JOURNAL OF
ANTHROPOLOGICAL RESEARCH

(Formerly Southwestern Journal of Anthropology)

VOLUME 42 • NUMBER 2 • SUMMER • 1986

METAPHOR AND BELIEF

Andras Sandor

Department of German and Russian, Howard University, Washington, D.C. 20059

Given statements can be metaphoric or literal according to a person's beliefs. Statements mean what they mean in terms of some world. One person's or culture's metaphor may be another person's or culture's metonymy, or indeed another person's or culture's literal truth. Anthropologists often try, as do people in general, to make metaphoric sense of statements which seem to make no sense literally. It may be more useful in such cases, however, to try to construe a world which allows a literal reading. The view that language is fundamentally metaphoric, and that truth can only be expressed metaphorically, is a recent one and is based on a certain view of the world. Seeing metaphors everywhere means assimilating other worlds to a particular world: it is ethnocentric and works against understanding strange worlds. Tribal societies are not 'poetic'; their creativity consists in producing a world different from other (tribal) worlds, not in transfiguring an objectively given reality.

WE HAVE METAPHORS BECAUSE language allows it and experience warrants it. Language allows sentences like "Achilles is a lion" or "This apple tree is a nightingale"; and experience warrants it because, for instance, we can feel one thing in terms of another. Such a blending of things, that is, of images, is common experience in dreams, and dreams do not occur in sleep only.

What language allows and experience warrants, of course, is not 'metaphor'; it is identification or predication. We speak of metaphor when we think or feel that an identification or predication in question cannot be literal, direct, because it is contrary to our experience and/or logic; when we are struck by some deviation from customary usage of words or visual presentations.

But what is customary or proper to one person, or one culture, may not be so to others. Belief is an essential ingredient, or context, of all identifications and predications; it needs to be considered whenever one is inclined to notice and speak of metaphors. For the very same verbal form (or visual presentation) may constitute a direct or a metaphorical predication according to one's beliefs.[1]

This is the chief contention to be argued here. It needs to be argued because the urge to see 'metaphors' is both ethnocentric and comparatively recent.

Recent, that is, in regard to an assumed cognitive or expressive-communicative role of metaphors; and ethnocentric insofar as it assimilates other peoples' 'facts' to our idea of 'meaningful fiction'.

The issue I am dealing with seems to run against the basic hypothesis of Lakoff and Johnson (1980) that ordinary language is inconceivable without metaphors, a metaphoric structure; that people regularly speak and think of one thing in terms of another, and, possibly, this is how they experience the world. Keesing (1985) has recently applied this hypothesis to anthropology with the critical intention that anthropologists should not take other peoples' metaphors for literal statement and should not produce from them fanciful and exotic metaphysical systems.

Keesing's point is well taken. But I am dealing here with the opposite problem, with anthropologists' taking literal statements for metaphorical ones because that is the only way that they can make sense of them. The urge to see metaphors everywhere hinders us from understanding what other people think and how they do it. We universalize in the name of metaphor, forcing our own way of thinking, our logic, on others. A few examples will make the point clear.

The Moche of the north coast of Peru (A.D. 100–800) depicted on their pottery mythical beings, presumably ancestors (Hocquenghem 1977a, 1977b), who are a composite of man and hummingbird. They also depicted hummingbirds next to figures of runners. If we think that hummingbirds signified some complex quality the Moche cherished and, in particular, attributed to runners, the relationship between Moche and hummingbird will be metaphorical to our thinking. But if we learn that the Moche presumably ate hummingbirds, as the custom still survives elsewhere in the Andes, in order to acquire the complex quality particular to hummingbirds, and that they believed that this could be done, the relation between Moche (or Moche runner) and hummingbird will have to be construed as direct—causal or contiguous—not metaphorical. What is a metaphor for us was a direct predication for them (Hocquenghem and Sandor 1982).

Another example, similar but much better documented, is the apparent identification between the Kwakiutl and the salmon. Walens (1981:105) writes that "salmon are considered to be people who live in houses like humans do, in villages at the bottom of the sea in the west." They wear masks, "transforming their outward form from human to piscine," as humans also do (1981:59): "If they put on salmon masks, they will look like all other fish when they travel to the land of salmon." Walens adds that "masks are the metaphors of altered self. . . . To the Kwakiutl masks are living beings whose powers are literally those of life and death, for masks take people from one world and move them to another. . . . The salmon dons a mask because he wants to die."

Now Walens's use of the term 'metaphor' is problematic. For if the identification between Kwakiutl and salmon is as direct, as literal, as Walens claims, the Kwakiutl produce no metaphors when they identify with salmon, a kind of fish which they catch for food. Walens (1981:18) does emphasize that "for the

Kwakiutl metaphors express not merely likeness, not merely similes, but equivalences, and that the central importance of transformation in Kwakiutl ontology is a statement, not of how one thing is like another (and therefore not the same as the other), but of how one thing is another, of how it becomes another thing by being eaten by it." But he forgets that metaphors always express equivalences, the point being that some equivalences, i.e., identifications, are considered metaphoric because they cannot be accepted as literally true, as direct predication.

Walens's mistake is quite common among anthropologists, as well as among literary critics and art historians. When Walens suggests that the Kwakiutl see an equivalence between "salmon" and "humans," he ignores the fact that the equivalence could only have existed between 'salmon' and 'Kwakiutl'. As soon as we introduce the (abstract) term 'human', we will indeed be forced to construe the relationship as metaphorical. For when and where the concept of 'man' (anthropos) emerges, apparent equations like the one made by the Kwakiutl disappear.

For us, who do not believe that the Kwakiutl and the salmon are a single breed, the relationship between some humans and salmon, as believed by the Kwakiutl, is metaphoric. For the Kwakiutl, however, it is direct; they do not mean to say anything extraordinary. To use Searle's terminology (Searle 1979:93), sentence meaning and speaker's utterance meaning coincide for them. Kwakiutl speakers making that statement "deviate" from other tribes, their meaning is not deviant within their own.

A third example for the role of belief in predications which usually are considered metaphoric is taken from Beardsley, who developed the "controversion theory" of metaphor: "it is a logical absurdity of statements in poems that give them meaning on the second level" (Beardsley 1958:138). "To call a man a 'fox' is indirectly self-contradictory because men are by definition bipeds and foxes quadrupeds, and it is logically impossible to be both" (Beardsley 1958:141). This can be countered by referring to lycanthropy, the belief that a human can turn into an animal (Harner 1973:140–45). The belief in werewolves may be a logical absurdity for me and yet a reality for others. "Man is a wolf" is not nonsensical for everybody, at least not in the restricted form that "some men are wolves." Moreover, it is necessary to differentiate between nonsense and illogic. For whereas I can call somebody's belief nonsensical I cannot call it "logically impossible."

So stated, the issue of metaphor and belief leads to four interconnected claims. First, whether certain predications are to be taken directly or metaphorically depends on the beliefs of those who make them. Second, what appears (to me) a metaphor may be direct predication (for others). Third, that even the strangest beliefs may be quite thoughtful, even 'logical'. And finally, that no metaphor occurs where none is recognized. Metaphors need reflected consciousness in order to emerge; there is no such thing as an unconscious metaphor. Accordingly, we should not interpret predications metaphorically unless we have good reason to assume that they were meant that way. If we

know that they were meant to be direct predications, we should try to make sense of them in such terms.

CLARIFICATION OF THE TERM 'METAPHOR'

The term 'metaphor' is used here in the sense of practical and, therefore, active metaphors, especially predicational metaphors. So conceived, metaphors occur at the level of discourse, not at the level of the sign. Their context is semantic, not semiotic. This needs to be explained, however briefly, since the word 'metaphor' can be used in a number of other ways, although its specific sense, the sense which no other word can designate, happens to be the one here used.

The word itself is always used for designating some transfer of meaning. The differences in its use result from the different ways in which the scope and the nature of the transfer have been conceived. I want to distinguish here four major trends. This classification, while not arbitrary, is not meant to be complete; it has been made for the sole purpose of separating off 'metaphor' in the sense of metaphoric predication from all other major uses of the word.

In its broadest sense, 'metaphor' means transfer of meaning in general. Since it has been proposed that meaning in language is never direct, 'metaphor' has been called the basic principle of language or communication in general (e.g., Gadamer 1972:406). This is a philosophical view; I call it pan-metaphorization.

The second major trend may be called the transfer view of metaphor. In this view, words have their more or less fixed meaning, but they can receive some other meaning in any given instance of communication. As Bateson (1972:230) has put it, in communication "anything can stand for anything else." He has called the result of such a transfer "transform" as well as "metaphor" (Bateson 1972:271f., 421f.). The transfer view is based on the idea of substitution; a word is used in the sense of some other word. But this substitution need not be marked nor does it need to be motivated in the sense that the two designations imply one another in some way. In any secret or idiosyncratic code, sane or insane, there may be no motivation, i.e., internal relation, between habitual meaning and substituted meaning.

The third trend in the use of the word 'metaphor' assigns it an even narrower scope. The word means 'trope' or 'figure',[2] comprising all the traditional tropes, such as metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche, and irony. I call this the generic view of metaphor in contradistinction, above all, to the fourth major trend which I shall call the specific view. This is the narrowest major meaning of the word; it designates only one of the tropes (or figures). I have been using the word here in this sense only.

The confusion that 'metaphor' can designate both a genus and one of its species was introduced by Aristotle. People sharing the generic or the specific view of metaphor have, therefore, equal right to refer to him. One of the results has been that, in English, 'figurative' and 'metaphoric' have come to be used synonymously. Accordingly, 'metaphoric' is an ambiguous designation.

Controversies among people who share the specific (i.e., the narrowest) view of metaphor have been abundant. In fact, discussions carried out and published in recent years, as a rule, concern themselves with 'metaphor' in this fourth sense only. The reason for this is that the concept of specific metaphor, of metaphor as a species, is not easy to define.

Three distinct spheres of disagreement have emerged. Some hold that metaphors are identifications, not comparisons, whereas others maintain that there is no fundamental difference between metaphors and comparisons (Ortony 1979:191). The second sphere of disagreement concerns the operation performed in the production of metaphors. Some speak of substitution (of one term for another), others of interaction (between two terms), and yet again others, being interested in speech-act theory, consider the conflict between the substitution and the interaction views spurious. The latter are only interested in the deviational aspect of the process, in how it is that people say one thing and not only mean another, but also are understood to mean another. According to such a pragmatic view, the distinction between generic and specific metaphor, too, is of no significance.

The third and final sphere of disagreement concerns reflected consciousness, the question whether it matters that a metaphor is or is not noticed. Distinction is made between 'dead' and 'live' metaphors. 'Dead' metaphors, such as the 'leg' of the table, are not noticed any more; they have turned routine, in fact, lexical. No deviation is felt, no metaphor 'emerges'. Some people, for instance the interactionalists, are not interested in 'dead' metaphors at all, whereas others ignore the distinction. I am going to refer to it as that between active and inactive metaphors.

A special issue concerns catachresis, the use of a word (lexeme) to designate a meaning other than its conventional one because there is no word for it in the language. A good example is the unbiological use of 'conceive' to mean 'understand' or 'think'. Some consider catachresis a kind of metaphor—Blumenberg has spoken of "absolute metaphor" (Blumenberg 1960) to designate words which sound metaphoric but cannot be replaced by any literal expression—while others consider it a separate trope. It could be argued that the pan-metaphoric view is based on ignoring the difference not only between active and inactive metaphors, but also between metaphor and catachresis.

If we consider the controversies within the fourth trend of 'metaphor' use, we can notice a dichotomy which is of particular interest in the present context. Metaphors can be nominal and predicational, i.e., in the form of "(Achilles) the lion" or else "Achilles is a lion." The difference matters because there is a kind of asymmetry among the tropes (or figures) in this respect. Synecdoche, metonymy, and catachresis can only be nominal, whereas metaphor and irony can also be predicational. If we simplify matters by considering irony a special kind of metaphor—in which the transfer of meaning is always to the opposite—metaphoric predication, being a predication, can only be 'metaphoric' in the sense of specific metaphor and, within it, only in terms of the interactionalists.

We can also notice that only nominal metaphors can become inactive ('dead').

For a predicational metaphor, like "Achilles is a lion," will turn into a direct predication as soon as the metaphoric deviation is no longer felt. What is true of active tropes in general is especially true of metaphoric predications: meaning is not merely transferred in them, it is also meant to be noticed as transferred. It must emerge.

The interaction view of metaphor, as put forward by Max Black (Black 1962, 1979), is cognitive in its orientation. Substitutional metaphors, it is claimed, are merely ornamental, they offer no new information (since the suggested meaning could be directly expressed), whereas interactional metaphors are innovative, creative.[3] They can offer insight inaccessible from any other source. Metaphors are the vortex of some meaning which cannot be (conceptually) defined, i.e., reified. The novel meaning can only emerge according to certain stipulations, since it must be noticed as novel. Black proposed at first that the new meaning emerged against a background of "associated commonplaces." Later, under criticism, he called the background a "complex of implications."

The earlier of Black's formulations is more effective[4] because even if it is true that a maker of metaphors may invent a background as well (i.e., he may introduce a complex of implications which are not commonplace), the complex itself must be traceable to underlying beliefs, to notions commonly shared in society, if, in interaction with some term, it is to generate a metaphor.

It follows from this short sketch that the metaphors considered here in their relation to belief are those of the interactionalists, and that they are considered here according to the distinction established in speech-act theory by Searle between sentence meaning and speaker's utterance meaning. For I am only interested here in predications which have a single verbal form (or visual form) and yet can be equally understood, and interpreted, as direct or metaphoric. It is only in this case that interpreters will conceive of given predications as metaphoric whenever they do not share, and probably do not even understand, the content of the beliefs which make the predications meaningful as direct predications.

The fact that the speaker's deviant utterance meaning must emerge in metaphoric predications helps to point out the trouble with the use of the word 'metaphor' in the first three major trends. For the pan-metaphoric view, 'metaphors' cannot be noticed during regular discourse. For the transfer view, they need not be noticed. And for the generic view, often they are no longer noticed, and the distinction between active and inactive metaphors (i.e., tropes or figures) need not be considered as a result (Richards 1965:101, 121).

A consequence of ignoring the distinction between active and inactive metaphors, and between tropes (or figures) in general, has been that rhetorical terms have come to be used for naming logical operations. The various tropes (i.e., the various species of generic metaphor) could be differentiated from one another by identifying each with a special logical operation: metaphor with similarity, metonymy with contiguity, synecdoche with part-and-whole relation. This is a dubious practice. For tropes in general, when active, are expressive of similarity, contiguity, etc., as established by some marked deviation, not of

mere similarity, contiguity, etc. Logical operations, as such, are not figurative; and figures or tropes are not logical operations but deviations employing certain techniques which can be identified in logical terms.

People cannot be stopped, of course, from using the word 'metaphor' in the various ways mentioned. But maybe they can be made a little more aware of the fact that if metaphors active in discourse are called 'metaphor', and this is how everybody calls them, it is at least confusing to use the same word for designating other concepts.

It is equally confusing to merge two or more concepts, to use the word in terms of more than one of the major trends, as, for instance, Roman Jakobson has done (Jakobson 1971). Jakobson's influence has been great, and not without reason. He offered conceptual tools which greatly simplified matters and yet could also be used in a sophisticated way. But these tools, whatever their merit otherwise, are wanting when one deals with practical metaphors, especially metaphoric predications. Since Jakobson's views are well known, I want to review them in brief in order to show why they are not helpful in dealing with practical metaphors.

Jakobson's "metaphor" belongs in part to the fourth trend, metaphor as a species, but in part also to the first trend, pan-metaphorization, and sometimes, or to some extent, to the second trend, metaphor in the sense of transfer within communication. This is confusing and not on account of my typology.

Jakobson identifies what he calls "metaphor" with the paradigmatic axis of language, the selection of words, hence substitution; in binary opposition to metonymy, identified with the syntagmatic axis along which the words are sequentially ordered. Jakobson's "metonymy" includes synecdoche, for he associates it with contiguity, causality, and part-and-whole relation; whereas his "metaphor" is associated with similarity via substitution. The former expresses external relations, the latter, internal relations (Jakobson 1971:238). Insofar as his "metaphor" is conceived in terms of the species view, it is clearly substitutional, not interactional, as Ricoeur (1979:144f.) has pointed out. And it also clearly contradicts the speech-actional view of metaphor: the selection of words is not meant as deviation, nor is it so noticed.

Jakobson's "metaphor," in other words, is an idiosyncratic fusion of specific metaphor with a universal principle of language. This universal principle coincides with another universal principle in Jakobson's view. He emphasizes that language can only appear on both axes at the same time. But he mentions a possible predominance of either axis over the other one. The predominance of the metaphoric/paradigmatic axis he associates with poetry and the "poetic function" of language; the predominance of the metonymic/syntagmatic axis, with science and the referential function of language. The respective predominance of either axis is expressive not only of pathological disturbances but also of trends, such as French *symbolisme* in poetry versus literary realism in prose.

This theory, which has been adopted at times also by Lévi-Strauss (1966:204f.),[5] is problematic on three counts in the context of metaphors active in discourse,

and in regard to the relation between metaphor and belief. First, the substitutions on the paradigmatic axis—whether a person selects, of all the available expressions, "hut" or "shed"—are not metaphors in the specific sense in which Jakobson uses the word. Metaphors suggest similarity or identity by means of deviation; they cannot be equated with the similarity relation of logics. (Comparisons and identities, to repeat, can be both literal and metaphoric.) This weighs much more than the fact that Jakobson uses the substitutional concept of (specific) metaphor, although this is enough of a problem by itself.

Secondly, Jakobson's concept of metaphor does not allow for metaphoric predications. His theory never leaves the semiotic level of the linguistic sign, whereas metaphoric predication can only come about at the semantic level of discourse. The distinction between the two levels, as established by Benveniste, need not be discussed here. It only should be emphasized that the smallest semiotic unit is the linguistic sign; the smallest semantic unit is the word, a linguistic sign as used in discourse (Benveniste 1979, vol. 2:224f.). The entire discourse may be considered a semiotic sign, but parts of the discourse are semantic units. Metaphors active in discourse are, of course, semantic, i.e., words used in a special way; and predications, too, are semantic: they can only occur at the level of discourse.

Finally, Jakobson's scheme does not allow any differentiation between literal meaning and metaphoric (or figurative) meaning at any level. For him, everything is figurative by name—i.e., "metaphoric" or "metonymic"—and nothing is figurative in fact. (He subscribes to the transfer view of metaphor in the generic sense of the word.) His scheme shares the defect of Neumann's cybernetic scheme of analogue and digital computers and mental processes. Computers cannot produce metaphoric or ironic operations, for these require (the) self-reflexivity (of subjects in concrete situations).[6]

This brief summary of the uses of the word 'metaphor' should stop at this point. Practical metaphors, especially if predicational, need to be noticed; they need to be registered as metaphors. This is their logical as well as pragmatic status; this is how they should be considered. There is good reason in general to consider only active metaphors as practical metaphors, and when we come to metaphoric predications we have no choice; they need to be active, for an inactive metaphoric predication will appear as a direct one: it will be taken literally.

COMPARISONS AND CONNECTIONS

We notice a metaphor when literal meaning makes no sense and we are forced by our beliefs to make sense in some other way. Our beliefs force us in this case in two ways: not to accept literal meaning and not to accept absurdity or inanity. If we encounter the apparent identification "Kwakiutl is salmon," we are forced to take it metaphorically because we believe that Kwakiutl = human, human ≠ salmon; yet at the same time we know that the Kwakiutl expressed something that they found meaningful, indeed that they believed in

it. It was a literal identification for them, a metaphorical one for us. It has to be metaphorical for us because it was an identification.

But what if it was not an identification; if it only looks like one? We encounter here the problematic nature of 'is'. This word may express identity ("Barbarossa is Frederic I"), membership in a class ("Barbarossa is a legendary hero"), entailment ("To sleep is to dream"), existence ("God is") (Langer 1967:56). Accordingly, the predication "Kwakiutl is salmon" need not be an identification just because it sounds so. Using the symbols "=" for identity and "ε" for membership in class, the predication may mean:

1. Kwakiutl = salmon
2. Kwakiutl ε salmon (Kwakiutl is a species of salmon)
3. Kwakiutl ε salmon (salmon is a species of Kwakiutl)
4. Kwakiutl = salmon . . . ? (Kwakiutl and salmon are members of the same class, or parts of the same whole)

The last variant points to a whole which is not named, and of which Kwakiutl and salmon are equally parts. We may also explain this last variant with Leibniz's "reciprocal proposition."

In his *New Essays,* Leibniz (1981:486) writes that the relationship between container and contained is "different from that of whole and part, for the whole is always greater than the part, but the container and the contained are sometimes equal, as happens with reciprocal propositions." Kwakiutl and salmon, too, may be reciprocal propositions, without any name and concept for the space of being in which this reciprocity occurs.

A well-known example of a whole which has no name, and which in fact does not exist, although it does seem to have parts, is that of Lepidoptera, an order of insects including the butterflies and moths. The four stages form a whole, or at least they are contiguous with one another and even are causally related to one another. The 'animal' has no name; there is in fact no animal but only animals; and our usual, but by no means exclusive (think of silk), interest in the butterfly—as the showy and sexually mature stage in the sequence—cannot lead us out of our embarrassment that the caterpillar is no butterfly; and yet it is, in a manner of speaking (and not metaphorically), a form of the butterfly, or of the animal of which the butterfly is another form and which itself has no discrete form, just as 'human being' has none. This is a trivial example but an ancient one: the existential enigma, as fresh today as in the earliest of archaic times (Crocker 1977:181).

Empirical observation cannot help in the case of Lepidoptera. We may even generalize and say that empirical observation always needs the help of controlled mental spontaneity, especially when a gap needs to be bridged between discontinuous entities which in all appearances do belong together but we cannot say how. The gap can only be bridged by belief or else must be left unbridged. Science, working at the conceptual level, has not really bridged it.

Aristotle says in his *Organon* that there is no 'master' without a 'slave', and that one should mark the particular relation whenever one speaks of relatives, such as 'master' and 'slave'. If there is a name available, we will find it easy

to mark it, but if there is none, he says, it will be necessary to produce one. Relatives require each other reciprocally; they are, as a rule, given by nature simultaneously (Aristotle 1973:55).

Science did produce a name, 'Lepidoptera'; but ordinary language can only speak of 'butterflies' and 'moths', of one stage of the animal. The caterpillar seems to be an independent animal, and even if we know that it is not,[7] we will find it difficult to ignore its independence. True, we cannot say that "the caterpillar is the butterfly," but we feel ill at ease what to say about the caterpillar as long as we maintain that the animal in question is a butterfly. The reciprocal relation between caterpillar and butterfly has no name.

The situation with the Kwakiutl is different, but only if we look at it from the outside, i.e., *not* from the vantage point of the caterpillar or the butterfly. For a caterpillar could in fact say that it is the butterfly, and conversely, as long as it feels equal. Whether the caterpillar would be satisfied with such an equation/identification or believed that it was in fact part of a whole, of a relation which it could not 'see' and name, is, of course, difficult to say, short of knowing caterpillar language. But it is equally difficult to say anything equivalent in regard to the Kwakiutl or, for that matter, to Aristotle. (Is 'bondage' an adequate name for the relation between 'master' and 'slave'? Did Hegel offer a good one in his *Phenomenology of Mind?)* And 'Lepidoptera' has not entered ordinary language.

What is at issue is not merely the impossibility of getting rid of discontinuities in certain cases and the need to acknowledge them (or to lie about them). Equally important is the indeterminacy of the nature of the relation which has been established by acknowledging, or accepting, some discontinuity.

If we are aware of the semantic polysemy of the verbal form "Kwakiutl is salmon," we better not start out by considering it an identification.[8] Maybe it is better to start out with the concept of relation. This is what Leibniz did:

> I take relation to be more general than comparison. Relations divide into those of *comparison* and those of *concurrence.* The former concern *agreement* and *disagreement* (using these terms in the narrower sense), and includes resemblance, equality, inequality, etc. The latter involve some *connection,* such as that of cause and effect, whole and parts, position and order, etc. (Leibniz 1981:142)

Thinking of Leibniz's division of relations into comparisons and connections, we can see that one of the readings of "Kwakiutl is salmon" is 'comparison'; the other possible readings are some kind of 'connection'. We do not have to credit the Kwakiutl with identifying themselves with salmon, which is nonsensical for us if taken literally. We can credit them with establishing an undifferentiated connection which may be faulty as far as we are concerned but not nonsensical.

The similarities—i.e., that salmon live in villages on the river bed—may well follow from 'connections' which are in part contiguous and in part causal, and

not just 'external' but 'internal' as well. The genus-species relation is semantic; the part-whole relation is factual in nature (Levin 1977:103). The stages of Lepidoptera indeed are factually related to one another, and so are salmon and man. But factual wholes do not result from sheer empirical observation, and reciprocal relations may remain inexpressible because they can only be known, not seen. The Kwakiutl live on salmon. They are, therefore, relative to salmon. This is a matter of thought. Accordingly, it is logical in Aristotle's sense to think that the salmon, too, are dependent on the Kwakiutl, and the Kwakiutl in fact were quite logical when they expressed a relation between two relatives, salmon and themselves.

But whether or not the Kwakiutl were logical, not merely thoughtful, we only are logical if we realize that a predication like "Kwakiutl is salmon" may just as well be a connection as a comparison, and, in either case, it may be metaphorical as well as direct. According to one's beliefs and momentary intentions, the very same verbal form may mediate a literal or a metaphoric meaning, and it may be the expression of quite different mental or logical operations.

REFLEXIVITY AND METAPHOR

The first task of an interpreter is to bear in mind that the same verbal form may carry a literal or a metaphoric predication. 'Verbal form', not 'predication', since a predication is already literal or metaphorical.

Recognition of this circumstance, and the use of the expression 'verbal form', leads us to a certain modification of Searle's distinction between sentence meaning and speaker's utterance meaning. The distinction is valid in the sense that a person in fact says one thing and means another. Searle's example is: "Sally is a block of ice" (Searle 1979:97). The person who says this presumably does not name a block of ice (i.e., he is not explaining with this sentence that the 'Sally' in question is a particular block of ice) although he could be doing just that. The verbal form, by itself, is quite neutral even to sentence meaning.

Searle does not consider this. He does not discuss the circumstance that the speaker's utterance meaning is always actively present, indicated by special signs or the absence of signs. In the case of literal predications, the absence of signs, too, may indicate that the speaker means what he says (he may be pretending, of course). The verbal forms are registered and decoded as sentences in terms of imputed utterance meanings. In the case of metaphoric predications, the utterance meaning is twofold: it establishes a literal sentence meaning and a metaphoric sentence meaning, for the metaphoric one could not be noticed if it could not be held against a literal one. The metaphoric meaning emerges not just against the background of associated commonplaces, but also against a literal meaning which makes no sense in the context of the associated commonplaces. (The metaphoric meaningmakes very good sense in the very same context.)

It may be said, of course, that Searle wrote on the assumption that the

verbal form conveys the sentence meaning automatically; that the sole function of the speaker's utterance meaning is to deviate from the meaning which is automatically (as if objectively) attached to the verbal form.[9] The question is, however, whether one can deviate without establishing that from which one deviates. There is good reason to deny this, to say that transgressions confirm laws, even if they do not affirm them, and that the same is true of deviations of all kinds. Those who are unaware of laws and conventions will also be unaware of committing transgressions or deviations. Awareness of deviation includes awareness of convention. In the present context, awareness of metaphoric meaning includes awareness of literal meaning, and literal meaning is based on associated commonplaces and underlying beliefs.

If it is true that metaphors cannot be consistently interpreted in zero context (Fraser 1979:181), the same is true of direct predications. "Achilles is a lion" will be a metaphoric comparison (i.e., a metaphoric identification) when uttered as Aristotle had it in mind. But if we state that Achilles belongs to a clan which claims descent from a lion, the predication will be direct, not metaphoric (and it will be, perhaps, a connection, not a comparison, i.e., not an identification). Achilles can only be a lion metaphorically if he cannot be a lion literally. The predication can only have a metaphoric meaning if it is known not to make sense literally. What is at issue here is reflexivity, the kind of reflexivity required for producing and noticing practical metaphors, especially metaphoric predications.

Linguists and philosophers of language as a rule take it for granted that (active) metaphors need to be noticed. They do not concern themselves with inactive metaphors, and this is understandable, since they are interested in how metaphors work and what they can achieve within language. Anthropologists and critics are interested in other things—usually in information or behavior allegedly mediated by metaphors—and they very frequently write on two major assumptions: that metaphors can be produced by the unconscious and that metaphors can be so called even when they are inactive, i.e., that they exist whether or not people know that 'this is metaphor' ('this is figurative').

To my mind it is an unproductive contradiction to say that metaphors can be generated in the unconscious or that they can be produced unreflectingly. But arguing this point with any rigor would take up a study by itself, and, strictly speaking, it does not need to be argued here. It is sufficient to realize that the claim advanced here earlier in fact was two claims and that they need not be tied together. I proposed, on the one hand, that metaphoric predications cannot be produced and noticed unconsciously and, on the other, that predications should not be conceived as metaphoric whenever *it is acknowledged* that they were not intended and not understood as metaphoric. This second one is the stronger claim, and it is much easier to argue.

If certain people need no metaphoric transfer to make sense of their own predications, we should not take refuge in such a transfer, at least not initially. We will not be able to notice another person's facts, and to understand his meaning, as long as we turn his direct predications into metaphoric ones.

The weaker claim matters, however, whenever it is proposed that given predications are metaphoric even if the people who produced them were unaware of it. For it is necessary in this case to point out that metaphor, like irony, cannot come about unless it is reflected upon.

Reflection matters, especially in predicational metaphors, because the mind must say "no," at least in effect, to any literal interpretation of the content (to Searle's "sentence meaning") in addition to saying "yes" to the "speaker's utterance meaning," and this "yes" will be based on that "no," or mediated by that "no." Such an explanation may sound cumbersome, but whoever doubts that metaphors need to be registered should ask himself whether he would really understand "Achilles is a lion" in terms of totemistic beliefs.

It is the very nature of practical metaphors that they generate meaning by pointing beyond the literal. If literal predications require reflexivity, metaphoric ones require it twice over, and metaphors work the better the more the gap between the two reflections allows thought to break into the open or to reverberate between the "no" and the "yes."

Double reflexivity is mandatory for all active metaphors. Jakobson's scheme does not even consider it; this is why it is inadequate whenever we deal with active metaphors. His "metaphor v. metonymy" could be related to Leibniz's "comparison v. connection"; indeed it may have been derived from it originally. We could say, therefore, that a given relation is 'metaphoric' or 'metonymic' according to one's beliefs. It even sounds aphoristically neat to say that one culture's metaphor is another's metonym; that belief sees metonyms where lack of belief sees metaphors. But we should not say this. For active metaphors suggest, not simple similarity, but similarity (or identity) by means of deviation. If similarity implies discontinuity, metaphoric discontinuity implies discontinuity twice over, and we should not ignore this duplicity; it is related to the reflective nature of all active metaphors. Comparisons themselves need reflection, but metaphoric comparisons need reflection of similarity mediated by a reflection of dissimilarity.

Comparisons can be literal, such as "encyclopaedias are like dictionaries" (Ortony 1979:191; Fraser 1979:177); the person making them can believe in the reality of the relation in question. It is belief that determines what is and what is not a literal statement about reality; what reality is and what it is not.

Differently, but in a similar vein, metaphors can be true; that is, statements can be metaphorically true or metaphorically false, just as they can be literally true or false (Lyons 1981:214). "Sally is a block of ice" is metaphorically true if Sally is very unemotional, etc.; it is metaphorically false if Sally is a very responsive and emotional person.

Now, 'metaphorically true' means 'not literally true', and this in turn means 'suggesting acts without naming them directly'. Literal predications, whether comparative or connective, can establish facts, whereas metaphoric predications can only suggest them by establishing meaning. "Sally is a block of ice" certainly is a meaningful sentence, and it suggests some fact about Sally by being meaningful. A metaphor, in other words, may do more than establish fiction, even when it does not establish facts. If Sally is the name of a particular

block of ice, fondly so named, the literal predication "Sally is a block of ice establishes either the name of that block of ice or what the bearer of that name is.

Metaphoric predications can be true, but only if they are known to be metaphoric, i.e., if it is believed that the predications in question are not literally true. This is why the issue of metaphor and belief matters. To regard other people's direct predications, including their myths, as metaphorical means that one does not believe in the facts of the manifest content (i.e., of the narrative level) and yet would like to give the predications meaning, *and meaning only,* by making use of the manifest content. To think of metaphors means to rescue the belief in meaning, not the belief in things.

To put it in Kantian terms, myths believed to be true are constitutive of reality; metaphors are regulative and can only stand in for constituting reality when people believe that the human mind neither can receive objectively constituted objects and processes nor is able to have powers constitutive of reality. In this limiting case, widespread nowadays, the need to believe in some reality fosters an attempt to transcend the distinction between the constitutive and the regulative powers of the human mind, a mind which, after all, constituted that distinction in order to regulate itself. The need to believe leads to metaphors. But in other cultures—and in our own past as well as in many of our present subcultures, indeed in everyday life—the need to believe does not lead to merely transcendental solutions, for the mind has produced there no transcendental distinctions. The need to believe leads straight to beliefs which constitute things by regulating them at the same time.

It is ethnocentric to try to assimilate other cultures, including our own past and our splintered present, to our metaphoric view of the world. And yet it happens, often with the best of intentions. If Shakespeare is our 'contemporary', why not the Bororo or the Kwakiutl?

An interesting mixture of assimilation and refusal of assimilation can be found in Sahlins's book *Historical Metaphors and Mythical Realities.* Analyzing the killing of Captain Cook by Hawaiians in the context of Hawaiian myths, Sahlins shows that Cook was believed to be a god, the god Lomo, who was annually defeated by the god Ku. One of Sahlins's conclusions is: "The incidents of Cook's life and death at Hawaii were in many respects historical metaphors of a mythic reality" (Sahlins 1981:11). The question is, however, why "historical" and why "metaphor"?

Sahlins (1981:14) also says that "Cook's fate was the historical image of a mythical theory" and that "mythical incidents constitute archetypal situations. The experience of celebrated mythical protagonists are re-experienced by the living in analogous circumstances." Bearing these statements in mind, we can see that Sahlins tries to look at Cook's fate from both points of view, European and Hawaiian, at the same time. The events were historical from a European point of view, and it is from the same point of view that they appear metaphorical. For the Hawaiians, the events were mythical, i.e., real and, accordingly, literally true. Sahlins (1981:14) quotes Johansen approvingly: "We find

it quite obvious that when an event has happened, it never returns; but this is exactly what happens." But he does not carry over this conclusion into his own terminology. If he had done it he would have spoken of mythical instances, not of "historical metaphors."

The problem is that Sahlins's intentions are mixed. He tries to express Cook's fate both on Hawaiian terms and on ours because he is interested in the "dialectics of history." He wants to show how history moves across structure, and how structure is displaced by history. His basic point is that "the historical process unfolds as a continuous and reciprocal movement between the practice of the structure and the structure of the practice" (Sahlins 1981:72). It follows from this that Sahlins only tries to explain Cook's fate on Hawaiian terms in order to integrate it with "our" historical terms, and with our problems of how to integrate history and structure, as well as action and meaning, i.e., how to produce changeable structure and meaningful action. These are legitimate preoccupations. What is problematic is the terminology.

For the Hawaiians, Cook's fate was mythic (if Sahlins's interpretation is correct); his appearance and death were but an instance of recurrent events in the (facts of the) world. If the Hawaiians today know that Cook was an Englishman, they would have to adopt some Jungian concept of archetype to explain how he was nevertheless Lomo. But if they adopted it, they would leave behind their own kind of mythic view no less. And when Sahlins explains to us Cook's fate on Hawaiian terms, he is a faithful historian, not a creator of myth. But is he a creator of metaphor?

Only if we collapse Cook's historical and mythic fate into a single entity. In that case Cook was a metaphoric Lomo. We may say that this is indeed what he was; that history played a trick on the Hawaiians. But history is, of course, our trick which we play also on ourselves, just as it is our trick to make sense or poetry out of chance and misunderstanding.

When Sahlins conceives of Cook's fate as metaphoric, he makes both myth and history poetic for us. If he left alone the term 'metaphor', he would be left with facts of myth on the one hand, facts of history on the other, and the gap that divided and connected Englishmen and Hawaiians. He would make it easier for the reader to ask: Did history close that gap? Can poetry really close it?

Myth could close it for the Hawaiians for the simple reason that their myth knew of no Englishmen and no gap. It 'absorbed' both, and on this particular occasion it was slowly undone by the reality attached to them. Cook was no metaphoric Lomo; he was the real one on the one hand and not at all Lomo on the other. To produce integration by means of a metaphor cannot lead to anything but a metaphoric integration, a figurative one, that is; to one that is not real.

This may be a good point to comment on Cristopher J. Crocker's interesting article, "My Brother the Parrot." Crocker discusses a claim similar to that of the Kwakiutl concerning salmon. The Bororo at times identify themselves with macaws. After careful investigation, Crocker concludes that only males tend

to make such an identification, and that they do it in order to express themselves: "In metaphorically identifying themselves with red macaws, then, the Bororo do not seek either to disparage or to adorn themselves; but to express the irony of their masculine condition" (Crocker 1977:192). But Crocker also establishes that there is a totemic relationship between the Bororo and the macaw, since there are spirits who temporarily may dwell in both: "I contend that certain Bororo ritual attitudes towards macaws involve synecdoche, in that various attributes towards macaws are considered aspects of clanship, and vice versa; other Bororo comparisons between men and macaws will be held to rest on more purely syntagmatic contiguities, and reflect metonymy. In these totemic and cosmological terms per se, the conclusion must be that Levy-Bruhl is more correct than Lévi-Strauss" (Crocker 1977:168).

Now it seems to me that the totemic-cosmological identification, which is not metaphorical, is basic; it made the metaphorical identification possible. But even if this cannot be argued, because it cannot be proved, it ought to be clear hat the literal identification is integrative, constitutive, whereas the metaphoric one is expressive and regulative, i.e., figurative. Fact and fiction are two distinct things, however closely related they may be, i.e., however realistic the fiction may turn out to be.

NOVELTY, CREATIVITY, AND THE 'POETIC METAPHOR'

The four interconnected claims mentioned at the outset can now be corrected and expanded. Predications which are known to have been considered direct, i.e., literal, by those who made them should not be considered metaphoric by the interpreter. Verbal (or visual) forms are by themselves indifferent to meaning; predications which sound strange or absurd unless interpreted metaphorically may make good literal sense within the original context of beliefs. Comparisons (i.e., similarities and identities) can be both literal and metaphoric, and so can be connections. But the very same verbal form may be interpreted as predicating either a metaphoric comparison or a literal connection. The difference, in other words, will be also that of different logical operations, not just of different modes of predication (i.e., direct or metaphoric). Finally, metaphoric predications can only suggest meaning or suggest/point towards fact, whereas direct ones may also establish facts, and it is a question of belief whether they do or do not; whether the predication is considered literally true or not.

The last point implies a further one that has been alluded to earlier. Predications which seem poetic, extraordinary, novel, creative to us may be quite ordinary for those who make them. Novelty can be disclosed by direct predications no less than by metaphors, of course. This is a circumstance often ignored, although the world, perhaps, is only truly 'animated' when it is not 'poetic' as distinct from 'prosaic'. When it just is.

Samuel Levin (1979:131) has argued that "poetic metaphors" are the reverse of ordinary metaphors which work on

> the assumption that, given an incompatibility between the utterance and conditions in the world, the conditions are to be taken as fixed, and it is the utterance that must be construed. Now this is not a logically necessary position. We may, if we like, assume that, in the face of an incompatibility between what is asserted in an utterance and conditions as they obtain in the world, we regard the utterance as fixed and construe the world. Instead, that is, of construing the utterance so that it makes sense in the world, we construe the world so as to make sense of the utterance.

He calls this the "phenomenalistic construal" (as opposed to the "linguistic construal") and ties it to the visionary nature of poetry as well as to Coleridge's demand for a "willing suspension of disbelief" (Levin 1979:131ff.).

Levin's theory is quite useful in the present context; it helps clarify the difference between 'poetry' and 'myth'. If we proceed with Levin's phenomenalistic construal, there is no metaphor but some direct predication in an adjusted world (a consequence not noticed by Levin). If we nevertheless *know* that there is a metaphor, we also know that the world cannot be really adjusted that way, i.e., we do not simply "suspend disbelief" but "know that we suspend disbelief." We *believe,* but we also *know* that the belief is not warranted as far as our actual reality is concerned. This is what it means 'to take the world poetically'. But those 'unconscious poets' who produced myths did not take the world 'poetically'; they took it for real, conceiving of it in its actuality.

The idea that true metaphor is poetic—an obvious extension of the interaction view that true metaphor is active—and that poetic metaphor depends on an excessive deviation from common usage, and from the world generally known, has often been expressed. Lyotard, for instance, emphasized (in arguing against Lacan's view of metaphor) that

> in poetic metaphor, the substitution *is not rightfully authorized by usage, it is not* inscribed in the paradigmatic network surrounding the substituted term. . . . When the substitution is authorized, we no longer have a metaphor in Lacan's sense, a figure of style, but only the occasion for a choice between terms which are in a paradigmatic relationship to one another. . . . True metaphor, the trope, begins with an excess in deviation, with the transgression of the field of substitutables as received by usage. . . . A. Breton is right here: 'For me the strongest (surrealist image) is that which presents the most elevated degree of arbitrariness; I do not hide that.' (Lyotard 1971:254–55)

The function of poetic metaphor, as conceived by both Levin and Lyotard, is subversive in regard to ordinary thought, the "associated commonplaces," the 'prosaic' view of the world. The function of Kwakiutl statements about the relation between Kwakiutl and salmon, by contrast, was not meant to be subversive or extraordinary at all.

At least not for the Kwakiutl, and they produced them, after all, for themselves. This last statement is, of course, both true and untrue. Untrue, because the Kwakiutl, whether they knew this or not, made those predications also for other tribes. And for other tribes the predications about the relation between Kwakiutl and salmon could have been both extraordinary and subversive, e.g., a cause for wars (or in the case of anthropologists, for rethinking their own culture). The Kwakiutl must have been ignorant of this, and it is not to their shame if we attribute to them this ignorance. They did not know of the species man, mankind, to which all and only human races and tribes are known to belong. They did not know that whatever they produced for themselves was also produced for others. This ignorance, if anything, held them back from producing metaphors in their predications about themselves and salmon. And acknowledging this ignorance of theirs should hold us back from considering their predications metaphoric. For their ignorance was but the inverse side of their knowledge about the world.

They were 'creative' by 'creating' themselves distinct from other tribes. This was their 'novelty', communally shared and repeated on innumerable occasions both within each generation and from generation to generation. They could only become poetic when they began to lose their ancient beliefs and began to use them subversively against the new ones.

Boas gives an account of a Kwakiutl shaman who informed him about 'the same event' on four different occasions many years apart. The story was progressively 'demythicized'. This incident sheds some light on both the issue of belief and the problem of poetic deviation and novelty.

There is no need to go into details; one brief example will do. The informant originally said that the Killer Whale had come to him. Later he corrected himself and said that a man called Hanyos was a shaman's spy and, in that capacity, his name was Killer Whale. It was this man who had come to him (Boas 1966:122, 124).

Commenting on the last version, Boas says: "In other words, all the supernatural elements, excepting the prophetic dream, have been eliminated." But Boas also adds: "The principal inference to be drawn from these accounts is that notwithstanding the knowledge of fraud, a deep-seated belief in the supernatural power of shamanism persists, even among the sophisticated" (Boas 1966:125).

The question left open by Boas is not that of the fraud; for awareness that the shaman practices fraud does not diminish a person's trust/belief that the shaman has the power to cure him (Lévi-Strauss 1958:205–26). It is the belief in the Killer Whale.

In the first version, "the Killer Whale man appeared again and said, 'Friend Calumniated *(Henak !alaso)* at Fort Rupert is sick. . . .' Then he transformed himself into a Killer Whale, blew once and swam away." Later the informant admitted "that in reality Hanyos had told him that Calumniated was sick" (Boas 1966:122–24). But does this mean that the informant did not believe, even at the first time, that Killer Whales transform themselves into men, and that he

treated a metaphor as direct predication to fool the white man Boas? Moreover, did the informant mean to exploit not merely Boas's assumed credulity but also his own people's beliefs? His own people's onetime beliefs? Or was the fraud embedded in a force field of beliefs, however weak, even on his part?

These questions are left open, even more open than Boas suggests. The reason for this must lie in part with the fact that the four interviews concerning events that had taken place "about 1870 or 1874" (Boas 1966:125) occurred at a time (1900–1925) when the pressure of the surrounding white culture had already been quite disruptive. The informant's knowledge that he himself saw no man transforming himself into a Killer Whale does not mean that he had no belief that such transformations could occur, and certainly not that other members of the tribe had no such beliefs. Possibly, Boas was never in the position to find out how much or how little his informant believed in Killer Whales.[10] The shaman as an informant may have deceived his own people and he may have fooled Boas. But did he speak metaphorically? And was his lie poetic?

The answer must be "no" on both counts. He could only have spoken metaphorically if he believed that, *in a manner of speaking,* the Killer Whale talked to him whenever his spy talked to him. Otherwise he spoke symbolically and did not share the code. And while he did invent an event, he did not invent the mythical figure associated with it. People tend to say, in common parlance, that myths are lies, but this informant lied about certain activities of a mythical figure; the figure itself was not a lie. If he no longer believed in the existence of such a mythical figure, he did lie of course. But even in this case he did not invent that figure, he merely perpetuated it and, in this case, not poetically.

If there is an understandable desire today to see the world 'poetically', it ought to be equally understandable that archaic cultures did not (and do not) see it that way. The term, and the idea, of the 'poetic' emerged, as already noted, in ancient Greece when a need for veridical metaphors arose (e.g., in Plato) to break the bonds of the known world rather than to establish constitutive relations. In this century an opposite tendency can be noticed. Breton's surrealism was an effort to do away with the split between the 'poetic' and the 'prosaic' (or the 'actually real'). Breton was against metaphor[11] and so was Ezra Pound. Whatever the differences, imagism, surrealism, and the ideogrammatic method were adopted for establishing constitutive relations, not poetic metaphors. The surrealist image was as little intended to be metaphoric as the predications or visual presentations which the Kwakiutl made about salmon.

The conclusion is that it is wrong (or a mental disturbance) to see metaphors where there are none, just as it is wrong (or a disturbance) not to see them where there are. No verbal or visual presentation veridical in nature is possible without beliefs, and the very same relation established verbally or visually may have different meanings according to the context of beliefs in which they appear. The speaker's utterance meaning not only may differ from his sentence meaning, it also helps to establish it. We run into misunderstandings if we ignore this circumstance, the audience of standing stipulations in the circus where our games are played.

NOTES

1. A word about 'belief' is necessary at this point. Needham (1972) has argued that the English word 'belief' cannot be used in scientific discourse because it means too many things. It is a family resemblance notion, like Wittgenstein's 'game'. The word is, nevertheless, used here unproblematically, both in conjunction with knowledge and by itself. For it matters little in the present context whether one's views on the world are based on knowledge, belief, or a mixture of both. 'Belief' means here that something is held to be true (i.e., to obtain).

2. 'Trope' and 'figure' can be defined as distinct from another, and yet 'figure' is not only more common with critics, it often is used as the inclusive term. 'Figure of speech' and 'figurative' are expressions applied to tropes as well. I am using both terms here in order to suggest that tropes are devices of figurative speech.

3. A similar concept is Donald A. Schön's "generative metaphor" (Schön 1979). Black, too, uses this term (Black 1979:38).

4. The same is the case with Thomas Kuhn's "paradigm," which he later replaced, bowing to criticism, by "disciplinary matrix" (Kuhn 1970:182ff.). I mention this because there is a certain similarity between the two theories. Kuhn's "paradigm" ("disciplinary matrix") is a background of 'associated commonplaces' ('complex of implications') within a mature science. It might be said that any scientific paradigm allows metaphoric extensions until a point is reached where the extension breaks the bonds of the old paradigm and emerges as a new paradigm rather than an extension of the old one. The same is true of metaphors. If the paradigm changes, the metaphor is no longer a metaphor, or what was no metaphor now appears as one.

5. But Lévi-Strauss does not adopt Jakobson's scheme all the time (see, e.g., Lévi-Strauss 1958:217ff.).

6. 'Subject' may be an illusion but it is a necessary illusion, i.e., an illusion of intelligence active in concrete situations. Computers cannot place themselves into concrete situations in the way natural intelligences can. This is why Eco's project to reduce metaphors to metonymies in order to enable computers to produce metaphors is ill-conceived.

7. Since it does not mate. Hence the curious topsy-turvy quality of the symbolism of the 'worm' as the body and the 'butterfly' as the soul, the immortal soul.

8. Cassirer (1977:153) may be wrong when he sees some "unmediated identity" in "mythic metaphor." It hardly needs any explanation that the relation between salmon and Kwakiutl is different in kind from that between master and slave. The former is not only factual, it does not even allow any logical generalization. It is a practical correlation which can be mythically based, i.e., based on a system of beliefs; but it is questionable whether the idea of the removal (the extinction) of the salmon or the Kwakiutl would have meant to the Kwakiutl that the other correlative, too, would become extinct. If the Kwakiutl were logical in setting up a correlation between Kwakiutl and salmon, they were thinking in terms of an unchanging, or imminent, world; or else they were thinking in terms of the world of their experience, not in terms of concepts detached from experience.

9. Searle does say that the speaker must contribute, in the case of a literal utterance, more than "just the semantic content of the sentence" because the semantic content is relative to "a set of assumptions made by the speaker," and these assumptions must be shared by the hearer for the communication to be successful (Searle 1979:95f.).

But he does not address the question whether or not the speaker indicates that he is abiding by shared assumptions.

10. Boas knew, of course, the difficulties perfectly well. He notes, for instance: "Still another difficulty in obtaining truthful statements is based on the relation between Indian and white. The Indian likes to appear rational and knows that shamanistic practices are disbelieved by the whites. So he is liable to assume a critical attitude, the more so the closer the contacts with the whites. This is still further emphasized by the attitude of the Canadian government and the missionaries, who relentlessly persecute most of the Indian practices" (Boas 1966:121).

11. Breton does use the word 'metaphor' on occasion (and equates it with the comparison) (Breton 1978:281). But he also says: "The analogical image, to the degree that it illuminates in the brightest way *partial similarities,* will not be traduced in terms of equation." And then he gives a number of examples, among them this one (which ends his essay): "The best light on the general obligatory sense that the image worthy of the name must have is furnished by a Zen writer: 'Out of Buddhist kindness, Basho one day ingeniously changed a cruel haiku composed by his humorous disciple, Kikaku. The latter having written, "A red dragonfly - tear off its wings - a pimento," Basho substituted "A pimento - add wings - a red dragonfly" ' " (Breton 1978:283). This is not a metaphor, even if it is quite a poetic 'metamorphosis'.

REFERENCES CITED

Aristotle, 1973, The Categories: On Interpretation (trans. by H.P. Cook). London: Heinemann; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Bateson, G., 1972, Steps to an Ecology of Mind. New York: Ballantine.

Beardsley, M.C., 1958, Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism. New York and Burlingame: Harcourt, Brace and World.

Benveniste, E., 1979, Problèmes de linguistique générale. 2 vols. Paris: Gallimard.

Black, M., 1962, Models and Metaphors. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

Black, M., 1979, More about Metaphor. Pp. 19–43 in Metaphor and Thought (ed. by A. Ortony). Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press.

Blumenberg, H., 1960, Paradigmen zu einer Metaphorologie. Bonn: Bouvier.

Boas, F., 1966, Kwakiutl Ethnography (ed. by H. Codere). Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press.

Breton, A., 1978, What is Surrealism?: Selected Writings (ed. by F. Rosemont). New York: Monad.

Cassirer, E., 1977, Wesen und Wirkung des Symbolbegriffs. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.

Crocker, J.C., 1977, My Brother the Parrot. Pp. 164–92 in The Social Use of Metaphor: Essays on the Anthropology of Rhetoric (ed. by J.D. Sapir and J.C. Crocker). Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Fraser, B., 1979, Interpretation of Novel Metaphors. Pp. 172–85 in Metaphor and Thought (ed. by A. Ortony). Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press.

Gadamer, H., 1972, Wahrheit und Methode: Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik. 3rd ed. Tübingen: Mohr.

Harner, M.J., 1973, The Role of Hallucinogenic Plants in European Witchcraft. Pp. 125–54 in Hallucinogens and Shamanism (ed. by M.J. Harner). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hocquenghem, A.M., 1977a, Une interprétation des "vases portraits" mochicas. Nawpa Pacha 15:131–39. Berkeley.

Hocquenghem, A.M., 1977b, Quelques projections sur l'iconographie des Mochicas: Une image de leur monde d'apres leur image de monde. Baesseler Archiv 25:163–91.

Hocquenghem, A.M., and A. Sandor, 1982, Metonymy over Metaphor: Interpretation of Moche Humming Birds. Pp. 353–70 in Andine Archaeologie-Arqueología andina II (ed. by A.M. Hocquenghem and S. Monzon). Berlin: Lateinamerika Institut.

Jakobson, R., 1971, Selected Writings II. The Hague and Paris: Mouton.

Keesing, R.M., 1985, Conventional Metaphors and Anthropological Metaphysics: The Problematic of Cultural Translation. Journal of Anthropological Research 41:201–17.

Kuhn, T.S., 1970, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. 2nd ed. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Lakoff, G., and M. Johnson, 1980, Metaphors We Live By. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Langer, S.K., 1967, An Introduction to Symbolic Logic. 3rd ed. New York: Dover.

Leibniz, G.W., 1981, New Essays on Human Understanding (trans. and ed. by P. Remnant and J. Bennett). Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press.

Lévi-Strauss, C., 1958, Anthropologie structural. Paris: Plon.

Lévi-Strauss, 1966, The Savage Mind. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Levin, S.R., 1977, The Semantics of Metaphor. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Levin, S.R., 1979, Standard Approaches to Metaphor and a Proposal for Literary Metaphor. Pp. 124–35 in Metaphor and Thought (ed. by A. Ortony). Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press.

Lyons, J., 1981, Language, Meaning and Context. Bungay, Suffolk, Eng.: Fontana Paperbacks.

Lyotard, J., 1971, Discours, Figure. Paris: Klincksieck.

Needham, R., 1972, Belief, Language, and Experience. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Ortony, A., 1979, The Role of Similarity in Similes and Metaphors. Pp. 186–201 in Metaphor and Thought (ed. by A. Ortony). Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press.

Richards, I.A., 1965, The Philosophy of Rhetoric. London: Oxford University Press.

Ricoeur, P., 1979, The Metaphorical Process as Cognition, Imagination, and Feeling. Pp. 141–57 in On Metaphor (ed. by S. Sacks). Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Sahlins, M., 1981, Historical Metaphors and Mythical Realities: Structure in the Early History of the Sandwich Island Kingdoms. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.

Schön, D.A., 1979, The Conduit Metaphor—A Case of Frame Conflict in Our Language about Language. Pp. 254–83 in Metaphor and Thought (ed. by A. Ortony). Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press.

Searle, J.R., 1979, Metaphor. Pp. 92–123 in Metaphor and Thought (ed. by A. Ortony). Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press.

Walens, S., 1981, Feasting with Cannibals: An Essay on Kwakiutl Cosmology. Princeton: Princeton University Press.