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WE ARE INDEBTED TO ALL OUR ANONYMOUS PEER-REVIEWERS AND TO ALL OUR PROOF-READERS, ESPECIALLY SARAH IRVING, ELEANOR RIDEOUT, TAYLOR SPEARS AND TRAVIS PATERSON, FOR THEIR DEDICATED WORK. WE WOULD ALSO LIKE TO THANK ANGELA LAURINS AND CLAIRE KNOWLES FROM THE DIGITAL LIBRARY, INFORMATION SERVICES AT THE UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH, AND OUR ADVISORY BOARD FOR THEIR CONTINUED SUPPORT. LAST BUT NOT LEAST, WE ARE GRATEFUL TO ALL OUR CONTRIBUTORS WITHOUT WHOM THIS ISSUE COULD NOT HAVE BEEN MADE POSSIBLE.

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In the past years and decades, even supposedly basic economic concepts – such as money, debt, and indeed, capital – have come to appear ever more elusive, affecting and transforming the lives of millions of people while escaping any firm definition. The variety of meanings and imaginaries assigned to these concepts by people grappling with their origins, their nature, and their effects, is dazzling and stunning. Anthropological ways of thinking can help us understand such social and cultural creations, as attested by the articles in this issue of *The Unfamiliar*. The essays on urban planning in Malaysia and the links between technology literacy and college access in the U.S. offer inspiring alternatives to conventional ways of thinking about society and economics. The three pieces of our special focus section, dealing with transformations in Greek society following the debt crisis, together with the article on understandings of the economic field among U.S. conservatives demonstrate how ordinary people engage directly with abstract fields such as ‘the economy’. Finally, the two visual anthropology pieces offer glimpses of ‘capital’ hiding at the margins of mainstream economic flows. All in all, this issue demonstrates that ‘specialists’ in capital are not the only ones that have a right to say anything about it, and that we are all entitled to have a voice in the processes of transforming capital.

Jona Fras

IN FOCUS:

GREECE

IN

CRISIS

IN FOCUS: GREECE IN CRISIS

Introduction

BY
EVANGELOS CHRYSAGIS

In her book *The Senses Still* (1994), anthropologist C. Nadia Seremetakis recounts memories of *rodhákino*, a peach variety whose taste had marked her childhood years and subsequent visits to Greece for summer holidays. She notes how the emergence of a new type of peach as well as a blend between the two had resulted in the gradual disappearance of *rodhákino* from the summer markets. According to Seremetakis, its displacement resulted in the simultaneous evacuation of distinctive cultural memories at the nexus of food, eroticism and history. The ‘breast of Aphrodite’, as *rodhákino* used to be known, had now given way to an array of ‘peaches’. But the evocation of *rodhákino* does not conjure up an image of mere nostalgia. As Seremetakis notes, ‘the erasure of one Greek peach poses the question: at what experiential levels are the economic and social transformations of the EEC being felt?’ (ibid.: 3). It is precisely these experiential fields which contributions in this section seek to address. In their examination of the repercussions of the Greek financial ‘crisis’ and the ensuing neo-liberal structural reforms, the authors adopt an approach which effectively challenges the proliferation of mediated narratives and stereotypical accounts. Therefore, by grounding their analyses into ethnographic fieldwork and personal experiences, they engage in sociopolitical commentary that attempts what Veena Das has elegantly phrased as ‘the descent into the ordinary’ (2007). They demonstrate how the experience of physical and symbolic violence that has been unleashed by the increasing disintegration of the social tissue through the implementation of abrupt austerity policies has given rise not only to forms of collective trauma and fantasy - essentially what it currently *means* to be Greek - but also to affective conditions pertinent to the fragmentation and re-articulation of individual identities. Most importantly, the authors show how within such turbulent and precarious social and economic circumstances people strive and eventually manage to find hope in the form of collective action.

Thus, in the first article Natalia Koutsougera attempts to elucidate notions of entertainment and popular culture in Greece through the examination of different forms of music and dance. Her ethnography discusses the cultural processes through which identities emerge and are contested. The creative appropriation of global music genres such as hip hop by the multi-ethnic Athenian youth can be perceived as a ‘unifying’ local practice which aims at neutralizing cultural differences. Far from a leisure pursuit, Koutsougera argues that the practice of street dancing and ‘breaking’ represents a strategy for social acknowledgement and survival. Her comparison between the politics and aesthetics of hip hop and night club activities in a working-class district of Athens skilfully exposes their points of convergence and the common ideas that underpin these cultural forms. Thus, while in night clubs the performance and affirmation of gender relations and social status as well as a strong sense of heterosexual eroticism seemingly contradict the competitive but largely egalitarian ethos of hip hop practice, it becomes evident that both are characterised by an underlying search for authenticity.

If urban spaces set the scene for the production of an authentic grounding through music practice, they also testify to the inherent spatialisation of political practice. Yannis Kallianos, whose fieldwork in Greek radical politics coincided with the riots of an unprecedented scale that swept Greece in the aftermath of the murder of a teenager shot by the police in December 2008, traces the trajectory of a rapidly transforming society by scrutinizing this change as a process of fusion and

disjunction. This is vividly captured in situations of public conflict and in the actions of squatting in public buildings and occupying open spaces where the exchange, confrontation and resolution of a multitude of perspectives by people from all walks of life become possible. Kallianos explains that the crisis has become an ontological predicament as well as a call for social change, albeit one which has been promoted by the Greek state as the only, non-negotiable *truth*. It is the monopolisation of the assertion of this truth by the state that the emerging forms of sociality in occupied public spaces seek to dispute. Ultimately, says Kallianos, the interpenetration of the public and private spheres reflected in these political events highlights the dissolution of the myth of a homogeneous community. But a counter-reaction and the re-invention of this myth lurks behind the cultivation of the fascist ideology and hate-based rhetoric of the Golden Dawn.

Leandros Kyriakopoulos detects in Golden Dawn's extreme and racist politics a widespread condition that involves the expression of guilt transformed into vociferous revenge. The strong denouncement of *Metapolitefsi*, a historical period introduced by the transition from the military junta to a democratic polity in 1974, is part of this revenge. Paradoxically but perhaps unsurprisingly, the sense of collective guilt that stems from the acknowledgement and recognition of a sinful political past embodied by *Metapolitefsi* simultaneously engenders and supports claims for the violent reforms currently implemented by political parties and actors that have played a crucial role in the political life of the country over the past decades. Kyriakopoulos also calls attention to the disintegration of traditionally strong familial relations brought about by the rise of opportunistic individualism. This begs for a reconsideration of the myth of the overprotective Greek family, which has currently left its offspring exposed to and unprepared to deal with the contemporary condition. By broadening the scope the author suggests that Greece's economic restructuring is not only a self-defeating challenge to be met by the country, but crucially a test for the EU's ability to enforce its punitive demands and devise a framework to be applied to the next victim of the faceless financial markets. As he puts it: 'Greece becomes now the lawless space in which the "new European country" is procreated'. If Greece's condition of crisis is not a singular event but a truthful indication of sustained European policies, soon everything will taste like 'peach'.

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FROM STREET DANCES AND 'BREAKING' TO NIGHT CLUBBING: POPULAR ENTERTAINMENT AS CULTURAL AND SYMBOLIC CAPITAL IN CONTEMPORARY ATHENS

TEXT BY NATALIA KOUTSOUGERA
PHOTOGRAPHY BY TATIANA KOUTSOUGERA

This paper is an anthropological portrayal of two cultural forms of popular entertainment, with a central emphasis on their dance practices: hip hop dance styles and night clubbing. Their main components are discussed in relation to emotions, materials and regulatory language and how these surround the sense of authenticity of the self. Breakdance, street dances of the Athens hip hop scene and night clubbing practices in the western suburbs of Athens unravel in a descriptive manner in order to illuminate their interwoven elements in terms of authenticity and the permutations of popular entertainment. The cultural and symbolic agendas of the subjectivities and collectivities engaged in these popular cultural forms unveil, along with the ways global and local discourses intersect, to produce a territory for identity formation. By highlighting the key aspects of popular entertainment in contemporary Greece, the aim of this article is to contribute to the anthropological study of popular culture by pointing out its role in the processes of shaping and performing subjectivity and in the production of authenticity.

TWO POPULAR DANCE CULTURES BOTH DISTINCT AND INTERCONNECTED

This article explores two different but inter-related ethnographic examples in Greece, street dances and breakdance of the Athens hip-hop scene, and night clubbing practices in the western suburbs of Athens. These two music and dance cultures differ significantly as to the musical forms, styles and practices used

by young people who belong to them. However, they both share something in common: they are widely considered as popular forms of entertainment. Popular entertainment is a controversial and elusive category which is connected to popular aesthetics and taste, employed by individuals and collectivities as 'cul-

tural' and 'symbolic capital' (Bourdieu 1979).

As Sarah Thornton comments on Bourdieu's definition of cultural capital 'it is the linchpin of a system of distinction in which cultural hierarchies correspond to social ones and people's tastes are predominately a marker of class' (1996: 10). In this respect, the discourses of these two music and dance cultures may function as ideologies of taste and style which fulfill the specific cultural and symbolic agendas of their participants, while at times these apparently contrasting discourses appear to escape their specificity by intersecting, fusing or exchanging elements. Accordingly, one of the claims of this paper is that different forms of popular culture consist of flows of meanings, discourses, strategies and practices which correspond to each other, constantly debating their boundaries and sometimes cooperating to construct a concrete basis for expressions of the popular to thrive.

The street dances and all breakdance-related data in this article are based on anthropological fieldwork carried out between May 2010 and October 2011 for the co-production of a ten minute video on street dance styles of the hip hop scene in Greece and a 40 minute ethnographic film on 'breaking' (*Born to Break*). Interviews were conducted with teachers and student-level dancers comprising members of crews, focusing mainly on two Athens-based 'breaking' crews, well-known at the time: *Lucky Dice* and *Dead Prezz*. The research on night clubbing in the western suburbs of Athens is a part of the author's forthcoming doctoral thesis about night clubbing practices and young people in the working class suburb of Peristeri, West Athens.

Performers' identities were created and reshaped through the mobilisation and appropriation of imported materials from the wider international breakdance culture, fusing them with local meanings and experiences concerning team spirit and aspects of authenticity. In a similar vein, as far as the night clubbing practices that belong to the sphere of the Greek mainstream are concerned, it was challenging to explore how authenticity blends and intersects with local and indigenous notions of 'the popular'. One aspect of the popular, *laiko*, is associated with specific cultural meanings as well as personal characteristics, class idioms and connotations in different

contexts and among different site-specific night clubbing cultures. As described later in our discussion, a *laiko* person attains certain attributes connected to one's 'true' and authentic identity.

In view of the above, these two distinct cultures are paradoxically interconnected through key ideas, values and a common ground in the search for authenticity – but without conveying an ideological identification – and at times through phenomenological similarities (music/dance/style). Thus, with the presentation and juxtaposition of both street dances and night clubbing, this paper is first and foremost an anthropological illustration of the main components of two popular dance cultures in present day Athens. This paper also attempts to demonstrate that as different as those practices might seem at first sight, they still share common ties, characteristics and attributes of critical significance. These commonalities concern affective qualities, language, goals and ideas which place these two cultures in the realm of the popular, with the latter seen as a fluid, broad category and discourse as well as a culturally specific embodied knowledge.

HIP HOP CULTURE

Hip hop is a culturally mobile, 'glocal' form, appropriated by different groups of people in cities and regions around the world. It is part of an Afro-diasporic culture attempting to negotiate the experiences of marginalization (within the context of African/Caribbean history, identity and community), to replicate and re-imagine the experiences of urban life and symbolically appropriate urban space through sampling, attitude, dance, style and sound effects (Rose 1994). Hip hop music arrived in Greece in the middle of the 1980s with the formation of a music group called FF.C (*Fortified Concept*). It was promoted through films such as *Breakdance* and *Wild Style*, while music groups like *Public Enemy* informed a young audience and triggered the emergence of many Greek hip hop groups like *Terror X Crew* and *Active Member*. The latter is a cornerstone in the history of Greek hip hop, creating a special hip hop blend called Low Bap. Other, more mainstream bands were formed in the 1990s,

such as *Goin' through* and *Imiskoubria*. Nowadays hip hop is a massive cultural phenomenon in Greece, growing rapidly in different forms, while its main elements - rapping, graffiti, djing and breaking - are used in various contexts, reflecting heterogeneous ideas and lifestyles.

STREET DANCE STYLES

Street dances of the hip hop scene, such as 'popping', 'locking', 'krumping', 'new style' and 'breaking' or 'bboying' - broadly known as breakdance¹ - have become very popular over the last few years in Greece. Their popularity was due to youth's widespread involvement in hip hop and their engagement in street styles and street art (graffiti). This emerged alongside the promotion of hip hop through dance TV shows and contests as well as proliferation of music and music videos in the media. The rapid pace of urbanization and constant flows of migration, framed by the emerging social and economic crisis in Greece, reinforced this preoccupation of young people with hip hop and street culture.



Apart from their apparent entertaining and sporty character, these dances also constitute a 'serious' activity. It becomes part of everyday life, revolving around clothing and material culture, team spirit, friendships and flirting, competition and 'battling'. Above all, it is the aspect of authenticity that emerges as the essential quality and discourse of hip hop culture. 'Keeping hip hop real' and 'keeping hip hop right' (Chang 2007: xii) directly invoke a uniqueness that has to be preserved by 'real' and 'right' individuals. These young individuals (the average age is 25) of various origins occupy several public and pri-

vate spaces in the city of Athens: squares, buildings, dance schools and training places. Street dancers participate in local and international dance contests and festivals. Their dancing idiosyncrasies depend upon the kind of dance they are engaged with. For example, 'poppers' who perform robotic mimicry are comical and grotesque compared to breakers, who use a much more aggressive dance language. Theatricality is significant to all these types of street dance, while style is also a defining element among dancers.



'BREAKING'

'Breaking' is one of the most popular street dances in Greece. The majority of breakers believe that it is the most authentic and pure dance form within hip hop. It first appeared in early 1975 in the Bronx, adopted by street gangs and developed as one of the four elements of hip hop: graffiti, DJ-ing, MC-ing and breaking. Prior to 1994, young dancers were practicing and experimenting with acrobatics in several places in Greece, but these were independent from hip hop culture. It was Chris Stammis, a member of the famous Swedish team *Throw Down*, who arrived in the country in 1994 to teach and impart his knowledge on breaking as part of hip hop culture. In 1998 he danced in a *Terror X Crew* music video and one year later he started teaching. He also organised the first breakdance contest: 'The battle of the year', held in 2001. Later on, various groups were created, contests and 'battles' were organized and 'breaking' gradually evolved from a street-only dance to a widespread activity in schools as well.

The first breakers in Greece were second gen-

eration immigrants or repatriated Greek immigrants. During the 1990s, Greece witnessed a heavy influx of Albanians and immigrants from other former Socialist countries. Moreover, in the 2000s a significant number of refugees and illegal immigrants from the Middle East and Africa entered the country. Nowadays, a lot of young people involved in breakdancing are of non-Greek descent and through 'breaking' they seek to blend into Greek culture. For them, as well as for Greek dancers, breaking and hip hop are ways of embracing other cultures as well as focusing upon the common elements that bond them together by following the hip hop principles of peace, love, unity and fun as sources of survival and pleasure. Some breakers claim that its team spirit is 'a unifying element' between different cultures, but also within individual communities, providing a sense of belonging and a way of negotiating their cultural identity. In the case of the *Dead Prezz* crew, for instance, which is an all-Albanian group from the region of Aspropirgos (West Attica), breakdancing functioned as a bond between members of the same ethnicity and mediated between their past and a present identity.

For the purposes of the film, two crews were interviewed and studied closely, *Lucky Dice* (mainly Greek) and *Dead Prezz*. Cultural differences did not enter their ongoing competition as an issue. Instead, their rivalry revolved around awards, titles and victories in local and international competitions, coloured by jealousy and prestige. The ethics of such rivalry are concerned with honesty, originality, respect, attitude as well as breakdance knowledge, such as specific steps and their names, the history of breakdance and hip hop and the rules of the breakdance challenge. Most of the issues at stake between the two crews were grounded in the wider question of authenticity: the limits of commerciality of 'breaking' culture as well as where 'real hip hop' or 'real breaking' starts and ends. Similar disputes, challenges and confrontations were developed among different collectivities and individuals in the hip hop dance scene, concerning what kind of dance styles constitute a 'real' hip hop dance. House dance and waacking², for example, are often attacked as not being part of hip hop but belonging main-

ly to lyrical hip hop and street jazz. Struggles over power and hierarchy are very common within teams, concerning prestige and other issues, as mentioned above. For certain crews, it is very difficult to stick together for a long period of time. The game of power revolves around constructing, preserving and deconstructing already founded and identifiable ideas as well as reinventing new categories that deal with gender and ethical issues. However, there are clear distinctions between all-immigrant and predominantly Greek crews. Similarly, the set-up divisions between b-girl and b-boy 'battles' reveal something concrete about the hegemonic realities of the Greek breakdance community.



There are important qualities for the b-boys and b-girls. These relate to ways of dancing and the use of specific movements, as well as the general ethics of the culture they belong to. Thus, much importance is given to originality of movement and style, and accordingly to the individuality of the dancer. Breakers must avoid 'biting', that is stealing movements from others. Dancing should also be performed with 'a soul', 'a heart' and 'a spirit', and breakers should be 'real' and honest with themselves and others.

One goal of the breaker is to ‘give and take respect’ from others. Respect is a very serious issue, as it could potentially affect the reputation of breakers throughout their entire life and career. These qualities are also visualized and expressed through movement, not only as people dance but also during everyday communication and comportment. Verbal expressions are also used to articulate value judgments. For example, when someone ‘breaks it’, it means that one achieves a high quality of dance performance ‘on the beat’, considered a compliment for most breakers.



As previously mentioned there is also a powerful discourse within the breakdance community regarding ‘real hip hop’ and ‘real breaking’. It is obvious that originality and authenticity play a fundamental role here. Some breakers focus on the underground aspects of breaking culture and are wary of its manipulation by the media and the market. Others, however, participate more in the popular entertainment industry and believe that ‘breaking’ should be promoted through TV shows and commercial events, because they perceive hip hop and the market as being interdependent. As members of the *Dead Prezz* crew claim: ‘there is nothing wrong with making money out of it’. In view of all this it is apparent that the constant debates and arguments among the protagonists of hip hop dance styles have a highly significant relationship to an anti-mainstream discourse, predisposing the subject to act in ways so as to gain ‘subcultural capital’ (Thornton 1995: 11). This process is embraced by some and ignored by others.

Hip hop is promoted in Greece as well as worldwide as a vivid part of popular culture, and coexists with indigenous and local meanings of ‘the popular’. The latest trend in mainstream

night clubs of Athens is the mixing of popular Greek music with songs which include rapping in the delivery of lyrics. In music videos the influences from street dances – mainly new style and waacking – are obvious. In 2011 rapping and breakdance movements were included in Greece’s performance at the Eurovision contest next to a popular Greek song and a folk dance called *zeibekiko*³. The inclusion of rapping in Greek popular music is a relatively recent phenomenon but has progressed with great success.



‘ELLINADIKA’

Many of the Greek popular songs heard in night clubs in Bournazi – an area of Peristeri, a

western suburb of Athens – adopt hip hop and RnB idioms. Night clubs, such as *ellinadika*⁴ use a combination of foreign pop and Greek songs, RnB, as well as oriental music. The famous ‘Greek night’ encapsulates emotional structures which are connected to ‘forbidden love’, ‘sin’ (Economou 2005), passion and pain (*ponos*). These are distinctive affective qualities objectified and embodied within a framework of evening entertainment. Greek popular songs are replete with lyrics which refer to emotional pain and the burning of the ‘heart’ (*kapsoura*)⁵, and to crazy, mad love (*trela*) of a man for a woman – or vice versa. Dancing and singing the lyrics of these songs is very popular among people who go clubbing in Bournazi. By dancing or singing the lyrics, the heterosexual erotic play is projected, somatized and ritualized through the situational, ephemeral and imaginary identification with the heroes in the songs.



Both males and females usually dance ‘tsifteteli’, a kind of belly dance – sometimes on the bar or on a table – and they normally perform this dance in couples while the rest of the group sing to each other and clap their hands, yelling encouraging exclamations such as *opa, dose* (give) or *pame* (lets go)⁶. With the phrase ‘break it’, night clubbers invite the person who is dancing to set himself/herself out of control and exceed his/her ordinary limits. In the past, breaking plates used to be very popular in night clubs featuring live Greek popular music, called *pistes* (dance floors). In such popular entertainment contexts, conspicuous consumption is indicative of power while erotic and gender relations are related to practices of publicly showing off money on part of the male subject.

Materialistic narratives such as ‘whoever has the money counts’ circulate in contradiction to other narratives concentrating on emotions and the power of the ‘heart’. These narratives and their expression through singing, dancing and drinking both articulate and challenge gender relations. The perceived ambiguity of certain performances, such as females dancing on the bar, may be seen both as a process of contestation as well as reinforcement of established notions of femininity. For example, the idea of the woman dancing ‘for herself’ on the bar and not for a certain male, or the stereotype of a woman who is ‘crazy’ and ‘burns the man’, may disturb settled phallogocentric notions of women as quiet and obedient. Simultaneously, it also confirms a regulatory discourse of an individualistic culture that promotes and embraces in certain ways an out-of-limit, dangerous woman, both praised and feared by men.

In this night culture, clubbers perform their acts in a continuous, unconscious effort to verify or attain their authenticity. As players in a game, they strive to be ‘real’ and accuse as inauthentic those who pretend to be different from who they really are. The term *laikos* that is used to describe these groups means popular but also folk. Its roots go back to the underground folk music of the 1920’s and 1950’s, when bouzouki was the key instrument of rebetiko⁷ music and culture. *Laiko* takes various local meanings which are central to the cultures and people to which it refers. It is often used by outsiders to describe night clubbers and is connected to characteristics of honesty, simplicity, originality and a ‘real self’: a ‘real man’ or a ‘real woman’⁸. Someone who is truly *laikos*, is someone who has ‘a heart’ and is real to himself and others. Being real is expressed through dancing, singing, flirting, chatting and drinking. Eroticism, but not romanticism, is intense in all these performances. A truly *laiko* male person must also be able to make it on his own and not depend on others for financial or other support. Individualism is a particularly strong element. By contrast, in ‘breaking’ team spirit is much more significant than the individual ego.

CONCLUSION

These two cultures of entertainment constitute parallel realities intertwined with the concepts of authenticity and the ‘popular’. ‘Breaking’ verifies Tricia Rose’s argument that ‘hip hop remains a never ending battle for status, prestige and group adoration which is always in formation, always contested and never fully achieved’ (1994: 79). Similarly, an equally competitive and confrontational character is clearly identified in the mainstream night clubbing practices in *ellinadika* with a greater emphasis on egocentrism and conspicuous consumption. The subject in this context regresses and recoils between materialistic, individualistic and emotional paradigms in its effort to disentangle the world. In both cases, the element of authenticity is always present, playing a crucial role in the formation and negotiation of people’s identities.

Thus, popular entertainment and its expressions as symbolic and cultural capital consist of common traits and affects which are embedded in the ethics, language and convictions of people who embrace them. Even though the ideals of these popular forms seem very different at first glance, authenticity is a central value at the points where variations of the ‘popular’ intersect. The ‘popular’, then, constitutes a shifting area that finds diverse expressions. There is great potential within popular entertainment for the reinvention of individual and social identities. In Greece, due to contemporary adverse sociopolitical circumstances, the study of popular entertainment forms is crucial for our understanding of processes of identity formation, *vis-à-vis* collapsing and dysfunctional formal institutions and social values. Therefore, it would be interesting to observe the negotiation of Greek identity as it unfolds into the future. As Stromberg points out: ‘entertainment is so central in our culture that it eludes us’ (2009: 20). Popular entertainment, though often intangible, can reveal gaps and connections between past and present circumstances. ♦



ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Natalia Koutsougera is an active social researcher and a Ph.D. candidate at Panteion University of Social and Political Sciences in Athens, Greece. Her doctoral thesis is about night clubbing and youth in the working class suburb of Peristeri, Western Attica. She has co-produced a 10 minute video on street and hip hop dance styles in Greece (www.dancetheater.gr) and an ethnographic film on ‘breaking’ (breakdance), under the title ‘Born to Break’.

NOTES

- 1 Most breakers claim that breakdance is a media term and as such it is not authentic. They prefer the terms 'breakin' or 'break'.
- 2 The vast majority of house dance movements stem from Jazz, African, Latin, Soul and Hip hop and is an amalgamation of post-disco era. Waacking is a dance style that originated from the disco era of the 1970s clubbing scene in Los Angeles.
- 3 *Zeibekiko* is a Greek men's dance, danced publicly 'for oneself' and a performance of the 'inner self' (Cowan 1990).
- 4 'Ellinadiko' which means 'Greek club', is a kind of club that developed in the mid-1990s using both popular Greek and mainstream foreign music.
- 5 They are called *kapsourotragouda*, that is songs for the burning heart. According to Ampatzi, the notion of *kapsoura* refers to a particular kind of love, usually the one that is 'unfulfilled, oneway and non-mutual' (2009: 221).
- 6 In 'breaking' there are similar exclamations during battles, such as 'give energy' (*dose energia*).
- 7 Rebetiko is conceptualized as a kind of popular and folk Greek music subculture of 1920's and a kind of hybrid as it concentrates elements from the Byzantium, Ottoman Empire and Arabia. It was familiarized by "lower" social categories in post war Greece (Economou 2005).
- 8 'Laikos' also takes some negative connotations from those who do not embrace this kind of lifestyle. However, most of the night clubbers in Bournazi are proudly self-defined as *laika pedia* (*laika* kids).

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THE CONDITION OF CRISIS AND THE SYMPTOMS OF SOCIAL CHANGE: *FIVE FLIGHTS OF THOUGHT ON THE POST OF THE (GREEK) POST-POLITY ERA*¹

BY LEANDROS KYRIAKOPOULOS

It is widely known that Greece faces one of the most precarious and transformative periods of its modern history. Greek society has come to learn, in a baleful manner, that crisis is the result of its former political inefficiencies and a slump that must be overcome. The pressure of this awareness leads people to deface previously established social convictions about the self and the world. In this procedure, social and mass media articulate and (re)produce discourses from above, below and the past so to capitalize the present for a new and solid horizon for the future. This article challenges five beliefs that circulate in the Greek public sphere inculcating their incontrovertible realities: the end of Post-Polity era (the 'former' political status quo of Greece known as Metapolitefsi), the revival of ethno-socialist movements, the debt crisis of eurozone countries, youth's stand for social change and the role Greece plays in this global financial turmoil comprise the contents of this critical debate. What I suggest, is that apart from the obvious misfortunes of crisis, the performative effects of the imposed vision of the well-regulated state brings forth collective feelings of offence and oppression in such ways that old divisive ideas about Greece are awoken, reducing the country to a zone of social change in which the subject renegotiates its sense of individuality and community.

INTRODUCING A PRECARIOUS STATE

The name *Metapolitefsi* has come to identify the last 30 years of civic life in Greece. In Greek it means the transition from one regime to another or from one way of being involved in *politics* to another. In the contemporary collective consciousness though the name embeds the fall of junta in 1974 and the institution of parliamentary democracy. For British historian Mark Mazower (2000: 7), the name is connected with Greece's 'return to some semblance of tranquility' after 'Europe's bloodiest conflict between 1945 and the breakup of Yugoslavia' among the Left and the Right that started even before the Second World War. The seven-year junta, he observes, was the last bloody chapter of this civil conflict and, for that, *Metapolitefsi* embodies the promise of a new governmental state deprived of the terror of ideological persecutions and national disunity.

The term *Post-Polity* I use, aspires to capture the three-fold quality of the name *Metapolitefsi* that itself obscures due to its historical weight: the political changeover of the year 1974 (what is widely accepted in the Greek public sphere),

the transition of one regime to another (the etymology of the word itself) and the promise the preposition *post* (*Meta*) withholds, both as an effort to heal past wounds and a quest for a new future. The Post-Polity regime that characterizes the last 30 years of Greece is indeed so grounded to this promise, that it is unattainable to fully understand the political transitions that happened within – such as Greece's dedication to the European vision and the ideal of the socio-democratic welfare state – or the collective feeling of distress that have grown since 2009 due to the austerity measures taken as to deal with the so called 'debt crisis', without taking seriously the resurgent discourses about the 'end of *Metapolitefsi*' that characterize today's political rhetoric. In the present year of 2012, Greece is under the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) instructions for structural reforms inherent to the neo-liberal paradigm and, as a result, a new horizon is conjured 'from above' with multiple side effects in the way people deal with their current predicament.

June's 2012 election results evinced the five-year Greek depression's simmering trends; yet

they still came with a shock for the public sphere. They were a shock, above all, because of the destined way the results affirmed themselves: the striking fall of the once dominant socialist party, the change of the two-party system after the youth, the ‘indignants’ and many other frustrated people’s turn to the radical left, and the rise of the ethno-socialist movements are some of the tangible events registered in the Greek social body. At that time, voters and candidates, dazzled in front of the T.V. screens, ruminated over the ‘already’ predicted yet seemingly unforeseen outcome. Fated and expected as they were, the Greek election results still mask the presence of all these rampant and perilous events that colour the current socio-political setting: anti-immigrant attacks by armed para-state nationalist groups, forest arsons on the eve of the election and stock market sabotages with en masse capital flight affirm and expose the frightful financial and political web. This unnerving scene cannot be seen as a consequence of Greek crisis alone, but as a constitutive feature of this transitory period. Still, ‘Greek crisis’ can be a flexible field for apprehending and communicating the symptoms of this contemporary social change.

I. THE *POST* THAT NEVER COMES: ‘I’M LIVING A DREAM, DON’T WAKE ME UP!’²

Since the arrival of the IMF and the official announcement of crisis, debates about the end of Post-Polity era have dominated the political discourses. At the same time, the ‘post’ of the Post-Polity regime was speculatively linked to the causes of the current misfortune and the IMF’s proposed reforms. In brief, the ‘end of *Metapolitefsi*’, has marked today’s collective imaginary, in reference to crisis only – a condition I would like to discuss as a starting point for my reflections. The German literary critic Andreas Huyssen discusses the ‘end of modernism’ in a similar manner. He sees *postmodernism* as a field of collective memory for the imaginative production of modernism. ‘The problem’, as he says, ‘is not what modernism *really was*, but rather [...] how it functioned ideologically and culturally after World War II’ (Huyssen 1986: 186). In a way, the *post* for Huyssen has been introduced in the context of

a disengaging process and has served for the production of knowledge(s) displaced from the *modern* myths of progress and rationality. In a similar fashion, I believe that the post of the Post-Polity era exists only as a performative gesture of retrospective accusation that functions as a political tool for the discomfiture of the Post-Polity societal claims for a socio-democratic welfare state, and for the acceptance of the sacrifices needed to reform the Greek society – in the neo-liberal paradigm – for its return to much awaited political and financial stability.

Thereby, the identity of that *post* media usually portray to make the need of a new structural paradigm more plausible and appealing does not indicate an *already here* present. It rather belongs to a manifold process of incriminating Greece’s recent political past, aimed to support the abrupt importation of neo-liberal reforms formerly considered ‘extreme’; disclosing, at the same time, the empowerment and encouragement, in a local level, of ‘the same global rhetoric about horizons of long-term economic growth’ (Guyer 2007: 410). Thus, this incrimination process serves for the penalization of the epistemic and ideological platform of the Post-Polity regime, leading all previous governments to a rampant criticism in terms of corruption, misappropriation and embezzlement. In result, the identity of that *post* as an outcome of this incrimination performance synthesizes and channels a public demand for a complete political change; a demand though, in which the ideological platform of these streamlined accusations is delicately masked.

To understand the identity of the *post* of the Post-Polity era in accordance to the sensitive issue of the societal claim for change, we have to ruminate over the imaginative construction of the past by the media and their capacity to effectively channel public’s discomfort and complaints. It is imperative in order to understand the massive salary and pension reductions, – in some cases exceeding 50 per cent – the increase of working hours, the extensive dismissals of bureaucratic personnel, the increase of personal taxes and the discontinuing of many social provisions; measures impossible for a previous government to take, and now enacted in only three years time. Because, for a society to ac-

cept the dismissal of all its social accomplishments, means to feel critical for the whole infrastructure that made them possible in the first place. So, Greece performs this ‘new’ identity of the post, by preserving a collective trauma (i.e. corruption, as the bankruptcy of Post-Polity’s promises) so to recast the image of its past and to extort a *different* – yet once criticized – field of innovations. Thus, the *post* of the Post-Polity is not a temporal event but an affective condition grounded in the population’s unconfessed complicity for the failures of Greece’s former political and economical life. A complicity (re) produced dialogically with the praise of a lawful and congruous state in the liberal market context.

II. THE RETURN OF THE DAMNED AS (MASS-MEDIATED) DEMOCRACY’S SELF PUNISHMENT

The imaginative construction of the Post-Polity era was heralded in with the establishment of the democratic constitution. In the 1980s, the opening of the press and television market to private interests, attached Post-Polity governments to the tele-visual way of conversing with people and to mass media holders’ political and financial interests. In the affective condition of the *post*, this notion of ‘financial interests’ pertains to a grid of secret, masked and undercover agreements that is not only used for the incrimination of Greece’s most recent political past, but also for the mystification of the current situation in terms of conspiracies and concealed – global or otherwise – plans.³ Consequently, one of the manifestations of the political strategy to implicate Post-Polity in the ordeals of the present is a sound distrust towards political life as a whole, in addition to the general disregard of the (social) democratic welfare.

In the Greek public sphere’s collective imaginary, democracy’s corruption is felt, first and foremost, in the collapse of expectations that were cultivated by the two main Post-Polity parties. Previous election slogans remain engraved on voters’ memory, such as ‘The citizen first’, ‘Greece first’, ‘Hat-in-hand’⁴ and ‘People won’t forget what the Right stands for’⁵, they are now internalised in the affective condition of the *post* and are inverted from their initial meaning producing a nervous turn towards na-

tionalistic and patriotic movements; particularly towards the one that vaunts for authenticity: Golden Dawn. The slogan ‘The citizen first’⁶, as the last ‘lie’ of the Post-Polity era becomes, in a reflective way, the ground for searching for that promise’s literal sense through the shadows and the ghosts of the now wounded democratic system. In other words, mass-mediated democracy’s promises are questioned through the constitutive Other of Post-Polity’s regime, which is the ‘reprehensible’ ethno-socialist ideal.⁷

This turn to patriotic movements is, obviously, coherent with the ultra right-wing streams of fanaticism that dominated Greece in the years after the civil war (see Mazower 2000). The Post-Polity regime had denoted, in a reserved way, the termination of the ideological divisions through Greece’s devotion to the European social-democratic ideal. And despite its incrimination, most people are not willing to ‘remind’ themselves the post civil-war traumas (see Danforth & Boeschoten 2012). Since Golden Dawn’s allocutions are disjointed from previous military languages, the ‘politics of memory’ which permeate the political disputes of Post-Polity create a political space in line with the affective condition of the *post*. Namely, Golden Dawn’s rhetoric of hate on leftists, corrupted politicians, gays, foreigners, artists and academics, is based on an accusation of national betrayal due to financial, diplomatic or other partialities.⁸ This is the common ground that relates the incrimination of the Post-Polity regime with the fanatic ruffle of Golden Dawn: the affective condition of guilt being embedded in the madness of revenge.

Thereby, Golden Dawn, the political party/movement that, as mass media portray, cannot be controlled by ‘democracy’ shines through the darkness it promises and its unlawful attacks against the corrupted political system. In voters’ consciousness, Golden Dawn becomes the par excellence agent of blackmail that places the ‘citizen-punisher’ into parliament life. It also becomes the carrier of the reformed model of ‘citizen’, a one that needs protection from the mass media, which are presented by Golden Dawn as an instrument of the threatening global forces that lead people to precarious states with their conspiratorial policies of nation, race and

gender boundary disturbance. The paradoxical relationship of hate between Greek mass media and the Golden Dawn party reveals the power and the limits of modern mass mediated democratic system, in which the claim for the 'lost' democratic ideal brings forth inglorious movements for democracy's complete and apocalyptic disablement.

III. GREECE IN A 'STATE OF EMERGENCY' OR THE STATE OF EXCEPTION AS A CONDITION OF CRISIS

It was after the elections of 2009 that Greece entered into economic 'crisis.' Its public announcement came from the lips of the newly elected prime minister himself, G. A. Papandreou, who declared that Greece now was in a 'state of emergency.' On his invitation, consultants from the European Union (EU) and the IMF arrived in Athens in no time to help the government take the necessary steps to decrease the deficit and improve the economy overall. This governmental discourse on Greece's 'state of emergency' - as Greece's *state of exception* from the markets - was necessary for today's crisis to take shape and for the stigmatization of the Post-Polity regime as responsible for it. Additionally, the vision of a lawful, modern and Europeanized state became the rule for this 'state of exception' to take shape, presaging and arranging a field of changes and reforms which without crisis would not have been possible; and to which not only Greece but all European countries must conform. Mass media and political agents were the main channel for this grand narrative to take form and until now the vision of a modernized state is still the one that acts as a metaphor for a desired outcome.

The Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben uses Carl Schmitt's concept of 'state of exception' to investigate the exceptional measures taken in periods of political crisis. He believes that the legal measures taken in states of exception cannot be easily understood from a legal point of view. For him, they are political, inasmuch as the state of exception entails the paradoxical position of presenting itself as the legal form of that which can have no legal form. He stresses the importance of the condition in which the state of exception becomes the rule, so the ex-

ceptional measures turn into government techniques and, as a result, the once familiar form of political constitution loses its traditional distinctions (Agamben 1998: 122). In a way, since this evasive state becomes the rule, an opening for a space devoid of law occurs where different power relations may become proximate. As he puts it, the state of exception is the provenance of every juridical placement since it opens up a space for the stabilization of a new kind of order (Ibid.: 19).

Using Agamben's analyses, we may say that the Greek government's decision to except Greece from the markets, due to its inability to fulfill its debt obligations, and put it under IMF's patronage, as the figurative schema which supervises and controls them, is not just part of a procedure that disciplines or re-programs Greece (what both ill or well disposed discourses tend to put forward) but rather a part of one, that tests the ability of the EU to sanction the new principles of its restructuring. A speculation that leads us to think that the abrupt reforms Greece is forced to adopt belong to a political intention of reforming European governance. So, in a way, Greece, the last geographical and financial frontier of the EU becomes, simultaneously, the barometer of European deficiencies and the laboratory of multiple strategies for EU reform. In this sense, the 'advanced European country' as the rule for the 'state of exception' to take shape becomes the *exception* itself, for Greece becomes now the lawless space in which the 'new European country' is procreated. The fact that G. A. Papandreou declared with such ease 'either we change or we sink' to every European council denotes that there is a vision of a new financial, governmental and state order at stake, which is continuously being exceeded as a trace, although never denominated as such.

Thus, we may assume that the danger of Euro's collapsing does not just show the 'structural' problems of the European countries, but, much more, it shows the liberating 'structural' solution of a more coordinated, flexible and effective governing mechanism. The language Europeans officials use, such as the statements German and French Prime Ministers frequently make about a 'European government', a 'trans-European executive authority' or a constitution

of a federation like the United States of America (USA) do not belong to an abstract vision for the EU, but they hold a very specific projection of a modernized European future, which is being anticipated in the present as a virtual horizon through this crisis. In this fashion, the 'event of crisis' is not just an objective social and economic matter needing attendance, but a bio-political laboratory of key signifiers that connect everyday life with the projection of the future.

IV. YOUTH'S STAND FOR CHANGE: 'IN THESE ELECTIONS, WE HIDE OUR GRANDPARENTS' ID CARDS!'⁹

Greek society is filled with outbursts of riots each and every time a package of austerity measures passes the parliament. Images of the most raging scenes are traveling around the world declaring, in a way, that the Greek public denies to submit to a change imposed 'from above'. We might say that this disobedience belongs, in some measure, to the same spirit of demanding political change, as the one that Theodore Roszak (1968) finds in the 'counterculture movement' which flourished in the USA and Western Europe in the 1960s. In his effort to make sense of the huge wave of confidence people had in changing the world, Roszak observes that 50 per cent of those populations was below the age of 25. In respect to his observation, I ought to note, that Greece of 2012 has 50 per cent of its population over the age of 40;¹⁰ and it is this part that accomplished its life-goals at the Post-Polity era. This means that a great deal of the Greek population operates with an outward mark of obeisance towards the austerity policies, in fear of losing its vested interests; while simultaneously, the young productive force embodies this part of society that craves for change, as it suffers the unbearable violence of austerity.

This was particularly evident during the months running up to the June 2012 election, that were marked by massive protests, riots and acts of disobedience. The confirmation of the belief for 'discipline' found Greeks tacitly divided, facing, through this 'involuntary' choice of austerity, memories of this 'long forgotten' polarization between the Left and the Right.

Through the 30 years of Post-Polity, these oppositions may have been smoothed over, but, as Danforth and Boeschoten (2012) have shown, there are still strong communities of memory – people that have witnessed the civil war – that 'would vote' for stability only to 'forget' the past. That is, this belief for discipline fully embodies the memory of past national misadventures, while the youth, in an ironic way, incarnate the part of the population that crave for change; even in the cost of dismantling the relative peace made in the Post-Polity era.¹¹ Thus, being young in modern Greece means to feel a minority force in the construction of Greece's future. For a young person, to live in Greece means to partake in the collective depression of seeing his/ her expectations and demands be set aside for the sake of older people's (bank accounts) safety and their fear of new national misadventures. Hence, current prime minister Antonis Samaras' rhetorical campaign dwelled on the catastrophic scenario of Greece's exit of the Euro zone is not such a surprise; as timid and divisive (and alien to the youths) as it was, it intended to reach the terrified ears of the seniors. It was also of no coincidence that in his first post-election speech he was eager to thank 'the masses of youth that supported him'.

Half of Greece's population has experienced the post-war, post-occupation and/or post civil-war traumas. It grew up out of 'nothing', yet with plenty of opportunities to make its dreams possible. It also grew up with the need to escape rural life and the desire to live the modern urban, consumerist and nuclear family life. Greek families, as shown in respective ethnographies, are formed with the principle of 'honour'. That is, the collectivity of the family is bounded when the individual's shares and interests conjoint with the safekeeping of the family's private sphere. Many theorists (Campbell 1983, Herzfeld 1987) have pointed 'honour' as an indicator for both structural continuity and social change. Despite differences, all commentators agree that massive urbanization and industrial modernisation have shifted the ways 'honour' is manifested, yet it is still a way to understand the boundaries of the family by means of individual action. Yet, in the site of crisis, this 'peculiar Greek individualism' (Abdela 2002: 218)

is presented in ambivalent terms. Because the boundaries of the family seem to frame both of these contradictory tendencies of muffled safety and extreme escapism; denoting the multiple articulation of ‘honour’ itself which family’s private sphere retains.

On one hand, the image of the paternalistic Greek family gets blurred in the misty shadow of crisis and reveals an opportunistic dimension which face such a concern for its offspring’s future, that it even accepts their sacrifice. On the other, the idea we have of the overprotective behaviour of the Greek family shatters with the ‘event of crisis’, as ‘honour’ is detached from the strict connotations of the family private sphere’s interests. Through these multiple shifts of individual concerns, the ‘young’ are forced to claim a space of ‘adult’ decision making and deny a juvenile precariousness, nourished by their elders. For the adults, a sense of sacrificing the most sacred gifts like security and (paternalistic) protection is produced, with their offspring as the first victims, who now ought to relearn how to be modern. Thus, current youth’s stand for social change is not just clashing with some restraining and conservative forces (what can be easily conceived through the mainstream ideological platforms) but with an attitude of passive impartiality that shares this unconfessed complicity for the ‘failures’ of the past. Crisis, as it seems, is another plateau of modernization where the Greek subject reconfigures its individuality and sense of community. It is a contemporary rite of passage for Greek society; a process of violent adulthood for all generations.

V. GREECE, THE CRADLE OF THE WORLD

In an article of his that was popular within the Greek public, British historian Mark Mazower (2011) says that Greece’s national history goes hand in hand and sometimes presages the great changes of the modern western world. The 19th century great empires’ fall, the collapse of Nazism, the European Cold War division, the expansion of the EU and now the crisis of the worldwide financial system spark are, as he points out, results of modern Greek history. At the same time, the little country of Greece acquires the heroic and tragic role of be-

ing ‘in the forefront of the fight for the future.’ (ibid.) I don’t find the real role of Greece in the worldwide theatre of changes that important; to my mind, each country partakes with a different role and degree of tragedy in this play. But, what I really find interesting is that Mazower takes up a philhellenic tradition in a time of war; representing Greece’s various resistances ‘as the noblest of causes’¹².

In a non-committal way, this popular article belongs to a storehouse of help that encourages the revival of the Greek spirit, by internalizing in the collective imagination the belief of a ‘Great Greece’ that holds the capacity of an explosive way of participating in ‘worldwide negotiations’. Having the feeling of this capacity means to cultivate, in a collective manner, the conviction that not only Greeks are capable of, but it is incumbent upon them to counteract against any assault to their private/national domain. The ability to unilaterally terminate the memorandum and to refuse paying off the debt, as well as the ‘invitation’ of an ultra-right wing ethno-socialist party in a European parliament, belong to the same reactionary context fed by a tank of allegories that share a common psychical denial best understood with the psycho-analytical themes of sublimity, egocentricity, narcissism, fear of loss, inability to accept criticism and various vindication fantasies.

What I actually want to say here is that the existential fear of a country in crisis, once it internalizes the capacity of assaulting the worldwide financial web, makes it ‘dangerous’ insofar as this country reflexively increases its metonymic power to protect itself by means of attacking the joints of the skeletal structure which finds itself entrapped in. So, to visualize the characteristics of a country in a precarious state, one has to bear in mind this shrewd oscillation between the capability of an explosive reaction and attending the exhortations for legitimacy. In that sense – and in a diametrical opposition to Mazower’s view – for a country to be ‘the cradle of the world’ means to be a screen for projecting the worldwide circulating needs for change and, at the same time, a camera that projects for itself the eventualities of crisis as a virtual horizon for the whole world. Greece as the cradle of the world is the crisis’ point of no

return. And it resounds the crisis's center since it has been reduced to a laboratory of multiple and contradictory narratives and metaphors of an imminent future through the most common conspiratorial stories of the hidden, yet terribly tangible, global financial relations.

'CAPITALIZING' THESE FIVE THOUGHTS

In illustration of what I have said, I am tempted to use another 'common' belief, one that is not only 'Greek' but, on the contrary, resounds the global image of the modern and well-regulated state in the market's context. It is the one saying that societies ought to control, as a moral stance, the financial steering wheel of their country. In the event of crisis, we can see that what this stereotype conceals is the disconnection of the steering wheel from the rest of the vehicle's navigation system and its participation in automated, by 'invincible' programmers, steering movement transmission systems. In the context of Greek crisis, it is a matter of trust of a faded and frayed map, with a very great obligation involved in society's part, to show a brave, authoritative and confident attitude. In other words, it means that what the Greek society has to prove is not that it can take the 'right direction', but rather that it can take on its back the burden of change imposed by the 'international fund community', as an after-effect of the harsh prescription for stability. Stereotypes like this, are not just vehicles for imposing, 'from above', the vision of a well regulated state, but they zigzag in monstrous rhythms in and out of multiple private and public spheres, producing ambivalent images of the self and the world (see Athanasiou 2007; Guyer 2007).

For the subject, the event of crisis becomes a zone for renegotiating the idea of self and community. The violence of this process is not just evident in the reduction of salaries and expenses, as politics of reform. It is presented in the products of this shrewd oscillation between the vision of a well regulated future and the apocalyptic dystopias of the present. This oscillation is an evidence of the contradictions of the Euro zone figure as well. Because for Greek society to be in this crisis means to occupy the EU's margins and at the same time cry with all its

strength about its inefficiencies. For the same reasons, the EU learns through this crisis how to reinstate its authoritative and paternalistic role, by trying schemes and models for an updated inter-national paradigm. Therefore, the *post* of the Greek Post-Polity era is something more than Greece's passing to a regime of risk and precariousness. It means that Greek society is living the parallel eventualities of crisis in which novel horizons are reflexively projected as the European rescue plans are being tested. In this condition, Greece becomes a social zone for reconfiguring its sense of orientation through facing the same divisions, exclusions and ideal projections which haunt its past and have made its present possible. And yet, the sense of its present is linked to the future as an image governed by the forces that control the financial steering wheel of the country. Ultimately, to capitalize on the present amidst a condition of crisis means to force a specific value onto the future; a value that conceals all the social and financial relations that produce it and sustain it. ♦

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

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NOTES

1 This article belongs to an effort to ground ‘crisis’ and its after-effects to an academic glossary and debate. An earlier version of some of the arguments made here has been published on the Cultural Anthropology website (see Papailias 2011).

2 A famous slogan coming from a Greek advertisement for mobile services. The protagonist – a hot dog seller – promises more ingredients than the other ones, building in a way a promise-land of goods that is within a grasp.

3 It is very common in today’s anti-memorandum parties to take on discourses of ‘intrusion of the banking lobby’, ‘global loan sharks’, ‘media’s terrorism for the manipulation of voters’ etc.

4 It was one the basic instructions former prime minister K. Karamanlis (2004- 2009) gave to his ministers, to persuade the people of Greece that his government had no intention of being implicated in scandals and corruption.

5 One of the most well known and repeated slogans of the socialist party of PA.SO.K. The slogan attacks the right-wing party, by ‘reminding’ the society the seven years of military junta.

6 It was the main slogan G.A. Papandreou used for PA.SO.K. pre-election campaign of 2009. At the second month of his presidency he called the IMF for financial support.

7 I make this speculation due to the fact that Post-Polity’s ideological platform was built in difference to junta’s military governments and royalist regimes.

8 It is important to note that the main policy Golden Dawn is practicing the few months of its parliamentary service includes attacks and persecutions of immigrants and illegal vendors. Many times it responds to calls of frustrated citizens who are unable to get help from the police. One of the latest ‘rumors’ is an attack to a public hospital’s doctor who asked for a 2.500 euro baksheesh to perform an operation. Despite what is true or false, many people have cultivated an image for Golden Dawn as the punisher who will cleanse Greece from corruption. In addition, Golden Dawn says that ‘gays’ are the next target after immigrants. The first attacks on them being a fact.

9 A slogan spread throughout the internet social networks among young people, at the time of Greece’s most recent elections.

10 An estimation based on the 2011 Greek population census.

11 Youths in Greece face most of the consequences of crisis. According to the National Statistical Service of Greece, the 55 per cent of the population under the age of 25 is unemployed (referring to July of 2012).

12 I am using – in an ironic political way – the same words Mazower uses to describe the feelings the philhellenists had at the time of Greece’s independence war.

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
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THE FALL OF THE 'PURIFIED' COMMUNITY: *CRISIS, TRANSFORMATION & COLLECTIVE ACTION IN GREECE*

TEXT & PHOTOGRAPHY BY YANNIS KALLIANOS
(UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

The article explores the recent social and political transformations in Greece through events of collective action in the public space of Athens. Drawing on Richard Sennet's notion of the 'myth of the purified community' it is argued that these events demonstrate a gradual disintegration of the social imaginary of the idea of community in various scales (national, local, etc). This argument builds on the indistinction between public and private as reflected in these events in Athens. By providing ethnographic examples from both before and after the economic collapse, the article explains crisis as a long process of contesting the sovereignty of the state and institutions in Greece and how these previously downplayed contestations were rendered visible in the Greek public sphere. This visibility shakes the foundations of the notion of a homogeneous community as it is established by the 'social contract'.

Ever since the beginning of the 'sudden' economic meltdown the Greek republic/nation-state has officially entered an era of crisis, and thus, an era of transformation. During the last three years a series of austerity measures have been imposed which have led to the destabilization of parliamentary authority. To withstand this institutional demise the Greek state was forced to make a number of constitutional changes. Despite these and the June 2012 elections, which provided juridical legitimacy to these changes, Greek society is oscillating between separation and cohesion. What is actually reflected in the gradual challenge of institutional power is a contest of values, social practices and established beliefs in the social field.

What is at issue here is the collapse of a common interpretation of community. Gupta and Ferguson have argued that the idea of "community" is never simply the recognition of cultural similarity or social contiguity but a categorical identity that is premised on various forms of exclusion and constructions of otherness' (1997: 13). For Sennet (2004) the notion of community is essentially built on the basic postulate that people belong to a community and participate in it because they are the same. This is a basic feature of what he calls the 'myth of a purified community' (2004). According to this idea common identity is constructed and/or imagined in a process of myth making that creates a sense of

togetherness and solidarity of that community.

I draw on Sennet's idea to explain a mounting social conflict from below, challenging ideas of social and political unity and thus the notion of the homogeneous society. Following this idea I explore events of public conflict in Athens as the sites that reflect a public process of social separation and cohesion based on the rising indistinction between public and private.

Martha Ackelsberg argues that 'there is no typology or set of procedures that will allow us to draw a line between public and private that will be appropriate for all times and circumstances' (2009: 85). This idea, which has been explored by feminist theory and identity politics, is related to the collapse of the myth of the purified community. This myth is fundamentally established on the clear distinction between public and private because it requires withdrawal in private spaces and a distance from non-mediated collective action.

CRISIS AS TRANSFORMATION AND THE TRUTH OF THE REPUBLIC

A month after the second consecutive elections in Greece, in July 2012, the new minister of labour participated in a meeting with representatives of GSEE¹, SEV² and other syndicates where he referred to the need for a 'new social contract'. This was not the first time that

members of the Greek parliament urged such an agreement. During their pre-election campaign the three parties which currently constitute the new coalition government³ all referred to the need for a 'new social contract' in their declarations of the forthcoming change.

In all of its definitions and expressions, the term crisis is intrinsically connected with meanings of decision making that could change the course of events and ideas of criticism or judgement (the Greek term *krisis* means both crisis and judgement). Its political connotations are also invested with the idea of change. According to Koselleck, from the 18th century onwards the term crisis 'pointed to fundamental changes in constitutions in which the alternatives were the survival or demise of a political entity and its constitutional order; but it could also describe a simple change of government' (2006: 369).

The reference to the announcements for a 'new social contract' by the recently elected government is valuable in our discussion as a process which is indistinct from the idea of crisis as change. But we should be careful here. It is not the economic expressions of crisis which are reflected in the 'new social contract' but essentially the meaning of crisis as the moment of a truth (Lynteris, 2011: 207) which needs to be established. The process of its legitimization (social rather than juridical) requires this moment of truth; we can also name it the high point of realization of a 'situation'. It is this awareness (of a truth) which proclaims a necessity for change. The 'new social contract' then is the forceful expression of this change and requires not merely the awareness of a truth but also, its recognition as the only truth. As we shall see it is the monopoly of that truth which is contested in the events of collective practice and conflict in Athens.

Immediately a few questions emerge: Who are the actual recipients of this plea for change? What are the main features that constitute this change? What is at issue here is the very nature of sovereignty.

If we follow Foucault's argument in his 1975-76 lectures that 'sovereignty is always shaped from below, and by those who are afraid' (2003: 96) we notice that consensus, as the fundamental agreement which establishes the sovereign, is confining as a process between two

distinctive sides; that is, the sovereign and the people. The latter, under the classification 'We,' is thus 'purified' as a homogenous community. The discourse over a 'new social contract' then is necessary in order to remind everyone of the explicit and implicit bipartition which is necessary for any western Democracy; the people (the *Demos*) and the State (*kratos*) as two complete, distinctively identified parties.

COMMUNITIES IN SUBTLE CONFLICT; PROCESSES OF SEPARATION AND COHESION

This crisis is in its essence an ontological crisis. Douzinas explains this as an identity crisis which has been triggered by the collapse of the economic model of neoliberalism (2011: 138). As I will try to demonstrate, what is reflected in the context of the crisis in cases of public turmoil is a change in the way people give accounts of what is of value in the social world, and the way we make sense of ourselves in it. This has not only led to a dynamic challenge of institutions and sovereignty from the wider part of society, but also, exposed in the public sphere, differentiations which constitute the social field and were previously concealed under the veil of national reconciliation. It therefore shuts the homogeneous interpretations of the people (the *Demos*) as a 'purified' community.

It was the murder of fifteen year old Alexandros Grigoropoulos by police in Exarcheia on December 6, 2008 which unleashed a collective political force whose dynamic collective practice and geographical (spatial) reach had never been seen in Greek territory until then.

In particular, the pattern of squatting public universities and city halls flourished during that period. These buildings were not merely sites of political struggle or strongholds of militant practices, but rather, they became the space where other socialities could develop.

In the occupation of the Athens University of Economics and Business (ASOEE), a daily anti-hierarchical, anti-commercial collective kitchen had been organized, while in the occupied city hall in Agios Dimitrios, the main assembly provided free Greek language lessons to immigrants. These actions suggest another experience of what it means to participate in the community.



FIGURE 1 The occupation of the City Hall in Agios Dimitrios, a suburb in southern Athens. The large banner reads: ‘You disgust us! The interplay between politicians, priests, journalists, judges, lawyers, cops, pimps and drug dealers has created a big trash pile. We spit on you’.

Even more, these actions put forward another understanding of everyday life. From this point of view the events of the December 2008 revolt can be seen as a disagreement on how we understand and imagine what constitutes this ‘We’.

This was particularly evident in the temporary occupations of the ‘General Confederation of Greek Workers’ (GSEE) on December 17, 2008 in Athens, the ‘Journalists’ Union of the Athens Daily Newspapers’ (ESIEA) during the first days of January 2009 and the Greek National Opera on January 30, 2009. These occupations functioned under the scope of a specific criticism concerning the official and institutional feature of these spaces, but also a general scepticism regarding the neoliberal structure of everyday life. In a communiqué published by the assembly of the occupied Opera House we read:

December’s rebellion, while drawing strength from all previous social struggles, laid the ground for a generalized resistance against everything that offends us and enslaves our lives. It triggered a fight for life that is being disparaged on a daily basis. As an answer to those who understand rebellion as a short lived firecracker, and discard and undermine it by simply saying “life



FIGURE 2 The occupation of the GSEE building in central Athens. The main banner reads: ‘The self-organization of workers will be the end of bosses.’

goes on”, we say that the struggle not only continues but has already set our lives on a new basis. (2009)⁴

What can be argued about this period is that the socio-political framework in which the daily events were taking place forced people to re-position in the social field and thus engage with the commons in a more immediate way, exposing vital differences in the way people imagine what a community is.

The December 2008 revolt initiated a rupture of the kind of neo-liberal individuality which is prevalent in modern societies. As Douzinas explains, ‘the December insurrection disrupted the settled state of recognized differences: what was invisible, unspoken, and unspeakable (under the pre-existing rules) came to the fore’ (2010: 286).

In the midst of tear gas, burnt and looted stores, occupations, and stones and marbles cast at riot police, a set of unmediated interactions matured into collective action. Stavrides (2010) explains this process as osmotic relations between identities. According to him identities were renegotiated through collective action. ‘In open assemblies organized in all occupied places, people tended to describe proposals for



FIGURE 3 A big banner during the occupation of the National Opera House. The banner is a painting of a performing ballet dancer wearing a tear gas mask while holding a petrol bomb.

action, to describe dreams and values rather than passively describe disempowering situations or criticize others just for being others' (Stavrídes 2010). These practices, which questioned the established power, created a critical path towards the public sphere which was not state-related. This had as a result the gradual development of a multiplicity of schisms in the public sphere since the way people interacted and interrelated in everyday life was inevitably formative of the event of the revolt.

Another aspect that was constitutive of the revolt during that period was the strengthening of political cultures which challenged parliamentary democracy and institutional power in general. This deep distrust towards these structures had already become evident in previous years. In 2006-07 the student movement rose to oppose the reform of a law concerning public education that the right wing government of New Democracy wanted to pass. In the streets the students chanted 'either with the ties, or with the hoods' and marked Athenian walls with the slogan 'Varkiza is cancelled, we are at war'⁵. A few months later in the summer of 2007 thousands gathered out-

side parliament to protest against the failure of the state to prevent one of the biggest natural disasters in Greece's modern history: a fire that burned down more than 268.834 hectares of forested land in August 2007. The sit-in was organized mainly through the internet. It was during that time that the radical slogan "burn the parliament" was adopted as a popular demand.

Since April/May 2010, when the Greek government officially contracted an agreement for a bailout with IMF and EU, a series of austerity measures have caused structural changes in the everyday life of people in Greece. Unemployment is mounting and the public sector is gradually being privatized. The number of homeless people has increased by more than 25% and images of people of any age searching in trash bins for either food or materials has become an everyday phenomenon since early 2010. These structural changes have also affected the way people participate in the commons in Athens and Greece in general.

On May 25, 2011 hundreds of thousands of people began to gather in Syntagma (constitution) Square. The square is just across from Parliament and next to one of the most expensive shopping streets in Athens, Ermou Street. Those who took to the streets that day answered a call which had spread around the social media on the previous days with the intention of openly challenging political authority and the government's agenda for new austerity measures. This call resulted in an occupation of Syntagma Square which lasted until July 2011.

The open public space of the square was gradually organized according to the needs and desires of the people who occupied it. During these protests a multitude of people occupied both Amalias Street in front of Parliament and the public space of Syntagma Square. These two spaces are both separated and united by a large marble staircase which leads to the metro station situated on the square.

Since day one of the occupation a subtle separation was identified between those who protested in Amalias Street and the people who organized in the public space of the square. This political difference was reflected in the way each space was organized. In Amalias Street protesters holding Greek flags would target their

emotions of anger, mistrust and bewilderment directly against the Parliament building. People shouted slogans such as ‘thieves’ and ‘burn Parliament, it is a whorehouse’ as well as pointing at the building with cheap laser pointers.

On the other hand, on Syntagma Square people gradually organized a network of spaces under the political framework of the main assembly. Tents had been set all over the grass to host the various groups which had been created, while statues, benches and trees became the formative material for creative interventions, graffiti and slogans.

The differences between these two forms of political practice have been classified with the distinction between the ‘upper square’ (pano plateia) and ‘lower square’ (kato plateia) (Stavrou 2011, Leontidou 2012:306). What is distinctive in this case is that even though quite schematic, this distinction reveals the heterogeneity of the multitude which participated in the occupation of Syntagma Square. The public space of Syntagma Square became a site of intense social interaction, a place where emotions, ideas and differences were exchanged, resolved, disputed and even confronted. By doing this people reclaimed their right to negotiate their identities and the idea of what it means to be part of a community, putting into question its homogeneity. From this point of view, in Syntagma Square people challenged the very role of the state as institutional mediator. As a result, the Greek republic resorted to force to contest and ultimately reclaim this public space, acting to restore the dipole between Demos (as the homogeneous national community) and State (the sovereign). On June 15 and June 28-29, 2011 the police violently attacked and dispersed the people in Syntagma Square. For several hours the public space of Parliament and the nearby avenues, alleys and streets were the site of irregular urban warfare.

In the next few months these antitheses sharpened. On October 20, 2011, the second day of a two day national strike, PAME, the ‘All-Workers Militant Front’ trade union of the Greek Communist Party (KKE), joined the protests for the first time and blocked off Parliament. According to them they tried to prevent MPs from entering the building to vote for new austerity measures. Their human chain around Parlia-

ment faced the crowd holding helmets and carrying red flag bats. Soon it became obvious that only KKE members were allowed to protest in Amalias Street. For anarchists, leftists and others the communists were actually protecting Parliament, securing the voting process. Riot police never actually interfered when clashes began between the communists and several other groups. In the next few hours small-scale civil strife took place. Several people were injured in the clashes which involved petrol bombs, rocks, wooden sticks and man to man fights. Despite the deep antagonism between communists and anti-authoritarians/anarchists in Greece, the level of violence had never been raised so high.



FIGURE 4 A slogan in central Athens, June 26, 2011. It reads: ‘Class Civil War’.

THE RISE OF NEW COMMUNITIES

Vradis asserts that the paradigm of the occupation of Syntagma Square suggests a termination of the spatial contract. According to this idea public space can be contested as long as the practice of the contest is temporary (Vradis, 2011:214). This permanence, demonstrated by the persistence to remain in the public sphere (and public space), contributes to the indistinction between public and private. When these political events acquire a permanent feature people engage with each other in a non-mediated manner, inventing new social tools.

In Greece, the distinction between private and public traverses almost all spatial arrangements. Home (oikos) is primarily a private space. The idea that “the house guards intimate secrets” (Herzfeld, 2005:216) is evi-

dent even in the architectonic arrangements of doors, windows and balconies. This is strongly rooted around the idea that ‘ta en oiko mi en dhimo’, or, what happens at home (oikos) –privacy- stays at home (Herzfeld, 2005:142).

However, the passage from private to public space is not new in the Greek context. As has been observed, the coffee-houses (kafeneio), until recently an exclusive male space (Herzfeld, 1985:52), used to be the place where politicians addressed the community (Herzfeld, 1985:119) and are identified as the space where community narratives intersect, coalesce or collide with each other. It is by any means a public space. Perhaps then it is also the strengthening of the private-public indistinction which has led people to attack, either verbally or physically, members of parliament (mostly those who have voted for the austerity measures) in taverns, restaurants and coffee houses or even to organize protests outside their houses.

The cases examined are paradigmatic of the indistinction between private and public which was promoted in collective action. In the December 2008 revolt, mourning had become altogether a public matter in political terms. By referring to the collapse of the myth of a homogeneous community, I argue for the rising realization that what people call ‘We’ is actually elusive.

One of the effects that this has had in the public sphere is the attempt to re-invent this myth on the basis of a more homogeneous and dynamic, but more unstable, framework, namely the rise of neo-fascists⁶.

However, at the same time, this collapse also gave way to other modes of social conduct and provided common sites where new communities could be re-invented which will not be constituted on homogeneity and exclusion but rather the opposite. Stavrides’s (2011) has explained the formation of such communities as communities in movement in reference to the recent phenomena of collective action in Athens. He understands these communities in the absence of any hierarchical format as well as lacking a ‘predominance of a central space’ (2011:6). This crisis, rather than establishing the one truth of the sovereign, is tearing it down into a multitude of truths. ☞

NOTES

- 1 General Confederation of Greek Workers.
- 2 Hellenic Federation of Enterprises.
- 3 The coalition government is formed by New Democracy, PASOK (Panhellenic Socialist Movement, and DIMAR (Democratic Left).
- 4 <http://apeleftheromenilyriki.blogspot.co.uk/2009/01/rebelling-interactive-opera-theatre.html>
- 5 This a direct reference to the Varkiza pact signed in 1945 between the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs (supported by the British) and the Secretary of the Communist Party of Greece (KKE). It ordered the disarming and destruction of ELAS (National People’s Army of Liberation) which was the military arm of the left-wing National Liberation Front (EAM).
- 6 I am referring to the neo-fascist party Golden Dawn which currently holds 18 seats in Parliament since the June 2012 elections.

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
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All photos by Yannis Kallianos, except Figure 1 courtesy of the 'Agios Dimitrios People's Open Assembly'; http://katadi-madim.blogspot.gr/2008/12/blog-post_8471.html



ESSAYS



REFLECTIONS ON POLITICS AND CAPITAL AMONG TEA PARTIERS

BY THOMAS W. FLEMING

JOHN:

THAT'S WHAT IT'S ALL ABOUT - IT'S ABOUT FREE TRADE. IT'S ABOUT BUYIN' AND SELLIN' STUFF. [...] AND WE DON'T WANT TO BE FETTERED. IF I TELL YOU THAT THIS WATER IS THE BEST WATER IN ST. CHARLES AND IT'S GONNA COST YOU A BUCK A GLASS [...] AND ACROSS THE STREET THEY'RE GIVIN' IT AWAY FREE ... YOU DIDN'T MIND PAYIN' A DOLLAR A GLASS. [I]T'S ALL ABOUT KEEPIN' GOVERNMENT OUT OF YOUR LIFE, BECAUSE PEOPLE, GIVEN FREEDOM, WILL BUY AND SELL AND CREATE COMMERCE. AND WHAT ELSE IS THERE, YOU KNOW?

John – a late-50's Tea Party leader and business owner in St Charles, Illinois – used this parable to illustrate the naturalness of capitalist exchange, the productive benefits of 'freedom'. We sat together at lunch in downtown St Charles while he attempted to explain, with sometimes frustrating brevity, what the Tea Party was about. He and his consociates are predominantly small business owners concerned with the unfettered operation of free market principles and the individual's *right* to engage in it and create capital, believing that only that political reality which best protects this right is the ideal one. For them, this reality is fast receding, being coopted by the 'Left' (variably called 'socialists', 'Marxists', or 'Communists') who – either mistakenly or not – desire control at the expense of individual liberty. Our conversation was punctuated by exemplars of individuals and corporations who, when left to their devices ('unfettered'), reaped the benefits of their labour, but equally by the prognosis that 'what's going on' is quite the opposite – that our rights to create capital are being abrogated. In what follows, I attempt a descriptive and theoretical overview of how we can approach such neoliberal political discourse, and argue (following Marx and Althusser) that how we understand politics in an anthropological sense turns on the self-referential, self-justifying logic of ideology.

Firstly, I will reflect on the sort of reality that John advocates. This end will be descriptive,

but there is an important methodological and theoretical point to be made. I take as fundamental the notion that, following Benveniste, it is in and through language that we constitute ourselves as subjects, thereby establishing our subjectivity (1971: 224). I will not analyze Benveniste's claim, but rather presuppose that it is through our (intersubjective) interactions with one another that we constitute subjectivity and, crucially for our analysis, a subjunctive modality (i.e., the way things *ought* to be). Following Althusser (1977), I take as central the claim that subjectivity (the recognition that you and I are subjects) occurs within ideology. Likewise, it seems uncontroversial to claim that a subjunctive modality necessary for conceptualizing political ends occurs *within* ideologies. Thus, we might say knowledge about ourselves, our relation to others and – further removed – how the world ought to be, is inherently recursive and reflexive.

Secondly, an anthropological analysis of politics cannot rely on what I call the *politics-qua-process* view, that is, the view that politics can be analyzed as *sui generis* functional institutions that are somehow extrinsic to our interactions and conceptualizations. It seems to me that while 'capitalism' and the 'free market' are fundamental concepts of an ideal political reality to Tea Partiers, how we study them should rest on the recognition that our subjectivity, being *in ideology*, is what renders any political reality seemingly 'natural'.

The Tea Party is a self-professedly grass-roots political movement in the United States, that started in 2009. As such its constituent Tea Parties vary in size, demographic composition, and in their organizational activities. While loosely organized, the Tea Parties consistently promote a triad of core principles: (1) fiscal responsibility, (2) constitutionally limited government, and (3) open markets. Many Tea Parties also promote what are deemed 'social' values like 'traditional families'. Furthermore, there is a clear distinction between the ideal political reality and the unjust political reality, the just political reality

being protected by a just political system, such as that conceived by the Founding Fathers. A 'just' political reality is one in which the economic liberties of individuals and organizations of individuals within the free market are maintained. Contrarily, an unjust political reality is one in which individual liberties are abated by corruption, a disequilibrium in the function of the free market, the possibility of which presents a perpetual moral panic due to a perceived devolution into tyranny.

John claims that he 'joined' the Tea Party at the age of 15 when he '*decided to believe in the Constitution*'. This is not hyperbolic because there is a sense in which he and others believe in continuity of their political orientations and transcendent values. Despite this 'transcendence', there is difficulty in talking about Tea Party activists as a 'group' on the level of ethnographic fact-finding and anthropological analysis. On the ethnographic level, John, for one, asserts that it is a loose organization, a 'confederation' further subdivided by 'confederations'. Indeed, the Tea Party is not a political party in the traditional sense. Put generally, it is a collection of 'civic organizations' whose aim is to network and educate its membership, increasing its ranks with 'informed voters' so as to influence the political system. The operation of these groups occurs on a local scale, and is usually managed by a few leaders. Meetings of the group occur normally once or twice a month, serving as informational sessions where specialist speakers give talks on politically prescient issues. Other activities include poll watching, marching/canvassing for candidates, holding rallies, public events, and much more.

Importantly, John rejected that the Tea Party is monolithic, instead asserting that its anti-structure reveals people acting in their *individual capacities* as, above all, concerned citizens, 'people on the street'. This requires an anthropological definition of politics that broadly reflects the subjunctive character of political *goals* (of ideal states of affairs) rather than reflection of process, since it seems clear that 'political activism' involves more than participation in political structures. In one possible definition, *politics* denotes an activity that is public rather than private, concerns *public* goals, and involves a

differential of power among the individuals of the group in question (Swartz et al 2002: 105). Studying politics thus involves studying the 'processes involved in determining and implementing public goals and in differential achievement and use of power by members of the group concerned with those goals' (Swartz et al 2002: 107).

However, this definition fails to take into account the fact that an understanding of politics should not be simply processual, but effective. While the purpose of Tea Parties is partly to influence the 'process' of the political system through activism, their continued organization and operation owes much more to common concerns among like-minded citizens who are united by a concern for their liberties and the seeming rationality and commonsense of what they advocate. As such, I prefer a broader definition from Latour, where politics is defined as the progressive attainment of a common world (2010: 60). We might conceptualize the goal of Tea Party politics to be a reality constituted by free market principles, which best reflects the natural abilities and rights of individuals.

Whatever we mean by any political activity, at least regarding Western societies, depends on the conceptual distinction between the 'State' and 'civil society'. It is clear that the Tea Partiers make a distinction between (what is currently or potentially) a hegemonic, partied State and the heterogeneous 'grassroots' populace. But how do we make anthropological sense of this and what are the implications? As Marx observed, there is a presupposition that civil society is composed of 'atoms', 'being[s] without relations, self sufficient' (1963: 225), and it is often taken that the State in some way constrains these atoms that comprise civil society. Marx argued this was not the case – the State does not hold together 'atoms' of civil society, but rather the 'atoms' of civil society are the products of 'imagination' (1963: 226). To think otherwise is due to the pretension that, as Chabal and Daloz observed, civil society has been seen in Western society as largely outside of culture, the idea that democratization is necessarily derived from the 'self-acquired power of civil society to check the hegemony of the State' (2006: 219-20). Indeed, while the vast assemblages of civil

society may be defined in contradistinction and by a self-consciousness of relative externality to the State (Bayart 1986: 117), any politico-scientific study ought to take note of this historical particularity of the concept and its semiotic dimensions.

Civil society and the State might be conceptually distinct from an emic perspective, but they cannot be taken as *sui generis*. They are embedded in the ‘social fabric’ and embody a particular manifestation of political accountability that is itself historically particular (Chabal 1986: 12). Accountability, to John, rests on the assumption that ‘capitalism’ and the ‘free markets’ are fundamentally constitutive of individual *liberty*, and this influences and underwrites the perceived goals of the Tea Parties. Such principles are coterminous with *American* values, John suggests:

“Limited government, fiscal responsibility, free enterprise. [...] Not managed enterprise – free enterprise.”

“So, why does [the Tea Party] adopt those principles and not others?”, I asked.

To which John responded: “Well, those are the principles of the country. The business of the United States is business. That’s what the United States is all about.”

Accountability vis-a-vis protecting these rights is legitimized by historical or textual reference and by the self-referential nature of ideology. I will address the former now. It is oftentimes held as an ideal that ‘informed voters’ familiarize themselves with historical and philosophical texts, including the works of the Founding Fathers (the Federalist Papers), classical conservatives (Edmund Burke), and a significant amount of history. Superlative value is placed on history and philosophy, since they claim that the purpose of their organization is to educate and to propagate this information in such a way that it influences the way their members engage in the political system. For example, what is almost unconditionally appropriated by Tea Partiers is the Lockean notion that rights of appropriation are given in nature, elemental in a *lex naturalis*, and that this provides a basis for arguments for capitalism. Political structures are only second-

ary (minimal in comparison) to a pre-existing, transcendent freedom of the individual to engage in capitalist production.

The logic underlying a Lockean conception of property is equally extensible to capital. Marx suggested that capital was historically opposed to landed property, and first took the form of money, and continues to take the form of money which is continually transformed into capital by ‘definite processes’ (1909: 108). His descriptions of these processes are concise and denote the exchanges by which a free market *ought* to function on the Tea Party view. The following schemas represent these ‘processes’, where ‘C’ denotes ‘commodity’, and ‘M’ denotes ‘money’:

1. C-M-C: selling in order to buy
2. M-C-M: buying in order to sell
 - 2.a M-C: a purchase
 - 2.b C-M: a sale
3. M-M: exchange of money for money – the consequence of the transformation, M-C-M.
 - 3.a M-M’: exchange of money for more money – the consequence of the transformation, M-C-M’
4. M-C-M’: buying in order to sell dearer

Whereas schema 1 represents ‘simple circulation’, where the values attain a status ‘independent of their use-values’ in the form of money (i.e., ‘M’) in the form of exchange values (Marx 1909: 112), the last formula is ‘buying in order to sell, or, more accurately, buying in order to sell dearer.’ The latter represents the ‘general formula of capital as it appears *prima facie* within the sphere of circulation’ (Ibid.: 113). If we suppose for the moment that this represents how Tea Partiers conceptualize their engagement in a capitalist economy, the Lockean notion that individuals are disposed to property *naturally*, in acquiring it and in propagating it – such that it is an inalienable right – is presupposed in the right of individuals to engage in the ‘definite processes’ behind capitalist production.

I also mentioned the self-referential nature of ideology. I have moved purposefully from John’s description of what ‘freedom’ engenders to a more general analysis of familiar liberal

economic postulates. Describing the conditions of capitalist production is apt because Marx recognized that productive capacities, our material circumstances, engender ideology; indeed, consciousness can never be ‘anything else but their actual life process’ and the ‘production of ideas’ is ‘at first directly interwoven with the material activity and the material intercourse’ of persons (1963: 89). Moreover, fundamental to ideology is the recognition that its supposed ‘practical role’, its logic, and ‘conditions of existence’ are accompanied by a belief in their supposed necessity (Althusser 1977: 230). That is to say, ideology is the *lived relation* between people and the world, and as such, the ‘naturalness’ of capitalism, or a particular political structure conducive to it, is sustained because it is subjectively *known*. Describing and analyzing the beliefs of Tea Partiers cannot be done by taking capitalism *or* political systems as *sui generis* sets of laws – explicit symbolizations with explicit meaning – since, following Cohen (1985: 309), boundaries enacted by ‘bounded’ groups often subsume ‘structures’ and perhaps even processes, and are integrated into intra-communal communication in reconstituting meaning.

So, the meaning and social significance does not lie in the reality of the ‘free market’, but in symbolic statements, as Cohen notes, ‘designed to perpetuate the boundary’ of a community (1985: 309). Indeed, the ‘definite processes’ characteristic of capitalism are necessary for their ideal political reality, but this necessity cannot be based on points of continuity or discontinuity at the level of *objectivity* since this is not coterminous with a study of *subjective* speech acts, of propositions, of the mundane, that is, the purview of ethnographic description and anthropological analysis. Here we should take Benveniste to heart and notice that language is not simply a tool for communication but is the very condition of subjectivity, and it seems, by implication, to show that ideology (assuming it ‘interpellates’ subjectivity itself) is intrinsically intersubjective.

John’s understanding of what the ‘free market’ and ‘capitalism’ is and how this relates to his idea of a just political reality is inseparable from the idea of a ‘common world’, the subjunctive end that reflects his ontology. The point

of this reflection, of course, is to notice that talking about ‘free markets’, ‘capitalism’ and ‘economics’, generally, is problematic since what are *prima facie* objective entities must be taken constitutively as elements of an ideology which determines the limits of subjectivity, of possibility, and the seeming necessity of social (and political) forms. A proper anthropological understanding of politics, however, yields a clearer picture of how they can be analyzed. ♦

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MASJID PUTRA (PUTRA MOSQUE)

PUTRAJAYA: *A CAPITAL FOR THE FUTURE*

BY STAFFORD D. OLIVER
PHOTOGRAPHY BY SARAH MOSER

This essay considers capital beyond its usual economic context and explores its meaning in two different but related senses of the word: the seat of government and an entity that is recognized as valuable. I refer to a transformation of capital by discussing the city of Putrajaya in Malaysia. The city was built as a part of the government's plans for the future, specifically the Vision 2020 national development initiative, so as to implement the ultimate objective of a 'fully developed' Malaysia. It is also the location of the Prime Minister and federal bureaucracy. Despite all of the plans, visions, and construction, the future remains unknown and Putrajaya as a capital is not yet finished.

'IT IS THE FUTURE THAT HAUNTS US WITH ITS ORACULAR DOOM' (BAXSTROM 2008: 84).

'HOPEFULLY THE MALAYSIAN WHO IS BORN TODAY AND IN THE YEARS TO COME WILL BE THE LAST GENERATION OF OUR CITIZENS WHO WILL BE LIVING IN A COUNTRY THAT IS CALLED "DEVELOPING". THE ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE THAT WE SHOULD AIM FOR IS A MALAYSIA THAT IS A FULLY DEVELOPED COUNTRY BY THE YEAR 2020'.

- TUN DR MAHATHIR BIN MOHAMAD, MALAYSIA: THE WAY FORWARD, 28 FEBRUARY 1991 (1997 [1991]b: 403)

Putrajaya is a recently built planned-city in Malaysia, south of Kuala Lumpur (KL) in a region called the Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC). I contend that the city refers to the transformation of capital in a double sense of the word. Successive Malaysian governments have had plans for such a city since the 1970s (King 2008: 112-113), but the building of Putrajaya began in the mid-1990s by the administration of Tun Dr Mahathir bin Mohamad during his

30-year national development initiative called *Wawasan 2020* or Vision 2020. Using the city to discuss capital in its common connotation as it relates to capitalism would be very easy, since Vision 2020 sets out to achieve certain economic targets and make Malaysia a powerful actor in the world economy (Mahathir 1997 [1991]b: 403; see Greider 1997 [2004]). However, capital is not only economic. Putrajaya is explored as a capital of a different kind in two related contexts.

Capital should not only be considered as wealth, profit, and investments. More than that, capital is also something that is recognized as valuable. Addressing capital as a valuable based on recognition shows how it can have various meanings and levels of significance in different contexts, for recognition is based on familiarity. Additionally, capital may also refer to a city or town that is the seat of government. KL remains Malaysia's official capital and home of the Sultan and Parliament. Meanwhile, Putrajaya is the location of the Office of the Prime Minister, the most powerful politician, in the Perdana Putra building, along with most of the federal bureaucratic agencies which bear the authority to act on the government's behalf (King 2008: 153). These two definitions of capital are used to show that capital is not so much a fixed entity but is more involved in processes of becoming. In other words, capital is still being formed and is not yet finished. Capital probably will always be transforming. The word probably is used in order to highlight the uncertainty of what capital means in a given context and how it can and might change. This leads to a third concern: the future.

The future is a difficult subject to cover as I am not an oracle. Nevertheless, the future is emphasized in works about Malaysia, including families and relatedness (Carsten 1997: 257), urban life (Baxstrom 2012; Baxstrom 2011: 62-63), and of course politics (Robertson 1984; Mahathir 1997 [1991]b: 403; Ibrahim 1996). A point needs to be made, though, in order to address the future. Jane Guyer (2007: 409-410) distinguished between the 'near future' and the 'distant future' and noted that, as opposed to the 'near future', the 'distant future' is not about maintaining a continuity with the present. The interplay between these two proximities of the future and their distance to the present is note-

worthy. The near future is 'a process of implicating oneself in the ongoing life of the social and material world' (Guyer 2007: 409). The distant future of a plan like Vision 2020, set to take 30 years to implement, relies more on 'emergent horizons of imagination' (Guyer 2007: 413). The distant future is not necessarily connected to the present and thus involves uncertainty. As much as there is hope, the future can also be risky. Potential outcomes can be dangerous and frightening as it is possible to imagine many possibilities, from triumph to doom, which cannot be completely known in the present. Even though the future is uncertain, its presence can still be felt.

The two quotes from Mahathir and Richard Baxstrom which began this essay illustrate concepts about the future plus the recognized value of capital. Together these statements may seem contradictory, since I mostly discuss an optimistic period in Malaysia from 1991 through 1997. These years, at the beginning of the boom of the 1990s and just before the Asian Financial Crisis, brought large-scale economic growth and optimism (Greider 1997 [2004]: 163). Mahathir made his hopeful statement during the February 1991 'The Way Forward' speech in which he announced a vision for Malaysia's future (Mahathir 1997 [1991]b: 403). Before exploring the vision, it's insightful to address the ominous, scary, pessimistic, but accurate words from a moving chapter by Baxstrom (2008). His concept of a haunting future can finely describe the Malaysian government's perceptions of the future during the Mahathir era. I'm not suggesting that the future is a ghost, but I will show that Mahathir and his UMNO (United Malays National Organization) party colleagues addressed the future as an ambiguous, unknown and physical presence.

Hope was very much about making the future the now. Yet, the future has and continues to remain unknown. Consider the 1996 book *The Asian Renaissance* by Anwar Ibrahim, written when he was the Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia under Mahathir. 'The future is embedded in time present. Yet, its shape and character is a matter of conjecture' (Ibrahim 1996: 127). He admitted that the future is strange despite its looming presence and closeness to the present. The future is that which has not yet

happened, in spite of all of the speculations, dreams, guesses, hypotheses, plans, and feelings of imminence. Thus, uncertainty is a feature of the future. As A.F. Robertson (1984:1) wrote, 'insofar as we are dealing with a future which is always uncertain, planning is a hazardous activity'. Like Baxstrom (2008) claimed, the uncertainty and probability of what will and may happen can be very disturbing and unsettling. Plans emerge as attempts to grapple with the unknown (un)certainty of the not yet.


BUILDING FOR THE FUTURE

Malaysia in the 1990s, similar to many other countries, was determined to make the ultimate objective of a 'fully developed' future a reality. Through library-based research, I have analysed publications, policies and sentiments from the era. The most prominent person during this time was Mahathir. Malaysia's longest serving Prime Minister from 1981-2003, Mahathir dominated political life during his years in office (see Hilley 2001). At the inaugural address before the first meeting of the Malaysia Business Council, an organisation of which he was the first chairman, Mahathir delivered 'The Way Forward' in which he outlined a vision for Malaysia's future (Mahathir 1997 [1991]a; Mahathir 1997 [1991] b). The speech identified nine goals/challenges which he thought that Malaysia should implement and/or overcome in order to become a 'fully developed' country by the year 2020 (Mahathir 1997 [1991]b). Vision 2020, comprehensive and ambitious, seeks to create by the year 2020 Malaysia as 'a nation that is fully developed along all the dimensions – economically, politically, socially, spiritually, psychologically and culturally' (Mahathir 1997 [1991]b: 404). The government proposed an absolute, detailed and concrete version of the future. As a national development plan, economics is a part of Vision 2020. 'The ninth is the challenge of establishing a prosperous society, with an economy that is fully competitive, dynamic, robust and resilient' (Mahathir 1997 [1991]b: 405). The realistic goal sought to make the country's 2020 GDP 8 times larger than it was in 1990, which would require growth at seven per cent annually (Mahathir 1997 [1991]b: 408). These and

other aspects of Vision 2020's capital can be addressed in subsequent research, though. My focus here is the question: 'How is it possible to plan without a concrete sense of the future' (Baxstrom 2012: 136)? With such comprehensive visions and swift efforts, the government tried to remove the uncertainty of the future and attempted to literally construct it. From the start, it seems that the goals were supposed to not eventually lead to but become the future.

Ahmad Sarji, the editor of Malaysia's Vision 2020: Understanding the Concept, Implications & Challenges, a lengthy book with chapters from academics, politicians and business leaders which outlines Vision 2020, explained that, 'a vision is a mental image of a future state of being which can be clearly perceived to be better or more attractive than the present state' (Ahmad 1997: xiii). Such mental images were quickly conveyed and gained a physical presence through large-scale projects. There are several examples including the Petronas Towers in Kuala Lumpur City Centre, built as the world's tallest building, and the Kuala Lumpur International Airport (see Bunnell 2004). Literally between those two, emerged a capital building initiative that served as an example of what the future will be like and a method to make Mahathir's imagination a physical reality, objectifying the ultimate objective. The vision became tangible, and it seems that this was the intention from the beginning. Planning in Malaysia has such a long history (Robertson 1984) that Vision 2020 and Putrajaya reflect and augment, which is possible to explore, but I'm still left with the question of is it really possible to build the future?

The grandest project of Vision 2020 is the Multimedia Super Corridor. About the size of Singapore with an area of 50 km x 15 km, the MSC was a government initiative led by Mahathir to create a space for technological innovation and creativity (Bunnell 2004:1-10). Large government investments in the telecommunications infrastructure of the MSC's cities of Putrajaya and Cyberjaya make the area the most digitally wired place in the country (Lepawsky 2005). Located within the MSC, Putrajaya is the federal administrative centre of Malaysia (King 2008: xxii), which is no coincidence. Plans for a powerful and modern Ma-



LOCATION OF PUTRAJAYA

laysia necessitated a particular urban dominion.

Now, I should make it clear that these concepts are not particularly unique to Malaysia under Mahathir or UMNO. There have been and continue to be similar development and capital projects throughout the world. Numerous governments, organisations and institutions attempt to take ‘an authoritative grip’ on their future via planning (Robertson 1984: 1). The perspective on capital that I use with Putrajaya is not new, as there are many places which deploy capital in similar ways. In her description of Putrajaya, Sarah Moser (2010) discusses several. These include contemporary cities such as Chandigarh and Hyderabad in India and Brasília in Brazil, plus the historical headquarters of Shah Abbas in Isfahan (also spelt as Esfahan) in Safavid Persia and Akbar’s court at Fatehpur Sikri in Mughal South Asia. Washington, D.C., built in the early years of the United States of America, could also be considered. Additionally, it would also be easy to compare Putrajaya to other cities in Malaysia, namely metropolitan KL (King 2008) and the wider Johor Bahru region (Moser 2011; Rizzo and Glasson 2012).

These other cities are mentioned briefly due to space limits and because the Southeast Asian concept of the exemplary seems more apt to

consider capital. Some instances of exemplary centres include hearths (Carsten 1997), houses (Chua 2007: 274), persons’ bodies (Tsintjilonis 1999), and principal cities (Geertz 1980; Tambiah 1976). The exemplary centre is described as a ‘microcosm and embodiment of cosmological and political order’ (Chua, Cook, Long and Wilson 2012: 5), an actualisation of the divine. The centre may draw people in and encompass them, compelling a movement on its surroundings into its domains in order to extend its reach and concentrate power (Carsten 1998: 225; Chua 2007: 274). According to Clifford Geertz (1980: 4) the term *Negara* describes pre-European polities in Bali, Indonesia in addition to the capital cities in and through which leaders ruled. In contemporary Malaysia *Negara* refers to the nation, for which Ross King (2008: 99) determined that the capital city must represent the country.

Geertz’s *Negara* concept explored an archetype of exemplary and central rule. ‘The court shapes the world around it into at least a rough approximation of its own excellence’ (Geertz 1980: 13). The ruler’s capital was a model for which all subjects were governed and by which they should live. Moreover, this idea of rule gained an everyday presence through rituals and symbolic objects (Geertz 1980: 13). The



ISTANA KEHAKIMAN (PALACE OF JUSTICE)

specific organisation of the political capital was the primary concern of Stanley Tambiah's (1976) study of Buddhist and Hindu principalities in Thailand. The mandala concept portrayed the polity and the capital as an inner core with orbiting peripheral areas, proposing 'a galactic picture of a central planet surrounded by differentiated satellites, which are more or less "autonomous" entities held in orbit and within the sphere of influence of the center' (Tambiah 1976: 113). Ideally, the ruler's capital and area of direct control was in the middle, surrounded by 'a circle of provinces ruled by princes or governors appointed by the king, and these again were surrounded by more or less independent "tributary" polities' (Tambiah 1976: 112). The mandala ideal was difficult to physically implement, but nonetheless one which leaders sought to impose. The organisation of the capital resembled the cosmos and this connection makes the centre divine (Tambiah 1976).

I wish to emphasize the centre and the way in which people participate in it. Benedict Anderson (1990 [1972]: 41-43) noted that the increased size of a centre corresponded to the greater influence of the ruler. Increasing the

centre required the movement of neighbouring areas and people, and as such the centre pulled. Yet, the persons on the peripheral areas and/or in adjacent polities sought to avoid being inscribed (Carsten 1998: 218). Movement was a key feature since the centre expanded, but also because satellites engaged in disputes, switched alliances, or persons moved away (Anderson 1990 [1972]: 41-43). The centre is composed of people, and the actions of people constitute the centre. Moreover, being recognized as an exemplary and sovereign centre was the goal of earlier polities. It is at this point that the two definitions of capital that I use combine. Recognition allowed the leader to stay in power and to inscribe more people to his realm. 'Performative validity' (Tambiah 1976: 125) required an audience (Geertz 1980). However, earlier polities were on-going projects, as they were never really finished, expanding and contracting, as the amount of people increased or diminished.

Regional scholarship explains how ideals are manifested and to some extent informs aspects of Vision 2020. As Janet Carsten wrote, 'in Southeast Asia the traditional state was defined by its centre' (Carsten 1998: 217). This is still true. Development schemes draw from existing repertoires (Li 2007: 6). A 'fully developed' Malaysia requires a 'fully developed' capital. Vision 2020 imagines Malaysia's 'fully developed' future as a tangible place. Ramasamy, Chakrabarty and Cheah (2004) even described the MSC as Malaysia's leap into the future. Though I find problems with their line of enquiry in that they essentially equate the MSC, Malaysia's future, with the USA's Silicon Valley, the present, their work portrays the 'if you build it, they will come' hope of the era.


Mahathir, the architect of Vision 2020 (Ahmad 1997: xv), personally supervised the planning of Putrajaya (King 2008: 153). Though the city is named after Malaysia's first Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra (Moser 2010: 286), the city is associated with Mahathir (King 2008: 125). King inferred that the PM attempted to construct a centre in which the Prime Minister and bureaucracy would disconnect and consume the power of the Sultan and legislature along with all of Malaysia (King 2008: 153-159). Additionally, the relocation of the Office

of the Prime Minister and federal bureaucracy to Putrajaya fixed Malaysian political life to revolve around the Prime Minister. Perdana Putra, the building which houses the Office of the Prime Minister, is the focus of the grand 4.2km axis of Putrajaya (King 2008: 153; Moser 2010: 289). Thus the PM is the focus of the city. Further, axes are usually only reserved for capital cities (King 2008: 153). Perdana Putra, marked by towering domes, suggests a link between Islam, the religion associated with Malays and the Malay ethnicity. Religion was definitely considered a feature of the renaissance (Ibrahim 1996: 19). The government's quest for modernity is connected with certain Islamic practices and forms inspired by polities from the Middle East and South Asia (Moser 2011; Moser 2010; King 2008: 182). The domes on top of the political centre suggest that 'the underlying agenda is the advancement of Malaysia as a Malay-Muslim polity, a new kind of high-modernist Muslim nation' (King 2008: xxiv). Thus, urban landscape is the medium in which a specific future was envisioned and in which it will arrive.

The decision to build Putrajaya was formally approved in June 1993 (King 2008: 131) and building began in 1995 (Moser 2010: 285). I contend that the construction of projects informs why Mahathir insisted that Vision 2020 had become a reality in his 1997 speech 'Vision 2020: The Way Forward' (Mahathir 1997: 449). The vision for the 'fully developed' future assumes an urban form in Putrajaya. A vision can become a reality, but can the future be now? In that same speech, Mahathir (1997: 458) asserted that Malaysians needed to act to capture and seize the future. As imminent as it may have been perceived, the future was out of reach and impossible to completely know or grasp. In a way, Mahathir admitted such. 'We can congratulate ourselves for the progress that we have made. But we cannot lie back' (Mahathir 1997: 457). In other words, Malaysia will still be developing.

Vision 2020 has and continues to attempt to make the future become the present. Putrajaya expressed a vision of and means to achieve that future. 'Political elites typically require a national capital to represent the nation. If the Malays would equate bangsa Melayu (the Malay "race") with negara (the nation), then the

city likewise must stand as the emblem' (King 2008: 99). Mahathir intended to achieve a Malay-centred, ultra-modern realm by constructing a laudatory and spectacular city. Under his rule, 'development was thus reoriented to the interrelated production of high-tech spaces and citizens' (Bunnell 2004: 58). According to Timothy Bunnell, the former PM considered urban living 'as a potential incubator of modern Malayness' (Bunnell 2004: 44). He declared that 'those who are backward must be helped. No one must be left behind' (Mahathir 1997: 453). And herein lays the conundrum of Putrajaya as capital in both senses, a recognized valuable and a seat of government.

A 'wired' and connected space like Putrajaya furthers 'opportunities and advantages to those "tuned in" to the new order' (King 2008: 144). But the order intended to circumscribe people under the government's authority. Mahathir would be at the centre. But how does a leader get citizens to participate in and compose a 'fully developed' capital? What the government may deem as valuable may not be recognized as such by all citizens, a topic that deserves more research. Putrajaya was the government's attempt to transform for the future, however capital is still not yet. As concrete as Putrajaya may seem in that it is a constructed city, the 'fully developed' future has not been seized nor has it arrived and it may not ever. Though seeming to be close, the future's uncertain presence flows as unknown. Consider that the city physically existed by 2005 (King 2008: 158), but as of 2012 the population goals have not been reached (Putrajaya Holdings 2012). Only 72,000 out of the planned resident population of 350,000 actually lives in the city (Putrajaya Holdings website). A 'fully developed' Malaysia and its capital still 'is in the process of coming into being' (Ibrahim 1996: 129). Many things can happen but there is uncertainty of what will occur. Transformations continue. 

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TECHNOLOGY AS CULTURAL CAPITAL, PARTICULARLY IN U.S. COLLEGE ACCESS

TEXT AND PHOTOGRAPHY BY MARLENA MATTEI

INTRODUCTION

Despite efforts to make education more accessible, a college education remains difficult to obtain if one lacks the proper economic and social resources. Further, the inequality in college access between different classes has been documented¹. Throughout my time volunteering as a graduation coach at a high school in West Philadelphia, I was able to directly observe college access inequalities. I quickly became interested in the ‘digital divide’ among social classes. My research revealed that not only are there disparities in technology access and knowledge, but that these inequalities can serve as cultural capital in college access.

INTELLECTUAL BACKGROUND

In the early 1960s, the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu proposed the concept of cultural capital (the idea that nonfinancial assets can impact social mobility). He argued that cultural behaviour is influential in determining educational success (Bourdieu & Passeron 1979:14). The theory is general and flexible enough to account for any form of unequally distributed ‘competence’ that provides advantages to those who have it. Additionally, it is emphasized that these advantages arise from institutionalized standards (Bourdieu 1977a).

Moreover, Bourdieu distinguishes between three subtypes of cultural capital: objectified, embodied, and institutionalized (Bourdieu 1986:47). Objectified cultural capital consists of material items which provide advantages. In order to utilize objectified cultural capital, it is necessary to have prior skill or ‘competence.’ This knowledge is embodied cultural capital (Kapitzke 2000:51). The embodied form of cultural capital, which can be acquired both consciously and passively, requires an investment of time and energy from the learner. Further, embodied cultural capital can take on an

objective value, which could later go on to be advantageous in the labour market. This relates to the third type, institutionalized cultural capital, which occurs when an institution, such as a university or workplace, acknowledges an individual’s competencies by formally recognizing skills (Bourdieu 1986). Connected to the types of cultural capital is the concept of habitus, or a set of dispositions gained in response to objective encounters which can affect perceptions and decisions (Bourdieu 1977b).

The broad definition of cultural capital has allowed scholars to expand the concept. Accordingly, the connections between cultural capital and technology have not gone unnoted. Researchers have documented the inequalities between groups in the use of and access to information technology, which is commonly known as the ‘digital divide.’ Emmison and Frow (1998) introduced the idea of information technology being a variable in cultural capital. They argue that ‘a familiarity with, and a positive disposition towards the use of bourgeois technologies of the information age can be seen as an additional form of cultural capital bestowing advantage on those families that possess them’ (Emmison & Frow 1998: 44). Emmison and Frow discuss computers as machines, which would be classified as objectified cultural capital, while the knowledge and ability to use these machines form embodied cultural capital (Emmison and Frow 1998:42). More recently, Warschauer (2003) published the findings of global case studies regarding technology and social inclusion. By examining his findings using various theories, including cultural capital, he found that physical access is not the only factor in effectively closing the digital divide. Rather, he argues that access to and the ability to use technology is essential to social inclusion (Warschauer 2003).

A CASE STUDY

My research was conducted as participant observation supplemented by informal interviewing, which allowed for a unique perspective into the concept of technology as cultural capital. As an undergraduate studying anthropology, I was interested in secondary education in urban areas. This prompted me to volunteer with a college and career access programme at a high school in West Philadelphia. My emphasis soon became focused on the use of technology by the students and within the organization.

Each Monday for six weeks, I assisted high school seniors with various college and graduation tasks, such as college and financial aid applications. Throughout my time, I worked closely with six African American students (three girls and three boys). As a whole, the student body is mainly made up of African Americans (96.9%) and economically disadvantaged students (at least 89.3%) (School District of Philadelphia 2012). Additionally, the average test scores are below that of the School District of Philadelphia's average in both math and reading (School District of Philadelphia 2012).

Granted, six weeks is a relatively short time to fully immerse oneself and understand a certain culture and the problems associated with it. I did not get to work with the same students each week, so I could not develop a lasting relationship, which would surely have provided me with more insight. Additionally, I was working with a very specific age group in a limited environment. Thus, these findings are somewhat generalized. Nevertheless, there are clear patterns that deserve attention and possibly further study on a larger scale.

LACK OF PHYSICAL ACCESS: CREATING THE DIVIDE

The creation of the divide of technological cultural capital begins with the disparities in access to computers and other technology. Without physical access to technology, assignments and applications must be done differently and research is harder to complete. In these cases computers and other technological machines act as objectified culture, since the lack of access could make it more difficult to achieve ed-

ucational success. Further it takes a certain level of knowledge—embodied culture—to be able to operate these machines (as will be discussed later).

At home

Five of the six students that I worked with did not have computer access in their homes. The main reason that students did not have computers at home seemed to be the expense. The price of a computer, coupled with monthly internet prices, not including various other expenses, such as routers, flash drives, printers, or ink, is relatively large and does not always fit in the family budget. The lack of access proved to be a hindrance for students, as my fieldnotes show:

When we were reading the guidelines for the senior project, it said that the papers needed to be typed. He seemed annoyed and said that this is hard for him because he does not have computer access [at home]... He stated that he usually wrote a rough draft and then typed it up at school.

We continued working on his senior research paper. I taught him about finding sources and doing work cited pages. This step was very important for him since he does not have access to a computer. It was essential that we used his computer time to the best of our ability. We found one great source, but since we did not have time to take detailed notes, we had to print it out so he could do it at home.

At school

If students cannot access the internet at home, another option is accessing a computer with internet capabilities at their school. Unfortunately a large portion of the students at this high school did not feel as if there was enough technological availability. Only 52% of students agreed that the school had enough technological resources (School District of Philadelphia 2010). An unwelcoming environment for technology usage is described in my fieldnotes:

After the presentation, we left the room we were in. [The site coordinator] had to take the projector and two laptops out with her because she was leaving the door unlocked. *From the way she talked about the door being unlocked it seemed likely that theft was a consistent problem in the school...*

[She] then showed us the room that we would be working in. It was tiny, and filled with test prep

books, and there were about three laptops. This room was separated from a larger room using a cage like door which also had a lock. *I wondered why the door was so intimidating.*

Here one can see the precautions taken to protect the devices. This is understandable, as schools are facing extremely limited budgets and must take care of the resources they already have. Nevertheless, the atmosphere that is created because of this is not the most encouraging to students.

At the school library

At this high school, students could access computers in the school library. One might think this is a simple solution to the problem of access, but using these computers does not just consist of walking into the library and logging on. In fact, both of these steps are difficult at the school.

To access the computers in the library, one must first get to the library. Again, this seems like an obvious statement that is not worth mentioning. However, this task is more difficult than expected. The hallways in the school are not the most pleasant place to be. It seemed as though every time I was in the hallway, I witnessed students being yelled at. My fieldnotes show clear examples of the seemingly exhausting process of walking through the halls to get the library:

On the bottom floor, a male administrator started shouting at a student from across the hallway, because she was supposed to be in detention. *It seems like any time the students are in the hallway they are being yelled at. It is like a battleground.* She began shouting ‘no, no, no’ and then ran after the administrator.

Once in the library, there were not many incentives to stay. Rather, the opposite was true. The library had very strict policies:

I saw a small rule sheet outside of the library door. It seemed very strict, even saying that students were not allowed to leave the library to go to the lavatory. *I wondered why such a strict and seemingly harsh rule was there.*

Once one is in the library and ready to work, there are still obstacles. When working with students, we were unable to log on to and use




FIGURE 1 A photo of the sign outside of the library. The rules read, ‘No Going To The Lavatory’ and ‘No Exceptions.’

the computers, because the students did not know the password. Additionally, there were no librarians there to provide the password (I later learned the former librarian had been laid off due to budget cuts), nor were there passwords posted:

Finally, we made it into the library. Some of the computers required passwords to log on. The students did not know the passwords and there was not a librarian—or even an adult—in the entire library. I went to see if the password was posted at the front counter. It was not. *I thought it was inefficient to have computers the students couldn’t access.*

LACK OF BASIC KNOWLEDGE: DEMONSTRATING AND MAINTAINING THE DIVIDE

The lack of access to objectified cultural capital likely creates a divide in the ability to use technology, as students do not have the required experience working with the machines. During my experience, I observed a lack of many basic technological skills. This was noted in my

field notes on numerous occasions, such as the when students were unable to properly turn off computers nor able to correctly remove flash drives. The most plausible explanation for why students were not properly using the technology is that they did not have the knowledge necessary to do so.

Incidents where students seemed confused and uncomfortable while actively using computer programmes (internet browsers and word processing) and the accompanying accessories (touchpads and keyboards) were observed:

When the student asked for the phone number to the YMCA, she told him to search it on the internet. He minimized each window (mostly word documents) until he reached the 'My Computer' window. He proceeded to try to type his search into the address bar on that page. When it did not work I pointed to the Internet Explorer tab on the toolbar...

He then typed up his work on Microsoft Word. He apologized for 'being so slow typing.' I told him that he was doing fine and to take his time. This was not the only sign that he felt uncomfortable typing. When he was looking for the comma key he kept pressing the apostrophe key. After he was done copying his written proposal to Word, I looked over it. There were words underlined to signify that they were incorrect. I told him that we should fix those words. He then went in and fixed each on his own. When he arrived at a word he did not know, he asked me how to spell it. He seemed unaware of the suggestions that Word would provide. I told him that if he right-clicked on the word, the programme would show him [suggested corrections]. He began clicking, but not right clicking. I showed him the correct way to do it.

As my fieldnotes show, learning to use technology is not something that one can do instantly. Time must be invested to gain computer skills. In this way, technological knowledge and skills can be seen as embodied culture. Without this embodied culture, students have problems using resources even when they are available to them. Thus, a divide between those with and without technological cultural capital is maintained.

PREFERENCE: A POSSIBLE EXAMPLE OF HABITUS

Another pattern I observed was the students' apparent preference for using other types of re-

sources rather than technological ones:

He seemed to know very little [about his project]. I asked if he had the guidelines. He said he lost it [the guideline sheet]. I asked if it would be posted online, and he said that he did not know and that we needed to ask [the site coordinator]. *I thought to myself, we are sitting right in front of the computer. Why not just look [online] and see?...*

The group was having a competition to see who could best market TastyKakes. They were discussing various types of marketing placements for ads, such as TV, radio, and newspaper. One girl said she thought it would be useful to give out coupons. *I was surprised that no one mentioned how useful internet ads would be, given how prominent it now is in marketing.*

Additionally, students often filed for financial aid and applied to colleges using paper applications, rather than completing internet applications, which are usually more efficient and allow for quicker responses. With both my own students and other students, with whom I did not directly work, email addresses were only used if necessary and were often forgotten.

These examples demonstrate a possible preference for using other types of resources and perhaps a lack of knowledge of how useful internet sources can be, both in finding and providing information. The apparent preference for using other types of resources rather than computers and internet can be viewed as a type of habitus. One's disposition and taste are being influenced by embodied culture and helping to form a choice of preference (cf. Bourdieu 1984). It is also important to note that although many types of people view the importance of technology as obvious and undeniable, in this particular case, there did not seem to be the same consensus regarding the significance of technology. In other words, the recognition that technology information can be used as a sort of cultural capital seems to be limited to certain groups.

RESOURCES: WHEN CAPITAL MATTERS

Today technology surrounds us. To not have the access or ability to use it can be detrimental, especially concerning college preparation. Wikipedia, although not always a reliable source, is incredibly valuable for obtaining knowledge in-

formally. Websites like Khan Academy, which offer free internet courses, would be a useful supplement to a student who is having trouble in a class or one who is simply curious about a certain topic. My fieldnotes depict students who did not have knowledge of some of these important sites:

When we were discussing locating sources for his senior project, he asked me how he could find them. I recommended Google Search and Google Scholar. I explained the difference between finding a reliable and verified source.

The student did not seem to have the ability to use the internet to access scholarly articles. Not only would this skill be useful in order to graduate and pursue college, but once he is in college, research is a crucial and an unavoidable aspect of higher education. Four of the students I worked with were unfamiliar with Collegeboard. It was significant that the students I worked with had no prior knowledge of Collegeboard, as it is one of the most important college related sites in the US. It is the website where one registers for the SATs, as well as fills out some financial aid forms. More generally, it can be used to look up common college statistics, in addition to information about majors and careers.

The internet as a general source of information through the usage of search engines was also unrecognized:

The student said that she wanted to become an RN [registered nurse]...and asked what she had to do. I explained that she would be taking a lot of biology classes. She was nervous about taking math classes, so I suggested we research [online] the general classes needed to become a nurse. She seemed surprised that the information could be found this way.

In this particular case the student did not seem to realize that the answers to her questions were literally a few clicks away. Additionally, when she tried to research her question, she had trouble understanding how to use Google to find the information that she needed.

The rapid growth of technology makes it a challenge for many people to stay up-to-date with the latest websites and programmes. The main difference is that students who have nei-

ther the basic computer knowledge nor the access to a computer will have a far slimmer chance of learning how to use and take advantage of these valuable resources. This capital will then go on to become institutionalized as colleges and employers select high school students based directly and indirectly on their technological capital.

CONCLUSION

Based on my research, technology does seem to reflect many of the ideas of Bourdieu's concept of cultural capital, as the lack of physical access, basic knowledge, and usage act as cultural capital when applying to colleges. Without the ability to access and use technology, students have a disadvantage in school and accessing college and careers. This is by no means an easy problem to solve, but there are ways to help equalize this technological gap which could be explored by policy makers. For instance, schools could focus more attention on providing access to technological equipment, preparing teachers to supplement teaching using technological information, and requiring students to take a course in technology usage. ♦

NOTES

¹ For further information on this topic, see Camara & Schmidt (1999), Lareau (2003), and Mullen (2010).

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VISUAL

ANTHRO
POLOGY

Visual **ANTHROPOLOGY**

This section is aimed to discuss and represent a wide range of visual material, classified under the broad term of Visual Anthropology. The use of photography, drawing, film and new media is very versatile, and we are hoping that through this section we will be able to share some great images and discuss their purpose: documentation, illustration, exploration or formal research material.

In our Transforming Capital issue, we are showcasing two authors – Colin Campbell, a fine artist, with his project on shelters in the area of the City of Bath, and William Carrick, a 19th-century photographer of Scottish origin based in Russia, represented by Ieva Meilute-Svinkuniene. Both authors use photography to visually represent the class differences of their countries.

WILLIAM CARRICK

(1827 - 1878)

One of the first visual anthropologists of Russia

BY IEVA MEILUTĒ-SVINKŪNIENĒ



Most people today, when thinking about Russia's past, are influenced by the brilliant literary works, such as the novels by Fyodor Dostoyevsky, in which the life of 19th century Russia was described in vivid and detailed words. But there is also visual material that offers much insight into the Russian way of life at the time, as depicted in 19th century paintings, drawings and photographs. In the 1860s, series of photographs produced in Moscow and St. Petersburg portrayed members of the working class while performing daily life activities such as drinking tea, washing clothes, playing or crossing themselves, while others were photographed carrying out their professions, for example, offering goods or sharpening knives (Brawn n.d.).

The photographic legacy of William Carrick is an excellent example of such work. Carrick was born in Edinburgh in 1827, but the following year his parents decided to move to Kronstadt, Russia, where his father prospered as a timber merchant. In 1844 Carrick moved to St. Petersburg where he studied architecture at the St. Petersburg Academy. Later he travelled to Rome to pursue his interests in painting and drawing. On his return to Russia in 1857, Carrick was to discover that the family business had been virtually ruined by the Crimean War. It was in the same year that he visited Edinburgh where he met a young photographer, John MacGregor, and invited him to establish a photography studio together. In 1859 the two men set up a photo studio in the city centre of St. Petersburg at 19 Malaya Morskaya Street, a vibrant and prestigious area of the capital, near St. Isaac's Cathedral. The partnership lasted for thirteen years until MacGregor's death in 1872. Carrick continued to work by himself until he passed away in 1878 (Brawn n.d.; Waters 2010).

St Petersburg in the 1850s and 1860s was not only the seat of the monarchy and the social locus of the Empire, it was also its photographic centre. Both Russian and foreign photographers were opening their studios, resulting in a very competitive environment. Due to the higher prices of photographic materials in Russia compared to Western Europe and the absence of a substantial middle class (the prime clien-

tele of mid-19th century photographers), the businesses never proved to be a great financial success (Brawn n.d.; Medišauskienė 2011).

Nonetheless, Carrick did manage to acquire some acclaim and financial security during his lifetime, which allowed him to develop his passion for photographing ordinary people – chimney-sweepers, postmen, cab-drivers, abacus sellers, icemen, woodmen, and knife-grinders among others. Carrick asked them to pose for him in his studio and produced from the resulting photographs *Cartes-de-visite* under the title *Russian Types* or sometimes *Rasnoshchiki (Hawkers)*, which were primarily intended for the tourist market (Ralston 1870).

William Carrick very aptly captured the characters of the locals, their physiognomy and their dress. Through posing, his subjects are mimicking their own occupations. The way that people appear relaxed and look alive in these photographs suggests that the photographer cultivated good relations with his subjects. There was a worldwide trend to approach photography in the tradition of paintings and printmaking of the time and many of Carrick's photographs are stylistically reminiscent of paintings by Ilya Repin and Ivan Kramskoi from the same era (Waters 2010).

Throughout Russia, there were photographers such as J. Monstein, Alfred Lorens and H. Laurent, but also Russian artists M.B. Tulinov, A.I. Denjer and V.V. Stasov, who similarly depicted representatives of different Russian ethnicities (Rossijskaja nacional'naja biblioteka 2006). Yet, despite huge competition, William Carrick managed to win the favour of the Grand Duke Nikolai Aleksandrovich as well as that of the subjects of his photography. To this day he is nationally and internationally renowned for his ethnographic photography, a work that remains a significant document of Russian folk heritage. ◆







All photographs courtesy of the Lithuanian Art Museum

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DWELLINGS

TEXT AND PHOTOGRAPHY BY COLIN CAMPBELL

The depicted semi-permanent structures, made from natural wood and scavenged materials, are home to an increasing population of young and not-so-young men and women. These particular dwellings are situated in the River Avon Valley in North East Somerset, on private land between the river, railway line and canal. Without planning permission and consent, these dwellings are a stone's throw from the circuits of capitalist economy – the Georgian splendor and affluence of the City of Bath, a World Heritage Site. They serve as very vulnerable shelters for those with no means of support, who are often blighted by health problems, drug and alcohol dependence, and mental illness.











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