CHAPTER 26

Emotions and Social Movements

JEFF GOODWIN

JAMES M. JASPER

The study of emotions in politics and protest has emerged (or reemerged) in the past decade through a messy inductive process of recognizing the obvious: Emotions of many sorts permeate political action. In grappling with the inadequacies of existing theories of politics, researchers grabbed pieces of emotion theory opportunistically where they could find them. Few existing approaches in the sociology of emotion have been applied systematically, much less compared, in this field, but almost all have found their way into the mix to some degree. This inductive and relatively atheoretical approach may make social movements a useful venue for comparing theories of emotions developed in other settings.

We begin with a review of the place of emotions in the field of collective behavior and then social movements over the past 100 years, as they fell out of explanations in the 1970s, only to reemerge in the late 1990s (for more details, see Goodwin et al., 2000, from which we draw). We then look at recent research that has tried to specify the role of emotions in social movements and related forms of political action, categorizing this research crudely by the type of interactional setting in which the emotions are generated and displayed. Finally, we reach out to theoretical perspectives in the sociology of emotions, suggesting ways that research from movements could be extended to engage these theories more explicitly than it has in the past.

Aristotle launched the study of emotions and politics almost 2,400 years ago by examining the effects of orators on audiences—insights buried first by the rationalistic traditions of recent centuries and later by the structural predispositions of sociology. By pointing out the different interactive contexts of meaning and feeling (such as leaders and followers, recruiters and potential recruits, insiders and outsiders, pairs of opponents, and so on), we suggest Aristotle—and

JEFF GOODWIN • Department of Sociology, New York University, New York, NY 10003
JAMES M. JASPER • New York, NY 10011-5939

rhetoric—as a starting point for a rethinking of emotions that recognizes the strategic purposes that often lie behind them.

FEARING EMOTIONS: A BRIEF HISTORY

Crowds

Crowd-based theories dominated protest research until the 1960s, typically combining vague macrostructural strains with pejorative (often psychoanalytic) views of participants and their emotions. Emotions were considered the driving force of virtually all political action that occurred outside normal institutions. In nineteenth-century images of the mob, normal, reasoning individuals were thought to be transformed in the presence of a crowd, becoming angry, violent, impressionable, and generally unthinking. Crowds were assumed to create, through hypnotic processes such as contagion and suggestion, a kind of "primitive" group mind and group feelings, shared by all participants outside of their normal range of sensibilities, overwhelming their individual personalities and capacity for reason. Well into the twentieth century, crowds and their dynamics were conceived as the heart of protest movements, the core around which other forms of action were built. We see a stark contrast in this literature, as in so much Western thought, between emotions and rationality. In this vision, institutions were calmly reasonable, and crowds were emotional and irrational.

In the most influential expression of this pathologizing perspective, Le Bon (1960) described crowds as impulsive, irritable, suggestible, and credulous. They were guided primarily by unconscious motives and exhibited "very simple and very exaggerated" emotions: "A commencement of antipathy or disapprobation, which in the case of an isolated individual would not gain strength, becomes at once furious hatred in the case of an individual in a crowd" (p. 50). Given these traits, crowds are susceptible to the emotional appeals of demagogues. "Given to exaggeration in its feelings," wrote Le Bon, "a crowd is only impressed by excessive sentiments. An orator wishing to move a crowd must make an abusive use of violent affirmations. To exaggerate, to affirm, to resort to repetitions, and never to attempt to prove anything by reasoning are methods of argument well known to speakers at public meetings" (p. 51). Most social scientists of the early and mid-twentieth century, including Weber, Durkheim, Freud, and Smelser, accepted some version of Le Bon's viewpoint.

Fascism and communism prompted scholars to look for individuals peculiarly susceptible to mass movements. They were alienated (Kornhauser 1959), for example, or predisposed toward violence (Allport 1924). Others used Freudian psychology to show that participants were immature: narcissistic, latently homosexual, oral dependent, or anal retentive (Lasswell 1930, 1948). Lasswell was only the most explicit in elaborating a political "type" for whom politics was an effort to fulfill needs not met in private life. Hoffer (1951) similarly saw a desperate fanatic who needed to believe in *something*, no matter what. Because driven by inner needs, especially frustrations due to a lack of a stable identity or to "barren and insecure lives," Hoffer's "true believer" could never be satisfied, hoping to lose herself in a collective identity, a "mass movement," in which she believed with utter certainty. When one movement ended, she moved on to another.

In protest, Smelser (1968) speculated, ambivalence toward one's father in the oedipal crisis reemerges, split between two objects:

> On the one hand there is the unqualified love, worship, and submission to the leader of the movement, who articulates and symbolizes "the cause." On the other hand there is the unqualified suspicion, denigration, and desire to destroy the agent felt responsible for the moral decay of social life and standing in the way of reform, whether he be a vested interest or a political authority. (pp. 119–120)

External circumstances such as strain mostly provide an opportunity for the expression of internal emotional dynamics.

Pejorative views of participation were developed into a model of a "mass society" of "atomized" individuals, abandoned by intermediary organizations and left vulnerable to charismatic national leaders like Hitler, who could manipulate them through the mass media (Kornhauser 1959). Causal priority shifted from personality to social structure, but the vision was the same as Hoffer's. The "masses" swept aside traditional sources of authority in order to rule directly or through their leader in "extremist" style. The affective ties of community broke down, leaving many with an ill-defined sense of self. These theorists dismissed the affective ties of informal networks and the social control they provided on the grounds that they opened workers to the appeals of rabble-rousers. Only formal organizations protected against alienation.

Scholars in this period set out to explain a form of politics they already knew was dangerous, and thus everything associated with it was dangerous too, including strong emotions. Psychological dynamics such as "self-estrangement" or "alienation" were poorly specified. Misleadingly, Kornhauser (1959) applied them not to socially isolated individuals but to those whose primary groups (such as family and friends and co-workers) had no broader linkages. Those with the strongest local bonds would therefore have less allegiance to broader social institutions or the state (a view recently reversed by Robert Putnam and others).

Even Turner and Killian (1957), who were more sympathetic to protesters and explicitly rejected the distinction between rational individuals and irrational crowds (p. 17), often expressed hostile attitudes toward "mobs." As individuals "mill" about in crowds, according to Turner and Killian, their emotions are intensified and focused by their "circular reaction" to one another. Such individuals become suggestible and uninhibited in their actions. Crowds come to be "dominated by a uniform mood and uniform imagery" (p. 58) and, when frustrated, become angry and aggressive: "Crowd behavior consists, in essence, of deviations from the traditional norms of society" (p. 143). From this vantage point, Turner and Killian were unable to see that protesters often fully accept and even seek to defend traditional norms, including feeling rules.

In trying to deal with emotions or psychology, researchers in this period had little to use except a rather simplified form of Freudian psychoanalysis. Smelser (1968:92) called for an integration of the social and psychological theory, on the grounds that protest "has a psychological dimension, since the deepest and most powerful human emotions—idealistic fervor, love, and violent rage, for example—are bared in episodes of collective behavior, and since persons differ psychologically in their propensity to become involved in such episodes." Jasper (2004b) has recently argued that psychoanalysis provided the main way for researchers to grapple with crucial issues of meaning and feeling before the cognitive revolution created numerous additional tools.

From a jaundiced psychoanalytic or crowd-based perspective, even the social movements of the 1960s did not always arouse sympathy, because they could be dismissed as the work of confused youngsters suffering from oedipal fantasies. As late as 1969, Klapp (1969:11–13) described the signs of "identity trouble" that led people to seek fulfillment in collective action: self-hatred, oversensitivity, a feeling of being blemished, excessive self-concern (including narcissism), alienation, a feeling that "nobody appreciates me," a desire to be someone else, a feeling of fraudulent self-presentation, Riesman's "other-directedness," and an identity crisis. In academic traditions like these, protest was either a mistake, a form of acting out, or a sign of immaturity.

Applying a more organizational and rhetorical view to the Chicago tradition, Gusfield (1963) managed to tame emotions in his study of the temperance movement. Feelings such as "hostility, hatred, and anger toward the enemy," said Gusfield (p. 110), "nurtured" the movement, and he analyzed the dynamics of moral indignation in detail. He linked these emotional responses to the declining status of parts of the middle class, taking a big step beyond most crowd theories. He anticipated later theories (even while limiting the importance of emotions) by seeing the issue

of drinking as a "symbol" of underlying—and more economic, structural—shifts in society. He famously, and perhaps misleadingly, distinguished symbolic from instrumental action (and by implication, movements themselves), implicitly suggesting that strong emotions were a hallmark of the former but not the latter. The symbolic politics of status were not entirely irrational, but they were clearly not rational in the way that "normal" interest politics were.

The portrait of emotions in these traditions was flawed in many ways. In the crowd tradition, emotions come directly from crowds (or demagogues), having little to do with individuals' own lives and goals. They appear and disappear in response to one's immediate surroundings, with little lasting resonance. In the Freudian tradition, emotions were seen as emanations from individual personality conflicts rather than as responses to the social environment. Thus, only certain kinds of flawed people are susceptible to movement appeals. Their emotions are inevitably negative or troubled rather than positive and joyful; they reflect a psychological problem, albeit one that might go away with maturity. Participants do not *enjoy* protest; they are *compelled* to it by their inner needs and drives.

These traditions also faced methodological problems: The salient emotions are often vague and difficult to identify except through the very actions they are meant to explain. Can we recognize a propensity to violence except when it results in violence? Can we identify states of anomie or alienation before they lead to participation? In the absence of empirical investigation, what Le Bon and Hoffer thought they saw in crowds was more a projection of their own fears and anxieties than an accurate psychological portrait of protestors.

Little was recognized between the individual and the macrosocial: no social networks, organizations, shared cultural meanings, or processes of negotiation and interaction. Driven by mysterious forces outside their control, whether subconscious motivations or the pull of the crowd, protestors were not rational agents with purposes of their own. The more emotional an individual (or crowd) became, the less rational he or she (or they) became. The actual stuff of contentious politics—moral principles, stated goals, processes of mobilization, the pleasures of participation—was ignored.

Such views would not long survive the explosion of noninstitutional politics in the 1960s, but along with these early theories went some of the topics they had addressed, including the power of strong emotions to either mobilize or inhibit collective action. Even if they pathologized the emotions accompanying protest (indeed they emphasized emotions *in order to* pathologize protest generally), early theorists had at least paid attention to them. This would not be the case, alas, for the next generation of movement scholars.

Structuralism

By the early 1970s, many sociologists had been active in or were sympathetic to the movements they studied. Civil rights, antiwar, new left, and labor activists were clearly not atomized individuals, defeated in their personal aspirations, swept up by charismatic leaders. To the contrary, they were politically shrewd and instrumentally rational. In the new models, accordingly, activists campaign outside institutional politics because they are blocked from pursuing their interests through regular political channels, not because they are personally alienated. Rather than being studied alongside fads, crazes, and panics, social movements were now seen as "politics by other means."

To replace pathological explanations, sociologists turned to rational actor models and organizational theory, shifting from motivational "why" to strategic "how" questions. Given scarce resources and people's tendency to free ride on the efforts of others, how were activists sometimes

able to mobilize people around long-standing grievances? The grievances themselves were rarely viewed as causally important or interesting. Grievances, and the emotions that accompanied them, were seen as "relatively constant and pervasive" (Jenkins and Perrow 1977:250). Their persistence could not explain why frustration only sometimes led to collective action. To account for the emergence of social movements, "resource mobilization" and "political process" theorists turned primarily to the occasional largesse of elites. Lacking resources themselves, powerless groups needed the attention, money, and political clout of powerful sponsors such as foundations, organized labor, and the government (Jenkins and Perrow 1977; McCarthy and Zald 1977).

In one of the most comprehensive statements of this new structuralism, Oberschall (1973) briefly listed a number of emotions in discussing the dynamics of conflict. He cited, for instance, impatience, trust, and the bitterness of protracted conflicts. Even more than social movements, conflict is hard to understand without recognizing the emotions involved. Oberschall mentioned emotions at key moments in his analysis without dissecting their dynamics.

In his influential model, Tilly (1978) depicted collective action as a function of interests, organization, the mobilization of resources, power, repression (or facilitation), and opportunities (or threats). Tilly presented these variables, including interests, as "structural," or independent of individuals' beliefs and feelings. He recognized, if implicitly, that emotions matter for what people want (i.e., their interests) and for their collective identities (a component of organization in his scheme) and that emotional reactions mediate between repression, opportunities, and threats, on the one hand, and actual collective action, on the other. Yet Tilly's rationalistic, organizational language and formulas discouraged any further attention to emotions.

The view of protestors as rational calculators was applied to ongoing movement dynamics as well as mobilization. In Kitschelt's (1986) view, for instance, antinuclear protestors of the 1970s deployed more radical tactics when blocked in normal political channels. They were rationally searching for effective strategies, with no emotional loyalties to their tactics. Similarly, Gamson (1975) treated strategic choice as a cognitive exercise. Emotions were absent from his discussion of factionalism, for example. Internal divisions arise because participants "will disagree on strategy and tactics. They will differ in the priorities they give to different subgoals and in their emphasis on the pursuit of short-range or long-range solutions. And they may compete for control of the organizational apparatus with power as an end in itself" (pp. 99–100). Nothing on the allegiances, jealousies, hatreds, demonizations, disappointments, hopes, and so on that not only accompany but help create—even define—schisms.

In structural accounts, emotions dropped out of view, along with many other things (Goodwin and Jasper 2004). Presenting activists as rational seemed to prevent their being emotional. Theorists depicted shrewd entrepreneurs, rational actors coolly calculating the costs and benefits of participation, and people mobilized by incentives rather than by passionate anger or righteous indignation. Much as they disliked everything else the crowd tradition had done, the new generation of theorists shared with the older ones one big assumption—*that emotions are irrational*. Although the earlier theorists had portrayed protestors as emotional to demonstrate their irrationality, the new theorists demonstrated their rationality by denying their emotions.

Some structural theorists recognized a role for grievances, and McAdam's (1982) concept of "cognitive liberation" was intended to capture the subjective processes by which people suddenly come to believe that protest is possible and might succeed. However, he defined those processes as cognitive: "the altered responses of members to a particular challenger serve to transform evolving political conditions into a set of 'cognitive cues' signifying to insurgents that the political system is becoming increasingly vulnerable to challenge" (p. 49). Even though the term implied a radical change in perspective, cognitive liberation was portrayed as a relatively instrumental reading of available information about the likelihood of repression. "Liberation" implies heady emotions

that "cognitive" then denies. All that potential protestors need, it seems, is a cognitive signal that they can succeed or at least will not be severely repressed (also Klandermans 1984). These are calculating automatons, not passionate human beings.

Research techniques account for part of the inattention to emotions, which are hard to identify from brief newspaper accounts of protest events. Historical research precludes participant observation, which is a good way to identify the emotions of protest. Nor can questionnaires always do the trick. The problem, however, was also conceptual. Metaphors of formal organizations and conflict over material interests encouraged an assumption of strategic purpose that did not seem to require attention to emotions. A view of collective actors as rational, political, and organized made sense as a counter to crowd theories. Activists are rarely crazy. But by defining rationality in contrast to and incompatible with emotion, resource mobilization and political process theorists missed powerful springs of collective action. (Ironically, emotions disappeared from the study of collective action just before the late 1970s, when the sociology of emotions emerged as a distinct subfield.)

The Cultural Turn

In the late 1980s, American scholars began to recognize cultural dimensions of social movements, partly inspired by European researchers who saw a range of so-called new social movements as efforts to transform dominant cultural codes and identities rather than as bids for political or economic power (Cohen 1985; Laraña et al. 1994). As the economy shifted from manufactured goods to the production of knowledge, Touraine (1977) argued, domination took the form of an increasing penetration of "technocratic power" into all spheres of life. New movements sought not economic gains or greater participation in the system, but spaces of autonomy in which to enact new lifestyles and relationships.

Melucci (1995) drew attention to participants' "emotional investment" in the new collective identities that are the chief product of mobilization, and he cautioned that "there is no cognition without feeling" (p. 45). Yet his view of collective identity as an "interactive and shared definition . . . concerned with the orientation for action and the field of opportunities and constraints in which the actions take place" (p. 44) emphasizes its cognitive components. Nevertheless, Melucci's recognition of emotions was a departure from structural analyses, and new social movement theorists' focus on culture, identity, and intersubjective processes encouraged attention to those processes even in "old" movements.

In the 1990s researchers criticized structuralists' indifference to cultural processes (Johnston and Klandermans 1995; Laraña et al. 1994; Morris and Mueller 1992). Culture had a distinctly cognitive cast in these writings, however, made up of "customs, beliefs, values, artifacts, symbols, and rituals" (Johnston and Klandermans 1995:3), "ideas and beliefs" (Mueller 1992:13), and "ideas, ideology, [and] identity" (McAdam 1994:36). Culture influenced activists and potential activists by shaping their understandings, not their emotions.

A cognitive bent was also apparent in the scholarship on "framing"—the term originally used to describe the rhetorical processes by which a movement recruits members (Snow et al. 1986). Snow and Benford (1992:137) defined a frame as "an interpretive schemata that simplifies and condenses the 'world out there' by selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences, and sequences of actions within one's present or past environment." Snow and Benford (1988) saw three types of framing as necessary for successful recruitment: *diagnostic*, in which a movement convinces potential converts that a problem needs to be addressed; *prognostic*, in which it convinces them of appropriate strategies, tactics, and targets; and *motivational*, in

which it exhorts them to get involved in these activities. The many definitions and applications of frames and framing processes deal almost entirely with their cognitive components. "Motivational framing," which implicitly refers to emotions, is rarely discussed, although it is apparently what gets people actually to do something. Benford (1997:419) later admitted:

> Those operating within the framing/constructionist perspective have not fared much better than their structuralist predecessors in elaborating the role of emotions in collective action. Instead, we continue to write as though our movement actors (when we actually acknowledge humans in our texts) are Spock-like beings, devoid of passion and other human emotions.

As usual, Gamson (1992:32) saw what many others missed. He argued that "injustice frames," essential to protest, depend on "the righteous anger that puts fire in the belly and iron in the soul." In experiments that exposed ordinary people to transgressions by authority figures, Gamson and his collaborators (1982) found that hostility to authority preceded the development of an injustice frame. Suspicion, anger, and other emotions may arise even before blame is allocated through more cognitive processes. Gamson (1992:33) later elaborated on the sources of injustice frames, including "concreteness in the target, even when it is misplaced and directed away from the real causes of hardship." The need to elicit strong emotions, in other words, may lead organizers to distort their analyses. They may "exaggerate the role of human actors, failing to understand broader structural constraints, and misdirect their anger at easy and inappropriate targets" (p. 33). Le Bon redux.

Recent work on collective identity partly reflects a desire to capture the emotional motivations for protest, even though these are rarely discussed explicitly (Polletta and Jasper 2001). Identity is usually contrasted to "interest" in accounts of participation, suggesting a connection to movement aims that is closer to kinship than material interest. It is also used to describe a sense of solidarity among members of a social movement itself, again suggesting bonds of trust, loyalty, and affection. However, most discussions define collective identity as the drawing of a cognitive boundary rather than as a set of positive affects toward other group members on the grounds of that common membership. Perhaps the latter sounds too much like Hoffer or Klapper.

Methodological barriers to getting at emotions in social movements persist, since the rigorous questionnaires favored by social psychologists who study emotions are not always appropriate or feasible in studies of protest. The result is that emotions have remained unrecognized and untheorized, even as they have supplied much of the causal force behind some of the key mechanisms identified in recent years. This is as true of cultural concepts such as collective identity and frames as it is of structural concepts such as political opportunities and social networks (Jasper 1998).

REDISCOVERING EMOTIONS: RECENT RESEARCH

In the spirit of Aristotle, we distinguish several different interactional contexts in which emotions are generated and displayed. Some emotions arise outside of movements altogether, in individuals who are influenced by any number of others, including the media. These have been studied as the raw materials from which mobilization may be built. There are also internal dynamics in which participants engage each other, including the interactions between leaders and followers. In between these, participants engage potential recruits. This encounter may include specific efforts to build confidence, which is crucial to all strategic action (Jasper 2006b). It may include a great deal of moral work, labeling various players as good or bad. Then there are external interactions with other players, be they opponents, authorities, or bystanders. Finally, there are a

number of trade-offs between internal and external dynamics, or ways in which internal processes affect external actions, in which emotions play an important part.

We also try, when possible, to apply a typology of emotions that we have used elsewhere (Goodwin et al. 2004; Jasper 2006a). One category consists of reflexes, such as anger or surprise, that are quick to appear and to subside and which have clear bodily programs associated with them (Ekman 1972). Another group are long-standing affects, especially love and hate but also others such as trust and respect. There are, in addition, a number of moral emotions of approval and disapproval, including shame and pride, or sometimes sympathies such as compassion. Our final category, moods, does not take a direct object the way most emotions do; moods color our action, especially giving us more or less confidence, and we usually carry them with us from one setting to the next.

Raw Materials

Some emotions form the raw materials for movement sympathy and recruitment. These may consist of cultural sensibilities such as compassion for different groups, or it may consist of individual personality dynamics—as well as an interaction between the two.

Broad sensibilities are raw materials for political mobilization. Shifts in emotions and their expression have created new vocabularies of motive, new subjects, and new targets of protest. Compassion for animals was the most important precondition for the emergence of animal protection movements (Jasper 1997). Barker-Benfield (1992) argues that "sensibility," the capacity to be swept up by excesses of pathos, pity, and sympathy, was promoted in the eighteenth century by British manufacturers purveying luxury entertainments and goods. It "disciplined" women's attachments "into tasteful domesticity," stimulating the demand for domestic objects (Barker-Benfield p. xxvi). But sympathy also drew women out of the house and into a public world of shopping and luxury entertainment. It encouraged middle-class women to speak publicly and collectively of their sufferings at the hands of men, nurturing a protofeminism. Stearns and Stearns (1986) noted that worker unrest as well as growing female employment in the twentieth century prompted managerial concerns about workers' emotions. Preventing anger became an important labor relations goal. Collective action could change institutionalized practices in part through its association with broad shifts in moral emotions.

Emotion norms also affect whether people think they can engage in politics and in which ways. Gender norms are the most studied example. Women's emotions (and those of other relatively powerless groups like racial and ethnic minorities, the physically disabled, and so on) are often characterized in ways that blunt their challenges to authorities or cultural norms. Women are particularly susceptible, Campbell (1994) argues, to having their opinions dismissed as bitterness or sentimentality. To say that someone is "bitter" is to say that her anger is without effective expression as well as to blame her for her own failure to be taken seriously. Bitterness, along with emotionality and sentimentality generally, "are used to interpret our expressions narrowly and critically as always either being on the edge of excess, or already excessive" (p. 55). Sentimentality is paradoxically encouraged in women but only in certain (private or domestic) spheres; it is thus used to control and limit the public occasions on which women may express emotions.

Scheff's (1994) approach has been to identify patterns of pride and shame that allow varying degrees of recruitment to collective action because of their rhetorical resonance. These two emotions are eminently social, having to do with our attachment to others—pride issuing from positive connections and shame issuing from disconnection. When shame is not acknowledged, according to Scheff, it can lead to aggression, at an individual, a group, or even at the national level. Also,

when people feel ashamed of their anger, a "shame-rage" spiral can quickly spin out of control. Leaders mobilize through appeals to these emotions and especially promises to avenge shame.

Scheff (1994) has applied these ideas to nationalist movements and to nazism in particular, arguing that such movements "involve an intense and passionate quest for belonging" as "individuals and groups seek to increase their pride/shame balance (pp. 282, 286). For Scheff, "Hitler's appeal [to Germans] was that he promised that pride and community would replace shame and alienation"; "the promise of ending Germany's shame after the Treaty of Versailles and raising its pride formed the core of virtually all of his speeches and writings" (pp. 286–287).

Honneth (1995) has linked patterns of respect in a society to its politics and protest. When groups lack certain kinds of recognition from others—affective bonds, respect for their rational autonomy, and esteem—they develop a righteous anger that leads to mobilization. Eventually, they force others to grant the recognition due to all humans. Honneth sees an important role in this process for negative emotional reactions such as anger and indignation. He also shows the tight bond between cognition, morality, and emotion.

Psychoanalytic approaches, which treat individual preoccupations and neuroses as raw materials for political organizers, have persisted, gaining new energy from narrative and other cognitive approaches that allow a less pejorative understanding of symbols and decision-making (Schafer 1976). For instance, psychoanalytic approaches have addressed the sources of cynicism and despair, moods that discourage political action (Hoggett 1992). Psychoanalytic theories, complementing Scheff, have also suggested a number of pathways by which shame operates in politics (Thompson forthcoming).

Occasionally, a movement will take a society's emotion norms as the target of its political work. Thus, self-help groups of women suffering from postpartum depression (Taylor 1996) explicitly aim at transforming the emotions associated with certain gender roles, as the women's movement more generally (Hochschild 1975).

Confidence and Recruitment

Most often, movements use a culture's emotional expectations to recruit members. Blee's (1991) study of the 1920s Ku Klux Klan showed how the Klan joined a rhetoric of women's rights with a virulently racist agenda through inflammatory (and sexually titillating) portrayals of the sexual abuse of white Protestant women by blacks, Catholics, and Jews—themes still present, Blee has found, in the worldview and propaganda of contemporary racist activists (Blee 2002). Moral emotions, including indignation based on perceived threats, are the core of political rhetoric.

One way that activists must grapple with the emotions they bring to the movement is to try to transform deactivating emotions into activating ones. Shame cripples action, as do moods of resignation or depression. Anger, outrage, indignation, and pride, on the other hand, encourage action. Growing research has examined how action is sparked through emotional dynamics. A sense of agency is important for both recruiting new members and motivating existing ones.

Pride activates and shame deactivates, and their interplay has been analyzed. For instance, since the Stonewall riot pride has been the desired stance among lesbian and gay men. As Gould (2001, 2002) shows, however, pride can motivate very different forms of protest. Whereas expressions of pride accompanied militant and confrontational protest in the years after Stonewall, activists also invoked pride when calling for volunteerism, remembrance of the dead, and quiet lobbying in the early years of the AIDS crisis. According to Gould, lesbian and gay men's continuing ambivalence about their homosexuality—proud but also ashamed—discouraged expressions of anger in favor of demonstrating a quiet nobility in the face of a deadly epidemic. Five years

into the epidemic, however, the movement's emotion rules changed again. Morally shocked and angered by the Supreme Court's *Bowers v. Hardwick* antisodomy decision, as well as by the government's inaction and state legislatures' willingness to consider quarantines, gay men and lesbians began to express indignation and outrage and to form militant groups like ACT UP. "Pride" once again demanded militant confrontation.

The transformation of shame into pride also operates at the other end of the political spectrum. Stein (2001a, 2001b) found signs of shame in interviews with Christian conservative activists, who accounted for their activity in terms of a selfless commitment to higher authorities—family, nation, and God—but also expressed feelings of rejection and passivity in describing themselves as victims of forces beyond their control. Through their activism, Stein argues, they try to construct a positive sense of themselves and their families as strong and independent, in contrast to weak, shameful others, in this case the gays and lesbians they feared and detested.

Connecting movement emotions to broader theories of culture, Polletta (2002) argues that the stories activists tell one another are critical in mobilizing the emotions of confidence. In an analysis of students' contemporaneous accounts of the 1960s sit-ins, she shows how black student "apathy" was reinterpreted as the repression of political aspirations—they were "tired of waiting" for the rights denied them—and thus transformed into a motivation for action.

A sense of confidence and agency is not the same as a cold calculation of likely repression or success. Whereas structuralists and many culturalists viewed the latter as necessary for recruitment, it may be the emotions of the former that matter more.

Moral Work

Political activists do extensive rhetorical work to transform emotional raw materials into specific beliefs and suggestions for action. One way they inspire activity is through moral shocks, which occur when an unexpected event or piece of information raises such a sense of outrage in a person that he or she becomes inclined toward political action, whether or not the person has acquaintances in the movement (Jasper 1997, 1998; Jasper and Poulsen 1995). Whether the underlying image is a state of shock or an electric shock, it implies a visceral, bodily feeling, on a par with vertigo or nausea. The prospect of unexpected and sudden changes in one's surroundings can arouse feelings of dread and anger. The former can paralyze, but the latter can become the basis of mobilization. Activists work hard to create moral outrage and anger and to suggest targets against which these can be vented. Luker's (1984) research on antiabortion activists emphasizes how a Supreme Court decision—*Roe v. Wade*—morally angered and shocked certain women, mainly Catholic housewives, into lives of activism.

Nepstad and Smith (2001) have demonstrated how affective solidarities become the raw materials for moral shocks. When covert U.S. involvement in Central America became broadly known in the early 1980s, many members of American religious communities were especially likely to respond with activism because of their prior personal connections with Central Americans. Missionaries returning to the United States and Central America refugees given asylum by American congregations brought with them stories of atrocities suffered at the hands of U.S.-backed regimes. American churchgoers developed strong bonds with their fellow foreign Christians. Accordingly, when they heard about CIA-sponsored mining of Nicaraguan harbors and the CIA counterinsurgency "murder manuals," they expressed their shock by turning to activism not on behalf of strangers but on behalf of people they felt they *knew*.

Young (2001) has studied another group of activists who mobilized on behalf of a group with whom they had even less contact. In the 1830s, American evangelical Protestants began

to call for an immediate end to slavery with an urgency unthinkable only a few years earlier. What had changed, Young argues, was the cosmology and, even more important, the temperament of evangelical Christianity. Having long viewed slavery as a metaphor for Christians' own sinfulness, evangelicals now began to see slavery itself as sinful. Abolishing slavery was linked with personal redemption. Young shows how shifts in "emotion cultures" can create new motivations for, and targets of, protest. Again, activists must craft rhetoric to tap into moral sensibilities in the broader culture.

Whereas rational choice and even some structural traditions view morality as fairness calculations about the distribution of rewards, morality resides as much or more in emotions of approval and disapproval (Jasper 2006a). In all cases, words and images are crafted to arouse feelings and actions.

Internal Dynamics

Recent work has also examined the role of emotion in the internal dynamics of social movements proper. Gender is again prominent. In her study of a holistic health center, Kleinman (1996) found that men and women were rewarded differently for expressing the same emotions, with men praised for exhibiting caring emotions (or any emotions at all!) and women discouraged from being too emotional. Emotions, she found, were often used to attribute problems to personal failings rather than to structural inequities.

However, affective ties are the most studied way in which emotions affect the internal coherence of protest groups. In her study of women in the civil rights movement, for instance, Robnett (1997) pointed out that whereas national spokesmen like Martin Luther King, Jr., used emotional appeals to mobilize audiences, grassroots leaders, who were predominantly women, did a different kind of emotion work. Their day-to-day interaction with residents of Southern communities built the emotional loyalty necessary for persuading the latter to act in dangerous circumstances. In Lofland's (1996) book-length treatment of social movement organizations, emotions appeared primarily as affective bonds that make social networks such important mechanisms for recruitment. Other sociologists have also revealed the affective bonds that forge solidarity and motivate participation, but without theorizing those processes explicitly (Epstein 1991; Lichterman 1996; McAdam 1988).

Rupp and Taylor's research on the "abeyance structures" that sustain movements during difficult times reveals the affective ties that permeate them (Rupp and Taylor 1987; Taylor 1989). The National Women's Party (NWP) provided the resurgent women's movement of the 1960s with activist networks, goals, tactics, and a collective identity. These contributions were made possible by the NWP's continuity over time, purposive commitment, exclusiveness, centralization, and culture. Emotions were important for all these dimensions. "Personal ties of love and friendship among members were an important cultural ideal," Taylor (1989:769) observed. A willingness to shape personal relationships around the cause was, in large measure, what made possible the intense commitment of members. Many activists were actually couples, and many had an intense personal devotion to the party's leader, Alice Paul.

Positive affective bonds toward fellow participants can weaken as well as strengthen individual commitments. Reinterpreting the insights of Freud (1959) and Slater (1963), Goodwin (1997) stresses the potentially disintegrative impact of affective ties, pointing to the Communist-led Huk rebellion in the Philippines as a case in point. Love and erotic attraction can lead individuals and dyads out of movement participation and into private life. In strategic terms, Jasper (2004a) refers to this as the common Band of Brothers Dilemma: Strong affective loyalties are a boon to a

movement, but they may attach themselves to a subunit of the movement instead of the movement as a whole.

In addition, extremely tight bonds between some participants can alienate participants who do not share in them. In her history of radical feminism, Echols (1989) showed that the intense bonds of "sisterhood" promoted by the movement also ended up alienating some activists who felt stifled by those bonds. This suggests another way that emotions can motivate movement *dis*affiliation.

Researchers have remarked on the pleasures of protest without always analyzing what kinds of emotions accompany them. In some cases, these pleasures may be great enough to motivate participation without relying on a cognitive belief that success is likely or even possible. The deepest consist of dignity and pride. According to Bell (1992), many black civil rights protestors participated to gain dignity in their lives through struggle and moral expression, not necessarily because they expected to gain equal rights from that struggle. As he says of one participant, "her goal was defiance, and its harassing effect was likely more potent precisely because she did what she did without expecting to topple her oppressors" (p. xvi). This dignity is similar to Scheff's concept of pride.

Wood (2001, 2003) has similarly argued that Salvadoran peasants took pleasure and pride in their rebellion against long-dominant economic and political elites, regardless of their calculations about the likely success of their actions, which hardly seemed encouraging. Some *campesiños* engaged in collective action for its own sake: to assert agency was to reclaim their dignity; not to act was to be less than human. Protest itself was the only goal. Only later in the war, after the worst repression had passed, did some insurgents further their material interests through coordinated action.

In addition to pride, pleasures arise from the joys of collective activities, such as losing oneself in collective motion or song: Durkheim's classic "collective effervescence." Lofland (1982) described the "joys of crowds" in some detail—an important counter to older images of what inspired crowds. Eyerman and Jamison's (1998) research on the role of music in social movements emphasizes its cognitive functions, but they also note how music has helped to build collective identities and sustain solidarity and hope. Similar themes are sounded in Danaher and Roscigno's (2004) study of music in Southern textile communities. Berezin (2001) has shown how Italian fascists employed public rituals to induce strong feelings of national belonging—the neglected underside of political identities, according to Berezin—a cultural project that other movements have also pursued. Rituals are enjoyable in part because they reactivate affective bonds, in part because of the coordinated action.

Just as affective bonds can weaken as well as strengthen a movement, so the pleasures of participation have their negative counterpart in frustration and fatigue. In Hirschman's (1982:120) account, people "burn out" and retreat from the public to the private sphere because "participation in public life offers only this unsatisfactory too-much-or-too-little choice and is therefore bound to be disappointing in one way or another." Voting offers too little political involvement; social movements often demand too much. We become addicted to protest activities, commit huge amounts of time to them, and become exhausted; we have unrealistic expectations of social change and are easily disappointed. Hirschman's description of these dynamics depends (albeit mostly implicitly) on emotions such as excitement, disappointment, and frustration: "The turns from the private to the public life are marked by wildly exaggerated expectations, by total infatuation, and by sudden revulsions" (p. 102).

An important component of internal group dynamics involves the interactions between leaders and followers, a topic (like leadership more generally) that is currently out of fashion. Lalich (2004), examining Heaven's Gate and the Democratic Workers Party, has resuscitated

Hoffer's notion of a "true believer," giving it a more sociological twist by looking at the social mechanisms that sustain charismatic cults rather than blaming participation on defective personalities. Utter group loyalty depends on "singlemindedness, a way of thinking characterized by dogmatism and rigidity, and no identity outside the context of the group" (p. 255). Members feel both intense love and fear for their leaders, who in these particular cases were distant, disapproving, paranoid, and able to arouse guilt in members. The result is an overwhelming sense of duty to and unity with the group. Few groups manage, as these did, to absorb members so utterly, but successful groups need some of the same dynamics. So far, however, little research has examined the attraction of leaders or the "brainwashing" that groups can do, no doubt because of the shadow cast by Hoffer and similar thinkers.

External Engagements

Emotions are crucial to the interactions between social movements and others, just as they are to all social interactions. Participants may feel a certain way, usually negative, about opponents. They try to arouse sympathy and respect from bystanders. Interaction generates further emotions, including reflex emotions such as fear and moral emotions like shame and pride.

Gender reappears in the interactions between protest groups and outsiders as part of the goal or self-presentation of the movement. The animal protectionists studied by Groves (1997, 2001) were worried that their movement would appear too emotional because of its preponderance of women. Activists often used the term "emotional" to criticize colleagues they considered unprofessional, irrational, or (if they were women) feminine. Groves found that the career-oriented women who made up the bulk of the movement believed it was necessary to substantiate their feelings about animal cruelty with scientific arguments and the visible support of men.

Negative affects toward opponents (and sometimes outsiders generally) help mobilize people as surely as positive ones toward fellow group members. Jasper (1997, 2006b) analyzes the negative emotions produced by threats and blame, so important because they generate the strong emotions of Gamson's injustice frames. For example, when pro-choice and antiabortion newsletters "identify concrete and specific adversaries, characterize enemy action in an entirely negative light, attribute corrupt motives to the foe, and magnify the opponents' power" (Vanderford 1989:174), they enhance protestors' outrage and sense of threat. They transform emotions at the same time as understanding. Demonization fuels powerful emotions for social movements, such as hatred, fear, anger, suspicion, paranoia, and indignation.

The same myths that arouse positive feelings of national and ethnic belonging often inspire fierce hatred and resentment of other nations and ethnicities (Kaufman 2001; Petersen 2002). Hatred is far more than the absence of love; it is a passionate obsession with the other (Alford forthcoming). Still, although difficult, it is not impossible to forge intense positive bonds across national boundaries (Taylor and Rupp 2002), although perhaps only by defining an "in group" at the international level.

At the extreme, strategic engagement can be dangerous. Even in democratic societies, protestors often fear arrest, the loss of employment, bodily injury, harm to family members, and even death. Ongoing participation in "high-risk" movements typically requires the mitigation of participants' fears. Goodwin and Pfaff (2001) discovered several "encouragement mechanisms" whereby civil rights activists in the United States and the former East Germany managed to do just this. They showed that factors and processes that movement analysts have typically invoked for other explanatory purposes—including networks, mass gatherings, rituals, new collective identities, shaming, the possession of guns—also helped participants deal with their fears

(sometimes as unanticipated consequences of these processes). Flam (1998) has similarly argued that overcoming or managing fear was important for East German and Polish dissidents.

Trade-Offs

Protestors may find that they need to display different emotional packages in different settings, while at the same time trying to avoid appearing duplicitous. Whittier (2001) shows that the activist survivors of child abuse encourage different emotions in conferences dominated by fellow survivors, on talk shows, and in courts of law. When among their own, survivors are urged to experience and express strong emotions—anger, grief, and shame, but also pride at overcoming their victimization. When pressing claims for crime victims' compensation, survivors must demonstrate grief, fear, and shame in order to legitimate their claims of injury, but not anger or pride. Justified as "strategy," the emotional injunctions that Whittier describes reveal activists' normative assumptions about gender, feeling, and rationality.

This is only one example of a very common trade-off: The emotional appeals and displays that will have the desired effect on one audience will have an undesirable effect on others. In the days of Aristotle and face-to-face communication, the orator had to think about his audience as a whole, largely ignoring individual differences. This is still a challenge, but one matched by differences among entire groups. Thanks to modern communications, words, gestures, and bodily expressed emotions can go to friends, foes, authorities, and bystanders all at once. Telling your group that your opponents are incorrigibly evil may strengthen your group, but it will not help you deal with those you have demonized once they find out.

THEORIZING EMOTIONS: ENGAGING BROADER THEORIES

Few of the scholars who rediscovered the emotions in social movements in the late 1990s were self-consciously working in any of the recognized traditions in the sociology of emotions. In our own cases, Goodwin (1997) drew on a Freud tamed by Slater (1997) turned to a variety of cultural-constructionist approaches. Their cultural approach differed from Hochschild's in recognizing the ontological importance of emotions, not just their management and display. Although there was room for rituals and interactions, these were not emphasized as the sole or even main sources of influential emotions. Kemper's hierarchies were not emphasized because most of the "new social movements" did not seem driven by status or power issues, unlike the citizenship movements exemplary for political-process theories. Justice was central to the new research on movement emotions, but few links were made with existing sociologies of justice, largely because these are mostly limited to fairness. In this section we examine what links might be made to these literatures.

Culture

Movement research has touched on, without always explicitly engaging, several cultural and cognitive approaches to emotions. By defining culture as consisting of cognition, emotion, and morality, Jasper (1997) suggests both parallels and distinctions between cognitions and emotions. Among similarities, both of them have at the same time a public, shared component and an interior, personal component. We have expectations about cognitive meanings and about

what emotions someone should experience in a given situation—expectations that can be disappointed (Thoits 1985, 1990). Methodologically, there are parallel challenges in linking the public expressions and the interior versions of the feelings and meanings. And both cognitions and emotions have a neurological/physiological component as well as an interpreted cultural component.

Yet our beliefs about the world are not quite the same as our feelings about the state of the world—at least analytically. In practice, the two proved hard to disentangle, so that most research on movements came to adopt a cognitive view of emotions as a form of belief about the world, but one with special relevance to our own flourishing or desires (well articulated by Nussbaum (2001)). Initially, there was also an adoption of a constructionist approach (from scholars such as Rom Harré) that proved unnecessary. Indeed, debates over biology and culture were never important in the field of movement emotions.

Symbolic interactionism (discussed in Chapter 7 of this volume) has been a central theoretical influence on the study of social movements, in a kind of Chicago-school shadow that survived alongside the structural-functional paradigm in the 1950s and 1960s. In this line, Lofland (1982) gave explicit attention to the emotions of collective action. He wrote about the joys of crowd interactions and the affective bonds that aid conversion to religious cults (Lofland and Stark 1965), adding affective variables without linking to explicit theories of emotions or showing how the feelings are related to cognitions. Although little research has followed up on Lofland's work, his research suggests the need to distinguish among interactive contexts. Lalich's (2004) work on sects, for instance, examines mechanisms of social control: what happens after the conversion.

Another form of symbolic interactionism, affect control theory, looks at culturally accepted definitions of identities and the emotions that result when our expectations of them are either met or not met (see Chapter 8 of this volume). Heise (1977, 1979, 1989), Smith-Lovin (1990), and others working in this tradition posited three main dimensions that define identities: evaluation (good or bad), potency (powerful or powerless), and activity (animated or passive), or EPA. When our transient impressions of an event or situation do not coincide with our fundamental expectations (a "deflection"), we experience emotions, usually negative ones (although we may experience positive emotions if our expectations are surpassed).

Affect control theory might help us understand common expectations and images of protestors in the general culture. The role of protestor, incorporated in several studies, gets a rating in North American culture of slightly good, slightly powerful, and very active—placing them in three-dimensional EPA space near identities such as fanatic, salesman, vigilante, jock, lobbyist, nymphomaniac, boy, and extrovert! This rating seems intuitively reasonable, especially if news coverage pits protestors in angry confrontations with police (verbs associated with imagined encounters between the two include "haggle with," "oppose," "hoot" or "holler" at, and "cajole"). At the same time, fictional media portrayals of protestors, as in sitcoms, often seem to paint them as rather powerless and ineffectual, in which case, protestors would end up near a number of childlike roles, which seems to be how they are often portrayed, especially by business interests and conservative politicians. There may be an ongoing cultural conflict over how to think and feel about protestors, which raises a range of issues that affect control theory has yet to address.

Because cultural impressions like these presumably affect outcomes, they seem a fertile research area. We could observe what steps protest groups take to generate impressions of power—for instance relying on men rather than women as spokespersons or using discourses of science rather than emotion (Groves 1997, 2001). In addition to self-presentation, we might also observe how protest groups aim to change popular characterizations of other strategic players: how they praise friends and demonize opponents. Struggles over the public images concerning particular players will always reflect underlying cultural images of general roles.

Associating a player with a common cultural role, although important rhetorical work, involves a number of dilemmas. Do you portray opponents as strong and threatening, to emphasize the urgency of stopping them, or as inept and ridiculous, to undermine their confidence and sense of agency? Similarly, do you present your own side as strong and heroic, able to contain evildoers, but possibly not in need of anyone else's support? Do you present yourselves as victims instead, gaining sympathy but undermining your sense of your own power, a recurrent dilemma for adult survivors of child abuse (Whittier 2001)? Politics is filled with efforts to define players as heroes, villains, and victims in EPA space.

One dimension of EPA is often overlooked, even though it is crucial to collective action: active versus passive. For a movement to succeed, as we saw, activists must devote enormous effort to giving participants a sense of their own agency. They need confidence in their own ability to act, something that requires the suppression of demobilizing emotions such as apathy and fear.

A final source of cultural theorizing about emotions—as we saw—came from feminism, largely suggested by Hochschild's (1975) analysis of how women's anger had to be legitimated and deployed in the face of widespread expectations for women to be passive. Taylor (1996) applied this view to the case of postpartum depression, highlighting the special difficulties women face in dealing with emotions "inappropriate" to the mother role, and Kleinman (1996) showed the different amounts of credit that men and women receive for expressing highly gendered emotions. This kind of research should provide a way to extend affect control theory to cover explicit challenges to cultural expectations, one possible (but understudied) reaction to continual "deflections." Gendered roles set up enormously strong expectations about actions and trigger strong emotions when they are not met.

Structure

One of the most fruitful approaches to emotions has linked them to individuals' positions in social hierarchies (see Chapter 14 of this volume). Kemper (1978; Kemper and Collins 1990) suggests that our emotions differ according to our relative power and status in hierarchies as well as in response to changes in these. When individuals have or gain power or status, they tend to feel positive emotions such as pride, security, and confidence. When they lack or lose them, they tend to feel fear, anxiety, and other negative emotions. Kemper distinguishes dozens of emotions according to people's positions in social structures.

Research might investigate whether the emotions that individuals feel in their work or personal lives carry over into their political lives. Those who feel powerless at work may seek power through collective action, as Kemper suggests. For status, he explicitly predicts that losses will lead to collective action if they are attributed to the actions of others (through anger and indignation) but not if they are blamed on oneself. A long tradition of research on right-wing, so-called status movements has found just these dynamics: Shame leads to demonization of those who are blamed for the loss of status (Aho 1990; Gusfield 1963; Lipset and Raab 1978; Rieder 1985). This tradition, currently out of favor, needs to specify better the mechanisms by which these feelings are referenced in rhetorical contexts.

More generally in the field of social movements, the structural emphasis on political constraints and financial resources that emerged in the 1970s, although it tended to ignore emotions altogether, was conceivably consistent with Kemper's theory. Protestors, typically visualized as insurgents, were seen as outsiders, in subordinate positions economically, legally, politically, and often personally. The U.S. civil rights movements, and southern blacks, were taken as the exemplar, although early modern labor movements in Europe also fit the pattern. Here we might

expect hierarchical dynamics, with the emotions felt in everyday life (generated by structural positions) being the motivation to join collective action. But most social movements do not comfortably fit these exemplars, and despite Kemper's efforts (2001), structural approaches have not been widely adopted by students of social movements.

Another possible application would be to examine hierarchies *within* social movements. We must distinguish between a movement's internal dynamics and its attitudes toward the broader society it hopes to change. In the former, status and power differences may emerge more clearly. Relations between leaders and followers (currently an ignored research topic) may especially take the form of a social hierarchy. Authoritarian sects and cults, in particular, often have strong leaders to whom deference is given, as we saw with Lalich's (2004) account of Heaven's Gate and the (ironically named) Democratic Workers Party. In hierarchic groups like these, we should expect to see mechanisms that reinforce or rationalize hierarchies. For instance, the leaders of Heaven's Gate reinforced and exploited the age gap between them and their followers through nicknames and other language that infantilized the latter. Even those groups that, unlike Heaven's Gate, try to hide internal differences of power and status may still generate the emotions appropriate to them.

Nonetheless, today's protest groups, especially the so-called new social movements, rarely exhibit the kind of internal hierarchy that defines structure in Kemper's sense. Most are relatively egalitarian societies of equals, which try hard to minimize status differences among members, although informal hierarchies of status may nonetheless arise, capable of triggering the emotions that Kemper details.

Most protestors belong to groups that are explicitly critical of hierarchies, an observation compatible with Kemper's point about attributing blame for status decline. Ridgeway (1978, 1982; Ridgeway and Johnson 1990) has examined the cultural expectations people bring to interactions, expecting more competence from individuals of higher status (male, white, older, and so on) and becoming angry when lower-status individuals dominate instead. She has demonstrated these dynamics in the operations of small groups, a lead that might help us understand protest groups, especially gender dynamics (Kleinman 1996). Individuals of lower status, she suggests, may improve their ranking quietly and slowly without triggering negative emotions. With this exception, however, most structural factors will have more to do with constructions of outsiders than with the internal dynamics of ongoing movement groups. (Ridgeway's work has as much to do with cultural expectations about hierarchies as about hierarchies themselves.)

In another structural approach, Barbalet (1998) attempts to define macrosocial conditions for the spread of emotional raw materials useful in collective mobilization. When people lose the resources and capacities to maintain their social connections, they become resentful and vengeful against those they believe have denied them the status they deserve (resentment) or who have used their power against them (vengefulness). In rhetorical settings, organizers can appeal to these feelings whether or not they are held consciously.

In addition, Barbalet (1998) argues, confidence and fear can advance or hinder collective action. Jasper (2006b) also emphasizes confidence in his examination of strategic engagements in a variety of institutional arenas, and Goodwin and Pfaff (2001) have shown how important it is for protestors to manage fear. Barbalet points out that fear can inspire action as well as dampen it, tapping into recent work on the importance of threats as triggers of collective or strategic action (Jasper 1997, 2006b). Further, he notes that fear equally affects elites, frequently pushing them to innovate politically and organizationally. Students of protest might here learn something from international relations, which has often demonstrated how one nation's fears can lead it to strengthen its military, frightening its neighbors in turn and leading to hostile spirals (e.g., Buzan 1983).

In some ways, Barbalet (1998) has put the flesh of emotions on the spare bones of Smelser's (1962) idea of "social strain" (similar to many other early concepts). But it is not simply social change that causes strain; strategic actions by organized groups also place stress on others. Research on protest should be able to identify rhetorical references to and symbols of resentment and vengeance. Research on frames, for instance, should devote more attention to the emotional effects as well as the cognitive ones.

We saw that Scheff (1990, 1994, 1997), working in a similar vein, has documented the presence of shame in several collective mobilizations, although he has primarily examined nationalist wars rather than domestic and more local forms of mobilization. Like Barbalet (1998), he makes a plausible case that shame or pride can be widely distributed in a society and thus become an effective referent in pleas from political leaders. He adds more micromechanisms—for example the idea that leaders themselves can exhibit the emotions and thus embody the widespread feelings. Hitler, in one of Scheff's richest examples, displayed the signs of shame and called obsessively for revenge against his designated scapegoats: Europe's Jews.

Research on moral panics has explored many of the anxieties and fears suggested by Barbalet (1998) and Scheff (1990, 1994, 1997), especially among the elites who function as "moral entrepreneurs" in bringing attention to what they consider urgent social problems and in castigating "folk devils" responsible for them (Cohen 1972). The media, the police, politicians, and religious leaders are frequently prominent in defining a panic and organizing efforts to suppress it. Again, shame, anxiety, resentment, and other threatening feelings shape action primarily when leaders deploy or activate them rhetorically.

Although critics have decried the term "panic" as overly pejorative, it squarely suggests emotional processes. Its real weakness has been that the emotional mechanisms have not been specified. Perhaps Barbalet's (1998) descriptions of the emotions attendant on social change could remedy this problem. Moral panics are rooted in ongoing fears and anxieties about particular groups, especially those arriving from elsewhere, those at the bottom of economic hierarchies, and the young who have not yet been fully socialized. (These are the folk devils of many types of political mobilization, including revolutions.) There are clear social-structural sources for these feelings of threat.

Ritual

Drawing on Durkheim's concept of collective effervescence and Goffman's insights into interaction rituals (this is the subject of Chapter 6 in this volume), Collins (1975, 1981, 2004) has developed a theory of rituals and emotional energy, which he has applied to social movements (2001). Face-to-face social interactions can generate emotional energy that people crave, seeking out situations that generate more of it. In a way, Collins has specified new mechanisms for the old crowd image that dominated research through the 1960s. Rituals involve the physical copresence of individuals, who share awareness of one another, a focus of attention, and a mood. They synchronize their actions and develop symbolic and moral representations of their activity or group, thus helping to sustain it. Among other outcomes, righteous anger over infractions of the norms generated in the rituals may lead to collective action.

As we saw when discussing the pleasures of protest, existing research has remarked on a number of these mechanisms (e.g., Epstein 1991; Hirsch 1986, 1990), but it has tended to focus on the symbols that emerge as a kind of precipitate out of the interactions rather than the interactions themselves—no doubt because of easier methodological access. Group boundaries are reinforced, enemies demonized, insiders praised, and symbols promulgated. This research has

gone in two directions somewhat different from Collins's. On the one hand, it is clear that some symbolic and presumably emotional resonance occurs in settings beyond the face-to-face, through more impersonal media (Jasper and Poulsen 1995). The vast literature on collective identities is filled with emotional solidarities not always connected to rituals—and not always acknowledged (Polletta and Jasper 2001). On the other hand, there are numerous emotions generated in personal interactions that fill in the rather vague notion of emotional energy: angry reactions, lustful responses, the joys of crowds, the fears of engagement. We need more research on the relationship between reflex emotions and the longer-lasting moods they help to generate. All organized groups face the Janus dilemma of reaching out versus reaching in (Jasper 2004a, 2006b), and the emotional dynamics for the two kinds of activity differ enormously (Summers-Effler 2004). Research needs to both extend and further specify the emotional energies that rituals especially generate.

Fairness and Morality

Exchange theories have examined experimental subjects' emotional reactions to transactions that they consider unfair (Cook and Hegtvedt 1983; Hegtvedt and Cook 1987). Researchers have posited that individuals carry both substantive and procedural norms of justice, which allow them to see either outcomes or the underlying procedures as unfair. Students of politics, trying to get at the indignation that motivates action, have made parallel distinctions (Jasper 1997; Spector and Kitsuse 1987). Plus, a growing army of behavioral economists have conducted similar experiments (for an overview, see Camerer 2001).

Disadvantaged people become indignant when they perceive outcomes or procedures as unfair, but most exchange theories distinguish only two possible attributions of this unfairness: Individuals can attribute the outcome to structural position or to their own characteristics. What is usually missing is a third attribution: to blame the outcomes on the actions of others. This is the righteous anger that so often leads to collective action (Gamson et al. 1982). The construction of blame, fusing emotion and cognition, is a central activity of movement groups. Here is a potentially rich engagement between research on emotions and on politics.

Another potential dialogue has to do with comparisons between procedural and substantive justice norms. According to Turner and Stets (2005), it is not altogether clear if one of these trumps the other when they are in conflict. But if we see norms as partly rhetorical strategies, we see instead a trade-off or dilemma over which one of them to refer to in a given situation. Jasper (2006b) has labeled this the Dilemma of Form and Content, observing that it is usually difficult to return to conflict over substance once a strategic player has switched to issues of procedure.

The limitation of most experiments in this tradition is that injustice is defined as an unfair distribution of payoffs, typically in the monetary terms that economists and exchange theorists favor for their mathematical properties. However, there are numerous moral principles and intuitions that can be violated, such as religious or political principles, professional norms, communicative norms, and community norms of empathy and compassion (Jasper 1997, chap. 6). Like procedural norms, these are hard to quantify. But the softer techniques of movement research may help extend the insights of fairness theories.

The moral dimension of protest is often recognized but rarely linked to the emotions that make up such a large part of it. We follow moral rules because we are afraid of the consequences of breaking them; or we follow them because it feels good to "do the right thing." Contrary to Kant's recommendations, we do not act morally out of an abstract calculation or principle but from a gut feeling. Shame and guilt perhaps begin to get at these moral emotions better than sociological theories of justice do. Moral emotions have to do with *approval and disapproval*,

including approval and disapproval about ourselves. Pride and shame elude mere fairness theories, for the most part, even though they are central mechanisms reinforcing social norms (Scheff 1990, 1997; Elster 1999).

"Moral shock," we saw, is a term intended to get at the anger and outrage that can sometimes trigger political action in response to information or events that disrupt one's ontological security. It involves cognitive recognition that the world is not as it seems, with moral outrage and strong emotions about this gap. But these emotions have never been sorted out adequately. Fairness theories are only a start, and other sociological theories of emotion may help distinguish different sources of moral shocks.

Theories of justice might help us understand one of the puzzles of research into collective action: Sometimes repression dampens it and sometimes it stimulates it. Political-process and rational-choice theories have been unable to grapple effectively with situations in which higher costs to action lead to more of it. At best, they have suggested that short-run dampening may give way to longer-run stimulation (Andrews 2004), but the different effects can never be sorted out without attention to emotional dynamics. When repression is seen as grossly unjust, indignation is more likely to broaden protest, but it has to overcome fear to do so. Mediating factors probably include the attribution of blame; constructions of heroism, villainy, and victimhood; sheer hatred, fury, and revenge, alongside expectations about the costs and benefits of repression.

CONCLUSION

Sociological theories of emotions offer a number of leads to researchers on social movements, and we hope that such research can help advance these theories in turn. Different theories seem to be suited for different interactive contexts, and there are many such contexts in the recruitment, internal dynamics, and external engagements of social movements. The sociological study of political action desperately needs new microfoundations to counter those of rational choice theory, and the extensive tool kit of emotional mechanisms is a promising source for these (Jasper forthcoming).

Nonetheless, there seem to be several lacunae in which existing theories offer little if any guidance to the movement researcher. The first is how people negotiate different kinds of inter-personal and rhetorical settings, beginning with the contrast between dealing with insiders and outsiders. Just as different symbols and claims will resonate with each, so will different emotional appeals. Emotional appeals and displays that work with one audience may hurt with another, and it is difficult in today's world to segregate these audiences.

A similar gap in existing theories seems to be that most of them lump all emotions together, whereas the inductive research on social movements suggests differences. In particular, the abiding affective loyalties that go into collective identity and collective demonization must have sources and effects that differ from those of the reflex emotions such as anger and surprise. Moral emotions are also stable aspects of culture that differ from urges and reflexes. Moods too would seem to have different sources, although they are important in dampening or facilitating action.

Moral emotions are especially important in public rhetoric, suggesting another gap: Existing theories have little to say about mediated rhetorical settings and how they differ from direct one-on-one interactions. Systematic discussions of emotions began with Aristotle's observations on the emotional effects of rhetoric, an extremely sociological interest that has somehow been lost. Who arouses what emotions in whom? How and when? Specifying different emotional effects will help us understand politics, and political research can help us specify those effects.

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