

Read it and believe it: How metaphor constructs ideology in news discourse. A case study[☆]

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Abstract

Although it may be argued that critical linguistics needs to examine language as discourse, i.e., as text embedded in the social conditions of production and interpretation, to be independently identified and examined as the text is subordinated to them (Fairclough, 1992; Hodge and Kress, 1988), we claim that a thorough linguistic analysis, employing all the methods and tools which the discipline provides, is in a large measure revealing of such conditions. However, to yield such results, i.e., to unravel these conditions and their contribution to the generation of ideological complexes, a linguistic analysis should not be restricted to viewing grammatical units as isolated sentences or smaller structures within the text, as has been the case in traditional approaches, but rather examine such grammatical and lexical structures as being incorporated in the overall formation of the text. Moreover, the focus should be primarily on higher-level organizational features as well as on rhetorical structures and semantic and pragmatic relations as they contribute to the general style of the text, thus yielding desired versions of reality and ideologies.

We substantiate this claim by analyzing an article published in *Time* (October 12, 1992) entitled *Greece's defense seems just silly*. While paying close attention to both the grammatical and lexical structures of the text, our analysis views these structures within the framework of a constructed metaphor which not only permeates and dominates the whole article, but also forms the backbone of its argumentative structure. What is foregrounded, moreover, in this multi-level analysis is a preponderance of certain assumptions of an ideological nature, which, although they do not form part of the formal structure of the text, are aspects of interpretations surreptitiously cued into the subtext of the text.

[☆] A short version of this paper, titled 'How can silly syllogisms be persuasive', was presented at the second conference organized by the European Society for the Study of English (ESSE) in Bordeaux, 4–8 September, 1993. We wish to thank the audience for their comments and two anonymous referees of the journal for comments on an earlier version. However, the most heartfelt thanks have to go to the editor of the journal, Professor Jacob Mey, for his expert advice on matters of both content and style. The paper would not have read as well as it, hopefully, does now. All remaining shortcomings of the paper are our own, of course.

“In the vicissitudes of the word are to be found the vicissitudes of the society of word users.”

Vološinov

1. Introduction

1.1. *Language as discourse*

We consider it a commonsensical assumption to say that language, a system of signs, can no longer be profitably viewed as a self-contained system of signs, rules, and structures. Such an examination of language in isolation, emphasizing structures and codes, system and product, as if users were not manipulating language in order to control their environments and relationships, disregards the social and ideological dimension of language, and “attributes power to meaning, instead of meaning to power. It dissolves boundaries within the field of semiotics, but tacitly accepts an impenetrable wall cutting off semiosis from society, and semiotics from social and political thought” (Hodge and Kress, 1988: 2).

Taking exception to this view, we maintain that language is embedded in societal, political, and ideological structures and processes. Meanings are not frozen entities, but are generated and regenerated as they are immersed in the processes and structures constituting them, on the one hand, but also being constituted by them, on the other. Taking these factors into account involves a discursal analysis of language, i.e., an analysis of language as discourse.¹

1.2. *Language as text*

However, while acknowledging this, we believe that a ‘close reading’ of the text, can contribute significantly towards a realization of the social conditions governing the acts of the production as well as the interpretation and consumption of texts.

A text is rightly seen as a unit of language in use (Halliday and Hasan, 1976), a product rather than a process. More precisely, it is “a product of the process of text production” (Fairclough, 1989: 24), embedded in the discourse which constitutes the social process of any interaction. On this view, a comprehensive analysis has to be based on the analysis of discourse, rather than of text as such; to do this, such an analysis would need to turn to social theory (Fairclough, 1992: 36).

¹ It is quite obvious that our view of what constitutes discourse and discourse analysis differs from most current ones; it is consonant with Hodge and Kress’s (1988), Fairclough’s (1989), Thompson’s (1984; see the latter’s criticism of other theories), or Laclau’s. Laclau (1988: 254), for example, writes: “Consider the signifier ‘woman’: what is its meaning? Taken in isolation it has no meaning; it must enter into a set of discursive relations to have some meaning. But, on the one hand, ‘woman’ can enter into a relation of equivalence with family, subordination to men, and so on; and, on the other hand, ‘woman’ can enter into discursive relations with ‘oppression’, ‘black people’, ‘gay people’ and so on. The signifier ‘woman’ in itself has no meaning.”

Our paper, however, adopts and proposes a different orientation. We intend to show this by analyzing a particular piece of text, an article in *Time* magazine (see Appendix A). Although we recognize the significance of the social dimension in any act of communication, we claim that we need not adopt, as our point of departure, the social, ideological and political structures and processes involved in each case. Rather, we start from the text itself and examine its overall structure as a slate, on which ideological contexts are inscribed at various levels.

Moreover, text has a denotative function in any act of communication, inasmuch as it moves from sense to reference, from its internal structure to the external structure of the reality it projects; this function can be unveiled in a close reading. In addition, we will focus on the denotative dimension of the text in order to understand what kind of world it projects.

1.3. Text as message

Moreover, a text (and more specifically, a news text) can be analyzed as an act of communication which is characterized by directionality, i.e., it has a producer and a recipient and its purpose is to communicate. In a written text, such as a news report, this communicative act may take the shape of an event of saying, in which case the saying event has been transformed into one of writing. As such, it enjoys a certain semantic autonomy, which is the configuration of a form of distancing. As Ricoeur writes:

“[T]he text’s career escapes the finite horizon lived by its author. What the text says now matters more than what the author meant to say, and every exegesis unfolds its procedures within the circumference of a meaning that has broken its moorings to the psychology of its author.” (Ricoeur, 1981: 201)

In written text, therefore, the meaning of what is said is dominant over the event of saying (Barthes, 1975); as such, it is the first form of distancing, according to Ricoeur.

Having said this much with respect to the paper’s focus and orientation, and before proceeding to the proposed analysis at various levels, we must very briefly discuss certain central concepts which form the background of our analysis, since these concepts, too, interact with language to generate certain ideological complexes.

2. Some basic concepts

2.1. The co-text of the article

In any analysis that aspires to reveal ideological complexes and versions of reality, due attention must be paid to what may be called the ‘co-text’ of the text.

The article under consideration is a signed article which does not attempt to just inform, but also to inform from a certain perspective, i.e., to analyze a political situation, comment on it and help form public opinion. As it is signed, it does not

necessarily represent the magazine's ideological stance; however, the very fact that it is an article appearing in a magazine such as *Time* allows us, as readers, to invest it with the same authority and credibility as those enjoyed by the magazine. Moreover, this particular magazine, like *Newsweek* but unlike *The Economist*, or most British and U.S. broadsheet papers, does not carry any leaders (editorials). By virtue of this knowledge, the common understanding is that articles, such as this one analyzed here, may carry the weight of leaders.² This article, therefore, may be said to be merging two discourse types, of news reports and editorial commentaries. As such, this signed article, apart from reporting on a news item or a particular political action, will probably attempt to convince the readers that the events described have indeed taken place, or that the political action in question is commendable. Briefly, the article is expected to either forge new policies and ideologies, or help reproduce and perpetuate existing political and ideological contexts.³ Our proposed analysis aspires to show some ways in which this is attempted in the press.

2.2. *Conviction or seduction?*

Both conviction and seduction are processes that can be subsumed in a relation of species to genus, under the hyperprocess of persuasion. It goes without saying that, in order to be persuasive, news reports and commentaries on political issues need to be shown to be true and plausible by incorporating persuasive content features (Van Dijk, 1988).

As to conviction, this involves mapping out a series of argumentative steps. On the part of the readers, conviction involves acceptance of those argumentative steps. Because it involves the activation and participation of one's cognitive system, this reception is a cognitive process.

However, this is not always what happens when we read an article in a particular newspaper or magazine (even if this is *Time* magazine). Quite often, persuasion bypasses conviction altogether, in the sense that it preempts the reader's cognitive participation in the process of accepting the author's perspective. In such cases, one can talk of 'seduction' rather than conviction. Sornig (1988: 97) notes that "whereas the mechanisms of convincing and conviction obviously work mainly along cognitive argumentative lines, seduction, instead of trusting in the truth and/or credibility of arguments, rather exploits the outward appearance and seeming trustworthiness of the persuader". He also notes that "seductive persuasion tries to manipulate the relationship that obtains or is to be established between the speaker and his listener".

Extrapolating from this, we can surmise that also the mechanisms of seduction in the relationship between the persuader and his/her 'victim' or 'accomplice' are identifiable at both the textual and subtextual level, i.e., not only at the level of the lexes,

² Notice not only the header 'America Abroad' next to the author's name but also the fact that this particular article is included in the contents page of the magazine (see Appendix B).

³ However, we do not wish to side with the view that ideological bias determines public positions and views. We only wish to analyze how this biasing is attempted in the press.

structures, and figures of speech as components of a text's local structure, but also at the level of its overall coherence. Mechanisms of seduction, therefore, can be isolated both at the level of cohesion and at that of coherence (understood as the level of the assumptions inferred or activated in order to make a text coherent). In other words, we are not only dealing with the linguistic choices made in a text, but also with the kind of assumptions that underpin aspects of coherence.

All these means can be profitably manipulated by the persuader in order to seduce his/her readers. By instigating the emotional rather than the cognitive involvement of the readers, a persuader may succeed in consolidating or inculcating certain thoughts and ideas or in getting consumers of the text to adopt his/her own perspective by surreptitiously forcing them to either relinquish or modify theirs. What is implicit in all this is a selection of a certain style. Although we acknowledge that there is no such thing as a neutral style, and that we cannot operate a simple split between a certain style, on the one hand, and deviations from it on the other,⁴ we must assume that there is something which does not vary, viz. "the underlying meaning or reference that must be kept constant" (Van Dijk, 1988: 73). And Van Dijk concludes: "Style, thus, seems to be captured by the well-known phrase 'saying the same thing in different ways'" (ibid.: 73).

2.3. *The style of the text: The 'news story'*

Abiding by the objectivity principle and the norm of 'reporting mere facts',⁵ the overall formal structure of the text in question (see Appendix A) seems to be a configuration of descriptive and narrative structure. In contrast, the term 'news story', as Van Dijk (1988) notes, rather suggests a special kind of narrative.

Apart from the article's headline and its concluding paragraph, which are characterized by a clearly argumentative style (overt evaluations, covert authorial judgments, plus a couple of rhetorical questions), the structure of the text is overwhelmingly constituted by descriptive and narrative statements: sequences of events are narrated in sequences of past tenses. As to the headline, this is consistent with the concluding argumentative paragraph (ll. 112–119), which is the only section of the text to exhibit a clearly argumentative structure, where value-judgments are issued in the first-person personal pronoun. However, just as in the headline the occurrence of 'seems' serves to generalize and objectify an evaluation (see section 5.1), so does, in the concluding paragraph, the citation of an authority, Aristotle. By this technique, the author's value-judgments are corroborated and incorporated into Aristotle's voice.

Taken by itself, the fact that the headline and the concluding paragraph exhibit value judgments does not entail that their structure is argumentative within the overall structure of the text. Indeed, Labov writes:

⁴ On no account do we mean to associate conviction processes with a neutral style and seduction processes with the selection of a highly deviatory style in written texts.

⁵ Van Dijk (1988: 179) claims that news discourse was found to be "nonpersuasive in principle or intention", although it may well have "a persuasive dimension in a more indirect sense".

"A complete narrative begins with an orientation, proceeds to the complicating action, is suspended at the focus of evaluation before the resolution, concludes with the resolution and returns the listener to the present time with the coda. The evaluation of the narrative forms a secondary structure which is concentrated in the evaluation section but may be found in various forms throughout the narrative." (1972: 369)

Rather than focus our attention on these argumentative structures, we will claim (see 2.5) that the main organizing feature of the structure of the text at a global level is the construction of a dominant metaphor calling forth the 'script' (or the myth) of 'the weak and the powerful'. This metaphor is the predominant factor of transforming the style of the text from overtly descriptive or narrative to covertly argumentative, generating a particular ideological stance to the issue reported.

2.4. *Representation of reality*

As we stressed above, in analyzing the article we will also focus our attention on the way it represents the world. It is by now, we believe, well understood that such a representation will generate certain ideological effects; as Fowler says, "there is no neutral representation of reality" (1987: 67), if indeed there is such a thing as a well-defined reality. Still, there are certain types of physical reality, which one might call brute (or 'hard') facts (Austin, 1970a), to be described in various linguistic terms. For instance, does *Mr. Smith murdered his mother* describe the same event as *Mrs. Smith was murdered by her son*, or as *Poor Mrs. Smith is no longer alive because her son brutally murdered her*, or as *Poor Mr. Smith was insane enough to murder his mother*, or as *The old bitch, she deserved no better than being murdered by her own son*, or even as *Mrs. Smith's son murdered his own mother*, or as *Mrs. Smith's son caused his own mother to die*? In one word, we cannot escape comprehending reality or our world through language, because reality is always structured or reconstructed through language, as our examples above clearly show.

However, as the examples also show, there is a difference between neutral language and what one might call emotionally charged language; the latter appeals to our emotions rather than to the cognitive part of ourselves, and it is mainly this quality that differentiates the yellow press from the press in general, and the tabloids from the so-called quality newspapers. While the prevailing view is that it is this aspect of language which is primarily linked to certain choices of vocabulary and, particularly, metaphor, critical linguistics, however, has made us realize that reality is not constructed only in terms of the lexes used (Fowler, 1987), but that our choice of linguistic structures to represent particular (aspects of) events, processes, or states is just as significant from the point of view of the ideologies they reflect and thereby constitute. In what follows, we will point out some aspects of language use which help mediate and construct a particular type of universe.

2.5. *Metaphor as the article's main organizing theme*

Our analysis breaks away from traditional critical linguistics approaches in that we do not confine our attention to aspects of grammar and lexes as isolated and static areas or sources of ideological significance, but rather we examine such aspects

as representing dynamic processes within the overall formation of the text. Therefore, quite apart from the fact that the text reconstructs a certain version of reality (with the concomitant ideological effects), these structural aspects are viewed here as unobtrusively transforming one style into another by feeding into the construction of a global, dominant metaphor.

This pervasive metaphor secures the comprehension of the text within a certain ideological perspective. This perspective is constructed by analogy, i.e., by the intertextual relations between the constructed metaphor, on the one hand, and by its analogical interpretations (in terms of parallel conventional fictions, myths and paradigms), on the other.

The construction of this dominant metaphor is further brought about by ‘mini-metaphors’, being pieces of the same puzzle as the major metaphor. Just as the latter derives its construction from these partial-metaphors (manifest mainly at the semantic and syntactic levels), so too the partial-metaphors draw on the theme of the dominant metaphor for the construction of their significance. Since this interdependence, we claim, is the main procedural factor for the transformation of the text’s stylistic configuration, we will analyze at some length the structures and formations, both lexical and grammatical, that are implicated in this procedure. More specifically, we will first deal with aspects of structure at the semantic level (propositional structure, lexical choice), and next with aspects at the syntactic or semantico-syntactic level (transitivity, nominalization, passivization and classification). Our treatment of the latter issues will be lengthier because it is in these structures that the metaphor is constructed.⁶ Prominence will also be given to the analysis of some issues at the level of textual rhetoric and intertextuality, because these seem to aid significantly in giving the text’s style its argumentative flavour.

We will first turn our attention to the propositional status of assertions. But before doing so, we must place the reader in the article’s historical perspective.

3. Critical analysis of the rhetoric of the article

3.1. *Historical perspective*

Macedonia is the name of a large geographical area, situated on the Balkan Peninsula, which has been inhabited by many peoples mainly of Greek and Slavic origin. For many centuries, Macedonia belonged to the Greek world; its history has constituted part of the history of Greece.

As is known, Alexander the Great and his tutor, the Greek philosopher Aristotle, who were both born in what nowadays constitutes Greek Macedonia, spoke Greek and wrote in Greek, as did Aristotle’s teacher, Plato, and Alexander’s father, Philip.⁷

⁶ However, we do not wish to claim that metaphor is a semantic or pragmatic phenomenon. The interesting point is that in this case the semanto-syntactic structures of transitivity, passivization etc. seem to be aspects of local metaphors which feed into the main theme of the global metaphor. Nevertheless, interpretations of the metaphor based on activated versions of parallel myths need to be accounted for within a pragmatic framework.

⁷ See Kitis (1993) in this connection.

After many bloody wars in this area, Macedonia was divided (Treaty of Bucharest, 10 August 1913) roughly into 52% to Greece, 38% to Serbia and 10% to Bulgaria. These frontiers have now been settled for more than eighty years. In 1945, Marshal Tito's post-war Yugoslavian government named the southernmost province of Yugoslavia 'Macedonia'. Right after the break up of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, this province asked for international recognition of their newborn state under the name of 'Macedonia'.

The author of the article which we will proceed to analyze is concerned with the dispute between Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) regarding the adoption of the name 'Macedonia' by this republic as the official name of their country.

3.2. *Semantic level*

3.2.1. *Propositional status of assertions*

In a comprehensive, multi-level critical analysis of texts, close attention must be paid to the status of the propositional content of the text. According to Van Dijk, "news discourse nearly exclusively consists of assertions" (1988: 26); however, it is quite unrealistic in a study of this size and purpose to aspire to a comprehensive analysis of all the affirmative structures in the text. Therefore, we will restrict ourselves to analyzing the first statement of the text and point to the fact that such assertions can be multi-significant. That is, a statement, even an epigrammatic one, can have paramount significance if it is the headline and as such, it is not only an attention-getter but also a macrocomponent, i.e., a conventional category of the overall organizational pattern (Van Dijk, 1988: 27).

Titles express and signal topics of news items; as such, they function as summaries. Van Dijk (1988) notes that topics of news discourse or reports are routinely expressed in headlines with summary functions. These topics belong to the global, macrolevel of discourse description and Van Dijk uses the theoretical notion of 'semantic macrostructures' to describe them (1972, 1977, 1980, 1988); normally, such topics consist of propositions.

In the case at issue, the topical title of the article indeed consists of an argument ('Greece's defense') and a predicate ('seems just silly'), fulfilling the minimal requirements for a proposition. However, we maintain that in our case, the title is not just a topic-title encapsulating the topic or the theme of the article. We claim that it is more accurately described as a 'thesis-title', because its proposition expresses the author's thesis, which is embodied in a non-truth functional value judgment, clad in a relational attributive structure.

Because of its grammatical form (a declarative sentence), the title is taken to be an assertion. Although a statement, it is not in fact descriptive, and therefore not susceptible of being true or false, as Austin would say. He asks "When is a statement not a statement? ... When it is a value-judgment ..." (1970a: 131), and he goes on to add: "It is simply not the business of such utterances to 'correspond to the facts'". And if a statement does not 'correspond with the facts', then it is not true, because "'corresponds with the facts' is a 'fused' idiom precisely equivalent to 'is true'" (Austin, 1970b: 159).

More specifically, a proposition that expresses a value judgment usually registers the speaker's or writer's attitude towards his/her topic and as such it is not amenable to truth-valuation. The title *Greece's defense seems just silly* has no referential dimension as a proposition because it does not denote an event or a process or a state of affairs. It is *not* a factual statement.

However, it is not lacking in assertoric force and, as it is not expressed in question form, but is formulated in the declarative mode, it may delude readers and pass as an assertion, not of the author's judgment, but of a factual state, as assertions are overwhelmingly linked in our conceptual world with descriptions of states, events, and processes. Moreover, the modality expressed by 'seems' is also conducive to investing the title with a factivity guise (see 5.1).

As to the noun 'defense', although it invokes a war frame (see 3.2.2), it cannot by itself carry the weight of the argument 'Greece's defense'. This is so because not only is 'defense' an abstract noun, but in the context it is too abstract and diffuse to be assigned a specific reference: it is not qualified by any restrictive phrase (e.g. 'defense of Macedonia', 'defense of its borders', 'defense of democracy', and so on).

In the absence of a defining phrase, 'defense' – and consequently the concept of defense – is fused into its adjacent noun 'Greece', which represents the agent of a transformed transactional structure (Greece defends what?).⁸ 'Greece', therefore, carries all the weight of the predicate 'seems just silly' or 'just silly', since 'seems' occupies the slot of a dispensable copula. Thus the title *Greece's defense seems just silly* is surreptitiously transformed into the configuration 'Greece seems just silly' or even 'Greece [is] silly' since 'silly' is the predicator, i.e., the indispensable part of the predicate. This possible reduction is further accentuated by the evaluative epithet 'silly', which ultimately modifies a [+human] noun. The attribution of this epithet to Greece is a subtle initiation of the reader into the metaphoric theme of the article, and this occurs right at the headline.⁹

3.2.2. The headline as a script or frame header

The title *Greece's defense seems just silly* includes the word 'defense', which belongs to a war 'frame' (Mirisky, 1975). This is significant because the word 'defense' serves to activate our knowledge of the specific frame, thus raising certain expectations with regard to the lexes of the following text. A war frame (understood

⁸ It must be made clear that this is a case of a subjective genitive of a grammatical metaphor, in which the abstract noun 'defense' denotes an action carried out by the agent, in our case Greece. As Halliday (1989: 94) writes, "the metaphor is in the *grammar*. Something that would typically be represented, given the grammatical system of English, as a verb, has been represented instead as a noun".

⁹ It must be noted, however, that the construction of the mythical(?) theme of 'hubris-ridden Greece' (see our epilogue) is introduced in the contents: 'AMERICA ABROAD: The Greeks' preposterous posturing' (see Appendix B). Moreover, the headline projects the reader into another dimension which insinuates itself into the text and is explicitly voiced by the rhetorical question (l. 110): 'Where will the overriding interests of the U.S., the E.C. and NATO be then?' In other words, 'Greece's defense' might be deconstructed as an objective genitive, in which case the attribute 'silly' is there to characterize, not Greece, but those who might attempt to defend it, i.e., the U.S., the E.C. and NATO.

very broadly, as comprising also an argument) routinely involves two conflicting parties with ‘equal’ interests in ‘winning’ the war or the argument;¹⁰ moreover, there is the audience: viewers of either verbal or visual instances of warlike conflicts, or readers of their representations. The audience predictably sides with one of the parties, mostly with the one that is believed to have been wronged, as sympathizing with one of the two adversaries is a widespread trait of our culture.

However, apart from certain expectations regarding vocabulary, and the pre-shadowing of some form of conflict, no other more specific expectations, as regards the content of the following article, have been raised by the title. (Note also that the word ‘war’ is explicitly introduced in the lead section (l. 6) of the news report.)

There is, however, another way of looking at topical titles. Some would claim that a topic-title consists of normal components of a macro-act, (as Van Dijk would put it), to be developed into a full-fledged script or scenario. Even though ellipsis is a topic-title’s main feature, the title still invokes a certain script or frame (Schank and Abelson, 1977). For example, ‘Yugoslavia comes apart’, ‘Electoral reform in Japan’, ‘Dog-eared public libraries’, all titles of articles in a single issue of *The Economist*, can be predictably expanded on the basis of our accumulated stereotypic knowledge. We can confidently predict what is to follow in a report titled ‘Yugoslavia comes apart’ or ‘Electoral reform in Japan’, and this capacity points to the fact that cognitive representations of background knowledge are a significant factor in comprehending news reports (and language in general). The title at issue, however, does not have a similar function and this is borne out by our inability to flesh this title out into a complete script.¹¹ This is due, we believe, to the nature of the statement: it is a value-judgment, as shown in particular by its final word: ‘silly’. Moreover, a critical analysis cannot help noticing that ‘foolish pride’ (another value-judgment) is the expression that concludes the article, thus creating a link back to the title as well as to the magazine’s contents (see Appendix B). On the expression level, alliteration is deployed to enhance the overall impact: of the sibilants of the headline and of the plosives of the title in the magazine’s contents.

4. Metaphor: Personification

The pervasive presence of metaphor in our language evinces the metaphorical cognitive structures of our conceptual system (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980). What is particularly striking in this article is the abundant use of lexes and grammatical relations and structures that gradually but consistently build up a dominant metaphor that permeates the whole structure of the text. In this metaphor, Greece is characterized

¹⁰ See Lakoff and Johnson (1980) who analyze argument in terms of the ‘war’ metaphor.

¹¹ The war frame is called up quite independently by a single word and not by the whole proposition; had a script been called up, it would have constituted a side track. Schank and Abelson (1977: 47) write “for a script to be non-fleeting, two of its lines must occur, a header and one other line”.

in mostly negative terms, whereas so-called ‘Macedonia’¹² is depicted as a poor, helpless weakling in need of protection, predictably arousing feelings of sympathy in readers by analogical interpretations of parallel mythical paradigms.

Both Greece and ‘Macedonia’ are anthropomorphized in the text. Personification is an ontological metaphor that allows us to make sense of our world in human terms (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980), but it is also closely connected with traditional forms of myth, as it exploits the common tendency to ascribe (mythological) personality or agentive power to animate or inanimate entities. However, if we consider some aspects of the metaphors personifying Greece, on the one hand, and ‘Macedonia’, on the other, we discover that there is not a single metaphorical structure or formation rating Greece positively in any sense of the word.

It is precisely these metaphors that underpin and sustain an implicit but consistent argument seeping through the configuration of the overwhelmingly descriptive and narrative structures of the text. The presence of the metaphors is evidenced both at the level of lexical choice and of grammatical structure.

4.1. *Semantic aspects: Lexical choice*

“Lexical choice”, writes Van Dijk (1988: 177), “is an eminent aspect of news discourse in which hidden opinions or ideologies may surface”. Lexical items portraying Greece, its policies and its policymakers in a negative way abound in the text, thus implicitly, if not explicitly, identifying Greece as a party in the conflict who is ‘just silly’, if not utterly in the wrong. This feature is prominent in the very title of the article, in which the value-judgment epithet ‘silly’ is qualified by the lexical item ‘just’.¹³

Greece and its policymakers are negatively characterized in all the linguistic structures the author uses in his text.¹⁴ Greece ‘objects’ and ‘exercises [its] veto’ (ll. 26–27) forcing E.C. (the European Community) to ‘stiff-arm’ ‘Macedonia’ (l. 24); it ‘thinks’ (l. 33) what is not shared by others, and has ‘expansionistic ambitions’ (l. 51), which may be pernicious to neighbouring countries, all instances of aggressive behaviour, typical of a person enjoying power. Moreover, Greece has ‘extra leverage’ – physical strength – (l. 77), has the benefit of enjoying ‘additional help of the powerful Greek-American lobby’ (ll. 79–80), but despite all this it ‘is blockading fuel shipments to Macedonia’ (ll. 97–98), thus ‘murder[ing] without bullets’ (l. 101) and ‘strangulat[ing]’

¹² We chose to refer to the author’s use of *Macedonia* as ‘Macedonia’, within quotation marks, or as FYROM, the official name to date, October 1996. The reason for this choice is that we do not want to performatively name the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) *by fiat*, as the author does, since ‘Macedonia’ is not as yet an officially recognized name.

¹³ Bolinger (1972: 107) notes that ‘just’ in the absence of any prosodic features serves to intensify the meaning of the word it modifies to mean ‘no more than’, ‘no less than’.

¹⁴ It should be remembered that since readers are placed within a war frame, i.e., within the context of physical, psychological or verbal conflict right at the beginning of the article (title), positive or negative characterizations of the two adversaries are mostly associated with notions of aggression and power, on the one hand, and weakness and unprotectedness, on the other. The latter associations are motivated by humane principles of charity.

(l. 103) the economy of the ‘newborn, almost defenseless nation’ (ll. 66–67) of ‘Macedonia’. The policy practised by Greece is also characterized not so much by ‘wickedness’ as by ‘foolish pride’ (last line), both attributes of flawed human nature.

In all these metaphorical structures, Greece is portrayed as a ruthless and reckless, powerful human being who does not stop short of committing crimes, such as strangulating another country’s economy, which will predictably lead to ‘ignit[ing]’ (l. 104) ethnic conflagration, which again will lead to human suffering. Moreover, Greece is portrayed as a powerful (and in addition hateful) human being who is able to ‘murder’, though ‘without bullets’.

Athens, too, synecdochically denoting the Greek government, is personified in the same way: it ‘thinks’ that it has a ‘trademark’ (ll. 32–33) on the name ‘Macedonia’. In this way, the author succeeds in conjuring up for his readers images of a determined, relentless manufacturer, who knows how to protect his products. A manufacturing frame is called up by the metaphorical lexical item ‘trademark’, in order to portray the Greek government rather unfavourably in terms of trade relations.

In particular, this traditional figure of speech (synecdoche) employed here serves to subtly contrast what Searle (1969) calls the ‘descriptive backing’ of a name (‘Athens’): glorious history, paragon of democracy, originator of western values, etc., with our stereotypic knowledge of the not so glorified world of trade relations and manufacture. All this is naturally detrimental to Greece’s image.

On the other hand, ‘Macedonia’ is portrayed in the most favourable and charitable terms as a helpless human being, (often a baby), in an attempt to elicit feelings of sympathy, as ‘Macedonia’ is predictably identified as the weaker party in this two-party conflict.

‘Macedonia’ is ‘a newborn, almost defenseless nation’ (ll. 66–67) that can be ‘bullied’ (l. 68) by presumably cruel adults, and seems to have ‘no choice’ (l. 9) – a highly valued commodity of our western culture (remember Thatcher’s notorious dictum ‘freedom of choice’); this baby state, despite ‘passing tests’ (l. 14) like a good, obedient pupil, and ‘disavowing any [territorial] claims’ (l. 41), is still ‘stiff-armed’ (l. 24) by the Community, an act instigated by Greek cruelty (ll. 25–27). Moreover, further extending the human baby metaphor, ‘Macedonia’ is metamorphosed to an *edible* baby, or a morsel of food that could be ‘swallowed up’ (ll. 10–11).¹⁵

The one instance in which Greece is placed in a situation of powerlessness refers to the future; it comes off as a threat, or at best, a warning:

“Because Macedonia has large Muslim minorities, civil war within that republic is more likely than anywhere else to escalate into a religious and regional war that could end up *putting* Greece against any number of its neighbors, including Turkey.” (ll. 105–110; our emphasis)

But even so, the culprit for this imminent disaster is to be sought not so much in ‘Macedonia’ as in the ‘strangulation’ (l. 103) of this ‘newborn state’s’ economy, the agent of this action noun, ‘strangulation’, (Fraser, 1970) being readily identified with Greece.

¹⁵ This metaphor also alludes to mythology and literary history (Cronus swallowing his children, Swift’s *Irish proposal*).

At points, though, Greece is also portrayed as a sick person suffering from an ‘identity crisis’ (l. 75) or ‘hysteria’ (l. 3), both hyponyms of mental disorder. The connection between mental illness and erratic or irrational behaviour is well documented both in psychiatry and in public experience.

These metaphors, by personifying both Greece and ‘Macedonia’, reinforce the war conflict metaphor by providing anthropomorphized opponents in role-positions (Schank and Abelson, 1977); thus the whole system of metaphors appeals to readers’ emotions rather than to their cognitive abilities.

4.1.1. Side-metaphors

The metaphoric appeal is further strengthened by an extended use of side-metaphors, as by describing the inhabitants of Balkan countries as mentally ill (‘hysteria’, l. 3), thus downgrading the significance of history – mostly a European commodity – as something causing ‘hysteria’ in the region:

“Greece is reminding the world that it too is a Balkan country, the inhabitant of a region where history often induces hysteria.” (ll. 1–3)

The Greek Prime Minister and the Greek Foreign Minister both suffer from ‘paranoia’ or, at best, from ‘myopia’ (l. 116), features pointing to mental illness or to lack of correct judgment. This metaphor, too, reinforces the mental illness syndrome, as a distinctly Greek plight.

War is portrayed as a (black?) hole, one towards which the Greek Prime Minister has already ‘set out’ and is ‘well on his way to’ (l. 5) – another spatial metaphor – ‘deepen’ and ‘widen’ (l. 6), thus injudiciously multiplying the existence of evils.

Furthermore, the word ‘business’ (l. 36), used to refer to the situation, downgrades the issue to matters of business, i.e., work relating to the production, buying, and selling of goods or services, to activities and affairs relevant, or belonging, to a private sphere of interests; or at best it serves to diffuse the specificity and significance of the whole affair, as one may see by comparing casual or cryptic, colloquial ‘business-like’ expressions such as: ‘Let’s talk business’, ‘Let’s get down to business now’, or ‘I’ve some important business to discuss’ (source: Collins Cobuild). In this sense, ‘business’ is another metaphor, such as is ‘camouflage’ (l. 50) – a war-frame word – which portrays Greece cannily (if not cunningly) hiding its ambitions, as if it were engaged in a real battle situation, camouflaging its artillery.

It goes without saying that the choice of lexes like ‘preposterous’ (l. 48 and contents, Appendix B) characterizing the Greek position serves to further mar Greece’s image, while metaphors describing factories as having to ‘shut down’ (l. 99) and ambulances as ‘sitting useless’, or expressions like ‘crops ... rotting in the fields’ (ll. 99–100), all conjure up images of evils brought about by Greece.

Moreover, these disaster images are easily gathered under the umbrella of the emotionally charged noun phrase *economic strangulation* (l. 103), which semantically links the paragraph it introduces to the previous one. It suffices to substitute this expression by a term with exactly the same denotative value, but which is neutral with regard to any semantic and pragmatic connotations, (e.g. the word

embargo), to appreciate the emotional charging effected by this specific lexical choice. Furthermore, it is significant that the author chooses, not just a metaphorical nominal, or a grammatical metaphor (Halliday, 1989), but rather a noun that is actional – or *transactional* – and whose underlying structure requires participant roles. In the case at hand, the agent of the economic strangulation is no other than Greece, whereas the affected participant role is understandably occupied by ‘Macedonia’. Concluding, the author puts the finishing touch on the picture by likening the whole situation to ‘tragedy’ (l. 117), another metaphor.

Summarizing this section dealing with vocabulary and (mostly) with aspects of metaphor, we can confidently conclude that the choice of emotionally charged lexis and figures of speech serves to heighten the semantic and pragmatic intensity and expressiveness, as well as the connotational, evaluative, and affective content of what is said.¹⁶ Consequently, the referential-denotational aspect of meaning is considerably de-emphasized, not to say suppressed and distorted. This way of using language might be called persuasive manipulation by means of seduction.

4.2. *Grammatical aspects*

4.2.1. *Transitivity*

The effect of the metaphor of the powerful Greek opponent or suppressor in the two party conflict is carried further by exploiting the transitivity system of the language. Greece is overwhelmingly identified as the nominal constituent of a transitive verb occupying the subject position. The sentences in group A and B below (Table I) represent the text’s transitive structures. In group A, the subject position is occupied by nominals referring or relating to Greece, while in group B, the subject position is occupied by nouns and noun phrases referring or relating to ‘Macedonia’.

As Table I shows, ‘Greece’ and related noun phrases, i.e., nominal expressions designating the Greek government, policies etc., occur in subject roles in no less than nine transitive structures. In contrast, ‘Macedonia’ occupies the subject position in only four.

4.2.2. *The transactive model*

Since we are concerned with linguistic structures as instruments of representing a certain kind of reality and, therefore, indirectly as possible instruments of controlling perceptions of ‘reality’ and articulating ideology, we also need to focus on the semantic content of these structures. Seen from this perspective, at least four, if not five, out of the nine structures in A (1, 2, 3, (4) and 9) are what Kress and Hodge (1979) call *transactive*, i.e., their semantic structure shows an actor, an action, and an affected participant.

For the purposes of our analysis, we will adopt a modified view of transactive structure, as it is derived from the logical structure of action sentences on Davidson’s (1967) view. According to Davidson, it is a necessary condition that the agent be

¹⁶ See Carter (1987) and Carter and Nash (1990), who identify degrees of expressivity in terms of degrees of *coreness* (core vs. non-core words) in lexical items.

Table 1
Transitive structures

A. Greece	B. 'Macedonia'
1. Greece is reminding the world that it too is a Balkan country ... (1.1)	1. Macedonia had no choice ... (1.9)
2. ... Greek P.M. C. Mitsotakis is well on his way to deepening and widening the war there. (1.5)	2. Macedonia passed the test. (1.14)
3. Because Greece objects to the name and exercised a veto in the councils of the E.C. (1.25)	3. Never mind that Macedonia's constitution explicitly disavows any such claims. (1.40)
4. Mitsotakis has secretly discussed the partition of Macedonia ... (1.53)	4. Because Macedonia has large Muslim minorities ... (1.105)
5. Papaconstantinou denies this charge (1.56)	
6. Greece has extra leverage these days on both sides of the Atlantic. (1.76)	
7. In the U.S. it [Greece] has the additional help of the powerful Greek-American lobby. (1.78)	
8. Mitsotakis is working ... to reach a rapprochement with Turkey. (1.81)	
9. Greece is blockading fuel shipments to Macedonia. (1.97)	

active rather than passive, that the agent do something rather than being acted upon or having something happen to him/her. Moreover, "we impute agency only where it makes sense to ask whether the agent acted intentionally" (Davidson, 1967: 94) and when this intentionality can be tied to a person. Another condition we want to impose is that there be an affected participant, as well as an event related to the affected participant; the logical structure of this event would be represented in an existentially quantified form.

On closer examination we find that three out of the four sentences in group A, (2, 3, 9), are not only transactive, but also describe actions which are more or less violent ('deepening and widening the war' (1. 6), 'object[ing] to the name' (1. 26), 'exercis[ing] a veto' (1. 27), 'blockading fuel shipments' (1. 98)). Not only that, but also in all these structures the affected participant is 'Macedonia' whereas, of course, the perpetrator, the agent, is Greece.

Furthermore, in A(1) the way the transactive model combines with the aspectual system of the language is very cleverly exploited by the author. The meaning read off from this specific structure is that 'Greece', placed in the agentive role, has the potential or choice of enforcing an action, and is actually enforcing it (progressive aspect, continuity) on the world; in addition, the affected participant role slot is

filled with 'the world'. Thus, the author's choice of linguistic means in this case constructs a 'reality' in which a country, Greece, imposes of its own accord a certain action ('is reminding') on the world. A mental process verb is used in the transactive model to denote verbal and physical rather than mental actions. What is paradoxical in this configuration, though, is that the aspectual modification (progressive aspect) requires for both participant roles to be filled with noun phrases having the feature [+human]. Right at the beginning of the article, Greece is personified for the second time.¹⁷ A different choice of words might have been: *The world is* (or: *We are*) *reminded that Greece, too, is a Balkan country*; in this rendering, the intention attributed to Greece to inflict on the world the action of reminding would be blotted out. A(1) is a typical example of an event or a process of one type (a mental process) that is presented in the linguistic structure of another (an action).

On the other hand, none of the four structures in B is transactive. What is more, their syntactic pattern, NP+VP+O, is indicative of 'action' only on the surface, because, in all four instances, 'Macedonia' did not initiate any action in spite of the nominal 'Macedonia' being in the agentive role; 'Macedonia' is a pseudo-agent. In B(1) and B(2) the semantic content annuls the implications of the transitive structure. In B(1), it was not 'Macedonia' that had, or did not have a choice. Instead, the semantic content points to a state of affairs, or to something that just happened to Macedonia. *There was no choice for or Macedonia was given no choice* would have expressed that state of affairs better.

The same comment holds for B(2). The syntax is pseudo-agentive: 'Macedonia' is a pseudo-agent, because the real agent are the entities that subjected it to testing, and controlled the results. 'Macedonia' was in effect an object of, or an affected participant in, the action.

B(4), in another pseudo-agentive syntactic pattern, contains a descriptive sentence. *Because there are large Muslim minorities in Macedonia ...* would have exactly the same truth value. In actual fact, this is a relational structure of attributive possession. The verb in B(3) denotes a mental process and as such its subject position must be filled with a [+human] NP. The metaphor used serves to pre-emptively exonerate 'Macedonia' from being potentially implicated in instigating the 'tragedy' (l. 117).

Exploiting the agentive position in the first three structures of B, the author succeeds in enhancing 'Macedonia's' image for his readers. In particular, the personified 'Macedonia' is credited in B(3) for 'disavowing' any [territorial] claims, as is in B(2) for 'passing the test', another metaphor with equally exalting effects.

In sharp contrast to this, all the non-transactive structures in A, with the exception of (8), portray Greece either as implicated in a conspiracy against 'Macedonia', (4), or as involved in a criminal act, (5), or as the powerful party in the ongoing conflict (6, 7).¹⁸ The only exception is A(8), in which the Greek Prime Minister is portrayed as trying to work for a reconciliation, however not with 'Macedonia', but with

¹⁷ The first instance of the metaphor occurs in the title in which it is ultimately Greece that is characterized as 'silly', an attribute entailing the feature [+human].

¹⁸ A(6,7) can be characterized as an attributive possessive, attributing power to Greece.

Turkey, an issue that is outside the concerns of the article. A(8)'s only function could be said to be that of a friendly gesture directed towards Greece, in an effort to put the more critical reader at ease.

As far as A(4) is concerned (which is not a transactive, as we have noted), on closer examination, its transitive structure barely conceals a transactional content. This is so because the object of the secret discussions concerns a transactive act in which Greece will have a share as an agent, whereas 'Macedonia' will be in the affected participant role. This meaning is generated by the nominal 'partition' which (through nominalization) derives from a transactive verb. "Nominalization", write Fowler and Kress (1979: 39) "is a transformation which reduces a whole clause to its nucleus, the verb, and turns that into a noun."

In Tables 2 and 3, the same groups of structures, as presented in Table 1, will be reproduced together with the findings in the form of annotations.

Table 2

A. Greece	Annotations to A structures
1. Greece is reminding the world that it too is a Balkan country ... (1.1)	1. <u>transactive</u> , agent: Greece, affected: the world, type of act: enforcing an act, ephasizing intentional act, de-emphasizing mental process, impact on Greece's image: negative
2. ... Greek P.M. C. Mitsotakis is well on his way to deepening and widening the war there. (1.5)	2. <u>transactive</u> , agent: Greece, affected: 'Macedonia', type of act: violent act, impact: negative
3. Because Greece objects to the name and exercised a veto in the councils of the E.C. (1.25)	3. <u>transactive</u> , agent: Greece, affected: 'Macedonia', type of act: violent, enforcing views (impact of act felt twice due to conjoined structure), impact on Greece's image: negative
4. Mitsotakis has secretly discussed the partition of Macedonia ... (1.53)	4. <u>deferred transactive</u> , agent: Greece, affected: 'Macedonia', type of act: conspiracy, threat to 'Macedonia', partition, impact: negative
5. Papaconstantinou denies this charge (1.56)	5. <u>transitive</u> , subject position: Greece, type of act: denial of accusation, impact on Greece's image: negative
6. Greece has extra leverage these days on both sides of the Atlantic. (1.76)	6. <u>transitive</u> , subject position: Greece, type of act: connotes power in Greece's favour, Greece as beneficiary (affected) of Great Powers impact on Greece's image: negative in context
7. In the U.S. it [Greece] has the additional help of the powerful Greek-American lobby. (1.78)	7. <u>transitive</u> , subject position: Greece, type of act: connotes power in Greece's favour, Greece as beneficiary (affected) of a powerful lobby impact on Greece's image: negative in context.

Table 2 (Continued)

A. Greece	Annotations to A structures
8. Mitsotakis is working ... to reach a rapprochement with Turkey. (1.81)	8. <u>actional</u> (is working), <u>transitive</u> (to reach a rapprochement), <i>agent</i> : Greece, <i>affected</i> : (positively) Turkey, <i>type of act</i> : reconciliatory but with Turkey, <i>impact on Greece's image</i> : positive but irrelevant to the issue at hand
9. Greece is blockading fuel shipments to Macedonia. (1.97)	9. <u>transactional</u> , <i>agent</i> : Greece, <i>affected</i> : 'Macedonia', <i>type of act</i> : violent, <i>impact on Greece's image</i> : negative

Table 3

B. 'Macedonia'	Annotations to B structures
1. Macedonia had no choice ... (1.9)	1. <u>transitive</u> , <i>subject position</i> : 'Macedonia', <i>type of act</i> : denotes state (predicament)/something that happened to it, deprivation of 'freedom of choice' <i>affected</i> : 'Macedonia' <i>impact on 'Macedonia's' image</i> : positive (sympathy with 'Macedonia's' predicament)
2. Macedonia passed the test. (1.14)	2. <u>transitive</u> , <i>subject position</i> : 'Macedonia', <i>type of act</i> : denotes something that happened to 'Macedonia', commends 'Macedonia', pseudo-action, <i>affected</i> : 'Macedonia' <i>impact on 'Macedonia's' image</i> : positive (praiseworthy 'act')
3. Never mind that Macedonia's constitution explicitly disavows any such claims. (1.40)	3. <u>transitive</u> , <i>subject position</i> : 'Macedonia', <i>type of act</i> : mental process/declarative speech act, <i>impact on 'Macedonia's' image</i> : positive (commendable act)
4. Because Macedonia has large Muslim minorities ... (1.105)	4. Descriptive statement (relational attributive possessive) <i>impact on 'Macedonia's' image</i> : neutral


4.2.3. Object position

As should be clear by now, the transactive structures identified above predominantly name 'Macedonia' as their object. That is to say, 'Macedonia' and related noun phrases occupy the affected participant role in structures in which the agent role is filled by noun phrases designating Greece or related entities: in nominals ('strangulation', 'partition'), and transactives in which the E.C. is the agent ('The Community stiff-armed Macedonia', l. 24).

‘Greece’ is encountered in object position only in one instance, as the object of ‘pitting ... against’, as shown in the extract reproduced below:

“*Economic strangulation* will soon lead to *social unrest*, which in turn could ignite an *ethnic conflagration* worse than the one in Bosnia. Because Macedonia has large Muslim minorities, *civil war* within that republic is more likely than anywhere else to escalate into a *religious and regional war* that could end up *pitting Greece against* any number of its neighbors, including Turkey” (ll. 103–110; our emphasis).

However, the agent role of this transactive gerund (‘pitting against’) is occupied by the word ‘war’ in two instances (‘civil war’, ‘religious and regional war’), and the ultimate responsibility for the prospective war is laid by the author, quite squarely, on Greece’s shoulders; more specifically, as was noted above, the instigator of this chain of catastrophes is the underlying subject-agent of the grammatical metaphor ‘economic strangulation’ (l. 103), and this agent is no other than ‘Greece’, as is diagrammatically shown below:



From this diagram, it becomes clear that, according to the author of the article, the ultimate agent of ‘pitting Greece against ... Turkey’ is Greece itself; this understanding tallies with the author’s implication that ‘foolish pride’ is a Greek characteristic (last line).

4.2.4. Passivization

A cursory look at the passive constructions of the text will readily reveal that ‘Greece’ and related nouns do not occur as the grammatical subjects of any passive structures. On the other hand, ‘Macedonia’ and related nominals do not only abound in object position of transactive structures, but are also encountered as grammatical subjects of passive constructions, as in

“it [‘Macedonia’] would have been swallowed up by Serbia” (ll. 10–11)

“if we [‘Macedonians’] can be bullied into changing our name ...” (ll. 67–68).

‘Macedonia’ is, moreover, found in subject position in active structures whose semantic content, nevertheless, places ‘Macedonia’ in a passive role, as in

“we [‘Macedonians’] are afraid ...” (l. 67)

“we [‘Macedonians’] will next come under pressure to change our borders” (ll. 68–69).

All these structures contribute to intensifying the connotations of helplessness and passivity the author wants to attach to his representation of ‘Macedonia’s’ reality.

4.2.5. *Relational model*

Relational structures establish relations between nouns or nouns and attributes (Kress and Hodge, 1979) and thus are at the basis of the classificatory system of a language. In our case, the relational structures found in the article under discussion underpin the author’s negative attitude to Greece’s version of reality: there is no paucity of attributive relational constructions qualifying Greece and related entities in the most uncharitable way, as shown primarily by the title of the article and the contents of the magazine (Appendix B)

“Greece’s defense seems just silly” (title)

“AMERICA ABROAD: The Greeks’ preposterous posturing” (contents, Appendix B)

“The Greek position is so preposterous” (l. 48)

“They [the P.M. and the Greek minister] are not guilty of irredentism” (l. 114)

“[they are guilty] of paranoia and myopia” (l. 116)

while, on the other hand,

“Miljevski is right” (l. 71).¹⁹

Avoiding the disputes on the nature of metaphor, we may conclude that in our case, metaphor is evinced at the level of the grammatical structures. By metaphorizing Greece and ‘Macedonia’ into consistent roles, grammatical structures (a cumulative set) – each structure lending weight to the next – seem to have a cumulative effect on the construction of the mythic thematic metaphor, as well.

¹⁹ It is noteworthy, however, that in our attempt to categorize the equative structures of the text into two groups, ‘Greece’ and ‘Macedonia’, we found ourselves at a loss in which of the two groups to classify the occurrence of the name ‘Macedonia’ in the following clauses: ‘Macedonia is the birthplace of Alexander the Great and the name of Greece’s northern province’ (l. 28). Our difficulty was due, not to lack of knowledge of Greek history and geography, but to the author’s performative nomination (Lyons, 1977: 218; Austin, 1962) of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as ‘Macedonia’, which was effected in the preceding three occurrences of the name ‘Macedonia’. In all these cases, the referential range of the name is delimited within the territory and jurisdiction of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia: ‘Macedonia had no choice’ (l. 9), ‘Macedonia passed the test’ (l. 14), ‘The Community stiff-armed Macedonia’ (l. 23). Similarly, the appositional phrase ‘another great Macedonian’ (ll. 117–118), used to characterize Aristotle, a Greek philosopher, is another instance of performatively obfuscating historical facts, leaving the reader completely mystified as to whether the philosopher was at all connected with Greece. It should be remembered in this connection that the most widely accepted view in philosophical semantics is that names have reference but not sense. This performative nomination is not only aided, but in effect inaugurated by the accompanying map (see section 6).

5. Pragmatic level

5.1. Modality

The view of modality taken in critical linguistics and adopted here for the purposes of our analysis is much broader than what is understood by the term in philosophical semantics. Modality in logic can be said to be the degree or kind of truth that is attached to the proposition. In a broader pragmatic perspective, modality is seen in terms of linguistic features that reflect the attitude of the speaker or writer towards what s/he says and towards his/her interlocutor. As we do not have the space here to examine all the modal markers of our text, and the resulting textual changes and the ideology they incorporate, we will concentrate on one or two instances only.

Let us consider, for example, the verb ‘seems’ in the title of the article: *Greece’s defense seems just silly*. As we said above, in our analysis of the title, the whole proposition expressed by this statement is reducible to *Greece [is] silly*. We said that ‘seems’ occupies the place of the copula in an attributive relational clause. So why has this particular verb been chosen instead of that copula (‘is’), which would make the value judgment stronger and hence more consonant with the author’s presumed perception of reality (*Greece’s defense is just silly*)?

As is well known, our western culture has, on the one hand, a long tradition of mistrusting value-judgments, as they are considered to reflect personal opinion and views and are therefore regarded as unverifiable statements or pseudo-statements (as e.g. the positivist tradition);²⁰ on the other hand, a dignified bias towards verifiable statements has always been favoured. A major preoccupation of good reporting is to provide what is called an *unbiased* representation of the facts (see note 5). Consequently, the predominant view in news reporting seems to be that value-judgments should not find their way into reports; if they do, as in editorials, for instance, they are supposed to be sufficiently documented and appeal to our cognitive faculties.

However, value-judgments are often disguised rather than substantiated. The choice of ‘seems’ is one such instance. By choosing the verb ‘seems’ and attaching it to the predicate ‘silly’, the author achieves the desired effect of ‘legitimizing’ his subjective evaluation; that is to say, he camouflages his value-judgment as a conclusion, arrived at by gleaning information from observed, supposedly ‘raw’, facts. Therefore, the author appears as an *interpreter* of external events and not as a judge of values.

The distancing effect of ‘seems’ is a way of attempting to control the reader’s perception of what is read. The same effect is obtained by means of another lexical choice, viz. ‘thinks’, in the excerpt below:

²⁰ Ayer (1974 [1936]: 142) writes: “If now I generalise my previous statement and say, ‘Stealing money is wrong’, I produce a sentence which has no factual meaning – that is, expresses no proposition which can be either true or false. It is as if I had written ‘Stealing money!!’ – where the shape and thickness of the exclamation marks show, by a suitable convention, that a special sort of moral disapproval is the feeling which is being expressed.”

"But the Community stiff-armed Macedonia. Why? Because Greece objects to the name and exercised a veto in the councils of the E.C. Macedonia is the birthplace of Alexander the Great and the name of Greece's northern province. Therefore Athens *thinks* it has a 2,400-year-old trademark on the word." (ll. 23–33; our emphasis)

Greece's argument for its version of reality is not given until the last line of the excerpt above (l. 33), and even then the reporting verb is not '[Athens] argues' or '[Athens] says', both of which would refer to Greece's version of reality (Geis, 1987), but instead, the author chooses a distancing verb like 'thinks', thereby only offering the complement clause as Greece's opinion, not as a simple, undiluted fact; the author thus manages to offer the argument as some individual's personal proposition, one not shared by anybody else (cf. such propositions as: *He thinks he is a genius, He thinks he is Napoleon, They think they possess the truth*).

Moreover, the word 'therefore' – which typically introduces the conclusion in a syllogism – makes this sequence of statements appear to be structured like a logical argument, in which the premises could be said to be the statements preceding the conclusion:²¹

Macedonia is the birthplace of Alexander the Great.
Macedonia is the name of Greece's northern province.

Therefore, Athens thinks it has a 2,400-year-old trademark on the word.

The irony of the concluding statement is drastic, and it is clearly brought about by the author's use of the word 'thinks'. He thus manages to kill two birds with one stone, viz., by choosing 'thinks' with its expressive modal meaning. Moreover, the referential ambiguity (as noted in note 19) of the name 'Macedonia' is also manipulative in constructing the text's ideological complexes as is the author's use of quotation marks to cite specific words only (viz. 'adopt a Greek name', 'provocation', 'implies territorial claims against us', ll. 37–38) used by the Greek Foreign Minister, thus explicitly distancing himself from what is reported.

Another feature worth noting is the prevalence of the present tense, especially in the progressive form, in structures in which the agent is 'Greece'. Fowler and Kress (1979: 207) note that this "is not a modally neutral form: it is one term among others in this system [of modality], if anything a particularly powerful term which signals certainty, unquestionableness, continuity, universality." Indeed, the modality of 'Greece is reminding the world that it too is a Balkan country' (ll. 1–2) intensifies the continuity of the act, as does the progressive aspect in 'Greece is blockading fuel shipments to Macedonia' (ll. 97–98); in both cases we are dealing with actions that are negatively valued.

The present progressive is likewise used to portray the effects of Greece's ill-doings: 'crops are rotting in the fields' (l. 99); 'ambulances are sitting useless in hospital parking lots' (ll. 100–101), and so on.

²¹ For a discussion of this function of connectives (logical dummies) see Kitis (1995).

Quite clearly, then, modality is an ideological determinant of texts, or more accurately, of discourse, and as such it lends itself to being exploited in the construction of a political ideology.

5.2. *Textual/intertextual rhetoric*

As a written sample of a news report, the text is expected to be governed predominantly by certain principles of textual rhetoric, which deal with the construction of texts and the organization of sentences and their interpretations (Prideaux, 1991).

The author, however, has recurrent recourse to devices or features of interpersonal rhetoric, too.²² At line 40, for example, the descriptive style of the paragraph is transformed into an argumentative one, as a concatenation of descriptive statements (ll. 45–47) is quantified into a factive expression (Kiparsky and Kiparsky, 1971), ‘never mind that’, with all concomitant presuppositional properties spilling over onto the resulting factive complement:

“Never mind that Macedonia’s constitution explicitly disavows any such claim. Or that its army consists of about 6,000 ragtag troops armed with pistols and rifles, while Greece’s is more than 25 times larger and is equipped with tanks, heavy artillery and jet fighters. Or that there is neither precedent nor justification in international law for one country to tell another what it can call itself.”

The argumentative effect is achieved by borrowing a feature of interpersonal rhetoric, the expression ‘never mind that’, which not only echoes the casual style of conversational use of language, but is moreover slightly tinged by irony;²³ this feature of interpersonal rhetoric (irony) (Leech, 1983), in our case, spans over a factive complement whose propositional content is presupposed, and as such it is assumed to have been asserted before.

Such presuppositional aspects alert the reader to the existence of an already-consumed or read text, to another discourse previous to the present one, to an intertext, which may or may not be locatable. This strategy points to a conscious manipulation of the circular memory of reading (Barthes, 1975).

We see how these rhetorical devices are employed at the interpersonal level as unobtrusive vehicles for conveying an argument at the level of ‘the unsaid’, the level of the underlying coherence of the text. Such devices aid in transforming the discourse into a seductive crypto-argumentation, thus contributing to the overall construction of the text’s ideology.

Furthermore, it is well known that the borders between authorial and reported speech, far from being clear at all times, may fuse into one another. So when the reader is exposed to the author’s report of a reply by Papaconstantinou (the Greek minister) as ‘Papaconstantinou denies this charge “categorically”’ (l. 56), the reader does not know whether the words ‘denies’ and ‘charge’ echo the voice of the Greek

²² Cf. Prideaux (1991: 117): “In one sense ... the textual rhetoric does have an interpersonal aspect as well.”

²³ Cf. the view of ironical statements as echoic mentions (Sperber and Wilson, 1981).

minister or that of his interviewer, and whether their respective voices are muffled and/or infiltrated by authorial commentary.

A parallel case is that of the author's reporting of the 'Macedonian' politician Miljevski's speech at line 66. However, in this case, instead of dissecting the speech into various parts with unclear boundaries, the author 'charitably' (Geis, 1987) attempts to maintain the integrity and authenticity of the politician's words by using hard-edged boundaries (that is, explicit boundary markers) at the beginning and at the end of the speech "to demarcate the reported speech as clearly as possible, to screen it from penetration by the author's intonations, and to condense and enhance its individual linguistic characteristics" (Vološinov, 1973: 119).

Moreover, the authorial *introductory* commentary, viz. the author's commentary introducing Miljevski's speech, characterizes it in its entirety as 'a persuasive rebuttal' (l. 66); the author thus manages both to preserve the autonomy and cohesiveness of Miljevski's utterances, thereby maintaining the minister's illustrative encapsulation of the thematic metaphor of the text (ll. 66–69), and at the same time to indicate his [the author's] favourable disposition towards the reported speech:

"... – Jane Miljevski, a minister in the Macedonian government – offers a persuasive rebuttal: 'As citizens of a newborn, almost defenseless nation, we are afraid that if we can be bullied into changing our name, we will next come under pressure to change our borders.'" (ll. 64–69)

On the other hand, exactly the opposite strategy, called "texture analysing" (Vološinov, 1973), is followed in reporting the Greek minister's speech (ll. 36–39). Papaconstantinou's speech is dissected, its texture analyzed, and individual words, such as 'provocation', or isolated sections, such as 'adopt a Greek name', 'implies territorial claims against us', are placed in quotation marks. This seems to be done not because the author wishes to emphasize the distinction between his own (the authorial) and the actual speaker's voice, but rather because he wishes to set off these sections of the reported speech, to isolate them in order to make them appear 'strange' or 'particular' by the use of so-called 'scare quotes' (Vološinov, 1973). However, at the same time, far from dissociating himself objectively from what is reported, the author attempts to smuggle in shadings of his own subjective attitude, of 'irony', 'disapproval', and so on (cf. Vološinov, 1973: 131):²⁴

"He [The Greek Foreign Minister] maintains that for Macedonia to 'adopt a Greek name' is a 'provocation' that 'implies territorial claims against us.'" (ll. 36–39)

All this shows that quotation marks can be used as a rhetorical device, that allows an author not just to narrate (i.e., to accurately report within the narrative structure of the text), but to suit a further hidden agenda: viz. to transform narrative into a crypto-argument, since the authorial evaluation is not offered as an aside – clearly marked as such by narrative structure – but instead is purposefully *incorporated* in the structure of the text itself at various levels, thus transforming its narrative structure into an argumentative one.

²⁴ For a purely linguistic point of view, see Weizman (1984).

The rhetorical question, as a feature of social intercourse (Vološinov, 1973) and a device of interpersonal rhetoric, entails the modification of written texts in the direction of dialogue. This feature, too, is employed in the text to help implement the necessary structural transformations at various points. At line 19, there begins a short narrative of the history of how 'Macedonia' was 'stiff-armed' by the E.C. This narrative is interrupted (l. 25) by an interposed question, 'Why?', which not so much echoes the author's voice, as it does that of the reader, who is allowed to step into the discourse at this juncture to voice his/her incomprehension of the original cause of a series of linked events in the narrative. Moreover, since this technique at the same time voices the author's identical, presumed incomprehension, both author and reader exhibit overlapping solidarities in comprehending (or not comprehending) an historical and political situation.

A rhetorical question is also posed at line 110: 'Where will the overriding interests of the U.S., the E.C. and NATO be then?', as the final element of a speech act predicting an imminent catastrophe.

In this case, the rhetorical question is used to foreground the voices of the interested parties (the U.S. and its allies); the author is merging his own voice with the latter's rather than with the reader's. Moreover, although the author and the other parties seem to merge in the act of asking the question, the answer, which is not given (at the level of 'the said'), but is left pending (at the level of 'the unsaid'), is characterized by the same double voicing that allows for the emergence of contradictory views and values in an argumentative, dialogic style.²⁵

Double voicing occurs also in the negative proposition 'they're not guilty of irredentism' (l. 114), as it is generally acknowledged in philosophical semantics that "a negation is just a second order affirmation" (Austin, 1970a: 128).

Moreover, the presupposed status of the proposition couched in the *because*-clause of line 48 ('Partly because the Greek position is so preposterous') is based on certain intertextual relations in that it invokes echoes from another discourse, in which the truth of the proposition is taken for granted. With respect to this, we also want to underline the presuppositional aspects of *implicative* structures (Karttunen, 1971): a proposition such as 'most Western officials acknowledge that Miljevski is right' (ll. 70–71) contributes to the stylistic transformation of discourse by invoking an intertextual relationship.

6. Iconosemiotic level

6.1. *Iconic features as rhetorical devices*

Iconography is part of the rhetoric of texts since icons (or, in general, pictorial representations) play a part in the construction of significance and ideology.²⁶

²⁵ Rhetorical questions are a device of argumentative writing (Nash, 1989: 76).

²⁶ For meaning and significance construction derived from a configuration of both textual and iconic cues, see Kitis (1997).

The article is visually dominated by two elements: its title and a colour map of 'Macedonia' and the surrounding countries, occupying the centre of the page.

If propositional meanings can be said to 'paint a picture' and if "a picture is a model of reality" (Wittgenstein, 1921: 2.12), then the same holds for icons. As picture-like signs, icons have a certain modality-value built into them (Hodge and Kress, 1988), i.e., their message is directly perceived and so they effectively promote persuasion.

Apart from such persuasive content features as quotations (ll. 37–39, ll. 56–69) and eyewitness reports ('I had a chance to ask him ...') (l. 35; cf. Van Dijk, 1988) that are used to enhance the truthfulness and plausibility of the report, the most effective and persuasive content feature employed in this article is the map mentioned above; as such, it is the text's most forceful rhetorical feature.

The seductive persuasion of the map lies in its clever exploitation of features such as typeface and colour: the name 'Macedonia' appears twice, once indicating FYROM, in bold typeface (**MACEDONIA**) as do all the names of the countries surrounding Former Yugoslavia, and once, in much lighter typeface (*MACEDONIA*), designating the northern province of Greece. As to colours, the area of FYROM is yellow and that of Greece is green, whereas Macedonia, Greece's northern province, is a shade more akin to the yellow of FYROM than to the green of Greece; in contrast, all the other provinces of former Yugoslavia exhibit the colour of the country they are part of. This map, together with repeated references to FYROM as 'Macedonia' – a name that had not been officially recognized at the time of our article's going into print (September 1997) – is in effect an act of performative nomination articulating a specific ideology. Besides (without going into details), we may affirm that the semiotic function of the colours themselves is very forceful, indeed. For all these reasons, we consider this map to be the most seductively persuasive ideological content feature employed in the article, and as such fulfilling a crypto-argumentative function.

7. Conclusion

Our analysis has revealed the existence of a pervasive dominant metaphor portraying Greece and 'Macedonia' as being involved in a two-party conflict, in which Greece is depicted as the powerful, violent adversary, while, on the other hand, 'Macedonia' is represented as a defenseless victim of an aggression, orchestrated by Greece under the auspices of the E.C. This metaphor is constructed step by step and sustained throughout the text of the article, not only by lexical choice, but also by semantic and syntactic structures, as 'Greece' is overwhelmingly the agent in trans-active structures denoting violent physical acts, and is therefore metaphorically attributed agentive power, whereas 'Macedonia' is predominantly metaphorized as an affected, passivized, participant, whose role, in the syntactic as well as in the semantic structures of the article, is that of an object.

If meaning and significance are constructed, not extracted, so is ideology. In this paper we have argued that a multi-level critical analysis is able to reveal the

construction of a dominant metaphor as a higher-level organizational feature. This metaphor draws for its construction upon structures and relations at the semantic and syntactic level, gradually but consistently building up a coherent argument of a certain ideological configuration.

We claimed that it was precisely the implicit construction of the metaphor that acts as a catalyst for transforming a configuration of descriptive-narrative structures into a crypto-argumentative one. This construction, furthermore, proceeds in parallel to representing a certain version of reality.

Also, in section 1.3. we noted that a text is an act of communication characterized by directionality, i.e., it has a source and a target. We noted, too, that a written text has a certain autonomy inasmuch as it has an existence of its own. In other words, in written texts the act of saying is subordinated to the meaning of not only what is said, a phenomenon that Ricoeur calls the ‘intentional exteriorization’ of the speech-act, but also to the meaning of what is not said.

Although the perlocutionary act as such is considered to be non-discursive, we maintain that it is the *intended* perlocutionary effect of specific illocutionary acts in news discourse that, in effect, linguistically shapes news reports. A critical interpretation of the language of a news report thus involves considering the connection between the overall meaning of the text and the perlocutionary intention of its author, which in turn involves bridging the gap between the text and its conditions of production (political, social, ideological) (Thompson, 1984; Fairclough, 1989, 1992).

Taking into account the conditions of production of a text involves not only considering the linguistic cues identified here, but also relative positions and relations of power that determine the production of a text. Such structures are not always linguistically encoded, but a comprehensive critical examination of texts at all levels of construction, focusing on higher-level organizational features and their overall coherence, can yield important indications in this direction, and will help clarify how social relations are structured and constituted by that discourse. For instance, it is of paramount significance to consider the positions assigned in the text to the authorial agency, on the one hand, and to the positions assigned to other agencies (E.C.), on the other, especially as regards the relationships between the two. A critical analysis should not gloss over the connection between linguistic choices such as the ones identified above, and concrete references to agencies of power, such as metonymically represented by ‘Washington’. Thus, Washington is portrayed as the axis around which the world (and primarily Europe) revolves, and to which ‘several European governments ... relay ... reports’ (l. 51). The particular political ideology that the authorial agency of the article intends to project is a (fantasy?) version of reality, in which the ultimate judge delivering verdicts world-wide is, and has to be, not just ‘Washington’, but subsidiarily its representatives to which it delegates its power:

“Having heard *out* the Greek Foreign Minister, I’m prepared to give him and Mitsotakis the benefit of the doubt on their motivation; they’re not guilty of irredentism ... but merely of paranoia and myopia.” (ll. 112–116; our emphasis)

Ideology, being inextricably linked with domination (Thompson, 1984), does not so much contribute to shaping discourse as it does to reproducing and perpetuating social and political structures and power relations in political contexts and in society in general. It is very often through text that "power is installed, exerted, enacted, legitimized, motivated, defended, excused, and therefore reproduced structurally and historically", as Van Dijk (1987: 18) writes. Therefore, Fairclough is quite right in pointing out that there is a dialectic between structures and practices, that "discourse has effects upon social structures, as well as being determined by them, and [that it] so contributes to social continuity and social change" (1989: 17).

The ideology of a text, being an inextricable and irreducible part of its world, seeps through readers in a process of *appropriation*. Ricoeur understands *appropriation* as an act of *dispossession* "through which one may relinquish a prior self and deepen one's understanding of oneself and other's by virtue of the meaning inscribed in the text" (Thompson, 1984: 183).

What is there to be gained, then, from a critical linguistic textual interpretation? It certainly is not an exercise in linguistics as is not a linguistic analysis of a literary text either (Cf. Kitis and Mehler, forthcoming, for a discussion). The purpose of a critical linguistic analysis of a text is to unravel hidden meanings in its lexical, semantic, and syntactic structures as these gradually mediate its global meaning, and to see how these meanings help construct its ideological content, so that ultimately this content is not only grasped, but also conquered; as Fairclough (1989: 1) says, "consciousness is the first step towards emancipation". In one word, the contribution a critical linguistic analysis wants to make is to check (in the double meaning of 'to control' and 'to keep down') acts of *appropriation* (in Ricoeur's sense).

However, to take us from 'the word to the society' our analysis must primarily focus on higher-level organizational features, as well as on issues belonging to the level of its overall coherence. This involves analyzing also what is not linguistically encoded, since ideology is primarily generated at the level of the assumptions underpinning the coherence of the text.

The results obtained from our multi-level critical analysis of one particular article do of course not allow us to claim that we have shown how "in the vicissitudes of the word are to be found the vicissitudes of the society of word users", to use Vološinov's words. But, besides refuting, both qualitatively and quantitatively, the claims of objectivity in news reporting often made by journalists and the media, our results show that a close critical reading of a text, utilizing a wide spectrum of discourse analytical tools and concepts, can make significant headway towards capturing social 'realities' and the ideological and political effects of discourse.

Our study shows that a close consideration of the 'word' and its underpinnings can identify the kind of social practices that have contributed to their formation. Its major contribution, however, is seen as the claim that the discourse of news reporting can (and will) utilize (at the conscious or subconscious level) whatever linguistic, rhetorical, textual, and subtextual means and methods are available to construct an implicit evaluative stance, and to develop an implicit, but consistent argumentation. By transforming a configuration of descriptive and narrative structures into a covert

argumentative structure, journalists can claim to respect the principles and values of news reporting, such as ‘objectivity’ and ‘reporting mere facts’, while at the same time constructing ideological contexts, social ‘realities’, and ‘practices’ at will.

Admittedly, the findings from only one study are not adequate to substantiate this claim, and further critical analyses of news discourse will have to show that covert argumentative structure (what we have called ‘crypto-argumentative’ structure) is a common characteristic of news reporting, where the arguments are often constructed not only in terms of the text and its underlying assumptions, but also in terms of intertextuality, as defined by Kristeva (‘Word, dialogue and novel’; 1986).

In other words, news reporting, just like any other text, enacts an intertextual paradigm. Such an intertextuality (Kristeva, 1986), heteroglossia or dialogism (Bakhtin, 1981), need not be overtly manifest. It can, as in the present case, be kept under cover, through the interpellation of individuals as subjects of ‘their’ discourses by ideological formations represented in language (Althusser, 1971), through activating other contexts and discourses, and by mythologizing, that is, by myth formations.

In this study, we have analyzed a case of the construction of a dominant global metaphor, which, we claimed, formed the backbone of the main argument of our target article. This metaphor, however, can only be fleshed out in complicity with the obliging reader, whose active involvement is required not only in the construction of meaning and significance, but also in the intertextual process of activating other texts and discourses (mythological or otherwise) which are part of his/her background knowledge in constructing the appropriate myth(s), such as that of ‘the strong vs. the weak’, of ‘David vs. Goliath’, of ‘Tom vs. Jerry’. It is interesting to note that the gradual construction of a metaphor can be utilized to transform a neutral narrative style into a crypto-argumentative one by invoking intertextual representations of parallel, paradigmatic myths.

It is these intertextual relations, the analogy between the constructed metaphor and its conventional fiction, that provide empirical evidence for the prediction of a certain ‘atmosphere’ and for the emotional, discursive involvement of at least part of the readership, thus creating a fertile soil in which certain ideological contexts may be subtly developed in the construction of the text.

One may claim that in certain types of discourse an argument need not always be grounded on reasoning and logic, but on the use of myths or ‘mythography’. As the Greek saying goes ‘if you want to persuade take your myth with you’. After all, the parables of Christ, through their use of allegory in preaching, were essentially argumentative in nature, and could only superficially be called narratives. His narratives were thus “convenient adjuncts to persuasion” (Nash, 1989: 92).

8. Epilogue

We would like to end our analysis on a deconstructive note. In his conclusion, the author likens the ‘Macedonian’ situation to what happens in Classical tragedy, where ‘foolish pride’, the state or quality that brings about the ancient *húbris*, is attributed to Greece. But this *húbris*, is a quality attributed to mortals, in their stance

of challenging the gods. But who are the mortals, and who are the gods in this case?²⁷ ‘Macedonia’ has been portrayed as the affected, powerless, acted upon party in this transaction, whereas Greece has been presented as the dominant, powerful, potent, acting party. But if Greece is possessed by *húbris*, whom or what is it turning, or sinning, against? Who are the powerful gods? Could it be the institutionally legitimated hegemony that produces and endorses texts such as the present one, and the ideologies underpinning them? Thus, the text deconstructs itself in its conclusion: Greece is ultimately envisaged as committing *húbris* against some gods that are unidentified but identifiable through a critical discourse analysis.

²⁷ We owe this observation to Jina Politi.

Appendix A

America Abroad/Strobe Talbott

Greece's Defense Seems Just Silly

GREECE IS REMINDING THE WORLD THAT IT TOO IS A Balkan country, the inhabitant of a region where history often induces hysteria. In his policy toward the disaster zone that used to be Yugoslavia, Greek Prime Minister Constantine Mitsotakis is well on his way to deepening and widening the war there.

When Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina declared independence and appealed for international recognition last year, Macedonia had no choice but to follow suit. Otherwise it would have been swallowed up by Serbia.

A commission of the European Community established criteria for recognition, stressing respect for the rights of ethnic minorities. Macedonia passed the test. Its population is a mixture of nearly a dozen nationalities, but its political system is democratic and pluralistic.

The E.C. was quick to recognize the other breakaway republics, including Croatia, whose regime discriminates against local Serbs. But the Community stiff-armed Macedonia. Why? Because Greece objects to the name and exercised a veto in the councils of the E.C. Macedonia is the birthplace of Alexander the Great and the name of Greece's northern province. Therefore Athens thinks it has a 2,400-year-old trademark on the word.

Last week the Greek Foreign Minister Michalis Papaconstantinou was in Washington, and I had a chance to ask him about this whole business. He maintains that for Macedonia to "adopt a Greek name" is a "provocation" that "implies territorial claims against us."

Never mind that Macedonia's constitution explicitly disavows any such claim. Or that its army consists of about 6,000 ragtag troops armed with pistols and rifles, while Greece's is more than 25 times larger and is equipped with tanks, heavy artillery and jet fighters. Or that there is neither precedent nor justification in international law for one country to tell another what it can call itself.

Partly because the Greek position is so preposterous, the suspicion persists that the complaint about the name camouflages a revival of Greece's own age-old expansionistic ambitions. Several European governments have relayed to Washington reports that Mitsotakis has secretly discussed the partition of Macedonia with Serbia and perhaps with Albania and Bulgaria as well.

Papaconstantinou denies this charge "categorical-

ly: I have never seen any document or heard anything of this sort. We want them [the Macedonians] to exist [as a separate state]; we want them as a buffer zone" between Greece and Serbia. "The authorities in Skopje [the Macedonian capital] can change their name to anything except Macedonia," and that will remove "a point of friction in the Balkans."

Another recent visitor to Washington—Jane Miljovski, a minister in the Macedonian government—offers a persuasive rebuttal: "As citizens of a newborn, almost defenseless nation, we are afraid that if we can be bullied into changing our name, we will next come under pressure to change our borders."

Privately, most Western officials acknowledge that Miljovski is right. Yet publicly the E.C. and the U.S. have, in effect, sided with Athens on the ground that there are other, overriding interests at stake.

As a member of NATO, which is undergoing a post-cold war identity crisis, and the E.C., which is trying to keep the Maastricht treaty from unraveling, Greece has extra leverage these days on both sides of the Atlantic. In the U.S. it has the additional help of the powerful Greek-American lobby.

To his credit, Mitsotakis is working to resolve the long-simmering dispute over Cyprus and reach a rapprochement with Turkey. He keeps hinting that if he budges on the Macedonian question, extreme nationalists in the Greek Parliament—where he has only a two-vote majority—will bring down his government and replace it with one that will undo his welcome diplomatic initiatives.

Meanwhile, under the pretext of complying with international sanctions against Serbia, Greece is blockading fuel shipments to Macedonia. As a result, factories there have had to shut down; crops are rotting in the fields; ambulances are sitting useless in hospital parking lots. "It's murder without bullets," says Miljovski.

Economic strangulation will soon lead to social unrest, which in turn could ignite an ethnic conflagration worse than the one in Bosnia. Because Macedonia has large Muslim minorities, civil war within that republic is more likely than anywhere else to escalate into a religious and regional war that could end up pitting Greece against any number of its neighbors, including Turkey. Where will the overriding interests of the U.S., the E.C. and NATO be then?

Having heard out the Greek Foreign Minister, I'm prepared to give him and Mitsotakis the benefit of the doubt on their motivation: they're not guilty of irredentism—a desire to recover lands lost long ago—but merely of paranoia and myopia. The situation has all the makings of tragedy, which Aristotle, another great Macedonian who was Alexander's teacher, defined as the result not of wickedness but of foolish pride. ■



Appendix B

TIME

ON THE COVER: PEROT'S RE-ENTRY TO THE RACE FOR THE WHITE HOUSE


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Collor ousted



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mania in Romania



ASIA: A neighborly
visit to Beijing



U.S.: A month before the election the
economic indicators flash yellow



SOCIETY: Mighty
Maradona returns

18 COVER: Three-Ring Circus
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Shock Treatment: Perot's budget proposal wins raves for its brutal honesty, but many economists fear the timing is wrong

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