

WILEY



A · M · E · R · I · C · A · N
A N T H R O P O L O G I C A L
A S S O C I A T I O N

Personal Identity and Social Organization

Author(s): John L. Caughey

Source: *Ethos*, Vol. 8, No. 3 (Autumn, 1980), pp. 173-203

Published by: [Wiley](#) on behalf of the [American Anthropological Association](#)

Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/640126>

Accessed: 09/10/2013 09:30

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at <http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp>

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.



Wiley and American Anthropological Association are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to *Ethos*.

<http://www.jstor.org>

Personal Identity and Social Organization

JOHN L. CAUGHEY

INTRODUCTION

Many anthropologists have used some version of identity theory in studying social relationships. Along the way several of these writers, including Goodenough (1963, 1965), Keesing (1970, 1975), Wallace and Fogelson (1965), Spradley and Mann (1975), and Robbins (1973) have developed perspectives which are of potential importance for an understanding of personality. In this paper I would like to explore one aspect of this identity approach, the connections between "personal identity" and "social identity." I will argue that these connections are important in the analysis of the *meaning* of personality terms and also for the investigation of how personality appraisals affect social interaction. I will draw mainly on fieldwork on Truk but I will also consider patterns characteristic of contemporary American society.

Identity approaches to social organization depend upon the discovery and description of the systems of classification with which the people of a particular society sort themselves out into *kinds of*

JOHN L. CAUGHEY is Assistant Professor of American Studies at the University of Maryland, College Park, MD.

Research was supported by the National Institute of Mental Health and the University of Pennsylvania.

ETHOS 8:3 FALL 1980

Copyright © 1980 by the Society for Psychological Anthropology
0091-2131/80/030173-31\$3.50/1

persons, and upon the ways in which these classifications are connected to the conduct of social interactions. Identity theorists have suggested that in many, and possibly all, cultures two distinct systems of classification are employed; one set of categories for social roles or *social identities* and a second set of categories for personality types or *personal identities* (Goodenough 1965; Robbins 1973). Labels for social identities, such as "lawyer," "professor," or "uncle" refer to social positions (e.g., occupational, age/sex, and kinship categories) which carry rights and duties vis-à-vis the occupants of matching social positions (Goodenough 1965:3-4). Social identities are based on rules of conduct which specify what someone in one social capacity (e.g., "bartender") owes to and can demand from someone in another social capacity (e.g., "waitress," "customer," "owner") (Goodenough 1965:8; cf. Spradley and Mann 1975). On the other hand, labels for personal identity, such as "jealous," "shy," or "aggressive," are understood to refer not to social roles but to what someone is like "as a person." Taken as "personal and independent of one's social or occupational station in life" (Goodenough 1963:178; cf. Goodenough 1965:4), they are considered to refer to an individual's "personality," "temperament," or "character."

In studying social organization, anthropologists have concentrated on *social* identities. In the process of describing kinship, age/sex, and leadership roles, the social significance of personal identity has often been ignored. Even the literature directly focused on identity and social interactions, such as Keesing (1970, 1975), Berreman (1972), Spradley and Mann (1975), and Robbins (1973), devotes little attention to *personal* identity categorizations. This is unfortunate because, while analytically separate, social identity and personal identity are far from "independent." The connections between them are crucial for an understanding of personality appraisal and also for an understanding of social conduct. In fact, studies of social organization which are limited to the investigation of social identities alone are necessarily incomplete. As Goodenough suggests, "Whenever a person interacts with another he *bases his actions* on what he construes to be his own and the others' *personal* and social identities" (1963:186, emphasis mine).

To explore the influence of personal identity on social conduct, it is necessary to develop models of the meaning of personality terms, and of the processes of personality assessment within particular ethnopsychologies. Curiously enough this problem is relatively

neglected not only in identity theory but also in traditional and contemporary work in culture and personality and psychological anthropology. There "personality assessment" is commonly understood, both in theory and practice, to consist of the researcher's appraisal of individual or group personality in terms of Western psychological concepts. This trend is exemplified by the fact that review essays, readers, and texts, such as Bourguignon (1979), Kiefer (1977), Wallace (1970), Hsu (1972) and Barnow (1973), contain virtually no discussion of ethnopsychology in general and non-Western personality labels in particular. In fact, as Fogelson (1976:xiii) points out, "ethno-personality theory" has been neglected in anthropology generally. There are to be sure, some important exceptions.

Much of the early ethnographic work which paid attention to personality concepts in other cultures was based on a sympathetic feeling for local personality appraisal, but neglected to specify the descriptive terms through which personality was appraised. Thus Mead (1935:171) describes the Mundugumor "ideal personality" with a list of English expressions whose relationship to Mundugumor personality concepts remains unclear. In later work as well, there is little tendency to see the meaning of personality terms as a problem. Where the subjects' terms are reported at all they are often described simply by equating the local label with an English gloss whose meaning is taken to be obvious in itself and approximately equivalent to that of the subjects' term. This tendency is linked to the assumption, often quite explicit, that a single universal mode of personality appraisal underlies different ethnopsychologies. This suggests that classifications in other cultures can be explicated by showing how their terms parallel distinctions in Western ethnopsychologies. For example, in dealing with Gahuku-Gama personality ideals of "strength" and "equivalence," Read asserts that the ideal personalities of leaders "conform to the type which Riesman has termed 'autonomous'" (1959:425). In his pioneering study of the Lakalai, Valentine moves more deeply into ethnopsychology and shows that the Lakalai classify each other through the use of labels he translates as "men of shame," and "men of anger." However he does not attempt to deal in detail with the criteria by which the Lakalai make these judgements. Having translated the Lakalai terms with English phrases, he suggests that their categories parallel the Western distinction between "introversion" and "extroversion"

(1963:458) and suggests that this distinction may be universally recognized (1963:469).

To determine whether or not Valentine is right will require a great deal more research into the personal identity classifications of particular ethnopsychologies. By glossing non-Western terms with English expressions, it is all too easy to assume that the subjects' terms embody orientations which are implicit in the meanings of the English terms and hence to impose a spurious similarity on distinctive systems. Furthermore, since a culture's personality classifications are linked to its general theory of the self, such an approach runs counter to the work of Hallowell (1955) and Geertz (1973, 1976). They have shown that theories of the self can vary radically from one society to another. "The nature of the self," Hallowell, for example, writes, "considered in its conceptual component, is a culturally identifiable variable. Just as different people entertain various beliefs about the nature of the universe, they likewise differ in their ideas about the self" (Hallowell 1955:76). Even if some of the basic orientations of Western and non-Western systems of personality classification should prove similar, the differences are likely to be crucial to the understanding of how personal identity affects social interaction in particular societies.

A series of recent studies, notably those reported by Kirk and Burton (1977) and White (1978), offer promise of contributing to the solution of this problem since they focus directly on the "meaning" and "cultural organization" of personality labels. These studies show that catalogues of "personality descriptors" exist in the cultures of two widely different societies, the Maasai of East Africa and the A'ara of Melanesia, and they note that these personality terms are used "to interpret and explain interpersonal behavior" (White 1978:343). Like the studies cited previously, the authors treat A'ara and Maasai personality indicators as approximately equivalent to English glosses and they too suggest that there may be a "universal conceptual structure in the domain of personality description" (White 1978:334). However, their main concern is to elucidate the meaning of these personality descriptors by showing how they are connected to patterns of social organization. In examining this connection, Kirk and Burton, and White, employ formal models, based on multidimensional scaling and hierarchical clustering, to manipulate data obtained from informants' judgments about the similarity of selected personality descriptors. In each case, the basic

conclusion is that shifts in the meaning of personality descriptors occur when the terms are considered in relationship to contrasting "social identities." Working with age/sex categories, Kirk and Burton show that Maasai "warriors" are expected to have personalities different from those of "older men," "women," and "girls" (1977:758-760). White shows that A'ara traits like *nihnigrana* ("severe") and *fakukuru* ("demanding"), which are negative for the general population, are evaluated more positively when possessed by people occupying social identities of leadership such as "headman," "counselor," and "paramount chief" (1978:354). These studies underscore the significance of connections between personal identity and social identity which have often been obscured by the tendency to think of personality as independent from social role. However, the work of these authors illuminates only one aspect of the meaning of personality indicators, because they deal only with expectations about the typical (or "modal") personality of sets of people as defined by social identity categories. This still leaves unresolved the problem of *individual* personality assessment. To know that people of a given age-sex category are expected, on the average, to have certain personality traits does not tell us how to determine whether or not a particular individual has the trait expected. To know that the trait *nihnigrana* ("severe") is evaluated more positively when possessed by leaders than it is in other kinds of people, does not tell us what we, or the A'ara, have to know in order to say that a particular person is *nihnigrana*. An understanding of the meaning of personality indicators demands further analysis of the frames of reference by which individual personality assessments are made within a particular cultural system. By considering this aspect of meaning, we can explore additional ways in which personality classifications connect to social organization and influence social interactions.

PERSONAL IDENTITY ON FÁÁNAKKAR

My study of personal identity and social organization was carried out on the Trukese island of Fáánakkar in the Eastern Caroline Islands of Micronesia.¹ Fáánakkar lies across the lagoon from

¹ The name "Fáánakkar" is a pseudonym for the island in eastern Truk which I studied during eleven months of fieldwork in 1968. For a discussion of that research see Caughey (1977:1-7).

Romónum, the island where most of the previous fieldwork on Truk had been carried out, and it is considerably larger than Romónum. My fieldwork was done mainly in two districts of Fáánakkar, an area similar to Romónum in both size (approximately .4 square miles) and population (346 people). While there are differences in detail, the social systems of the two islands are also similar. On Fáánakkar as on Romónum, the population is divided up into named "districts" (*sóópw*), each of which is composed of eight to ten "matrilineages" (*eterekes*). The members of such groups control valuables such as land and magical knowledge in common, and stand together against outsiders. Marriages are arranged between members of the same or adjacent districts, and couples reside in extended family groupings at clusters of dwelling houses at one of the lineage centers where they have kin ties. Within a given lineage, brothers have authority over sisters and elder persons have authority over younger members. The eldest male is usually the "lineage leader" (*mmwenó*), and the leader of the chiefly lineage is also the "district chief" (*samwoonum sóópw*) (Caughey 1977; cf. Goodenough 1951, 1974).

Given these arrangements, people regularly interact with one another in terms of social identities based on lineage and district membership, kinship categories, age/sex categories, magical specializations, and leadership roles. However, people are also much concerned with assessing one another's *personal* identity or "character" (*napanap*, literally "shape"). In the Fáánakkar theory of the self, "character" is understood to refer to the style or "shape" of an individual's thoughts and emotions.² Taxonomically, "character" is a cover term for a series of expressions which may be appropriately employed in describing an individual's personal style. The most significant character descriptors are contained within a system of classification based on the interrelationships of three pairs of terms. Each pair consists of one expression designating a positive character quality and a second designating the negative opposite attribute. These terms are listed below with preliminary English glosses:

1. *mosonoson*: "respectfulness," "humility," "kindness"

² The general Trukese theory of the self includes a concept of "soul" (*ngúún*). While important in some contexts, it is not directly linked to character. What one does in life, for example, does not affect the soul's fate at death (cf. Goodenough 1963:132).

- namanam tekiya*: "arrogance," "haughtiness"
2. *pwara*: "bravery," "mastery," "power"
nissimwa: "cowardice," "weakness," "subservience"
 3. *ekiyek péchékkún*: "strong thought," "competitive thought"
ekiyek pwoteete: "weak thought," "lazy thought"

An understanding of the meaning of these terms depends on relating them to certain assumptions about character inherent in the Fáánakkar theory of the self. First of all, it is taken for granted that character is an object for critical evaluation. The combination of the three admirable traits, "respectfulness," "bravery," and "strong thought" defines the ideal type. This combination constitutes an emotionally charged and highly significant image within this culture and a person who approximates it is viewed with the greatest admiration. The combination of *namanam tekiya* and *pwara* ("arrogant bravery" or *mwááneson*, "man lowering") is viewed with ambivalence. "Arrogance" usually carries a strong negative evaluation but it intensifies an aspect of bravery in a way which is sometimes admirable. Other possible character types are considered progressively less desirable (see Figure 1). The worst character type combines the three negative traits, "arrogance," "cowardice," and "weak thought" and each of these terms evokes strong feelings of hatred and contempt (Caughey 1977:25-40).

A second important assumption is that character is unstable.³ The readiness with which they characterize their fellows shows that people have a more or less distinct impression of the current personal identity of all those with whom they regularly interact, but all such impressions are considered tentative.

Although he has been a leading figure on Fáánakkar, D. O. got drunk and cursed many people including some in his own district. He also got into a fight with one of his kinsmen. The next day another man commented as follows: "A long time ago D.O. stopped drinking. He wanted to be a man, he wanted to be a good person, he wanted to be respectful. And he *was* extremely respectful. But yesterday he was wounded by his drinking. People liked him until yesterday but now some will think, 'What is this? Is he turning into an evil person?' They will be undecided about him."

³ In this respect the Trukese theory of character contrasts with that which has been reported for certain other Pacific societies. Among the Lakalai, for example, somewhat similar character terms exist, but in Lakalai theory the terms are not evaluative and it not expected that a person will change from one character type to another (Valentine 1963:452).

As this text suggests, the maintenance or transformation of character is thought to be due in major part, to the individual's inner desire to achieve good character. It also relates to an individual's "understanding." As individuals get older, their understanding and hence their character sometimes improves. A lineage leader described his sister's son as follows:

I despise the arrogance of B.Q. He is brave, but he lacks strong thought, His thinking is womanly. He has not reached the age of manhood, however, and his character may change.

Character is also considered subject to alteration by a variety of other factors including magical forces. Spells and magical medicines may be used to improve a child's character. Sometimes adults are also affected, as is evident in a neighbor's characterization of A.W.

A. W. used to be arrogant. He was strong and he thought he could beat up all the men of his district . . . Now A. W. is very respectful. His wife put the medicine of love magic called "gluing" on him.

It is also assumed that certain individuals may feign (*mwaaken*) positive character they do not truly possess.

These assumptions are important for the conduct of social interactions; they are also important for the appraisal of personal identity. They mean that the character of others cannot be taken for granted; rather, character is something which has to be carefully monitored. One must be ready to radically reassess the character of another person, either because the apparent character was fraudulent or because the individual has, in fact, changed. As Gladwin and Sarason indicate (1953:149), the people of Truk are quite ready to revise their opinions of others, even those with whom they are closely related.

When directly asked about the meaning of their character terms, the people of Fáánakkar readily offer brief definitions. "A person of respectfulness," it may be said, "has sympathy for other people" or "truly understands etiquette." "True bravery," they say, "does not mean looking for fights, it does not mean being arrogant and starting fights, it means being respectful until someone wants a fight." A person of "strong thought" is one who "thinks in terms of the three stones, to envy, to equal, and to surpass," and so forth. While such definitions are crucial in getting a feel for the orientation of this




Figure 1. Dimensions of character on Fáánakkar.

framework of personality evaluation, they are rough, rule of thumb generalizations about the thought and behavior of people with given character attributes. As such they do not fully encompass the meaning of these personality terms because they do not provide the information necessary to determine when a particular person will be judged by the people of Fáánakkar to have the qualities to which the character terms refer. This is a problem for the understanding of any system of personal identity including that of American culture.

THE MEANING OF PERSONALITY TERMS

The meanings of personality terms are much less obvious than is often assumed—as suggested by the fact that neither our folk nor

dictionary definitions specify criteria which would allow an outsider to make culturally appropriate character assessments in American society. As Williams (1968) points out, “unless we know what behavior qualifies as honest in various circumstances we have no real guide to particular conduct; we know only that something called ‘honesty’ is regarded as a desirable thing” (pp. 284–285).

One difficulty that has interfered with attempts to specify the meanings of personality labels in particular ethnopsychologies is the deeply ingrained tendency to think of the referent of “personality” (and hence also of personality descriptors) as something intrapsychic. Thus, for Linton, “personality” designated “the whole of the individual’s mental qualities (1936:464). As Barnouw suggests, later anthropologists have also taken personality to be an internal structure which “influences behavior” (1973:9; cf. Geertz 1976:225). This tendency is also apparent in the definition offered by Barnouw: “Personality is a more or less enduring organization of forces *within* the individual” (1973:10, emphasis added). In practice, however, another person’s mental qualities are invisible to the observer intent on assessing personality, and this has been an issue of interest to researchers concerned with the meaning of scientific personality labels. As they point out, definitions which suggest that “personality” is something “within” the subject are misleading in terms of the actual process of personality assessment. In practice, “personality” refers to the “operations” by which the scientific observer assesses a subject’s overt behavior, or records of that behavior, and categorizes the subject in terms of the *observer’s* personality theory.

The clinical psychologist, describing personality structure from Rorschach test data, is visualizing a bar graph, based on frequencies of such phenomena as allusions to color, line, texture, perspective, and movement, and is inferring such characteristics as introversion, stereotypy, imaginativeness, and self control (Wallace 1970:7, cf. Hall and Lindzey 1970:9).

What then are the “operations” by which people arrive at personality judgments in natural social settings? What frame of reference do Americans use in deciding whether someone is “honest” or “cruel”; what knowledge do the people of Fāánakkar employ in judging someone to be *mosonoson* or *namanam tekiya*? An ethnographic answer to this question requires exploration of a basic connection between personal and social identity. While this connection has not

been well developed in identity theory, it is at least implicit in the work of several theorists.

In analysing rules about how a person in a given social capacity must behave, Goffman (1956:489) offers a conception of demeanor.

By demeanor I shall refer to that element of the individual's ceremonial behavior typically conveyed through deportment, dress, and bearing, which serves to express to those in his immediate presence that he is a person of certain desirable or undesirable qualities. In our society, the "well" or "properly" demanded individual displays such qualities as: discretion and sincerity; modesty in claims regarding self; sportsmanship; command of speech and physical movements; self-control over his emotions, his appetites, and his desires; poise under pressure; and so forth. . . .

It should be noted once again that demeanor involves attributes derived from interpretations others make of the way in which the individual handles himself during social intercourse . . . through demeanor the individual creates an image of himself, but properly speaking this is not an image that is meant for his own eyes.

While this is not his major concern, Goffman here specifies one basis for an ethnographic definition of personality—an individual's particular set of (culturally recognized) "qualities" (i.e., his personality) is necessarily appraised on the basis of "how he handles himself" in his various social capacities (or social identities). In thinking of personality as intrapsychic and "independent of one's social or occupational station in life" (Goodenough 1963:178), we have neglected to examine a fundamental connection between personal and social identity. A central aspect of this connection is implicit in a definition provided by Goodenough:

A social identity is an aspect of self that makes a difference in how one's rights and duties distribute to specific others. Any aspect of self whose alteration entails no change in how people's rights and duties are mutually distributed, although it affects their emotional orientations to one another and the way they choose to exercise their privileges, has to do with personal identity but not with social identity. The utility of this distinction is clear when we consider the father-son relationship in our own society. The status of the social identity "father" in this relationship is delimited by the duties he owes his son and the things he can demand of him. Within the boundaries set by his rights and duties it is his privilege to conduct himself as he will. How he does this is a matter of personal style. We assess the father as a person on the basis of how he consistently exercises his privileges and on the degree to which he oversteps his status boundaries with brutal behavior or economic neglect. But as long as he remains within the boundaries, his personal identity as a stern or indulgent parent has no effect on what are his rights and duties in this or any other relationship to which he may be party (Goodenough 1965:4).

In emphasizing that the personal style of individuals does not affect their rights and duties, Goodenough, in passing, indicates what we have to know in order to infer personal identity attributes. We appraise someone “as a person,” for example, by categorizing the individual as “stern” or “indulgent,” by considering how the individual’s behavior measures up to the rules of *particular social identity relations*—here, “father” to “son.” This is a crucial connection. The only way we can judge this father as “stern” (or “indulgent”) is by seeing that he requires more (or less) of his son than we think he should, given our understanding of the particular rights and duties defining the father-son relationship in American culture. This is what “stern” or “indulgent” means. In essence, then, the *meaning* of personality is directly linked to, and, at the same time, measured by the rules of social identity relationships.⁴

PERSONAL AND SOCIAL IDENTITY OF FÁÁNAKKAR

The personal identity attributes of Fáánnakkar culture are identified by just such a process of appraisal. Their terms, like ours, express judgments about how a person’s behavior is measured by rules of conduct. Here, however, the frame of reference is the rights and duties of Fáánnakkar social identity relationships. In order to understand the meaning of Fáánnakkar personality descriptors, it is not sufficient to know the English labels with which these terms may be roughly glossed. Because the English terms are rooted in and defined by the rules of our social system, these labels are not an adequate guide to character assessment elsewhere. What is “kind” in American society may very well not be *mosonoson* on Fáánnakkar. What one needs to know in order to say whether someone is *mosonoson* or *namanam tekiya* is the rules governing the relationships between occupants of particular social identities on Fáánnakkar. Like Americans, the people of Fáánnakkar *talk* about character as if it were something internal, that is, they associate character with the

⁴ A similar perspective has been developed by researchers interested in the processes by which labels for types of “mental disorders” are applied to particular individuals. People are not categorized as “mentally ill” because their thinking is disturbed—their thinking is invisible—but because their overt behavior is perceived as breaking culturally constituted rules about social conduct, or, further, because a psychiatrist perceives a person to break the psychiatrist’s version of these rules during a mental status examination (cf. Goffman 1963; Scheff 1975; and Caughey 1978a).

style in which a person "thinks" (*ekiyek*). In practice the only way in which a person's character can be judged as *pwara* or *nissimwa* is by comparing information about the individual's behavior against a conception of the rules of the social roles that individual performs.

"Respectfulness" (*mosonoson*) and "arrogance" (*namanam tekiya*) are assessed in terms of several different classes of behavior including use of "etiquette" (*faayiro*), a system of polite gestures and linguistic expressions (polite particles, words, and phrases). Here "respectfulness" is demonstrated by using these etiquette forms appropriately, i.e., by treating the other party to an interaction with the required or more than required tokens of deference. Assuming a person is not incapacitated, "arrogance" is shown whenever a person offers another less than the ideal or required degree of deference. However, these tokens of deference are distributed very differently in different social identity relationships (see Table 1). A type of greeting which would be properly "respectful" when a man meets his "sister's husband" would be "arrogant" if he used it on meeting his "lineage leader" or the "district chief." Maps such as that in Table 1, which show how rights and duties are distributed in different social identity relationships, are not just guides for ideal conduct, they also provide the *measure* of personality.

The same principle applies to rules involving the distribution of substantive obligations. An action which would be seen as *mosonoson* if performed for one kind of kinsman would be taken as *namanam tekiya* if performed to another because substantive obligations to help another in his work, to contribute goods to him, to share food with him, and so forth are distributed very differently in different social identity relationships. As noted above, one important dimension which affects kinship relationships is relative age. A man does not owe his younger brother certain obligations which he is expected to observe in relationship to his older brother. For example, it is legitimate for a man to sleep with his younger brother's wife, but he is not permitted to sleep with his older brother's wife. To do so violates the rules of this relationship and hence is "bad in terms of respectfulness." People do not necessarily follow such rules, but knowledge of them is crucial for understanding how people judge each other's character. If it is discovered that a man has been sleeping with his older brother's wife, the older brother and other members of the kin group are likely to be outraged and to focus and

express their anger by condemning the violators as persons of “arrogant character.” The shame felt at such accusations of personal unworthiness has sometimes led people to suicide. On the other hand, if a younger brother expresses anger at his older brother for sleeping with his wife, this emotional display is “arrogance” on the younger brother’s part since it shows he is a person who presumptuously claims rights appropriate to a social identity higher than the one he occupies.

In trying to define its meaning, people often mentioned borrowing as a major sign of *ekiyek pwoteete* (“weak thought”). This action is understood to conspicuously indicate that the borrower has not matched the accomplishments of the leader; it forces him to offer deference to the leader; and it “puts him under the rule of the other.” As one man on Fáánakkar put it:

If I have a large ceremonial bowl and people who are lacking plan a feast they must

TABLE 1

DUTY SCALE OF “SETTING ONESELF ABOVE ANOTHER” IN TRUK (FOR A MAN)

(Adapted from Goodenough 1965:13)

| Scale type | Relationship in which duty owed | Must say faajiro | Must crawl | Must avoid | Must obey | Must not scold | Must not fight |
|------------|-----------------------------------|------------------|------------|------------|-----------|----------------|----------------|
| 1 | Non-Kinsman to chief | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| | Non-Kinsman to <i>jitag</i> | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| 2 | Man to female <i>neji</i> | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| | Man to Wi's <i>mwááni</i> | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| 3 | Man to older <i>pwijj</i> | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| 4 | Man to male <i>neji</i> | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| | Man to Wi of older <i>pwijj</i> | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| 5 | Man to younger <i>pwijj</i> | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes |
| | Man to Wi's older <i>pwijj</i> | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes |
| 6 | Man to Wi of younger <i>pwijj</i> | No | No | No | No | No | Yes |
| 7 | Man to <i>semej</i> | No | No | No | No | No | No |
| | Man to <i>jinej</i> | No | No | No | No | No | No |
| | Man to <i>feefinej</i> | No | No | No | No | No | No |
| | Man to Hu of <i>feefinej</i> | No | No | No | No | No | No |
| | Man to Wi | No | No | No | No | No | No |
| | Man to Wi's younger <i>pwijj</i> | No | No | No | No | No | No |

come to me. They must bow their heads and say, "Forgive me please, but I have a request to make." This means they are afraid of me. It's extremely difficult to bow your head down before someone. After a while I grant the request, then I laugh and laugh for I know that they recognize that I am a true man because I have cherished goods. When you have valuable goods you can think of yourself as a man. If you don't, you must think of yourself as a woman.

This interpretation of borrowing provides a definitive basis for making character assessments—but it only applies within certain social identity relationships. When the two parties are members of the same lineage or the occupants of certain very unequal social positions, borrowing is not disapproved and does not suggest negative personality attributes. Judgments about each of the other basic character qualities also depend on knowledge of the rules of social roles. Assessments of *pwara* depend, in part, on rules about conduct in what are understood as test situations. However expectations vary depending on the social identity of the person confronting the challenge. For example, during a storm at sea, women are permitted to indulge in overt expressions of fear which would be taken as indications of *nissimwa* in a man.

In American society as well, most actions do not in themselves reveal anything definitive about personality. We have to know the social identities of the people involved and what the expectations and obligations are for that kind of person in that kind of relationship in that particular context. The information that someone gave a "fifteen dollar wedding present" to the bride and groom might indicate that the donor was "generous" if it came from the bride's young second cousin, but it would have a very different meaning if it were the only gift from her father. Judgments that a person is "aggressive," "shy," "generous," "emotional," or "cold" can only be made by interpreting his or her actions in the light of our rules about social identity relationships. Of course personal identity assessments are affected by additional factors as well. They depend on the observer's "bias," that is, the observer's social, personal, and emotional connections to the individual being judged and on the particular context in which the judgment is made (cf. White 1978:357). They may also be affected by stereotypes about the expected personality attributes of people of a given social identity (Kirk and Burton 1977; White 1978). However, judgments of an individual's personal identity still depend on comparing an interpretation of the particular subject's behavior against an interpretation of

the rules of his or her social identity relationships. Without knowledge of culturally constituted rules, individual personality appraisal would be impossible because it is these rules which provide the measure of personality.

PERSONAL IDENTITY AND MOTIVATION

Attention to the cultural meaning of personal identity descriptors is an essential prerequisite to investigations of how personality classifications affect the conduct of social behavior. As Hallowell (1955:76) has observed, a culture's theory of the self connects to the individual's conceptualization of his or her self, and culturally constituted concerns with self-image or identity represent one potent source of individual motivation. Many aspects of self-perception appear to be organized along "identity dimensions" with four sets of self-images. At one end will be the "ideal" self-image, what an individual would like to be in relation to the dimension in question; at the other end will be the "feared" self-image, what the individual does not want to be like in respect to a given dimension. Somewhere in between will be the "claimed" self-image, what the individual would like others to think he or she is, and the "real" self-image, how the individual actually ranks him or herself in respect to a given dimension (Wallace and Fogelson 1965:380-381; Wallace 1967:65). To the extent that an identity dimension is culturally and personally salient, an individual will seek to maximize the distance between the feared and real self-images and to close the gap between the ideal and real self-images (Wallace 1967:71).

The identity dimensions of a culture must be approached through analysis of the particular systems of terminology in which self-conceptions are culturally coded. This is because a culture's repertoire of identity labels necessarily provides the medium through which an individual understands and thinks about self. In most, and probably all, societies the terminology of self-appraisal includes a system of personal identity classification. Certainly on Fáánakkar, the positive character terms I have described are *ideal* not only in the sense that persons who are thought to possess them are admired. For the individual these attributes are also subjective ideals. People are deeply concerned with trying to be, or to become, the kind of person identified by the ideal terms. They want to be, and to be

known by others, as persons of "bravery," "respectfulness," and "strong thought," and they very much wish to avoid being, or being regarded by others as, persons of "cowardice," "arrogance," or "weak thought." In short, the framework of character labels is internalized as a system of identity dimensions; the positive traits represent ideal self-images and the negative terms represent feared self-images.

People are concerned about these identity dimensions for a number of reasons. First of all, to grow up on Fáánakkar is to grow up in a society where it is taken for granted that personal worth is defined, measured, and evaluated by means of the character terminology analysed above. Therefore, these dimensions provide the terms in which the individual must answer the explicit or implicit question, "What kind of a person am I?" A variety of specific enculturation processes introduce and reinforce this general concern, and both inculcation and identification are important. Elders are deeply concerned about fostering desirable character in their young people. As one middle-aged man remarked:

I have really worked to teach S.L. (the son of his deceased brother) about (true) bravery. That is why he is respectful around here. But when he goes to the other islands, he fights all the time. He thinks he is brave, but I tell him, "You are not yet brave."

At the same time young people clearly identify with those who are considered to be ideal types. One young man volunteered the fact that he particularly "liked" the style of a man who notably embodied the positive character ideals and that he was "studying his character" (*kkayé napanapan*) in order to copy it. The man he admired reported experiencing a similar identification in his own youth (Caughey 1977:41-51).

Given the earlier analysis of how the meaning of character terms is defined by the rules of social identity relationships, it is possible to see how concern with character leads to specific forms of conduct in particular social relationships. Attempting to fulfill the particular obligations of a given social identity relationship at or above the required level provides one basic means by which an individual can maintain or enhance self-esteem by confirming his or her self-image as a person of "respectfulness" while avoiding the undesirable self-appraisal of "arrogance." At the same time, people are also

motivated to play their social roles in certain ways, or make other people think they do so, because this is one way in which they can influence others to judge their character favorably. On Fáiánnakkar, and Truk generally, this is a very significant motive. In part this is due to standard human concern over the opinions of others, the desire to be well rather than ill thought of by significant others. In part it may be due to certain insecurities engendered by the Trukese system of socialization (Gladwin and Sarason 1953). It is also due to an explicit cultural theory about the social consequences which befall a person with a particular character reputation (see Figure 2). It is expected, for example, that people will "despise" a person of "arrogance," that there will be much "hostile gossip" about such a person, and that others will eagerly seek a chance to humiliate the person in social encounters or to do the person physical harm as through "stealthy attacks," such as ambush, arson, or sorcery. Elders often warn young people to "be more respectful," i.e., to follow the rules of their social identity relationships more circumspectly, lest they meet an early death.⁵ Conversely it is assumed that people will "feel sympathy" towards a person of "respectfulness" and treat that person with respectfulness, i.e., by promptly fulfilling their obligations in turn. To be characterized as "cowardly" is strongly feared because of the humiliation and shame which such a reputation involves and because of the expected "derision," lack of deference, and hostile gossip. It is also taken for granted that a man with a reputation for "cowardice" will be "exploited." That is, he will suffer substantive loss—and further character damage—because others will violate his substantive rights in property, as by encroaching on his lands or stealing his goods. Conversely to be known as a man of "bravery" is highly desirable. It means that others will praise him, that they will hesitate to engage in substantive, character-damaging violations of the obligations they owe him, and that they will treat him, whatever his social identity, with the fear and deference commanded by a person of superior character. States one informant:

If someone loses a battle or is injured it means others will say he has lost and is

⁵ The consequences of violating the rights of others may also include supernatural punishment, because ancestor ghosts are just as offended by "arrogance" as ordinary persons. In American culture personality assessments are also important in imaginary or "artificial" social relationships (cf. Caughey 1978b).

afraid. But people here have never yet heard that I have fled or lost a fight or been wounded or been afraid. Therefore they don't play around with me. If they think about wanting to fight me they hesitate. They are afraid of me. I am at ease about the hearts of others, (they respect me) they offer me food without my asking.

This framework of assumptions about the connections between character and social fate provides an individual with an image of the responses one can expect from others on the basis of one's current character reputation. It also provides the individual with a model for calculating how to respond to the personality communications explicitly or implicitly encoded in the social role-playing of others: respect the respectful, deride the weak minded, attack the arrogant, etc. Furthermore, failure to respond to others in terms of this model (for example, to be respectful in the face of arrogance) subjects the individual once more to negative character appraisals.

Given the evaluative significance attached to character on Fáánakkar the theory about the relationship between character and

| | | | |
|--------------------------|---|--|---|
| Assumed Social Reactions | "Respect" (<u>Faayiro Wóón</u>) | "Respect" | "Respect" |
| | "Fear" (<u>niweyiti</u>) | "Sympathy" (<u>tong</u>) | "Fear" |
| | "Praise" (<u>ingeyiti</u>) | "Praise" | "Praise" |
| Ideal Reputation | "Bravery" (<u>pwara</u>) | "Respectfulness" (<u>mosonoson</u>) | "Strong thought" (<u>ekiyek péchékkún</u>) |
| Feared Reputation | "Cowardice" (<u>nissimwa</u>) | "Arrogance" (<u>namanam tekiya</u>) | "Weak Thought" (<u>ekiyek pwoteete</u>) |
| Assumed Social Reactions | "Gossip" (<u>kkapas chómmóng</u>) | "Gossip" | "Gossip" |
| | "Derision" (<u>Takir</u>) | "Hatred" (<u>opwut</u>) | "Derision" |
| | "Ridicule" (<u>Wurumót</u>) | "Foul Play" (<u>sorongngaw</u>) | "Ridicule" |
| | "Exploitation" (<u>turunuffas</u>) | | |

Figure 2. Assumed social reactions to a person with particular character attributes.

social fate, and the assumptions about the unstable nature of character, people are highly motivated to conduct their social interactions in ways which will maintain or enhance their reputation for positive character. This concern affects the way people perform both the ceremonial and substantive obligations governing their social identity relationships. In describing how he decides to greet the various categories of people he meets on the paths of Fáánakkar, a highly respected lineage leader showed his conscious concern with *maintaining* his character reputation even during ordinary social encounters: When a greeting is obligatory, he uses appropriate greetings in order to confirm his reputation as a respectful, as opposed to an arrogant, person. When a greeting is optional, he uses highly respectful forms of greetings to persons he knows well, and with whom he is currently on good terms. This again shows his good respectful character and conveys his regard for the others. However, he is careful to withhold certain optional forms of respect from persons whom he does not know well or with whom he is not on good terms and who might, however falsely, construe their use to indicate that he is "cowardly," "inclined to back down from a dispute," etc.

Rights and duties involving the control of property are an important substantive dimension in many social identity relationships. When disputes over valuables occur, character considerations are also inevitably involved because, by definition, disputes involve perceived violations of rights and duties. Winning the character struggle which ensues often becomes at least as important as winning the property dispute, as in the following case:

When C. G. learned that K. F. and his kinsmen were cutting breadfruit from a large tree on the disputed border between their land he was unable to let it pass.

"It is as if they were sporting with me," he said. "We do not like to see others taking something on the basis of their strength." When advised by a kinsman to refrain from a dispute because of conflicting kin loyalties, and because of his advanced age, C. G. responded, "I am old, yes, but I despise (the idea of) K. F. winning. He is old and so am I, but he is human and so am I. In such disputes," he said, "one wins with bravery and loses with cowardice." He also said that he was unwilling to take the matter to court, "lest K. F. laugh at me and say that I fear him, that I need to go to the court for help against him."

C. G. visited K. F. and they argued about the disputed tree. C. G. threatened to chop it down if K. F.'s people touched it again.

People also engage in attempts to create the impression that their identity is closer to the ideal than performance justifies. Although the community is small, some encounters with significant implications for character are successfully concealed, as in this example:

P. W. and F. N. fought over bravery. F. N. was near losing. He did not really lose, but if they had kept fighting he would have been able to fear or lose to P. W. So he asked P. W. to stop. He also requested that they become brothers, "From today onward let us be as true brothers. Don't tell anyone that we fought and that I almost lost so that people won't learn of this and come around to sport with me." The two men were like true brothers until P. W. died.

There is still another important way in which concern about character influences social conduct. This derives from the assumption that "bravery" and "strong thought" are more important than "respectfulness." A person who seeks the highest reputation for strong character must necessarily be generally "respectful" yet *not* always follow the requirements of social identity relationships. It is not just that the person responds aggressively ("from bravery") to the "arrogance" of others; an individual sometimes acts with "arrogance"—that is, deliberately violating the rights of others. Partly the person does this to counter the potentially negative character implications of respectful rule following by showing that the politeness and kindness displayed towards others is not based on "cowardice." Partly this is done to put down opponents and all others who cannot match such actions. Stealing openly is one basic example.

Some people were selling their catch of fish on the dock. J. T. walked up, climbed into their boat, and began loading fish into his sack and said, "I am not going to give these back, and I won't pay. If you want them back we will fight." They were angry but afraid. Others who had been buying fish were looking on. They thought, "We have lost to J. T. We have to pay but he can just take."

Acts of this kind are referred to as *namanam tekiya-pwara* ("arrogant bravery") or *mwááneson* (literally "man lowering")—"putting down others." By deliberately violating obligations to others, individuals seek to enhance their own reputations for bravery and strong thought and to "lower" that of their opponents. This kind of character conflict, a variety of what Wallace and Fogelson (1965)

refer to as an “identity struggle,” is common in the relationships among experts in *roong* (“magic” or “special knowledge”).

Roong refers to esoteric knowledge which controls ghostly powers and helps a person to perform significant actions beyond the range of normal human ability. Although this knowledge was originally given to humans by ghosts, a person usually learns it by becoming the student of a living master. If the student succeeds in mastering a particular body of knowledge, he (or, less commonly, she) assumes one of the specific social identities included under the cover term *sowuroong*, “master of special knowledge.” The individual becomes a *sowusáfey*, “curer,” a *sowupenu*, “master of navigation,” a *sowupwe*, “master of divination,” a *sowupwen*, “master of fighting,” a *sowuwimw*, “master builder,” or a *sowufanafan*, “master of canoe building,” etc. As such, the person becomes involved in a set of social identity relationships. A specialist has the duty to use knowledge fully for the benefit of clients and has the right to demand standard compensation in return. The master also has certain obligations to other *sowuroong*. One is expected to refrain from criticizing the work of other specialists; one is not supposed to brag about one’s own accomplishments; one is obligated to offer other specialists a deferential greeting, and so forth. An understanding of such rules is necessary to understanding conduct among practitioners of special knowledge. It is also essential to consider how competitive character concerns modify actual behavior.

It is expected and assumed that people who have achieved these social identities also have certain character attributes. Because they have succeeded in the difficult and demanding task of learning special knowledge, all practitioners are considered to be persons of “strong thought.” Because acquiring and using knowledge subjects them to extreme danger—including illness, insanity, and death—every practitioner is also a person of “bravery.” However, people are not content to know that specialists in general are people of positive character; they are also interested in making individual character assessments. They want to know whether a given practitioner is more or less “brave,” “powerful,” and “strong of thought” in comparison to others. Thus statements about individual specialists are regularly expressed competitively. As an ally of one curer said, “She is the absolute number one at that curing; the others just understand a little.”

Practitioners of the same specialty compete over their relative reputations for character and knowledge. Any particular application of knowledge is conceptualized as a contest in which the character and power of the practitioner are pitted against whatever he or she is seeking to control, whether this be a disease, a building, or another person. If one succeeds it is a triumph, and the phenomenon one has controlled is described as having "lost to" or "feared" the expert. Any triumph is also, indirectly, a win over other specialists who are put down by one's success. Thus practitioners may seek to sabotage the work of their rivals. When a master builder successfully erects a meeting house, it has been done despite any rivals, who are likely to have tried to block the project with their sorcery. Rival specialists also compete directly. Out of "desire to put down others" (*nóón aan mwécén mwáánesoon*), an expert will seek to manipulate the rules of his or her social identity relationships so as to enhance his or her own character at the expense of others. One way to do this is by deliberately violating obligations to another specialist.

A master of knowledge working on a house or a canoe should offer a deferential greeting if another specialist should happen to pass by. The greeting says in effect, "I acknowledge your strength, please do not use your power against me." By definition any failure to observe this nicety is "arrogance." It indicates that the worker regards the other expert as someone who need not be respected; it suggests that the worker feels superior and thinks that the other specialist is "afraid" to contest this. Because it is an arrogant challenge the passing expert is not only fully justified to retaliate but will suffer damage to reputation if he or she does not. The character and power struggle which results from such violations of the rules is usually not decided immediately. Such struggles are often carried out under a veneer of respectfulness and the techniques of retaliation, such as sorcery, may be slow in their effects.

M. Q. came upon another canoe expert who was building a large sailing canoe. Despite the fact that M. Q. is a well known canoe expert, the other man failed to say the proper words of respect. M. Q. decided to "try his power." He stopped to talk with the builder and while sitting there he whispered spells at the canoe under his breath. Several days later the other man finished his canoe and dragged it down to the water. However, when it was launched it keeled over and the outrigger sank to

the bottom of the shallow water. They hauled it back up on the shore and the specialist began to think about who might be responsible. He went to visit M. Q.

"Would you please give some thought to my canoe," he asked.

"Why," answered M. Q.

"Because I believe I have sinned against you."

"It is true. You failed to respect me."

"Yes, and I am extremely sorry. Could you please think about making some medicine for my canoe?"

"Where is your money?"

"I have none."

"I have no medicine."

Later the man gave in and brought a payment to M. Q. and he prepared medicine to fix the canoe.

To allow the builder's arrogance to pass would have suggested that M. Q. was afraid or lacked power. He answered with bravery, that is, with a sorcery attack. Because it was successful it gave M. Q. an ideal triumph. He confirmed his own character, put his rival into a subordinate position, and forced him to fear his powers, to apologize, to make requests, and to compensate him with valuables.

In other cases an expert will challenge a rival by violating the obligation not to criticize another specialist's work. A master builder who detects flaws in the work of another expert may choose to let it be publicly known that he or she has "read" the building and found it "evil." This is understood as a prediction that people associated with the building will die, since it is believed that flaws in proportions or arrangements of the structural features of a meeting house will cause (magical) deaths among those who use it. Such deliberate arrogance initiates a battle between the two rivals. The expert who "read" the building wins if the builders rework the meeting house or if anyone associated with the building becomes sick or dies. The expert loses if no one becomes sick or if the expert him or herself falls ill from the sorcery of the rival. The expert also loses if forced to back down by the builder, that is, if forced to ask forgiveness.

J. T. was directing construction of a lineage meeting house for kinsmen in the next district. A woman there knew something of the knowledge of houses. She told people that J. T.'s meeting house was bad; she said that he or one of his kinsmen would die. Later the two met on a path. J. T. asked if she had really criticized his building. She replied it was so.

"Then you will die," he said.

"What?"

"I will prepare medicine to kill you."

The woman lost her nerve and said that she had just been joking. She asked his forgiveness and begged him not to make the medicine. He turned away without answering. She stood on the path and watched fearfully as he walked away.

Conflicts are also initiated when one master shows "pride in knowledge" by breaking the rule against direct assertions of superiority. If a specialist brags in the presence of rivals, they will seek to bring that person down, but if the specialist gets away with flaunting his or her superiority, then the rivals have been "lowered." An elaboration of this principle occurs in the relationships of fighting experts. The fighting expert knows a set of magical judo-like holds and throws. This knowledge is considered far superior to mere physical strength and it is taken for granted that an expert in special knowledge can easily best several stronger opponents who lack knowledge. However strength of character is also necessary. Thus it is also taken for granted that an expert of "bravery" and "strong thought" will master a rival with lesser character and more holds. An expert usually teaches an apprentice secretly. Sometimes, however, a master will open a public fighting school in one of the district's meeting houses. If the teacher successfully carries out such a school it validates the public claim to superiority. However this "arrogance" is unlikely to go unchallenged. A rival may bring one of his pupils and enter the meeting house while the school is in session. The teacher of the school must select one of his pupils and the two students fight it out. If the outsiders lose, they are derided and thrown out of the meeting house. If his pupil loses, the teacher's claims to superiority are deflated and the school must be ended.

Before concluding it should be emphasized that concern with character is not limited to the relations of magical specialists. Whatever the social identity relationship, people are highly concerned with the character inferences that can be drawn from the way in which they play the rules of their social roles. Thus relationships among lineage members are importantly influenced in numerous ways and even the composition of lineages is affected. Individuals frequently defect from their own lineage in order to affiliate with some other lineage. This is contrary to the ideal rules of

the social system, but it happens regularly and it is commonly due to character conflicts among lineage mates (Caughey 1977:93-103). Character concerns also influence Fáánakkar marriages. For example, the social identity relationship between a husband and his wife's lineage leader is of great significance. If the lineage leader comes to regard the husband as "arrogant" — i.e., if he comes to perceive that the husband is not fulfilling his obligations to his wife and to his wife's people at an acceptable level — he is likely to try to terminate the marriage whatever the wishes of the husband and wife (Caughey 1977:128-129). All kinds of political relationships are also affected. For example, the conduct of lineage leaders and chiefs is importantly influenced by the need to maintain a reputation for "respectfulness" while also effectively commanding others (Caughey 1977:75-76; cf. Swartz 1965:27-30, 1959:216-217; Goodenough 1951:143). Even the relationships among social groups, such as lineages and districts, are often structured by character concerns.⁶ In short, concern with character is apparent in all areas of social life.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

In studying the cultural organization of social relationships, anthropologists have concentrated on social roles, that is, on the expectations and obligations governing the behavior of occupants of particular *social identities*. This approach provides a necessary but not a sufficient means for understanding the conduct of social behavior. It is also essential to discover how the people of a given society sort themselves out into kinds of persons on the basis of personality or *personal identity* and to analyze the ways in which these classifications influence social relationships.

In this paper I have described how the people of Fáánakkar, Truk, appraise the personal identity or "character" of their fellows. I showed that their conceptions of character are encoded in a ter-

⁶ The names of many of these groups reflect preoccupation with character. One lineage is called "Master of the North Wind," and the people of this group "will be strong, they will sweep over all others and they will be bigger than all others." Of the 28 kin group names whose cryptic meanings are known to Fáánakkar informants, 17, or 60%, involve assertions about the superior "bravery" or "strong thought" of the people in these groups (Caughey 1977:71).

minological system which sets the positive attributes of *pwara*, “bravery,” *mosonoson*, “respectfulness,” and *ekieyk pwécékkun*, “strong thought,” against the negative attributes of *nissimwa*, “cowardice,” *namanam tekiya*, “arrogance,” and *ekiyek pwoteete*, “weak thought.” I indicated that these terms are strongly evaluative and I showed that the personal qualities they are understood to refer to are considered unstable; a person with a current reputation for the positive character qualities is viewed with great admiration, but it is considered quite possible that his or her character may change. While the general meaning of these character terms is partially revealed in the definitions offered by the people of Fáánakkar, and while their character terms can be roughly glossed with English personality terms, neither of these strategies effectively specifies the meaning of Fáánakkar character terms. This is because neither provides the information necessary to determine when a particular person will be judged by the people of Fáánakkar to have a given character quality.

In the Fáánakkar theory of the self, as in most anthropological approaches, personality is assumed to be intrapsychic, but this assumption obscures the actual process of personality appraisal. In practice, as I have shown, personality judgments depend on interpretations of observable behavior based on a systematic connection between personal identity and the rules of social identity relationships. The only way one can tell whether an individual “has” (i.e., has displayed) a given character quality—say, *namanam tekiya*—is by knowing the rights and duties governing the particular social identities the person is operating in. This means, first of all, that superficially similar English glosses cannot be treated as equivalent to the Trukese terms. It is not only that the two sets of terms are embedded in fundamentally different theories of the self, it is also that an act which is *namanam tekiya* in terms of Trukese culture may not be “arrogant” in terms of American culture. Even more important, an act which might be *namanam tekiya* in terms of the rules of one Fáánakkar social identity relationship may be *mosonoson* in another relationship, because the rules governing both substantive and ceremonial aspects of conduct vary significantly from one social relationship to another. Maps specifying the expectations and obligations of particular social identity relationships are not just guides to appropriate conduct; they also provide the

frame of reference through which personality is defined and assessed.

Using this approach to the meaning of Fáánakkar character terms, I have argued that these concepts have a pervasive effect on the conduct of social relationships. Because it is taken for granted that personal worth is measured by character, and because of various aspects of their enculturation, including inculcation and identification, people on Fáánakkar are deeply concerned about character appraisal. From the point of view of the individual actor, the positive terms represent ideal self-images and the negative terms represent feared self-images. In order to maintain their own self-esteem, in order to influence others to judge their character favorably, and in order to avoid the consequences that are expected to befall a person of negative character, people seek to play the rules of their social roles in ways which will allow them to achieve and maintain positive character. Concern with character often functions as a means of social control, but it does not always have this effect. Because "strong thought" and "bravery" are more important than "respectfulness," people sometimes violate the rules of their social identity relationships—as by stealing openly—in order to enhance their reputations. I showed how this strategy affects the relationships of magical specialists and leads to conflicts among them. To understand the relationships of these magical specialists it is necessary to know the rights and duties which ideally govern their interactions. However it is also necessary to understand how concern with character leads people sometimes to follow these rules and sometimes to break them. Here as elsewhere an understanding of social behavior on Fáánakkar demands attention to *personal* as well as social identity.

Anthropologists have frequently expressed dissatisfaction with culture and personality studies which employ Western psychological categories to appraise the modal personality and "explain" the social behavior of people in other societies. Such studies have been strongly criticized from a variety of different perspectives (cf. Shweder 1979:257). As Kiefer (1977:106) observes, some writers have questioned the utility of "personality" as an explanatory concept while others have predicted the demise of research in culture and personality. Ethnopsychological approaches offer a promising and relatively little explored alternative. By focusing on the conceptions of personal identity employed in the culture studied, by considering

how the meanings of personality terms are connected to the rules of social identity relationships, and by examining how such terms come to represent positive and negative goals for the self, we can begin to formulate detailed ethnographic answers to questions about the relationships between the individual and culture which were fundamental to the development of culture and personality studies and which are basic to psychological anthropology generally (cf. Langness and Kennedy 1979:101; Bourguignon 1973:1109). That is, we can get at the motivations of individual actors and the ways in which these motivations influence the conduct of social relationships.

REFERENCES

- BARNOUW, VICTOR. 1973. *Culture and Personality*. Homewood, IL: Dorsey Press.
- BERREMAN, GERALD. 1972. Social Categories and Social Interaction in Urban India. *American Anthropologist* 74:567-586.
- BOURGUIGNON, ERIKA. 1973. Psychological Anthropology, *Handbook of Social and Cultural Anthropology* (John Honigmann, ed.). Chicago: Rand McNally.
- _____. 1979. *Psychological Anthropology*. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston.
- CAUGHEY, JOHN L. 1977. *Fáánakkar: Cultural Values in a Micronesian Society*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Publications in Anthropology No. 2.
- _____. 1978a. Identity Struggles in the Mental Status Examination. Paper presented to the 77th Annual Meeting of the American Anthropological Association, Los Angeles.
- _____. 1978b. Artificial Social Relations in Modern America. *American Quarterly* 30:70-89.
- FOGELSON, RAYMOND D., ed. 1976. General Introduction, *Contributions to Anthropology: Selected Papers of A. Irving Hallowell*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- GEERTZ, CLIFFORD. 1973. *The Interpretation of Cultures*. New York: Basic Books.
- _____. 1976. "From the Native's Point of View": On the Nature of Anthropological Understanding, *Meaning in Anthropology* (Keith Basso and H. Selby, eds). Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press.
- GLADWIN, THOMAS, and SEYMOUR SARASON. 1953. *Truk: Man in Paradise*. New York: Wenner-Gren.
- GOFFMAN, ERVING. 1956. The Nature of Deference and Demeanor. *American Anthropologist* 58:473-502.
- _____. 1963. *Behavior in Public Places*. New York: Free Press.

- GOODENOUGH, WARD H. 1951. *Property, Kin, and Community on Truk*. New Haven: Yale University Publications in Anthropology No. 46.
- _____. 1963. *Cooperation in Change*. New York: John Wiley.
- _____. 1965. Rethinking "Status" and "Role": Toward a General Model of the Cultural Organization of Social Relationships, *The Relevance of Models for Social Anthropology* (Michael Banton, ed.). London: Tavistock.
- _____. 1974. Changing Social Organization on Romónum, Truk, 1947-1965, *Social Organization and the Applications of Anthropology* (Robert Smith, ed.). New York: Harper and Row.
- HALL, CALVIN S., and GARDNER LINDZEY. 1970. *Theories of Personality*. New York: John Wiley.
- HALLOWELL, A. I. 1955. *Culture and Experience*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- HSU, FRANCIS L. K., ed. 1972. *Psychological Anthropology*. Cambridge: Schenkman.
- KEESING, ROGER. 1970. Toward a Model of Role Analysis, *A Handbook of Method in Cultural Anthropology* (Raoul Naroll and Ronald Cohen, eds.). New York: Columbia University Press.
- _____. 1975. Explorations in Role Analysis, *Linguistics and Anthropology* (M. Dale Kinkade, Kenneth Hale, and Oswald Werner, eds.). Lisse, The Netherlands: Peter de Ridder Press.
- KIEFER, CHRISTIE. 1977. Psychological Anthropology, *Annual Review of Anthropology* (Bernard J. Siegal, Alan R. Beals, and Stephen A. Tyler, eds.). Palo Alto: Annual Reviews.
- KIRK, LORRAINE, and MICHAEL BURTON. 1977. Meaning and Context: A Study of Contextual Shifts in Meaning of Maasai Personality Descriptors. *American Ethnologist* 4:734-761.
- LANGNESS, L. L., and JOHN G. KENNEDY. 1979. Editorial. *Ethos* 7: 95-103.
- LINTON, RALPH. 1936. *The Study of Man*. New York: Appleton Century.
- MEAD, MARGARET. 1935. *Sex and Temperament in Three Primitive Societies*. New York: Mentor.
- READ, K. E. 1959. Leadership and Consensus in a New Guinea Society. *American Anthropologist* 61:425-436.
- ROBBINS, RICHARD. 1973. Identity, Culture, and Behavior, *Handbook of Social and Cultural Anthropology* (John Honigmann, ed.). Chicago: Rand McNally.
- SCHEFF, THOMAS, ed. 1975. *Labeling Madness*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- SHWEDER, RICHARD A. 1979. Rethinking Culture and Personality Theory. Part I. *Ethos* 7:255-278.
- SPRADLEY, JAMES, and BRENDA MANN. 1975. *The Cocktail Waitress*. New York: Wiley.
- SWARTZ, MARC J. 1959. Leadership and Status Conflict on Romónum, Truk. *Southwestern Journal of Anthropology* 15:213-218.
- _____. 1965. Personality and Structure: Political Acquiescence in Truk, *Induced Political Change in the Pacific* (R. W. Force, ed.). Honolulu: Bishop Museum Press.

- VALENTINE, CHARLES. 1963. Men of Anger and Men of Shame: Lakalai Ethnopsychology and Its Implications for Socio-psychological Theory. *Ethnology* 2:441-477.
- WALLACE, ANTHONY F. C. 1967. Identity Processes in Personality and Culture, *Cognition, Personality, and Clinical Psychology* (R. Jessor, ed.). San Francisco: Jossey Bass.
- _____. 1970. *Culture and Personality*. New York: Random House.
- WALLACE, ANTHONY F. C., and RAYMOND D. FOGELSON. 1965. The Identity Struggle, *Intensive Family Therapy* (Ivan Boszormenyi-Nagy and James Framo, eds.). New York: Harper and Row.
- WHITE, GEOFFREY. 1978. Ambiguity and Ambivalence in A'ara Personality Discriptors. *American Ethnologist* 5:334-360.
- WILLIAMS, ROBIN M. 1968. The Concept of Values, *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, Vol. 16 (D. Sills, ed.). New York: Macmillan and the Free Press.