosely organized. It had few institutions of its own, relying largely on the church to provide resources and shelter. It eschewed, for both practical and ideological reasons, the form of a secret society or underground party. The social and political marginalization of civic groups led to a great deal of informality, interpersonal intimacy, and a strong sense of solidarity vis-à-vis the surrounding society: “Within the structure of the informal groups the personal relations among the individual members played an especially important role. Since there was no formalized communication structure, the interactions of the groups were to a large degree based on direct personal relations among involved persons” (Findeis, Pollack, and Schilling 1994: 245).

Intimate relations among the democracy activists helped to sustain their commitment in the face of repression and social isolation. Extremely
close personal links were forged between activists which encouraged them in their activities and raised the costs of dropping out, of submitting to outside pressure, or of becoming an informant for the secret police (Stasi). People who were arrested or suffered interrogation knew they would not be forgotten by their friends in the groups. Consider the following report of a Leipzig human rights activist on his experience after his arrest and interrogation by the Stasi:

You stand in the streets again...you see your friends again. Hugs, laughter, you look into tired, sleepless eyes. Only now you understand the degree of solidarity. These were sleepless, guarded nights and these people worked through the night on the telephone, on the typewriter, in vigils and in discussions...A solidarity vigil was held for you, a vigil for you and the others arrested. You can't hold back the tears...They greet the arrested with a bouquet of flowers and you cry. That bouquet still lives for me today—a symbol of hope and never to be forgotten hours.

(Quoted in Dietrich and Schwabe 1994: 408)

While intimate ties and a strong sense of collective purpose and community helped to unite and encourage activists in the face of disappointment and adversity, this informal structure had the disadvantage of making personal conflicts simultaneously conflicts within and between groups. Egoistic participants, rivalries, and Stasi-inspired informants and agents provocateurs could do considerable damage through these networks. As Findeis notes, “personal relationships had an ambivalent function for the groups. There were not only friendly relations that stabilized the group climate, but rather practical engagement was often bound up with ambitious personal interests” (Findeis, Pollack, and Schilling 1994: 246). Thus, while the deeply personal and highly emotional character of activism in the GDR afforded it a strength that helped make survival possible, it also gave it a somewhat unstable, loose, and shifting character. The conflicts among activists (often of romantic origin), contributed to the many factional and organizational divisions that limited the movement’s impact in the revolution of 1989. An organization based on intimate networks, informality, and consensual decision-making may be poorly suited to take full advantage of a revolutionary crisis.

**Mass Meetings**

Mass meetings, which in both countries typically took place in the relative safety of churches, encouraged political activism in two main
ways: First, by their sheer size such meetings seem to have helped certain people overcome a sense of isolation and to have provided them with a sense of security in numbers. “Part of the way oppression works,” U.S. civil rights activist Charlie Cobb has noted, “is that people buy into the oppression and part of the way that you get people to buy into oppression is to convince them that they’re absolutely alone. . . . So part of organizing is showing people that that’s not true.”

The Lutheran Church provided the roof under which many meetings and assemblies could take place in East Germany prior to the mass public demonstrations and public assemblies of fall 1989. The oppositional or alternative groups in the GDR developed a repertoire of political and quasi-political gatherings and church services where organizing, mobilizing, and the dissemination of information could take place. The church played a key role, since it was the only (formally) autonomous institution in the GDR, and some pastors were themselves active in dissent or were sympathetic to the democratic opposition. In addition to peace prayers, vigils on behalf of those arrested, and youth services where political themes were discussed, the church also made space available for seminars, workshops, and exhibitions focusing on alternative culture, human rights, and environmental themes.

Church-based opposition groups made widespread use of peace vigils and information sessions and made contact with Western journalists and human-rights activists in order to overcome the feelings of isolation and fear experienced by those arrested. Peace prayers became the occasion not only for communication and coordination among the alternative groups in the GDR, but especially in Leipzig, weekly peace prayers played the role of assembling activists and protesters before demonstrations, which were usually held outside the church after the service, when protesters would attempt to march, against police resistance, toward a central city square. In the spring and fall of 1989, first hundreds and then thousands began to gather at the Nikolai Church in Leipzig’s inner city. Many of these were young people who had filed formal applications to emigrate to West Germany and were angry at the delays and harassment that accompanied this process. After the peace prayers, some of those in the church would attempt to stage public demonstrations outside of it, even attempting to march to the market square in the face of police cordons and Stasi surveillance.

Second, mass gatherings, especially when they involved impassioned oratory and communal singing, seem to have produced something like a Durkheimian “collective effervescence,” that is, a collective feeling of unusual energy, power, and solidarity. (See also Randall Collins’s dis-
discussion of “emotional energy” in chapter 1 of this volume.) Tiryakian (1995) has noted how the theory of collective effervescence can help to explain the character of spontaneous mass protests in the fall of 1989 in the GDR and other Central European countries. Once large numbers of people began to assemble in public and to express their grievances, the protests expanded rapidly as these demonstrations took on a strikingly emotional character. People had a chance to experience something larger than the sum of their individual grievances—namely, a collective emotional experience of solidarity, hope, and courage.

Protesters in the GDR would often encourage one another with shouts, cheers, chants, and songs. The importance of this is especially clear when protesters faced police beatings and arrests during the demonstrations of September-October 1989. In Dresden in early October a week of protests and clashes with police left hundreds injured and resulted in thousands of arrests. A protester arrested on October 8 reported how the participants maintained high spirits even in the face of mass arrests. The protester was among some three hundred people seized when the police charged the mass of protesters. As this group was being taken into custody and transported, thousands of protesters surged up to the police lines and began to shout their support for those arrested and to applaud their bravery. The result was encouraging: “The expression of sympathy made by people behind the police lines through their applause really had an impression on us and gave us a lot of courage” (“Augenzeugenbericht der Demonstration in Dresden am 8.10.89,” Archiv Bürgerbewegung Leipzig, H1).

When it became clear that the authorities had given up trying to repress the demonstrations, the result was euphoria. The demonstrations of October became expressions of unity, relief, and joy. In this “moment of madness” (Zolberg 1972), strangers hugged and cheered each other on, linked arms, and marched together. They jeered and booed the authorities who tried to ignore them and scolded those people who got too rowdy or tried to provoke violence. At these moments, the demonstrations had the feel of a popular festival. (Lenin once referred to revolutions as “festivals of the oppressed.”)

The powerful way in which mass meetings could excite and energize people in the U.S. civil rights movement—activists called it “freedom high”—is conveyed by an incident in which Martin Luther King Jr. spoke to an audience in Tallahassee, Florida, “with some white racist reporters in attendance.” King preached about oppression, justice, and righteousness, and then, according to the Rev. Daniel Speed,
I saw that lady get up and whoop and scream. I'm talking about a white woman. [A reporter?] Yes. A reporter. She forgot her job. I personally had to get her. She said, “I’m sorry.” I remember Reverend Steele saying, “No, don’t feel sorry, just let it come.” (Quoted in Morris 1984: 98)

Mass meetings were particularly likely to produce a collective effervescence of excitement and zeal when they involved song. “The songs of the [U.S.] civil rights movement,” suggest Eyerman and Jamison,

became sources of collective identity formation not so much by being musically innovative or even commercially successful as by lending themselves to shared performance. Their melodies were simple but emotive, geared to being sung collectively. They invited participation, simple repetitive choruses, and rhyming couplets, with an emotional and political content. (Eyerman and Jamison 1998: 102)

On more than one occasion, song energized and encouraged civil rights protesters during actual confrontations with opponents. According to Eyerman and Jamison,

In 1959 at the end of a workshop at [the] Highlander [Center in Tennessee] the local police burst in, and somebody started to hum “We Shall Overcome.” In the heat of the moment, a young female high school student from Montgomery, Alabama, began to sing a new verse, “We are not afraid” and, according to Bernice Johnson Reagon, this helped give the song “new life and force.” (1998: 4)

Andrew Young (1996: 183) has written that “through the music a great secret was discovered: that black people, otherwise cowed, discouraged, and faced with innumerable and insuperable obstacles, could transcend all those difficulties and forge a new determination, a new faith and strength, when fortified with song. The music was... a bottomless reservoir of spiritual power.” According to Young, during

a freedom meeting in a rural church near Albany [Georgia]... the sheriff and his deputies suddenly crashed into the church, and the people were struck with fear. The sheriff strutted around the church and made his point clear: “We don’t wanna hear no talk
’bout registerin’ to vote in this county . . .” But while he was speaking, the congregation began to hum “We’ll Never Turn Back” softly. As the sheriff moved to the rear of the church and shouted, “There won’t be no Freedom Riders round here . . .” the congregation commenced to sing, still softly. Then the singing became stronger and louder and some sister began to moan till you could hardly hear the sheriff over the singing and moaning. The sheriff didn’t know what to do. He seemed to be afraid to tell the people to shut up. Finally, he and his men just turned their backs and stomped out. Those beautiful people sang the sheriff right out of their church! That was some powerful music. (Young 1996: 183)

Here is how Sally Belfrage, a white civil rights activist, describes her arrest in Greenwood, Mississippi, during the Freedom Summer project of 1964:

I felt a hand seize my arm and shove me toward the bus through thickets of guns and clubs. Up the steps and in, where a dozen or more [protesters] were already pounding, shouting, thumping on the windows, “FREEDOM! FREEDOM! FREEDOM! FREEDOM!” while others in cadence sang: “Ain’t gonna let Chief Lary turn me around, turn me around, turn me around . . .” The bus was packed; it began to move. “FREEDOM! FREEDOM! FREEDOM! FREEDOM!” The shout ripped the air apart as we drove off, building a wild elation and sense of power. If only the movement’s success could be measured like a noise contest, I thought irrelevantly, remembering the applause meters on TV quiz shows, and shouted. (Belfrage 1965: 138–39)

Finally, here is Young’s description of a march in St. Augustine, Florida, whose destination was the town’s old slave market:

The white onlookers were screaming for blood, and I was trying hard not to show my fear. We made a circle and I talked with the marchers. I had reminded our marchers at Shiloh Baptist Church that we would have no real protection from the police, and that we weren’t in any position to take responsibility for anyone’s life. “Now is the time to turn around,” I said, “for any of you that don’t want to go. We won’t think ill of you, we won’t talk about
you, but some of us must go on.” We prayed. A woman started singing “Be Not Dismayed, What E’er Be the Tide, God Will Take Care of You,” a song that we sang so often during those days. Without waiting for the song to conclude, I started out the door of the church and headed toward the slave market downtown. (Young 1996: 292)

Mass meetings and demonstrations also involved a great deal of singing in the GDR, including “Donna nobis pacem” (“Lord grant us peace”), but also “We Shall Overcome” and the “Internationale.” Especially in the fall of 1989, these songs were sung as an appeal for peace, to encourage fellow protesters, and to give demonstrators a sense of purpose and identification with a larger tradition of protest. Later in 1989 and 1990, patriotic songs were sung (including the national anthem of the GDR and later of the Federal Republic), most notably during the unexpected fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989.

**Identification with the Movement**

Mass meetings were one of several factors that helped people manage their fears by encouraging their identification with the mass movement or with the larger population that the movement sought to represent (i.e., African-Americans or East Germans as a whole). This new identity was particularly effective in eliciting courageous behavior because the movements themselves were understood to be righteous and their eventual triumph inevitable. In the U.S. case, people were often called upon in mass meetings to stand up and explicitly declare themselves part of the movement.

This process of collective identification—or re-identification—is well known to movement scholars, who have emphasized the importance of collective identities for solving the “free-rider problem” and otherwise sustaining commitment to movements. What has received less attention is the way in which collective identities help people to manage their fears. For fears clearly weigh more or less heavily upon people depending on their identities. The prospect of harm or injury is clearly more salient to isolated individuals who weigh such costs solely in terms of their own individual utility than it is to people who view themselves as but a small part of a much larger and irrepressible movement. Quite a number of interviews that we examined belittle or downplay individual fears given the overriding collective and historical importance of the movements in
each country. As John Lewis became increasingly involved in the civil rights struggle, for example, he reports that he “began believing in what I call the Spirit of History”:

It is the essence of the moral force of the universe, and at certain points in life, in the flow of human existence and circumstances, this force, this spirit, finds you or selects you, it chases you down, and you have no choice; you must allow yourself to be used, to be guided by this force and to carry out what must be done. To me, that concept of surrender, of giving yourself over to something inexorable, something so much larger than yourself, is the basis of what we call faith. . . . It’s an absolutely selfless thing. . . . It is a process of giving over one’s very being to whatever role history chooses for you. (Lewis 1998: 73)

Or consider the following words from a sermon by Andrew Young, delivered during the civil rights campaign in Birmingham, Alabama, in 1963:

We have no choice as to whether we will die. We all will die. But we can decide that dying in the cause of freedom for our families, our friends, in the cause of justice, is preferable to dying in an automobile accident, or from cancer or alcoholism. . . . Dr. King says, “A man who has not found something he is willing to die for has not found something he is willing to live for.” We want you to believe in that, and to support our movement, not for us, not for Dr. King, but for your own interests, your own families. (Young 1996: 218)

Compare Young’s words of encouragement with those of Pastor Christoph Wonneberger in September 1989 at the traditional Monday peace prayers in the Nikolai Church in Leipzig:

We have fear, I think, all of us. . . . But “Be not afraid! To me is given all power in heaven and earth,” so said Jesus once. That was not a threat. That is and was not desperation. No apparatus of power stands behind it. “To me is given all power,” that means inner confidence and inner strength, that means credibility and it means for me true competence, complete power. And I take part in this when I think responsibly, when I speak honestly, when my actions are transparent. I invite you to do the same today. Against true power stands the Stasi [secret police] apparatus, the army
units, and the police dogs. But they are only paper tigers. Do not be afraid! (Quoted in Dietrich and Schwabe 1994: 419)

On October 9, 1989, in Leipzig, a major confrontation between the growing protest movement and the police and army was widely expected. Tensions were high and the regime had already publicly threatened demonstrators that it might be necessary to halt the movement “with a weapon in hand.” The traditional Monday evening peace prayer at the Nikolai Church was already overfilled with more and more people filling the square. Church officials opened a second church nearby for another service. The pastor presiding over the service reports that he was terrified that violence would erupt but that he did not want to discourage peaceful protests. In his sermon he “spoke about the peaceful example of Martin Luther King and how he confronted fear without resorting to violence and did not shrink in the face of intimidation” (Hans-Jürgen Sievers, “Eine Zweite Kirchen öffnet sich,” Archiv Bürgerbewegung Leipzig, H1).

**Shaming**

In the U.S. case, shaming served as an encouragement mechanism by increasing the costs to individuals of not participating in protest events and by encouraging potential protesters to identify with the aspirations and travails of the larger black community. “Throughout the movement,” according to Young,

> the men were usually the last to become involved, always using the reason that they didn’t believe in a nonviolent response to violent provocations. This was more an excuse than anything else. I began challenging the men as they went into the pool halls and bars, attempting to shame them for letting the women and children carry the movement. I told them, “You won’t have to turn the other cheek. Anytime there are fifty men in one of our demonstrations the Klan won’t touch us!” (Young 1996: 295)

Belfrage writes that at a mass meeting in Greenwood, Mississippi, on the evening that the bodies of civil rights workers James Chaney, Andrew Goodman, and Michael Schwerner were found,

> Brother Williams reserved his scoldings for other matters than this or that failure to go down to the courthouse [to register to vote]. Of . . . all the young people who were forging out justice with the
only tools they had, he said, “Let me tell you, these chillun doin’ what you scared to do. These chillun ain’t scared o’ the white folks. You ought to be ashamed!” And then, from him, a new note: “If the white man ain’t scared to die wrong, he oughtn’t t’be scared to die right. If they ain’t scared to go to hell, they oughtn’t t’be scared to go to heaven!” People at the meeting were getting angry at each other. A woman stood and berated those who still bought from the Snow Frost stand in Johnson Street. Negroes always had to buy at an outsider counter. . . . Now the woman shouted furiously, “I seen you all at the Snow Frost, standin’ out there lappin’ cream like a crowd o’ hungry cats. You buyin’ segregation! You got to have some race pride!” (Belfrage 1965: 181–82)

James Farmer, the head of CORE (Congress of Racial Equality), recounts how he was shamed into joining a dangerous Freedom Ride:

I tried to fink out, I must confess. . . . The two buses were there, and they got on the buses, and I helped them put their luggage in and get on the bus, and I said, “Well, bye.” [Laughs] And one of the CORE girls, Doris Castle, a girl from New Orleans, said, “Jim, you’re going with us, aren’t you?” I said, “Doris, I’ve been away from the office now for three weeks, and mail has piled up and somebody has to mind the store . . .” She said, “Jim, please.” I said, “Get my luggage out of the car and put it on the goddamn bus. I’m going.” How was I going to face her afterwards if something happened, and I had finked out? (Quoted in Raines 1977: 123–24; emphasis in original)

According to John Lewis (1998: 168), Farmer “would admit later on that he was, in his own words, simply ‘scared shitless.’ . . . Shame got the better part of Farmer.”

Martin Luther King Jr. himself was allegedly shamed into civil rights activism during the early days of the Montgomery bus boycott. E. D. Nixon told a group of concerned citizens that “you all are too scared to stand on your feet and be counted. You oughta make up your mind right now that you gon’ either admit you a grown man or concede to the fact that you are a bunch of scared boys.” The provocation had its intended effect: “King hollered that he wasn’t no coward, that nobody called him a coward” (quoted in Raines 1977: 49). The twenty-six-
year-old King immediately assumed the presidency of the Montgomery Improvement Association.

In the East German case, friends often encouraged each other to attend the demonstrations in the fall of 1989 by invoking one’s duty to do something and by suggesting that it was wrong to sit at home while others were risking their lives. There is considerable evidence, moreover, that protesters tried to shame the police and security forces. When demonstrators passed by Stasi officers or administrative buildings they often shouted things like “Parasites!,” “Get into the factories!,” and “We earn your bread!” Police and army troops deployed to disperse or control demonstrations were often confronted with shouts of “No Violence” and “Brother join us” up until the point at which they made arrests or used violence, after which they were confronted with “We are the people” and “Shame on you” (“Schämt euch!”). For example, at one demonstration in Dresden on October 7, demonstrators facing police orders to disperse from public places encouraged each other with shouts of “We are staying here, we want reforms,” and “Join us, we need every man.” After the police attacked, they shouted “Shame on you!” A protester arrested that evening reports that the police were “not very enthusiastic” about arresting protesters and seemed ashamed of what they were forced to do after night upon night of confrontations (“Erlebnisbericht der Demonstration in Dresden am 7.10.89,” Archiv Bürgerbewegung Leipzig, H1). Oberschall cites the case of a Berlin woman who confronted the police with the statement “I could be your grandmother and you stand there with your truncheon.” After being confronted by a different woman in Leipzig, a policeman said, “Leave us alone, we just want to go home” (Oberschall 1996: 114).

The church-based groups in the GDR generally avoided confrontation with the state. Fearing repression and under pressure to moderate their demands and actions by church officials eager to accommodate the state, more militant action was typically avoided. In the spring of 1989 the growing opposition movement came under pressure from both the state and church officials who hoped to limit the political activities of the church-based groups. Protesters after the Monday peace prayers were arrested in large numbers, and the church leadership threatened to deny the democracy movement support. But demands for a more militant confrontation with the state were growing within the movement. In the midst of the conflict, theology student and democracy activist Michael Arnold from the Leipzig group Initiativ Gruppe Leben gave a sermon at the Monday peace prayer on May 8 that called on activists and supporters to intensify their efforts and ignore efforts to constrain their work. His tactic
was to compare the inactivity of the East German civil rights movement with the militant direct action of the U.S. civil rights movement. He wanted to shame church officials and activists alike into more active opposition to the state:

We say that we are duty bound to bear public witness to the message of Christ’s evangelism. Public witness involves spiritual work but it just as clearly embraces demonstrations. Let us consider Martin Luther King, who called on people from his pulpit to join the protest demonstrations against racism. . . . We are guilty when people are shot crossing the borders of our country because they can find no other way to escape their problems. Let us now begin and never stop to speak the truth both privately and publicly. Let us overcome the fear that makes us tolerate injustice. (M. Arnold, “Auftrag und Dienst der Kirche,” Archiv Bürgerbewegung Leipzig, H1)

**Guns**

As noted, two additional encouragement mechanisms were also operative only in the U.S. case: the possession of firearms and a belief in the divine protection of movement participants.

While the U.S. civil rights movement was famously nonviolent (at least until 1965 or so), and most activists would never have permitted firearms at rallies or marches, they wisely refrained from encouraging southern blacks to get rid of the guns that they owned. In fact, the interviews that we have examined suggest that quite a few participants in the movement felt less vulnerable because they kept guns in their homes (see also Tyson 1999). The poet Lorraine Hansberry no doubt spoke for many African-Americans when she wrote, “Negroes must concern themselves with every single means of struggle: legal, illegal, passive, active, violent, non-violent. They must harass, debate, petition . . . sit in, sing hymns . . . and shoot from their windows when racists come cruising through their communities” (quoted in Brinkley 2000: 116). Consider the following examples:

[Interviewer]:  Martin Luther King talked about nonviolence, but you shot back. How did other civil rights workers react to that?
[Robert Cooper Howard]:  . . . All I was doin’ was protectin’ myself. . . . See, the onliest way to break the sneakin’ around at night is you gonna have to be ready for it. They would sneak
around and then laugh about it. But it happen they got
cought that time, and that absolutely stopped it. . . . I felt
that you’re in your house, ain’t botherin’ nobody, the only
thang you hunting is equal justice. An’ they gonna sneak by
at night, burn your house, or shoot in there. And you gonna
sit there and take all of it? (YROCC 1991: 94)

[Interviewer]: How did you overcome fear?
[Leola Blackmon]: I tell you the truth: I never had no fear. . . .
That night when they set up that cross afire at my house, I
didn’t notice it was a cross until they threw the match. I
thought to cut ’em down, but I didn’t. I just let some bullets
through behind ’em. I had a rifle. It would shoot sixteen
times, and I just lit out up there and started shooting.

[Interviewer]: Did most people have a gun at home, and were
they prepared to use it?
[Blackmon]: Yeah, all of us that was involved.
[Interviewer]: How did that work with what Dr. Martin Luther
King was saying about how the Movement was nonviolent?
[Blackmon]: Well, we said nonviolent when we was protesting
the school buses; nobody not s’posed to fight. But that fight
was brought on because we were looking for them to hit us.
And we had got prepared to accept that. (YROCC 1991: 175)

Charles Evers, the brother of NAACP field director Medgar Evers
(who was assassinated in 1963), claims that Medgar “was nonviolent,
but he had six guns in the kitchen and living room. He needed them”
(1997: 117). (Charles Evers’s autobiography, interestingly, is titled Have
No Fear [1997].) Evers adds:

Before ’63, the FBI did almost nothing for civil rights. . . . Some-
one recently made a movie called Mississippi Burning, which
painted the FBI as our friends, and to this day many whites be-
lieve the FBI stood for civil rights. That’s dead wrong. I was there,
I know. I never relied on the FBI for anything. I trusted to God, to
other Negroes, and to my .45 pistol. Not always in that order.
(Evers 1997: 114)

There is no evidence, by contrast, that civil rights activists or pro-
testers in the GDR possessed firearms. The East German state’s monopo-
lization of the means of violence was virtually total.
Divine Protection

Finally, some interviews suggest that at least some participants in the U.S. movement believed that God would protect them from harm:

[Interviewer]: How did you overcome your fears?
[Robert Cooper Howard]: My fear just finally grew out of me. . . . I had faith the Almighty would protect me. Right gonna win. (YROCC 1991: 98)

[Interviewer]: Were you scared that first time you went over there [to the railroad station] and sat with [whites]?
[Viola Winters]: They sho’ was, but I still didn’t get afraid. That didn’t stop me. I asked the Lord to take care o’ me and just went on out there. I overcome fear by keep goin’. (YROCC 1991: 84)

Statements such as these are intertwined with, but seem to express something more than, a belief that the cause was just and victory inevitable (“Right gonna win”). The latter belief, after all, is compatible with a fully secular outlook—consider the traditional Marxist belief in the inevitability of proletarian revolution. These and similar statements also reflect a belief in a compassionate God who both listens to (“I asked the Lord . . .”) and actively protects the faithful. Such a belief, for which we find no evidence in the case of the East German movement, despite the strong religious convictions of many of its participants, must have been greatly encouraging for those who shared it.

Conclusion

For more than a decade, scholarship on work and organizations has tried to incorporate theoretical insights from the sociological analysis of emotions (see, e.g., Hochschild 1983; Fineman 1993; Leidner 1993; Pierce 1995; Kleinman 1996). During this same period, however, social movement scholars have unfortunately neglected the sociology of emotions, preferring to talk about hard “structures” and rational action, implicitly equating emotions with irrationality (see Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta 2000). We hope this chapter, by contrast, has demonstrated the utility to social movement analysis of attending to emotions and emotional labor.
We hope it is clear, moreover, that the value of “bringing emotions back into” social movement research lies, for us, not simply in uncovering and thereby describing more fully the experiential or intersubjective dimension of history—although this is surely important. Rather, bringing emotions back in also promises, more fundamentally, a better causal understanding of the “nuts and bolts” (Elster 1989) of popular mobilization, including a better grasp of factors like social networks, collective identities, and shared beliefs—factors that we imagined we already understood. Most high-risk social movements, and perhaps others as well, probably require considerable management or mitigation of their members’ fears. This was accomplished in the cases of the U.S. and East German civil rights movements through intimate support networks, mass gatherings, the shaming of participants and opponents, and other identifiable mechanisms.

We believe that emotions are important to examine not simply as another set of independent variables, then, but as crucial components of familiar sociological concepts and causal processes. It is simply impossible to grasp the general causal mechanisms that are implicated in processes of popular mobilization and historical change without attending to the emotional dynamics on which many if not most such mechanisms are dependent. Our wager is that this sort of emotional sociology, as we have called it, will open up broad new avenues of understanding for analysts of social movements.

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Endnotes

1. For purposes of this chapter, we simply take as “given” the high-risk character of these movements, although the general emotional climate of fear in which they navigated is amply documented by our primary data sources.
2. We examined the following oral histories: Raines 1977 and the Youth of the Rural Organizing and Cultural Center [YROCC] 1991 for the U.S. civil rights movement, and Lindner and Grueneberger 1992, Neues Forum Leipzig 1990, and Philipsen 1993 for the East German movement. In all, we examined approximately 102,600 words of text for the U.S. case and 111,900 words of text for the East German case. Nari Choi, Jordon Peugh, and Michael P. Young assisted us in this research.

3. The primary limitation of the data utilized in this chapter is undoubtedly their silence concerning those who did not participate in the two movements that we are examining. The oral histories that we have examined, for example, do not include interviews with nonparticipants; in sociologese, our data sample or select on the dependent variable. However, this problem is mitigated to a large extent by the fact that we are less interested in why specific people joined these movements than in why participants engaged in, and persisted in engaging in, high-risk activities.

4. Similar patterns of emotional ties and community building can be seen in movements outside of the GDR’s (and the Southern civil rights movement’s) authoritarian context. Examples include the nonviolent direct action groups within the peace and ecology movements of the United States during the 1970s and 1980s which Epstein (1991) has studied.
Conclusion

Second that Emotion?: Lessons from Once-Novel Concepts in Social Movement Research

Francesca Polletta and Edwin Amenta

Applying new concepts to old areas in sociology carries with it enormous potential. New concepts may complement existing theories by filling gaps in their claims, or, more daringly, they may provide different and better explanations for processes explained by previous theories. By highlighting previously unaddressed issues, they may suggest new questions and open up new lines of research.

The social movement literature provides some well-known examples. When sociologists began to see organizations in collective action rather than just atomized individuals and social contagion, they not only refuted claims that protest was irrational and protesters social isolates but also drew on organization theory to generate new hypotheses about movements’ emergence and trajectories. When students of Western European mobilizations around nuclear energy, local autonomy, and homosexuality argued that these “new social movements” differed from earlier movements in seeking recognition for new identities rather than political and economic concessions, they prompted wide attention to the role of identity in all movements—new and old.

New approaches bring dangers with them as well, however. Scholars may define a new concept so broadly or vaguely as to make it difficult to use in constructing plausible theoretical arguments. They may highlight a neglected dimension of social movements without specifying what outcome or process it is meant to explain, or its contribution to ex-
plaining protest may be a trivial one. An intriguing concept may be impossible to operationalize and arguments based on it therefore impossible to substantiate.

The social movement literature provides instances of the downside of innovation, too. When they were new, ideas such as resources, collective identity, frames, free spaces, movement impacts, poor people’s movements, and political opportunities brought with them analytical problems, not all of which have been resolved. For instance, scholars still employ concepts such as “free spaces” and “identity” in vastly different ways (Polletta 1998; Polletta and Jasper 2001). Scholars also struggle to define political opportunities in ways that are not overly broad, and to connect specific opportunities to specific movement outcomes and processes (McAdam 1996). “Resources” have been expanded in some accounts to include anything that makes protest possible—producing an argument that is difficult either to refute or establish (Steinberg 1998). Movements undoubtedly have “cultural impacts” (Amenta and Young 1999), but these have not been well conceptualized, much less assessed and explained.

The challenge is to demonstrate, rather than just state, that the new concept matters, and to show when and where it matters. How well has recent work on emotions in social movements responded to that challenge? The question can be divided into four parts: (1) Have scholars made arguments based on emotions that convincingly fill gaps in existing models, for example, by supplying mediating mechanisms or extending the model to previously unaddressed processes? (2) Have scholars employing emotions advanced coherent and empirically appraisable alternative explanations for aspects of movements’ emergence, trajectory, or fates? (3) Have these arguments been substantiated in research? (4) Have scholars identified wholly new questions that we need to answer in order to understand social movements? We give an emphatic yes to the first question, but increasingly more qualified assessments as we move down the list. In exploring these answers we concentrate on the tasks left undone and the problems confronting those who would do them, drawing on the experiences of other once-novel concepts in social movement research. These concepts help us identify parallel problems and ways around them.

**Filling In and Going Beyond Political Process Explanations**

Many of the essays collected here can be read as supplements and correctives to the dominant political process model. Their authors aim to dislodge narrow constructions of the model’s key explanatory vari-
ables—political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and collective action frames. They do so by opening up black boxes in causal chains, identifying new mediating mechanisms, and extending the models to previously uncharted terrain.

Consider political process theorists’ argument that people mobilize when political realignments make it more likely that extra-institutional protest will have substantial impact. People have to believe that the opportunities are there; thus the importance of what McAdam (1982) calls “cognitive liberation” in which people come to believe that insurgency will be effective. The emotions come from optimism and confidence: people mobilize “on the basis of some optimistic assessment of the prospects for successful insurgency weighted against the risks involved in each action” (1982: 34). Closer attention to the emotions that actually precede and accompany protest, however, suggests something different. First, people are often motivated by anger, indignation, fear, compassion, or a sense of obligation, not optimism about the possibilities of securing political concessions through extra-institutional protest. And second, even when protesters’ main feeling is one of optimism, it is based on more complex perceptions and assessments than a calculation of the objective probabilities of substantial political impact.

Both points are illustrated in black southerners’ experience of the landmark Brown v. Board of Education ruling. As the editors note in the introduction, the 1954 decision, while a tremendous victory for the movement, brought increased violence and intimidation against blacks by southern whites. As Adam Fairclough (1986) points out in his account of the 1955 Montgomery bus boycott, it was blacks’ anger at the white racism unleashed by Brown that led them to mount a full-scale assault on segregated busing rather than the more moderate compromise arrangement they had originally sought. This decision may have motivated protest more through white backlash and black indignation than through its demonstration of a receptive political system.

Similarly, as Elisabeth Jean Wood shows in her chapter, Salvadoran peasants mobilized not because they saw new potential for undermining a repressive regime, nor because they hoped to gain material benefits like access to land or freedom from control by state forces. These were available to residents in contested areas whether they participated or not. Rather, they sought dignity. They protested to reclaim the sense of agency that had been denied them in years of political and economic marginalization. Like others in the volume, Wood demonstrates the inadequacy of viewing the decision to protest as a cool assessment of costs and benefits and the probability of success.
Several other authors in this volume provide analyses that may refine or extend political process accounts. Sharon Nepstad and Chris Smith show that the prior networks theorists have identified as crucial to mobilization supply not only information but sympathy, trust, and emotional identification. When American churchgoers heard about U.S. actions in Central America, their prior contacts with Central American refugees and clergy made that information trustworthy—and personally galling. Nancy Whittier responds to a major gap in recent theorizing on movement “framing” by identifying some of the factors that shape and constrain activists’ framing of injustice and its victims. The legal changes that opened up new opportunities for adult survivors of sexual abuse to press claims also structured the kinds of emotional displays considered appropriate in those settings.

The next step for scholars of emotions is to specify just what kinds of changes in existing models are compelled by these emotion-rich analyses. For example, if we recognize that indignation and anger often accompany protest, do we then want to argue that these emotions can generate a social movement even in the absence of what scholars have called political opportunities? Or is the indignation sharpened, experienced by more people, or responded to differently in the context of political opportunities? How far do analysts want to go in revising the political process model and the assumptions on which it rests? If activists talk more about dignity than about material interests, does this mean that they are not motivated to protest by the latter? In what kinds of movements is this likely to be the case? The analytical challenge in these cases is to specify the relation between newly recognized emotional processes and existing explanations for mobilization.

Other writers in the volume are more explicit in challenging key tenets of the political process model. They take up the model’s building blocks—opportunities, mobilizing structures, and frames—not to refine but to rebut the model. Movements are dependent neither on political opportunities nor on prior networks, they argue. James Jasper (1997: 106) argues notably that “moral shocks” can raise “such a sense of outrage in a person that she becomes inclined toward political action, with or without the network of personal contacts emphasized in mobilization and process theories.”

Deborah Gould challenges political opportunity arguments by way of this concept. She argues that militant AIDS activism emerged at a time when lesbians, gay men, and AIDS advocates lacked access to political power and influential allies, benefited from no splits in ruling alignments, and confronted increasingly repressive legislation. Yet a 1986 Supreme
Court ruling upholding a Georgia anti-sodomy statute nevertheless galvanized militant protest around the country. *Bowers v. Hardwick* confronted gays and lesbians with the extent of their marginality and in doing so crystallized their anger at the government’s inaction on AIDS. When experienced as a “declaration of war,” what might be viewed as a constriction of political opportunities can produce the kind of rage that compels protest.

In another challenge to political process theories, several authors point out that people may develop such a strong emotional identification with a cause that they join organizations in which they don’t know anyone. They are motivated neither by selective incentives nor by prior obligations to co-workers, congregation, or community. Instead, it may be a religious sensibility—a temperament—that commands participation on behalf of people they have read about, as Michael Young shows in his account of Protestant evangelicals’ embrace of a militant abolitionism.

These challenges to the dominant political process account are provocative and sometimes persuasive. They would be strengthened, however, by better specifying the conditions in which particular emotional dynamics are likely to occur. We can take a cue from one of the missteps of earlier theories. As critics have observed (e.g., Amenta forthcoming), political process analyses have had a post-hoc quality—calling “opportunity” any political development that preceded mobilization. The concept of “moral shock” is one of the most intriguing in emotions theorist’s repertoire, but it is susceptible to the same overextension. Virtually any event or new piece of information can be called in retrospect a moral shock. So we need to ask what it is about certain events that create such anger, outrage, and indignation in those exposed to them that they are driven to protest. Are some *kinds of issues* more likely to generate moral shocks than others? Do moral shocks have any relation to what are usually counted as political opportunities?

To continue with the example of 1980s AIDS activism, Gould points out that the *Bowers v. Hardwick* decision was by no means the first indication of the government’s indifference to the concerns of gay, lesbian, and AIDS activists. Yet previous government action and inaction had been met with stoicism, prayer vigils, community service, and quiet lobbying. This was a function, Gould argues, of lesbians’ and gay men’s continuing ambivalence about their homosexuality—they were proud but also ashamed. Why then did *Bowers v. Hardwick* have such an effect? Gould’s account suggests several different possibilities. One is that it simply came after a series of governmental betrayals that were already shifting the emotion culture of gay and lesbian activists from acceptance
to rage. So the moral shock was not such a shock after all but simply confirmation of what had been felt, if inchoately, before. Would militant AIDS activism then have emerged even without *Bowers v. Hardwick*, if probably somewhat later? An alternative explanation for *Bowers v. Hardwick*’s impact lies in the decision itself, and perhaps in the emotionality that surrounds judgments about rights in the United States. That explanation suggests we look to Supreme Court decisions, or perhaps high-profile judicial decisions generally, to find likely moral shocks. A third possibility is that the importance of emotion work historically in gay and lesbian movements—of changing how people feel about themselves and others—predisposed activists to turn emotional affronts into collective action, and made them skilled in doing so. Emotional affronts may galvanize action when there is a history of activism that emphasizes emotional transformation.

Together, these alternatives suggest that collective action motivated by indignation rather than political opportunities may be more likely in some political contexts than others (after a series of governmental affronts), in response to certain kinds of governmental actions (rights rulings), and for certain movements (those that emphasize emotion work). Specifying *when* moral shocks are likely to occur seems crucial. Otherwise, we risk the circularity characteristic of some political process arguments: anything that preceded protest was a political opportunity—or, here, a moral shock.

We can ask the same kinds of questions with respect to other emotional processes. Is the ambivalence that Gould describes characteristic of all groups whose difference is treated as deviance? If the changed religious beliefs of evangelical Christians motivated their activism against slavery, as Young argues, then under what conditions more broadly are religious beliefs likely to be transformed into political action? Among whom are such beliefs likely to lead to political action? Under what circumstances are people likely to battle for their dignity, as did the campesinos Wood studied, rather than for material benefits?

Note that these conditions are likely to be cultural as much as structural, to include distinctive ways of seeing the world as much as formal rules and resources. To understand why “dignity” or “interest” dominates participants’ self-accounts, we need to know much more about the broader emotion cultures within which protest unfolds. Several writers in this volume identify the “rules” for feeling and expressing emotions (Hochschild 1979) that operate within a movement. But emotion cultures extend beyond particular movements, and they encompass more than dominant feeling rules. They include also “social epistemologies of emo-
tion” (Thoits 1989): beliefs about who is likely to experience what kinds of emotions, how emotions affect behavior, how emotions are repressed or expressed or transformed, beliefs about the dynamics of emotional “contagion,” about the effects of emotional “repression” or “denial,” about the relationship between affect and biology, etc. In social movements, they include the assumptions that activists as well as nonactivists make about what particular emotions signify, how emotions should be interpreted and expressed, and how they should be responded to.

Analyzing such cultures can help to develop more accurate models of individual and group choice than those currently dominant in social movement research. Simply revealing the variety of individual motivations that accompany protest has allowed emotions researchers to expose the inadequacy of cost-benefit-calculating rational actor models. To go beyond simply describing the varied motivations evident in protest, however, and instead begin to account for them, emotions researchers should try to explain why a particular “vocabulary of motives” (Mills 1940) comes to prevail within a historical period. Why did “rage” become a legitimate rationale for protest in the 1960s? Thomas Haskell (1985) argues that the rise of capitalism made “empathy” into a strong and common emotion (see also C. Taylor [1989] on the rise of benevolence). Can we trace the predominance of other emotions at different times to structural factors such as transformations in the state, capital, or other institutions?

Theorizing the consequences of emotion cultures is also a way to counter the instrumentalist bias of reigning models, not only in accounting for people’s decisions to participate, but in explaining movements’ trajectories. Activists’ understandings of efficacy and appropriateness, their views of what is feasible and what is rational, are all shaped by the cultures they inhabit. So, for example, the animal rights activists interviewed by Julian Groves often used the term “emotional” to criticize activists they considered unprofessional, irrational, or feminine—that is, if they were women. Men’s expressions of emotion, especially anger, were considered legitimate. The female activists who made up the bulk of the movement believed that it was necessary to substantiate their feelings about animal cruelty with scientific arguments and the support of men. Their insights were probably right, but they nevertheless reveal activists’ normative assumptions about gender, feeling, and rationality.

The authors in this volume argue persuasively that movement tasks ranging from recruiting members and sustaining their participation (Jeff Goodwin and Stephen Pfaff) to securing public support and winning legal battles (Nancy Whittier) depend on activists’ capacity to elicit, manage,
and transform people’s emotions. But leaving it at that, and viewing emotions only as the raw materials for activists’ mobilization efforts, risks the same instrumentalist bias that has limited political process accounts. To understand why activists choose the strategies, tactics, targets, and organizational forms they do, we need to understand that emotions configure their very criteria of instrumental rationality.

In sum, theorists of emotions might simultaneously be more cautious and bolder in their claims. They should demonstrate how their theories improve on existing models by better specifying the conditions in which the alternative processes they describe are likely to operate. But they should also be bolder in theorizing about the role of emotions in shaping activists’ assumptions about strategy, rationality, and interest.

Methodological Issues in Assessing Emotions and Supporting Claims about the Influence of Emotions on Social Movements

Whenever scholars make theoretical claims that complement or replace political process arguments, methodological strategies are key to supporting these claims. Some of the methodological challenges faced by scholars of movement emotions are similar to those confronting most movement scholars. These are standard problems, and there are well known ways to get around them. Yet the subject matter of emotions also poses unique methodological dilemmas.

The standard style of social movement research—case studies of individual movements or movement organizations—makes it possible to cast doubt on theoretical claims, but difficult to support them in more than an illustrative or anecdotal manner. It is difficult to gain enough observations in a case study to substantiate empirical claims beyond showing that the evidence for the case at hand is consistent with one’s theoretical claims. But without comparative evidence it is difficult to cast doubt on other plausible explanations. For example, if one scholar is claiming that a moral shock motivated movement activity while another is arguing for a political opportunity, and both seemed to be present, how would one adjudicate between them?

Like other scholars in this area, researchers attempting to establish the importance of emotions in answering standard questions about social movements need to do more work in substantiating their claims. A common strategy is to compare cases to ascertain whether one argument is better supported than another. One might compare across many movements, as William Gamson (1990) did to address the success and failure of a large number of American challengers. One might also make com-
parisons across smaller numbers of largely similar challengers. For in-
stance, comparing movements supposedly influenced by moral shocks
with movements not subject to shocks may be a useful research strategy.
Such a comparison would aid in appraising arguments about the impact
of moral shocks as well as in elucidating the emotional processes thought
to be involved. Benefits of the small-N comparison can be seen in Rebecca
Allahyari’s contribution to the volume. She argues that the very different
emotional orientations of two voluntary organizations, The Salvation
Army and Loaves & Fishes, were responsible for their contrasting styles
of activism on behalf of the homeless. Whereas The Salvation Army had
an ideology and identity centered on rehabilitation, Loaves & Fishes’
“felt politics of caring” was centered on compassion. This comparison
helps to support her claim that the groups’ distinctive emotion cultures
shaped their orientation toward political activity. Allahyari might de-
velop the point further by comparing groups that were more similar than
these two. Unlike Loaves & Fishes, The Salvation Army relied largely on
state funding and was staffed largely by beneficiaries rather than con-
science constituencies—conditions that may have inhibited political ac-
tion. It would be worth exploring other groups with private funding and
conscience constituencies but with different emotion cultures than that
of Loaves & Fishes in order to establish what it was about its felt politics
that induced political action.

Even for those working with one challenger, there are comparative
opportunities to appraise claims. One is to examine a movement or simi-
lar challengers across polities in which they mobilized (Kitschelt 1986;
Jasper 1990; Amenta and Zylan 1991). For instance, comparing activists’
claims-making in legal systems that diverge from the American one would
help to develop Whittier’s argument that abuse survivors’ emotional dis-
plays in court accommodated features of their legal setting. To take an-
other example, gay rights movements have mobilized throughout West-
ern Europe, and undoubtedly have had different experiences with respect
to moral shocks. Another related methodological strategy is to follow a
challenger historically, or upstream and downstream, as Charles Tilly
(1999) puts it.

In studies at a lower level of analysis, where the focus is on people’s
participation in protest, one can compare participants with otherwise
similar persons who did not participate, as Doug McAdam (1988) did
in his examination of volunteers in the Freedom Summer project. This
sort of comparison is useful in supporting claims that certain emotional
states underlie movement participation. In her chapter, Arlene Stein ar-
gues that feelings of shame motivated Christian right activists. Those
feelings were induced by prior experiences of economic or social hardship such as drug problems or bad relationships. To further buttress these claims, she might interview evangelical Christians who had suffered similar hardships but who did not turn to anti-gay protest. Along the same lines, Nepstad and Smith might interview Central American peace-movement participants who were not members of communities of faith in order to strengthen their argument about the role of church networks in building moral outrage. Gould might interview gay men and lesbians not involved in AIDS activism.

Analyzing movement emotions also presents methodological difficulties that go beyond the ones common in movement research, however. The first involves conceptualizing emotions in ways that can guide empirical research. The same problem has confronted those studying “resources.” Just as it is possible to identify almost anything as a “resource,” so the wide standard usage of “emotion” makes it easy to define terms broadly, perhaps too broadly. Also, scholars may disagree on how to conceptualize emotions, hindering research. Most of the contributors to the volume use them in the standard noun form. People have emotions and manage and act on them. Colin Barker suggests that emotions should be thought of as coloring cognition and should be employed in an adjectival or adverbial way. A lack of clarity on conceptual matters will make it difficult to formulate and appraise theoretical claims. If, for instance, indignation is left loosely defined, it may be possible for scholars to see it almost everywhere or only rarely, or confuse it with resentment or pique or outrage.

The only way out of this difficulty is conceptual clarity. Many of the contributors to the volume do well in identifying specific emotions and distinguishing them from other, similar ones. In the introduction, the editors indicate that emotions can be arrayed across two continua, according to their length and to the degree to which they are directed at specific objects. They suggest that certain long-term and object-oriented emotions are most likely to lead to social movement activity. One could go further perhaps in identifying the types of action one would expect from specific long-term and object-oriented emotions. Or one could hypothesize standard sequences in which undirected and short-term emotions are transformed into the long-term and object-oriented emotions hypothesized to lead to protest—as from unfocused anger to directed indignation or outrage—and the conditions under which such transformations would occur.

Other methodological challenges have to do with gaining the evidence needed to support claims about the prevalence and character of
emotions in collective action. In some circumstances emotions in general carry negative societal evaluations, and certain emotions almost always do. These evaluations and the sanctions that often accompany them provide good reasons for people to manage their emotions—to channel them in certain approved directions or to maintain that they have done so. Because our emotions are often fleeting and because we are often compelled to attempt to manage them, it seems likely that we can manage to forget or revise our more inconvenient emotional impulses. Probably anyone who has kept a journal has been surprised by the feelings expressed in previous entries. One’s feelings often change over time, and one’s emotions at one time may be overwhelmed or transformed by one’s reactions to intervening events. Similarly, former movement participants may retrospectively exaggerate emotions or make them correspond to current feelings or what are deemed more culturally appropriate feelings. It is probably difficult to get interviewees to admit having been animated by short-term, undirected, and negative emotions like hate, envy, or boredom, even if they were. Gaining reliable information on people’s emotions may therefore pose problems that go beyond those involved in reconstructing activists’ programmatic statements and political beliefs. Because there are good reasons to manage and hide one’s feelings, it may be difficult to rely on retrospective accounts of emotions by activists.

These problems are not insuperable. Sociologists may need to rely, in the manner of historians, on primary materials that provide little opportunity for face-saving, after-the-fact emotional reconstruction—such as diaries, contemporaneous testimony, transcripts of meetings, and other statements and actions recorded at about the time they happened. Participant observation is probably even more useful, perhaps with the researcher including the trajectory of his or her own feelings.

Several of the authors in this volume rely on psychoanalytical concepts that are sophisticated and promising, but that also pose unusual challenges for researchers. Determining whether shame motivates certain kinds of movement activity, to take Stein’s chapter again, requires a style of interviewing that few sociologists are trained to do. It is far easier to ascertain whether someone has a friend who is also an activist, as expected by some political process arguments, than to diagnose whether someone is feeling shame (although see Scheff 1990). Also, even if one is trained to conduct such interviews, the time burden on the researcher may be more substantial than is usually the case in interviewing. It may be difficult to be certain about diagnoses in brief meetings with subjects who might be suspicious of or hostile to the motivations of the interviewer. One solution is to go beyond what is customary in sociological
interviewing. To use some concepts it may be necessary to gain psychoanalytical training. It may also be helpful to do more interviews than is usual and to interview subjects at greater length than is standard among sociologists.

In short, like other movement scholars, scholars of movement emotions would do well to avoid the methodological problems inherent in case studies. Opportunities for comparisons, even within a given movement, should be exploited to substantiate theoretical claims and to cast doubt on likely alternatives. Scholars of movement emotions have the opportunity to do more research at the individual level, but they face distinctive methodological challenges. Some of these have to do with the newness of thinking about these matters and others with the nature of emotion concepts.

**Provoking New Questions and Lines of Research**

New concepts can reinvigorate a field by illuminating previously unrecognized processes, dynamics, or effects, or by causing us to see phenomena that we have long studied in different ways. Either way, they lead us to ask new questions.

The problem here, though, lies in convincing other scholars that the questions are important ones. Scholars of emotions might follow a lead from those studying movements’ consequences and impacts, an area of research which has taken off in recent years. Scholars of impacts argued that since social movements come into being in order to effect some important social change, scholars should examine the conditions in which they do effect some change, and what kind of change. One can perhaps make a similar argument with respect to emotions and social movements. People participate in movements in order to meet psychological or emotional needs that cannot easily be met otherwise or to find emotional benefits in movements as they go along. From this perspective, emotional experiences are an important purpose of social movements, a key reason for their existence or maintenance, and explaining why movements have different emotional contents becomes an important question in its own right. Although a number of chapters in this volume hint at this line of argument, it has yet to be made explicitly.

Another way to gain support for lines of questioning based on new concepts is to demonstrate that the new concepts and questions make it easier to answer the old ones. Again the literature on the impact of social movements provides a useful example. Piven and Cloward (1977) argued that what they called “poor people’s movements” were different from
those with middle- or working-class bases. Poor people’s movements de-
pended on different political circumstances to be successful and needed
to engage in different kinds of action. Similarly, the kinds of emotions
that animate a movement—rage or love, shame or compassion—may in-
fluence its recruitment process, the strategies it chooses, and the impacts
it has.

A third way to justify new questions is to show that the old ones
were limited by the level of analysis at which they were pitched. Political
process theories have been criticized for their meso-level focus, and schol-
ars of emotions have responded aptly by analyzing the experiences of
shame, anger, and fear that precede and accompany protest—a micro-
level analysis. However, in some cases, political process theorists have
asked larger questions about why protest changes in form—from reac-
tive to pro-active in Tilly’s (1978) formulation—or varies systematically
across countries—from assimilative to disruptive in Kitschelt’s (1986)
model. From the start, new social movement theorists asked macro-level
questions, notably about changes in the goals and targets of protest, set-
ting off lines of research focused on explaining the role of identity in
social movements and protest. Movement emotions scholars would do
well to ask similarly macro-level questions. Can we identify historical
changes in the dominant emotional content of protest? For instance, has
moral outrage replaced resentment or fear or vengeance as the central
emotion in protest? Is moral outrage more common or commonly ex-
pressed among social movements in some countries rather than others?
Once scholars have documented shifts and differences like these we can
begin to account for them.

We conclude by offering a few tips on how to realize the promise
of incorporating emotions into theory and research on social movements.
First, some theoretical and analytical injunctions: Indicate where a new
argument stands with regard to reigning political process ideas. Does it
supplement these ideas or challenge them? If the idea is complementary
to political process arguments, show how the idea improves upon the
existing model and why the improvement is needed. If the new argument
challenges the existing model, make clear the basis for its challenge. Indi-
cate the likely scope conditions of the argument—how applicable the ar-
gument is to other contexts and movements. Make sure that the new
concepts are not so wide as to preclude or confuse empirical analysis.

This leads into our methodological suggestions. To avoid the stan-
dard epistemological limitations of case studies, look for comparative op-
opportunities. Compare processes across movements or compare people who participate with those who do not. As always, these sorts of comparisons will help in appraising arguments as well as refining them. In research, be sensitive to the fact that emotions are often of varying duration and some emotions are difficult for respondents to acknowledge.

Finally, a few suggestions for advancing an emotions research agenda. Do not abandon the meso-level questions on which political process theorists have concentrated. Scholars of emotions need not restrict themselves to describing emotional experiences or restrict themselves to elaborating a social psychology of emotions. They can contribute to better understanding why movements emerge, and why they take the forms and have the impacts they do. On the other hand, don’t hesitate to go beyond the meso-level. Ask big historical questions about how dominant emotion cultures come into being and how they shape widespread perceptions of what is strategic, what is political, what is an interest, and what is good. Wrestling in new ways with the questions that have bedeviled students of social movements may secure for emotions the place in our analyses that they deserve.
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abolitionism: new motivation for, 17; prior to 1830, 106–9. See also immediate abolitionism
action: emotions as aspect of all social, 9, 16; ritual as form of, 93; Weber on logical versus emotional, 2. See also collective action activism: charitable action, 195; shame and, 17–18; social ties in, 163. See also AIDS activism
ACT UP (AIDS Coalition To Unleash Power): emotions and emergence of, 152–55; first chapter forms, 135, 148; social movement theory and emergence of, 136
administration, 76
Adorno, Theodor, 128, 173
adunate, 90
affective emotions, 10, 17
agency, pride in assertion of, in Salvadoran insurgency, 18, 258, 270, 272–78, 279, 281n.5, 305
agitation, 286
Alcoholics Anonymous, 199
Alexander, Jeffrey, 11
alienation, 3, 4
Alinsky, Saul, 3
Allahyari, Rebecca Anne, 19–20, 311
Allport, Floyd, 2
Amenta, Edwin, 24, 304
American Antislavery Society, 100–101, 102, 112
American Colonization Society (ACS), 106, 108, 109
American Temperance Society, 106
Americas Watch, 165
Anderson, Benedict, 86
anger: activists trying to create, 16; and AIDS crisis, 135, 143, 144, 145–46, 150, 152, 153; in animal rights movement, 218–19, 309; bystanders alienated by, 71; in child sexual abuse survivors, 238, 239, 240, 244, 245; as discontent, 67; in feminist emotional repertoire, 238; forms of, 12–13; in Irish land movement speeches, 256, 265; and justice, 69; management of, 285; metaphors for, 253; as motivation to engage in protest, 305; and nonviolent direct action,
anger (continued)
3; in North American travelers to Nicaragua, 163; and one’s own status, 64–65; and other’s status, 65, 66; in recruitment to social movements, 23; rituals amplifying, 29; time scale and scope of, 11; universality of, 11, 12; in U.S. and East German civil rights movements, 286. See also rage
Animal Liberation Front (ALF), 219
animal research, 220, 223–24
animal rights movement, 212–29; acceptable anger in, 218–19, 309; cultural context of non-emotional framing in, 214–15; emotion talk in, 215–24; hierarchy in, 222–23; as moral crusade, 212; professionals versus radicals in, 216–18; rational approach in, 213–14, 215; and social movements of the 1960s, 38; as women’s movement, 212, 226, 227
animal welfarists, 219–20
anti-liberal states, 88, 94, 96, 98n.16
anti-rape movement, 238
antivivisection, 212
antiwar movement, 38
anxiety: and one’s own power, 63, 64, 66; and other’s power, 65, 66; and other’s status, 67; time scale and scope of, 11; in U.S. and East German civil rights movements, 286
anxious seat, 113, 114n.5
Apuzzo, Virginia, 145
Arminianism, 109–10, 114n.4
Arnold, Michael, 297–98
Augustine, 48
authoritarian individuals, 128
authority, 61

Bauman, Zygmunt, 128
Becker, Howard, 200
Becher, Lyman, 107
Belenky, Mary Field, 215
Belfrage, Sally, 292, 295–96
beliefs, amplification of, 69
Bell, Derrick, 18
belonging: identity and, 94–97; in new and old political spaces, 83–84
benevolent societies, 99, 106–7
Benford, Robert, 6, 172
Bentham, Jeremy, 49
Berezin, Mabel, 20, 85
Birney, James, 106
Blackmon, Leola, 299
Black Muslims (Nation of Islam), 35
black nationalism, 22
Blau, Joel, 205
Blumer, Herbert, 2
Bly, Robert, 214
Booth, William, 198
Borowczak, Jerzy, 177–78
Bourdieu, Pierre, 14, 52, 254
Brethren, 167
Brown v. Board of Education (1954), 7–8, 305
Brubaker, Rogers, 86, 95, 284
Buddhism, Pure Land, 38
bystander emotions, 70–71
Cal Expo overflow shelter, 198, 201, 208
Calhoun, Craig, 22
Calvary Chapel movement, 44n.9
Calvinism, 106, 107, 109–10, 114n.4
Cameron, Paul, 122
Carter, Jimmy, 166
case studies, 310–11, 314, 315–16
catharsis, 29, 55, 56
Catholicism. See Roman Catholicism
Catholic Worker, 195, 197, 204, 205, 211n.6
North Americans traveling to, 163; personal encounters with Central Americans, 161–64, 306; physical brutality in, 164–66; refugees from, 161–63. See also El Salvador; Guatemala; Nicaragua
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 170
Chancer, Lynn, 56n.1
charity: felt politics of, 195–211; versus social change, 205. See also Loaves & Fishes; Salvation Army, The
Chatfield, LeRoy, 208
child sexual abuse movement, 233–50; aftereffects of abuse, 244; art and theater in, 239, 241; Clothesline Project, 239, 240; coming out in, 242, 243; countermovement to, 247–50; drumming circles in, 240; emotional expression seen as breaking silence about child abuse, 236; emotional labor and public displays of feeling in, 235, 237, 240, 241, 243, 246, 249; emotional opportunities and public displays of feeling in, 235, 237, 250; feminism influencing, 238; oppositional emotions in, 235, 237, 249; and psychotherapy, 236–37; public events of, 238–43; resistance promoted by, 238, 240, 242, 244; safe rooms at conferences of, 241–42; and state institutions, 245–46; strategies of, 235–36; talk shows featuring survivors, 243–45; trauma suffered by survivors, 238, 244; wings of, 235; workshop topics in, 239, 241
Chodorow, Nancy, 56n.1, 129
Chong, Dennis, 280, 281n.13
Christian Coalition, 116
Christianity: and Central American peace movement, 159, 163, 166, 173–74; churches as sites of mass meetings, 289; as emerging from plethora of movements, 43n.5; martyrs’ moral power, 33; in Salvadoran insurgency, 275. See also Christian right; Protestantism; Roman Catholicism
Christian right: in child sexual abuse movement, 235; culture war against homosexuality, 115–31; feelings of victimization in, 119, 121, 122; gays as primary target of, 40–41, 127–30; motives of, 116; personal struggles of, 122–25, 130; and Reagan Central American policy, 174n.1; resentment fueling anger of, 130; secular humanism opposed by, 120–21; shame in narratives of, 118–19, 120, 130, 311–12; solidarity created in, 126–27; techniques of the left adopted by, 39–40, 122; as vilified, 119–22
Church of the Brethren, 167
Citizens for Medical Justice, 135, 147–48
citizenship, 84, 85, 86, 95–96
civil disobedience, 168, 287
civil rights movement: Brown v. Board of Education and cognitive liberation in, 7–8, 305; collective identity as encouragement mechanism in, 293, 294; counterpoint to, 39; divine protection as encouragement mechanism in, 300; emotion management in, 3–4; emotions expressed in oral histories of, 286; firearms possession as encouragement mechanism in, 298–99; gender roles in, 14; mass meetings as encouragement mechanism in, 289, 290–93; as model for all movements since, 42–43; pleasure of defiance in, 18; public displays of emotion in, 23; shame as encouragement mechanism in, 295–97; singing in, 291–93; in social movements of the 1960s, 38. See also East German civil rights movement
Clothesline Project, 239, 240
Cloward, Richard A., 314
Coastal Worker (news sheet), 177
Cobb, Charlie, 289
Cobbe, Frances Power, 212
cognition: cognitive accessibility, 160; cognitive liberation, 7–8, 112, 159, 305; emotions counterposed to, 15–16, 50, 51–52, 54, 176
Index

Cohen, P. F., 156n.7
collective action: academic dismissal of reasons for, 3; emotion in, 48, 192; individual identity in, 193–94; versus instrumental politics, 104, 105; motivations of Salvadoran peasants for, 267–68, 272; not all emotion as conducive to, 171
“collective effervescence,” 28, 147, 289
collective identity, 8–9; Christian right forging, 127, 129; emotions and causal power of, 283; as encouragement mechanism, 287, 293–95; Hoffer’s true believer losing himself in, 3; Loaves & Fishes forming, 205–6; and oppositional emotions, 234; political process theory adopting, 105; public displays of emotion for maintaining, 23; versus rationalistic assumptions about motivations, 5; of religious people, 166, 168–69, 174
Collins, Randall, 22, 35
colonization, 99, 100, 104, 106–7
Comegys, Duke, 148
coming out, 119, 242, 243
commitment mechanisms, 286
common sense, 50
communist movements, fascist movements emerging against, 40
communities of feeling, 84, 92–94, 209
community, 155n.1
community colleges, 77
compassion: as motivation to engage in protest, 305; movement leaders trying to manipulate, 15; time scale and scope of, 11
competence, 238
Concord, California, Naval Weapons station, 171
confidence, 239
Congregationalists, 106, 108, 109, 110, 114nn. 2, 4
Connell, Robert, 87, 97n.9
Connolly, William, 84, 85
conscience constituencies, 31–33, 41, 44n.6, 206, 209
consciousness raising, 32, 40
conservative movement: as response to liberal movements, 39–40. See also Christian right
consternation, 66
contempt, 66, 71, 72
Contreras, 165, 168, 170
Cooksson, Jeri (pseudonym), 119, 123–25, 127, 129
Corradi, Juan, 277
covenant theology, 107–8, 110, 114n.3
creativity, intellectual, 36
Cress, Daniel M., 211n.4
crime victims’ compensation, 245, 246
critical mass, 27
Crossley, Nick, 176
crowd theorists, 2, 5, 9, 10
Crowley, Wickham, 281n.9
cultural studies, 45
culture: in analysis of social movements, 5–9; cognitive approach taken to, 1; cultural identities, 85; cultural turn in sociology, 283; emotions as culturally constructed, 12–14; nation as, 87; sociology of, 6, 46; structural and cultural approaches contrasted, 58–59, 73n.1
DAGMAR (Dykes and Gay Men Against Repression), 135, 148
Daly, James, 259–60
Davis, Cheryl, 208
Davitt, Michael, 255, 258, 263, 265, 266n.2
Day, Dorothy, 204, 211n.6
deep acting, 237
degradation ceremonies, 287
Deitcher, David, 147
Delany, Chris, 203
Delany, Dan, 203
democracy: alienating potential of, 87–88; and Arminianism, 109–10; in Gdansk shipyard strike, 180; U.S. subverting in Central America, 171
demonization, 17
depression: and one’s own status, 64–65, 66; time scale and scope of, 11
Index

de Sousa, Ronald, 52, 253–54
Deukmejian, George, 147–48
diagnostic framing, 6, 172
Diallo, Amadou, 43n.3
dialogical school, 175–77
Diani, Mario, 44n.7
DiMaggio, Paul, 79
direct action, nonviolent, 3–4, 39, 302n.4
disappointment, 64, 65, 66
Disciples of Christ, 109
discontent, types of, 67–68
disgust, 66, 71, 256
dislike, 64, 66–67
dissatisfaction, 64
distrust, 71
Dobbin, Frank, 22, 49
Dollard, John, 2
Dominicans, 38
Dort Confession, 114n.4
Douglas, Mary, 79
drumming circles, 240
Du Bois, W. E. B., 156n.7
Duda-Gwiazda, Joanna, 186
Dumont, Louis, 57n.6
Durkheim, Emile: on collective effer-
vescence, 28, 147, 289; and psychologism, 46; on religion, 210; on ritual, 28–29, 251; on social basis of concept of God, 33
Dykes and Gay Men Against Repres-
sion (DAGMAR), 135, 148

East German civil rights movement: collective identity as encouragement mechanism in, 294–95; divine protection not asserted in, 300; emotions expressed in oral histories of, 286; firearms not possessed in, 299; mass meetings as encouragement mechanism in, 289–90; shame as encouragement mechanism in, 297–98; singing in, 293; social networks as encouragement mechanism in, 287–88
ecofeminism, 213, 227
education, Christian right’s concern with, 124, 125
Einwohner, Rachel, 213, 229n.1
Elias, Norbert, 52, 254
Eliot, T. S., 1, 16
El Salvador: churchwomen killed in, 165, 166; competing interpretations of U.S. involvement in, 172; and Concord Naval Weapons station action, 171; emotional benefits of insurgency in, 18, 267–81, 305; features of peasant mobilization in, 271–72; FMLN, 267, 272, 281n.9; mapmaking by peasants, 270, 277–78; moral outrage in insurgents, 268, 272–77; pride in assertion of agency in insurgents, 18, 258, 272–78, 279, 281n.5, 305; refugees from, 161–62; Romero killing, 165–66; selective repression in, 164–65
Elster, Jon, 301
Emirbayer, Mustafa, 8, 23
emotional continence, principle of, 254
emotional energy: and free-rider problem, 30; and high ritual density, 28; in intellectual movements, 36; and motivation to engage in protest, 30; rituals creating, 29
emotional in-process benefits, 268, 272, 277, 279
emotional labor, 234–35, 284
emotions: as adverbs, 14, 176, 312; affective, 10, 17; as aspect of all social action, 9, 16; biological basis of, 10–11; bystander, 70–71; categories and examples of, 11; catharsis, 29, 55, 56; as changeable, 254; cognitions counterposed to, 15–16, 50, 51–52, 54, 176; communities of feeling, 84, 92–94, 209; as components of roles, 14; conventions about in management of ambivalence, 139–40; dialogical school on, 175–77; diversity of, 10, 12; as embodied, 24, 47, 53; emotional habitus, 52; emotional investment in everyday status quo, 54, 55; emotional labor, 234–35, 284; as entities, 13–14, 176, 312; false dualisms regarding, 14–16, 48–49, 52; feeling rules, 12, 234–35, 284, 308; felt politics, 19–20, 196; as folk constructs, 213; higher order, 12; interests contrasted with, 49, 50, 51–52, 75; in
Index

emotions (continued)
interpersonal relations, 53; intrapsychic processes, 51; irrationality associated with, 2, 49–50, 173, 176, 219–24; as located inside individuals, 53; management of, 3–4, 284–87; as manifest symptom, 68–69; men expressing, 225–27, 309; as metaphorically conditioned, 252, 253, 265; mixed, 63; and moral norms, 50; paradigm scenarios for, 253–54; and personality structure, 11; in political ritual, 93; and power, 60–67; in private sphere, 87; reactive, 10, 17, 106, 112; reciprocal, 20; rituals organizing, 55; ritual using for cognitive ends, 92–93; shared, 20, 32; as socially constructed, 12–14, 234; sociology of, 45–57; sources of, 10–11; and status, 60–67; structural approach to, 59–67; structures of feeling, 93–94, 179–80; as styles or qualities, 14, 176, 312; as unprofessional, 216–18; women associated with, 9. See also emotional energy; emotions in social movements; political emotion; and particular emotions (anger; fear; grief; guilt; hate; humiliation; indignation; love; moral outrage; optimism; pleasure; pride; shame; solidarity)
emotions in social movements: academic attitudes toward, 2–3, 4, 48; in ACT UP's emergence, 152–55; in AIDS activism, 135–57; ambivalence toward, 15; in animal rights movement, 212–29; bystander emotions, 70–71; in charity organizations, 195–211; in child sexual abuse movement, 233–50; in Christian right, 115–31; in civil rights movements in U.S. and East Germany, 282–302; in decline of movements, 21; in different settings, 20–21; difficulties in research on, 5; in El Salvador peasant insurgency, 267–81; evidence for, 312–13; focus of emotional attention, 27–44; in gay and lesbian movements, 308; in immediate abolition movement, 99–114; in intellectual movements, 36; in Irish land movement, 251–66; methodological issues regarding, 310–14; new questions and lines of research for, 314–16; and political opportunities, 306; predominance of different emotions at different times, 309; protesters' attitude toward, 3–4; public displays of, 23; in recruitment, 16–17, 23; in religious movements, 34; resource-mobilization attitude toward, 5; ritual transforming, 28–31; social movements making prominent, 55–56; in Solidarity movement at Lenin Shipyard, 175–94; structural approach to, 58–73; in sustaining movements, 18–19, 21–22; in U.S. Central America peace movement, 158–74; why they matter, 1–24. See also anger; fear; grief; guilt; hate; humiliation; indignation; love; moral outrage; optimism; pleasure; pride; shame; solidarity

empathy, 309

empowerment, 180, 256, 257

encouragement mechanisms, 19, 284–87

enthusiasm, 256, 257

entitlements, 125

envy, 66, 72

Epictetus, 48, 51

Epstein, Barbara, 15, 302n.4

Erikson, Erik, 123

Escoffier, Jeffrey, 138, 156n.7

ethnic nationalism, 95, 97

Evers, Charles, 299

Evers, Medgar, 299

excitement, 286

existentialism, 35–36

expert witnesses, 246

expressive social movements, 15

Eyerman, Ron, 291

faculty psychology, 176

Fairclough, Adam, 305
false memories, 239, 247
Family Research Institute, 122
Fanon, Frantz, 156n.6
Farabundo Martí National Liberation
Front (FMLN), 267, 272, 281n.9
Fargo, Heather, 207
Farmer, James, 296
fascist movements: communism in
emergence of, 40; in Germany
after World War I, 44n.10; resa-
cralizing politics and mobilizing af-
fection in Italy, 88–92
fear: agency and management of,
279; and AIDS crisis, 135, 143,
144, 150, 153; as beneficial in so-
cial movements, 284–85; biologi-
cal basis of, 10; bystanders alien-
ated by, 71; in child sexual abuse
survivors, 238, 240, 243, 244,
245; as discontent, 67; in feminist
emotional repertoire, 238; forms
of, 12; and freedom, 69; in Irish
land movement speeches, 256;
managing in high-risk movements,
19, 282–302; as motivation to en-
gage in protest, 10, 305; move-
ment leaders trying to manipulate,
15; and one’s own power, 63, 66;
and other’s power, 65, 66; over-
coming culture of, 277; in recruit-
ment to social movements, 23; ritu-
als amplifying, 29; time scale and
scope of, 11; in U.S. and East Ger-
man civil rights movements, 286
fearlessness, 286
feeling rules, 12, 234–35, 284, 308
feelings. See emotions
Felski, Bogdan, 178
felt politics, 19–20, 196
feminism: black nationalism influenc-
ing, 22; child sexual abuse move-
ment influenced by, 238; ecofemin-
ism, 213, 227; on emotion and
social action, 9; feminists as ther-
pists, 249; on morality of coopera-
tion, 214; public displays of emo-
tion in, 23; and social movements
of the 1960s, 38; sociology of emo-
tions influenced by, 45; on victim-
ization of women, 238, 250n.2; on
women and relationships of re-
sponsibility and care, 212–13,
227; women’s narratives legiti-
mized by, 238
field theory, 45
Findeis, Hagen, 287, 288
Fine, Gary Alan, 197
Finney, Charles Grandison, 100, 110,
111, 114n.5
firearms, possession of, as encourage-
ment mechanism, 287, 298–99
Fireman, Bruce, 5
FMLN (Farabundo Martí National
Liberation Front), 267, 272,
281n.9
Foucault, Michel, 199
Founding Committee of Free Trade
Unions of the Coast, 177
frames: amplification, 69–70; bridg-
ing, 69; cultural context of non-
emotional framing in animal rights
movement, 214–15; diagnostic
framing, 6, 172; and emergence of
ACT UP, 154; emotional content
of framing, 69–70; emotions and
causal power of, 283; and enemy
movements, 40; extension, 70; and
high-risk actions, 159; injustice
frames, 8, 306; motivational fram-
ing, 6, 172; and overlapping net-
works of Movement of 1960s, 39;
political process theorists adopt-
ing, 104–5; prognostic framing, 6,
172; in recruitment, 5, 6; and
study of emotions in social move-
ments, 9; transformation, 70;
types of, 6–7, 172; U.S. involve-
ment in Central America giving
rise to competing, 171–72
Franciscans, 38
Frank, Barney, 145, 146
Frank, Robert H., 11
freedom, and power, 69
free-rider problem, 30, 271, 293
free spaces, 304
Free Speech Movement (Berkeley),
43n.1
Freiberg, Peter, 145
Frelinghuysen, Theodore, 108
French Revolution, 42, 43
Freudian psychology, 2–3, 4, 9, 11,
49, 139
Fritzsche, Peter, 44nn. 10, 12
frustration: and aggression, 2; in decline of movements, 21

Gamson, Joshua, 122
Gamson, William A., 5, 8, 310
Garfinkel, Harold, 283, 287
Garrison, William Lloyd, 100, 106
Gaughran, Father, 264
Gaventa, John, 266n.2
Gay and Lesbian Alliance Against Defamation (GLAAD), 152
Gay and Lesbian Anti-Defamation League (GLADL), 145, 152
Gay Life (newspaper), 143–44
gay rights movement: and AIDS activism, 135–55; ambivalence and, 141–42; ballot initiatives opposing, 127; black nationalism influencing, 22; coming out encouraged by, 119, 240; emotion work in, 308; new Christian right in mobilization of, 41; Oregon Citizens Alliance campaign against, 116–17; shame and pride in, 18; and social movements of the 1960s, 38

Gays: AIDS epidemic bringing visibility to, 140; ambivalence about self and society in, 136–45, 156n.5, 307; Christian right’s culture war against, 115–31; as a community, 155n; gay pride, 18, 136, 138–39, 144; male homosexuality as threatening, 129; as religious right’s primary target, 40–41, 127–30; self-hatred in, 137, 138, 141, 142. See also gay rights movement; lesbians

Gdansk, Poland, shipyard, 175–94; crisis and development of strike, 180–84; demands of strikers, 180, 182; division and development of strike, 185–87; emotional tone at, 193; Mass held at, 182; regime attempting to blockade, 190; ritual and symbolic action at, 187–89; shock of recognition at, 179–80; strike movement begins at, 177; workers’ practical action at, 184–85
Geertz, Clifford, 79, 92–93, 254
gender roles, 14
Gierek, Edward, 185, 186
Gill, Henry, 264
Gitlin, Todd, 31
goals of protest, academic dismissal of, 3, 4
God: divine protection as encouragement mechanism, 287, 300; social basis of concept of, 33. See also religion
Goffman, Erving, 125–26
Goodman, Paul, 101
Goodwin, Jeff: on agency and management of fear, 279; on encouragement mechanisms, 19; on libidinal economy of a movement, 20, 97n.9; on love leading individuals out of movement, 21; on political process theory, 103; on social networks, 8, 23; on structural and cultural approaches to emotions, 59; on third world insurgencies, 281n.9
Gould, Deborah, 18, 306, 307, 308, 312
Gould, Roger, 97n.7
Gramsci, Antonio, 3
Granovetter, Mark, 79
grateful, 65
Green, Linda, 277
Gregg, Richard, 4

Grief: and AIDS crisis, 135, 153; in child sexual abuse survivors, 238, 244, 245, 246; in feminist emotional repertoire, 238; in Irish land movement speeches, 257; in peasant mobilization in El Salvador, 271; time scale and scope of, 11

Group emblems, 28
Group psychology, 4
Groves, Julian McAllister, 21, 22, 309
Grueneberger, Thomas, 302n.2
Guatemala: competing interpretations of U.S. involvement in, 172; refugees from, 162; selective repression in, 164
Guha, Ranajit, 269, 279
guilt: as bystander emotion, 70–71; as discontent, 67; in homosexuals, 137; as motivator, 10; in North American travelers to Nicaragua, 163; and one’s own power, 63, 66; shame distinguished from, 118
Hunter, James Davison, 115, 126
Hutcheson, Francis, 56n.6

identity: in collective action, 194; crises of, 3; diversity in employment of concept of, 304; hierarchies of, 83, 85, 97; identity politics, 54–55, 122; participation identity, 97n.7. See also collective identity; political identity; self, the identity politics, 54, 122

immediate abolitionism, 99–114; as emotionally liberating, 112–13; multiple meanings in, 101–2; religious sensibility in, 307; self-reform in, 102–3; social movement theories as applied to, 103–5; strategy in 1830s, 114n.1; as transformative movement, 100–103

indignation: and AIDS crisis, 135, 153; context and significance of, 308; defining, 312; as higher order emotion, 12; in Irish land movement speeches, 256, 259, 265; as motivation to engage in protest, 10, 305; and nonviolent direct action, 3; and political opportunities, 306

individualism, 87, 110, 122, 124–25

Initiativ Gruppe Leben, 297–98

injustice frames, 8, 306

in-process benefits, 268, 271, 272, 277, 279

instrumentalism, 1, 49, 104, 105, 309

instrumental social movements, 15

intellectual movements, 35–38, 41

interest: activists talking more about dignity than, 306; emotions contrasted with, 49, 50, 51–52, 75; identity contrasted with, 8; in insurgent and institutional politics, 103; in modern understanding of behavior, 78; and moral norms, 50

Inter-Factory Strike Committee (MKS), 177, 181–83, 184, 185, 187, 189, 190–91

interviewing, 313–14

investment, 176–77

Iran-Contra scandal, 170, 172

Gunning, John, 260
Gwiazda, Andrzej, 181, 191–92
Habermas, Jürgen, 96
habitus, 14, 52, 53, 254, 256–57
Hansberry, Lorraine, 298
happiness, 64, 66, 238, 239, 286
Hardin, Russell, 281n.14
Harrington, Michael, 211n.6
Haskell, Thomas, 309
Hastings, Thomas, 259
hate: in decline of movements, 21; as discontent, 67; in Irish land movement speeches, 256; time scale and scope of, 11. See also self-hatred

Healing Woman, The (publication), 240
Heider, Fritz, 53, 56n.1
Heise, David, 53, 56n.1
high-risk movements: encouragement mechanisms in, 19, 284–87; management of fear in, 19, 282–302; and normative organization of emotions, 55

high ritual density, 28

hippie counterculture movement, 38
Hirschman, Albert, 21, 49, 56n.5, 75, 78, 281n.14
historic peace churches, 167
Hobbes, Thomas, 49
Hoch, Charles, 205, 206
Hochschild, Arlie, 12, 234–35, 237, 284, 308
Hoffer, Eric, 3, 4, 173
homeless, felt politics of charity for the, 195–210
homosexuals. See gays; lesbians
hope, 64, 66, 163
Houses of Hospitality, 198, 205
Howard, Robert Cooper, 298–99, 300
humane movement, 214
humane societies, 219
Human Rights Campaign Fund, 148
humiliation: German habitus of, 254; in Irish land movement speeches, 256–57, 258; of Salvadoran peasants, 274
Humphries, Sally (pseudonym), 120, 121, 129
Hunt, Lynn, 87
Irish Land War, 251–66; and constitutionalism, 261–64; crucial movement activities, 255–56; diversity of movement in, 251, 256–65; habitus of humiliation in, 256–57; land meetings, 255, 256; narrative confrontation of shame in, 259–61; narratives of oppression in, 257–59; origins of, 255–56; radical nationalists in, 255; scenarios of resistance in, 261–64
Irish National Land League (INLL), 255, 261
Irish Republican Brotherhood, 266n.3
Italy, resacralizing politics and mobilizing affection in fascist, 88–92
Jagielski, Mieczyslaw, 187, 189, 190, 192
Jamison, Andrew, 291
Jasper, James M.: on affective versus reactive emotions, 10; on animal rights activists, 212; on battle for audience, 44n.8; on collective identity, 5, 8; on emotions and cognitive meanings, 12; on emotions for helping decide what is important, 265; on emotions swirling in and around social movements, 196; on frames and emotions, 69; on metaphors and social protest, 210; on moral shocks, 106, 112, 148–49, 169, 306; on new visions and language for study of social movements, 47; on political process theory, 103; on reciprocal and shared emotions, 20; on social networks, 173; on structural and cultural approaches to emotions, 59; on variety of emotions in social movements, 117
Jefferson, Thomas, 108
Jenkins, J. Craig, 72
Jesus people, 40
Jews, 166, 167–68
John XXIII, Pope, 167
Johnson, Mark, 252
joy: in child sexual abuse survivors, 239; as on constructed end of scale, 13; time scale and scope of, 11
justice: injustice frames, 8, 306; and status, 69
Kane, Anne, 20, 52
Kanter, Rosabeth Moss, 286
Kayal, Philip, 206
Kemper, Theodore, 10, 11, 12, 22, 69
Killian, Lewis, 48
Kilmartin, James, 260
King, Martin Luther, Jr., 14, 290–91, 295, 296–97, 298
Kintz, Linda, 117, 127
Kitschelt, Herbert P., 315
Klapp, Orrin, 3
Kleinman, Sherry, 14, 214
Kornhauser, William, 2
Kövecses, Zoltán, 253, 259, 261
Kramer, Larry, 157n.13
Kriger, Nora, 269
Krytosia, Aleksandr, 186
Krzywonos, Henryka, 190
Krzywonos, Krystyna, 180
Kuran, Timur, 44n.11
Laitin, David, 85, 284
Lakoff, George, 115, 252, 253, 259, 261
LaRouche, Lyndon, 149
Lasswell, Harold, 3
Lavender Hill Mob, 135
law of small numbers, 37–39, 41–42
Leavitt, Joshua, 106
Le Bon, Gustave, 4, 48, 193
Lefort, Claude, 87–88, 94, 96
Lenin, V. I., 3, 290
Leninist-style movements, 43n.2
Lenin shipyard (Gdansk, Poland). See Gdansk, Poland, shipyard
Leo XIII, Pope, 167
lesbian movement: and AIDS activism, 135–35; ambivalence and, 141–42; coming out encouraged by, 119, 240; emotion work in, 308; shame and pride in, 18
lesbians: AIDS epidemic bringing visibility to, 140; ambivalence about self and society in, 136–45, 156n.5, 307; Christian right’s culture war against gays, 115–31; as a community, 155n; gay pride, 18,
management, 76–77, 79, 80
Marx, Gary, 56n.3
Marx, Karl, 3
Mason, John Mitchell, 108
mass media coverage, as encouragement mechanism, 287
mass meetings: as encouragement mechanism, 287, 288–93; in Irish Land War, 255, 256; Italian _adunate_, 90
_Mater et Magistra_ (John XXIII), 167
Mauss, Marcel, 29
Mazzini, Giuseppe, 90
McAdam, Doug: on cognitive liberation, 7, 112, 159, 305; on collective identity, 206; participants and nonparticipants compared by, 311; on political opportunity structure, 148, 304; on political process theory linking institutional and insurgent politics, 103
McCarthy, Kathleen D., 211n.3
meetings. See mass meetings
memories, false, 239, 247
memory repression, 246, 250n.3
men: emotional men, 225–27; praised for being expressive, 214, 309; rationality associated with, 9, 225. See also gays
Mennonites, 167
metaphors: emotions as metaphorically conditioned, 252, 253, 265; in Irish land movement speeches, 256, 257, 263, 265; symbols as, 252
Methodists, 109, 110
Meyer, John, 79
Miller, Craig (pseudonym), 121, 123
Miller, Neal, 2
Miller, Perry, 107
Mills, C. Wright, 309
mind/body dualism, 47, 48–49
missionaries, to Central America, 160–61, 164, 165, 172–73
MKS (Inter-Factory Strike Committee), 177, 181–83, 184, 185, 187, 189, 190–91
mobilization paradigm, 5, 10, 37, 158, 312
mobs, 2
moods, 10, 15
moral outrage: as on constructed end of scale, 13; defining, 312; documenting shifts and differences in, 315; information as precondition for, 160; as logical reaction, 173; movement leaders trying to manipulate, 15, 16, 17; in recruitment to social movements, 23, 306; in recruitment to U.S. Central American peace movement, 158–74; rituals amplifying, 29; in Salvadoran insurgency, 268, 272–77; time scale and scope of, 11; in U.S. and East German civil rights movements, 286. See also moral shocks

moral sensibilities: emotions relevant to politics and, 13; and high ritual density, 28; and motivation to action, 10, 112

moral sentiments, theory of, 50

moral shocks, 16–17; Bowers v. Hardwick as, 148–51, 308; comparing movements with and without, 311; emotional reactions to, 171; judicial decisions as, 308; post-hoc quality of, 307, 308; slavery as, 99; in social movement formation, 106; from U.S. involvement in Central America, 17, 169–71. See also moral outrage

Morgen, Sandra, 19, 196

Morris, Aldon D., 5

motivational framing, 6, 172

motivation to engage in protest: academic denigration of, 3; in Christian right, 116; excitement-seeking as, 29–30; as ignored in research, 7; Mills on vocabulary of motives, 309; moral sensibilities as, 10, 112; optimism seen as, 305

Mueller, Carol McClurg, 5

multiple personality disorder, 244

Munt, Sally, 138

music, 291–93

narcissism, 3

narrative: emotions as structured in, 252; in Irish land movement speeches, 256, 257–61, 265

National Council of Churches, 167

nationalism, 86, 95, 97

National Security Council, 171

National Women’s Party, 21–22

Nation of Islam (Black Muslims), 35

nation-states: anti-liberal states, 88, 94, 96, 98n.16; immigrants and citizenship in, 94–96; state in creation of national identity, 97; as vehicles of political emotion, 86–87

Nealon, G. J., 262

Nelkin, Dorothy, 212

Nepstad, Sharon Erickson, 17, 306, 312

networks, social. See social networks

Neubert, Erhart, 282

Neues Forum Leipzig, 302n.2

“new age” cults, 35, 44n.9

New Haven theology, 109–10

New Left, 40

new social movements, 104, 303, 315

Nicaragua: CIA training manual for, 170; competing interpretations of U.S. involvement in, 172; Contras, 165, 169, 170; mercenary’s plane shot down in, 170; mining of harbors of, 169–70; North Americans traveling to, 163; refugees from, 162; Sandinistas, 160; selective repression in, 165

Nixon, E. D., 296

nonviolence: of Loaves & Fishes, 198; nonviolent direct action, 3–4, 39, 302n.4; tactical use of, 60

North, Oliver, 170

object-relations theory, 51

O’Brien, P. J., 257

OCA (Oregon Citizens Alliance), 116–17, 121, 122, 126, 127, 128

O’Connell, Daniel, 266n.1

O’Connor, Thomas Power, 258

Olson, Mancur, 56n.4

opportunity, political. See political opportunity structures

optimism: and belief amplification, 69; mobilization seen as based on, 305; and one’s own power, 64, 66; time scale and scope of, 11

Oregon Citizens Alliance (OCA), 116–17, 121, 122, 126, 127, 128
organizational theory, 76–77, 80
outrage, moral. See moral outrage

_Pacem in Terris_ (John XXIII), 167
pacifism, 3–4, 168
paradigm scenarios, 253–54
Parnell, Charles Stewart, 255, 261, 263
Parsons, Talcott, 11
participant observation, 313
participation identity, 97n.7
patriotism, 86
Paul VI, Pope, 167
Payne, Stanley, 44n.10
People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA), 216, 217, 218
Perez-Diaz, Victor, 98n.19
perfectibility, 109
Perrow, Charles, 72
personalist hospitality, 197, 198, 204
personality structure, 11
_Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act (1996), 210
PETA_ (People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals), 216, 217, 218
Pfaff, Steven, 19, 279, 309
Philipsen, Dirk, 302n.2
Pienkowska, Alina, 181, 183
pity, 29, 244
Piven, Frances Fox, 314
Plato, 48
pleasure: of defiance in civil rights movement, 18; and one’s own status, 64; and other’s status, 65, 66; of protest, 20; in recruitment to social movements, 23; of Salvadoran peasant insurgents, 18, 268, 270, 279
political emotion: identity and belonging, 94–97; liberalism and repression of, 87–88; logic of, 94–97; nation-states as vehicles of, 86–87. See also emotions in social movements
political identity, 84–86; and belonging, 94–97; citizenship as focus of discussions of, 84, 95; emotions and, 83–98; emotions as underemphasized in, 94; as inherently problematic, 83; Italian fascist conception of, 89; personal identity distinguished from, 85; as public, 83; state in creation of national identity, 97; as vulnerable to contingency, 85
political opportunity structures: and AIDS activism, 136, 148, 151, 156n.4, 306; context and significance of, 308; definitional problems with, 304; emotions and absence of, 306; emotions and causal power of, 283; and immediate abolitionism, 103–4; and Salvadoran insurgency, 267
political process theory: challenges to, 306–7; and emergence of immediate abolitionism, 103–5; going beyond explanations of, 304–10; meso-level focus of, 315, 316; post-hoc quality of, 307, 308; situating new arguments with regard to, 315; on structural factors and rationality of activists, 158
political psychology, 11–12
political showdowns, and law of small numbers, 41–42
politics, felt, 19–20, 196
politics of identity, 54, 122
Pollack, Detlef, 287, 288
Polletta, Francesca, 5, 8, 24, 210
poor people’s movements, 314–15
Poppendieck, Janet, 205
_Popularum Progressio_ (Paul VI), 167
Powell, Walter, 79
power: and authority, 61; as behavior, 61; and discontent, 67–68; emotions and, 60–67; emotions following from one’s own, 63–64; emotions following from other’s, 65; and framing, 69–70; and freedom, 69; movement energy consumed in struggle for, 72; as rising and falling, 62; as structure, 61; types of, 60
preferences, 79–80
Presbyterians, 106, 108, 109, 110, 114nn. 2, 4
pride: in child sexual abuse survivors, 238, 239, 243, 244, 245; gay pride, 18, 136, 138–39, 144; in Irish land movement speeches, 256, 257; as motivator, 10; and
pride (continued)
one’s own status, 64, 66; in response to AIDS crisis, 135; of Salvadoran peasant insurgents, 18, 268, 270, 272–78; and strong social bonds, 29; time scale and scope of, 11; in U.S. and East German civil rights movements, 286

private/public distinction, 87, 96
prognostic framing, 6, 172
Protestantism: evangelicals and immediate abolitionism, 99–113, 307; social teachings of, 167. See also Salvation Army; and other denominations by name
protest movements. See social movements
prototypical scenarios, 253, 259, 261, 265
psychoanalysis, 45, 51, 118, 121, 129, 313
psychologism, 46
psychology: faculty, 176; Freudian, 2–3, 4, 9, 11, 49, 139; group, 4; object-relations theory, 51; political, 11–12; social, 45
psychotherapy, 236–37, 245, 247, 248–49
public/private distinction, 87, 96
Pure Land Buddhism, 38
Putnam, Robert D., 96

Quakers, 106, 167

rational prejudice, 101, 102, 103
rage: activists transforming shame into, 126; politics of, 22; in Salvadoran insurgency, 268; in social movements of the 1960s, 309. See also moral outrage
Raines, Howell, 302n.2
raising consciousness, 32, 40
rational-actor theories, 1, 5, 30, 75–80, 309
rational choice theory, 30
rationality: in animal rights movement, 213–14, 215; child sexual abuse movement adopting, 246, 248–49; for dealing with state institutions, 246; emotions contrasted with, 2, 49–50, 173, 176, 219–24; men associated with, 9, 225; rationalization in social movement theory, 1, 75–80
reactive emotions, 10, 17, 106, 112
Reagan, Ronald, 149, 172
reason. See rationality
reciprocal emotions, 20
recovered memories, 247, 248, 250n.3
recruitment: emotions in, 16–17, 23; frames in, 5, 6; logic and emotions in, 158; in religious cults, 35; social networks in, 8, 23, 173–74; types seen as susceptible to, 2–3; to U.S. Central American peace movement, 158–74
Reddy, William, 139–40, 144, 157nn. 9, 10
Reformed Christians, 108, 114n.4
Regan, Tom, 221
relief, 65, 66
religion: and Central American peace movement, 159, 166, 172; cults, 34–35; Jews, 166, 167–68; Pure Land Buddhism, 38; teachings on social justice and peace, 167–69. See also Christianity
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (1993), 208
religious right. See Christian right
repressed memory, 246, 250n.3
repression, 139
Rerum Novarum (Leo XIII), 167
resignation, 11, 171
resistance: by child sexual abuse survivors, 238, 240, 242, 244; in feminist emotional repertoire, 238; in Irish Land War, 261–64
resource-mobilization paradigm, 5, 10, 37, 158, 312
Ricoeur, Paul, 252
Riesman, David, 3
Right to Life movement, 40
Rist, Darrell Yates, 141
ritual: boundary between self and other blurred by, 84; in child sexual abuse movement, 240; emotions organized through, 55; emotions transformed by, 28–31;
emotion used for cognitive ends in, 92–93; at Gdansk shipyard, 187–89; indeterminacy eliminated by, 94; in Irish land movement meetings, 256; as performance, 93; resacralizing politics and mobilizing affection in fascist Italy, 88–92

Robinson, John, 263
Robnett, Belinda, 14
roles, emotions as components of, 14
Roman Catholicism: Catholic Worker, 195, 197, 204, 205, 211n.6; Central American missionaries, 160; Dominicans and Franciscans, 38; and Irish Land War, 255; Italian fascism and, 89; Mass held at Gdansk shipyard, 182, 187; social teachings of, 167

Romantics, 49, 52
Romero, Archbishop Oscar, 165–66

Rosaldo, Michelle Z., 153, 196
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 52, 94
RunRiot, 242
Ryan, Matthew, 258
safe rooms, 241–42
safety, 63, 65, 66, 238, 239, 240

Salvation Army, The, The, 195–210; disciplined commitment required by, 19; on Loaves & Fishes, 199, 203; military model of, 199; motto of, 199; Muscular Christianity of, 19, 199, 202–3, 209; mutually constitutive horizons of, 196–97; setting of, 198–200; and the state, 200–203, 208–9, 211n.5; style of feeling of, 209, 311; vision of charity of, 202–3; volunteers of, 199–200; women’s view of, 199

Sanctuary movement, 162
Sandinistas, 160
Sandstrom, Kent, 197
Sarbin, Theodore R., 176
satisfaction, 64, 65, 66, 69
Scheff, Thomas, 10, 54, 118, 254
Schelting, Max, 209
Schilling, Manuel, 287, 288
Schmitt, Carl, 23
Schwarzenegger, Arnold, 214
Scott, Richard, 79

secular humanism, 120–21
security, 63, 64, 65, 66, 69
Seidman, Gay, 279–80
selective repression strategy, 164–65
self, the: and emotions, 24, 51; moral selving, 195, 196; public and private distinguished, 87–88; ritual blurring boundary between other and, 84; as social construct, 117.

See also identity
self-hatred: in child sexual abuse survivors, 238; in lesbians and gay men, 137, 138, 141, 142
self-help groups, 248
sense-making, 78
Sewell, William H., Jr., 252
shame: and activism, 17–18; and AIDS crisis, 135, 143, 144, 150, 152; and autonomy, 122–23; bypassed, 118, 126; as bystander emotion, 70–71; in child sexual abuse survivors, 238, 240, 245, 246; in Christian right’s narratives, 118–19, 120, 130, 311–12; and damaged social bonds, 29, 54; as discontent, 67; as encouragement mechanism, 287, 295–98; guilt contrasted with, 118; as higher order emotion, 12; homosexuals feeling, 137; and imagery of looking, 121; in Irish land movement speeches, 256, 257, 259–61; metaphors for, 253; as motivator, 10; and one’s own status, 64–65, 66; overt, 118; politics of shame reduction, 125–30; preoccupation with an “other” in, 127; sexual failure associated with, 129; as social emotion, 118; time scale and scope of, 11; women as prone to, 131n.2

shared emotions, 20, 32
Shelley, Martha, 137–38
shock: of recognition, 179–80; time scale and scope of, 11. See also moral shocks
Shridharani, Krishnalal, 4
Sievers, Hans-Jürgen, 295
Silence = Death Project, 148
singing, 291–93
Skocpol, Theda, 281n.9
slavery: as deeply embedded in white Americans, 103; as moral shock, 99; seen as sin, 102, 108–9, 110–11
Slayton, Robert A., 205, 206
Slotkin, Richard, 126
small numbers, law of, 37–39, 41–42
Smelser, Neil, 3, 37, 48, 56n.1, 173
Smith, Adam, 50
Smith, Gerrit, 106
Smith, Steven Rathgeb, 201
Snow, David A., 5, 6, 8, 69, 70, 104, 172
social movements: business model of, 74–80; and conscience constituencies, 31–33; crowds associated with, 2, 5; culture in analysis of, 5–9; as demanding too much, 21; discontent in emergence of, 67–68; the enemy as constant for, 39–40; focus of emotional attention in, 27–44; instrumental versus expressive, 15; intellectual movements, 35–38, 41; modern sensibilities in, 22–23; new social movements, 104, 303, 315; relational dynamics within, 72; religious cults, 34–35; resource-mobilization approach to, 4–5; transience of, 34; types susceptible to recruitment to, 2–3. See also high-risk movements; motivation to engage in protest; recruitment; social movement theory
social movements of the 1960s: dismissive analyses of, 3; overlapping networks in, 38–39; rage as rationale in, 309
social movement theory: crowd theorists, 2, 5, 9, 10; impact analysis, 314; management theorists borrowing from, 77; rational-actor theories, 1, 5, 30, 75–80, 309; rationalization in, 75–80; resource-mobilization paradigm, 5, 10, 37, 158, 312; succession of paradigms in, 36–37; supporting theoretical claims in, 310–12. See also frames; political opportunity structures; political process theory
social networks: emotions and causal power of, 283; as encouragement mechanism, 286, 287–88; group psychology on, 4; in recruitment into social movements, 8, 23, 173–74
social psychology, 45
sociology: cultural turn in, 283; of culture, 6, 46; emotional sociology, 283; locating emotions in, 45–57; new concepts in, 303–4; structural and cultural approaches to emotions in, 58–59; symbolic interactionism, 45, 213. See also social movement theory
solidarity: emotions accompanying, 18; of Gdansk shipyard workers, 188; and high ritual density, 28; in Irish land movement speeches, 256; movement organizers trying to build, 15; narrative creating in Irish land movement, 257, 264; polarizing rhetoric for creating, 126; rituals creating, 29, 30
Solidarity movement (Poland), 175–94
Somers, Margaret R., 95, 96, 98nn. 14, 20
Somoza regime, 160
song, 291–93
sorrow, 11, 256, 257
Soysal, Yasemin N., 95–96
Speed, Daniel, 290–91
Stark, Rodney, 34
status: as behavior, 61; and discontent, 67–68; and emotions, 60–67; emotions following from one’s own, 63–64; emotions following from other’s, 65–66; and framing, 69–70; and justice, 69; as rising and falling, 62; as structure, 61
Stearns, Carol Z., 22
Stearns, Peter N., 22, 283
Stein, Arlene, 17–18, 40–41, 311, 313
Steinberg, Marc W., 304
Stewart, Pamela J., 188
Stokes, Sue, 279
Stonewall Rebellion, 136
Strathern, Andrew, 188
structural approach to emotions, 59–67; 
applied to social movements, 67–72; 
cultural approach contrasted with, 
58–59, 73n.1; and multiple relational 
channels, 71–72  
structures of feeling, 93–94, 179–80  
Suarez-Orozco, Marcelo, 270  
“sudden grievances,” 169  
surface acting, 237  
surprise: time scale and scope of, 11; 
universality of, 11, 12; in U.S. and 
East German civil rights move-
ment, 286  
survivors’ of sexual abuse movement. 
See child sexual abuse movement  
Swaggart, Jimmy, 129  
symbolic interactionism, 45, 213  
symbols: at Gdansk shipyard, 187–  
89; group emblems, 28; meta-
phoric nature of, 252  
talk shows: child sexual abuse survi-
ors on, 243–45; religious conserva-
tives on, 122  
Tappan, Arthur, 106  
Tappan, Lewis, 100, 106  
Tarrow, Sidney, 156n.4  
Tavistock school, 57n.8 
Taylor, Charles, 50, 84, 85, 309  
Taylor, Nathaniel, 109–10  
Taylor, Verta, 14, 21–22, 211n.3  
testimony, 269–70  
therapeutic discourse, 237, 245  
Thoits, Peggy, 309  
Thome, James A., 101  
Tiananmen Square protests, 71  
Tilly, Charles: on change from reac-
tive to pro-active movements, 315; 
on repertoires of contention, 284; 
and social movement theory’s evo-
lution, 37; on upstream and down-
stream methodology, 311; on vari-
ation-finding, 285; on worthiness 
in social movement claims, 191 

tipping game, 85  
tipping points, 41, 44n.11  
Tiryakian, Edward, 290  
togetherness, 286  
torture, 164  
Tower Commission, 170  
Transcendental Meditation, 35 

Trans-Species Unlimited, 216 
trauma, 238, 244  
Trotsky, Leon, 3, 187  
“true believers,” 3  
trust, 11, 66  
Turner, Ralph, 48  
Turner, Victor, 55, 111  

unhappiness, 64  
University of Wisconsin Mathematics 
Research Center bombing, 71 

utilitarianism, 49, 50  

values: amplification of, 69; as fashion-
able in late 1980s, 214. See also 
moral outrage; moral sensibilities  
Vanderford, Marsha L., 17  
Vienna Circle, 35–36  
vioence, and hate, 67  
Volosinov, V. N., 175, 179 
Vygotsky, Lev, 175, 176, 177  

Wagner, David, 211n.3  
Walentynowicz, Anna, 177–78, 180,  
181, 185  

Walesa, Lech: at agreement cere-
mony, 187; asking workers about 
negotiations, 189; on continuing 
the strike, 180; criticism of, 183; 
on pay demands, 192; as strike 
committee chairman, 178; on tri-
als for political offenses, 189–90; 
workers called on to rejoin the 
strike, 182; workers carrying on 
their shoulders, 188, 192  

Walsh, Edward, 169  
Walter, Dave, 145–46  
Weber, Max, 2, 79  
Weick, Karl, 78, 79  
Weigand, William K., 208  
Weld, Theodore, 100, 103, 111–13  
White, Harrison, 79  
White Citizens Councils, 7, 39  
Whittier, Nancy, 20–21, 42, 55, 306, 
309, 311  

Williams, Erica (pseudonym), 120  
Williams, Raymond, 93–94, 179  

Wilsson, Brian, 171  
Windy City Times (newspaper), 146  

Winters, Viola, 300  
Wisniewski, Florian, 190
Wolch, Jennifer, 201
Wolfe, Maxine, 152
women: animal rights movement as women’s movement, 212, 226, 227; child sexual abuse movement, 233–50; competing loyalties of work and home for, 130; cult of the mother in fascist Italy, 90, 91–92; emotions associated with, 9; and false memory accusations, 247; as paying a price for expressiveness, 214–15; as prone to shame, 131n.2; and relationships of responsibility and care, 212–13, 227; on Salvation Army and Loaves & Fishes, 199. See also feminism; lesbians

Wonneberger, Christoph, 294
Wood, Abraham, 282
Wood, Elisabeth Jean, 18, 305
Wooten, Barney (pseudonym), 121, 129
Wright, Elizur, 106, 113
Wright, Henry C., 113
Wuthnow, Robert, 46

YMCA, 77
Young, Andrew, 291–93, 294, 295
Young, Michael P., 17, 304, 307, 308
Youth of the Rural Organizing and Cultural Center, 302n.2

Zolberg, Aristide R., 290